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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 7, 2023, Vol. 27, No. 126

                            Headlines

AJAX 2022-A: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class M-3 Debt
AMERICAN CREDIT 2023-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
ANCHORAGE CREDIT 6: Moody's Ups Rating on $30MM Cl. E Notes to Ba1
APRES STATIC 1: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class E-R Notes
AREIT 2019-CRE3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Certs

BBCMS MORTGAGE 2023-C19: Fitch Gives B-sf Rating on Cl. H-RR Certs
BDS 2020-FL5: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class G Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-1 Debt to Csf
CAMB COMMERCIAL 2019-LIFE: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G Certs
CFK TRUST 2019-FAX: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class E Certs

CFMT 2023-HB12: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class M6 Notes
COLLEGE AVE 2017-A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Transaction
COLT 2023-1: Fitch Gives Bsf Rating on Cl. B2 Certs, Outlook Stable
COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Csf
CONNECTICUT AVE 2023-R03: Moody's Gives Ba1 Rating to 26 Tranches

CSAIL 2016-C5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
DBUBS 2017-BRBK: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
DIAMOND CLO 2019-1: S&P Affirms BB (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
DT AUTO 2023-2: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa3

GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
INDEPENDENCE PLAZA 2018-INDP: DBRS Confirms B Rating on HRR Certs
JP MORGAN 2012-LC9: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. F Certs to Caa3
JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
JP MORGAN 2023-3: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs

JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C26: DBRS Cut Rating on Cl. E Certs to B(low)
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C25: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on F Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C31: DBRS Cuts X-D Certs Rating to B(low)
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 3 Classes
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2016-JP2: DBRS Cuts Class F Certs Rating to CCC

LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-3: S&P Affirms CC(sf) Rating on Class B Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-150E: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C19: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class E Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Fitch Cuts Rating on B Notes to Dsf
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2017-75B: DBRS Confirms B(high) on 3 Tranches
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-ALXA: DBRS Confirms BB(high) on E Certs
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2020-2PAC: DBRS Confirms B(low) on 2 Classes
NRPL 2023-RPL1: DBRS Gives B Rating on Class B-2 Notes

OBX TRUST 2023-INV1: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes
OBX TRUST 2023-NQM3: Fitch Gives Bsf Rating on B-2 Notes
OCTAGON LTD 16: Fitch Gives B- Rating on F Notes, Outlook Stable
OHA CREDIT 15: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
POST ROAD 2021-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes

READY CAPITAL 2022-FL9: DBRS Puts Class G Notes Under Review Neg.
RFMSII HOME 2005-HS2: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-I-3 Debt Rating to Caa1
RLGH TRUST 2021-TROT: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
SLC STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on A-4 Notes
SLM STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Lowers Rating on Two Tranches to Dsf

SYMPHONY CLO 30: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Debt
SYMPHONY CLO 30: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $100,000 Cl. F Notes
TPR FUNDING 2022-1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on E Advances
TRINITAS CLO XXII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating in E Notes
TRTX 2019-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class G Notes

US AUTO 2021-1: Moody's Puts 'B3' Rating on D Notes on Review
VERUS SECURITIZATION 2023-3: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on B-2 Notes
WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Certs to B2
WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS2: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class F Certs

WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Confirms C Rating on Class G Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS5: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to C
WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class G Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Cuts Cl. C Certs Rating to Ba2
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 128 Classes From 20 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 36 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 55 Classes From Eight US RMBS Deal

                            *********

AJAX 2022-A: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class M-3 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed six classes from AJAX 2022-A, a U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction. This
transaction consists a portfolio of seasoned performing,
reperforming, and nonperforming first-lien residential mortgages.
Of the six classes reviewed, DBRS Morningstar confirmed all the
ratings.

  Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2022-A,

    Class A-1  AAA (sf)  Confirmed
    Class A-2  AA (sf)   Confirmed
    Class A-3  A (sf)    Confirmed
    Class M-1  BBB (sf)  Confirmed
    Class M-2  BB (sf)   Confirmed
    Class M-3  B (sf)    Confirmed

The rating confirmations reflect asset performance and
credit-support levels that are consistent with the current
ratings.

The ratings assigned to the securities listed below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar
considers these differences material deviations; however, in these
cases, the ratings on the subject securities may reflect additional
seasoning being warranted to substantiate a further upgrade.

-- Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2022-A, Mortgage-Backed Securities,
Series 2022-A, Class M-1

-- Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2022-A, Mortgage-Backed Securities,
Series 2022-A, Class M-2

-- Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2022-A, Mortgage-Backed Securities,
Series 2022-A, Class M-3


AMERICAN CREDIT 2023-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to American Credit
Acceptance Receivables Trust 2023-2's automobile receivables-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 64.7%, 58.2%, 47.5%, 38.1%,
and 33.3% credit support (hard credit enhancement and haircut to
excess spread) for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively,
based on final post-pricing stressed cash flow scenarios. These
credit support levels provide at least 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.37x,
and 1.20x coverage of our expected cumulative net loss of 27.25%
for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.37x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, its 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' ratings on
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, are within our
credit stability limits.

-- The timely payment of interest and principal by the designated
legal final maturity dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling
scenarios, which it believes are appropriate for the assigned
ratings.

-- The collateral characteristics of the series' subprime
automobile loans, S&P's view of the credit risk of the collateral,
and its updated macroeconomic forecast and forward-looking view of
the auto finance sector.

-- The series' bank accounts at Wells Fargo Bank N.A., which do
not constrain the ratings.

-- S&P's operational risk assessment of American Credit Acceptance
LLC as servicer, and our view of the company's underwriting and the
backup servicing arrangement with Computershare Trust Co. N.A.

-- S&P's assessment of the transaction's potential exposure to
environmental, social, and governance credit factors, which are in
line with its sector benchmark.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  Ratings Assigned

  American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2023-2

  Class A, $148.40 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $33.60 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $61.40 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $54.99 million: BBB (sf)
  Class E, $36.40 million: BB- (sf)



ANCHORAGE CREDIT 6: Moody's Ups Rating on $30MM Cl. E Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Anchorage Credit Funding 6, Ltd.:

US$69,500,000 Class B-R2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2036
(the "Class B-R2 Notes"), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
November 5, 2021 Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class C-R2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2036 (the "Class C-R2 Notes"), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on November 5, 2021 Assigned A3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D-R2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2036 (the "Class D-R2 Notes"), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on November 5, 2021 Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2036 (the "Class E Notes"), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
October 29, 2020 Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Anchorage Credit Funding 6, Ltd., originally issued in June 2018
and partially refinanced in October 2020 and November 2021 is a
managed cashflow CDO. The notes are collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of corporate loans and bonds. The transaction's
reinvestment period will end in July 2023.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2023. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period which limit the ability of the manager to
effect significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will be maintained. Additionally, Moody's
noted that the deal currently benefits from interest income on
portfolio assets that significantly exceeds the fixed rate of
interest payable on the rated notes, due to the deal's exposure to
approximately 39% in floating-rate loans.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
spread, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $503,515,023

Defaulted par:  $4,298,000

Diversity Score: 61

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3300

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for reference rate
floors): 4.54%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.83%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 34.9%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.95 years

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's ran additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. The
additional scenarios consider one or more factors individually or
in combination, and include: defaults by obligors whose low ratings
or debt prices suggest distress, defaults by obligors with
potential refinancing risk, deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio, decrease in overall WAS or net interest
income, and lower recoveries on defaulted assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.


APRES STATIC 1: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the class B-R notes of Apres Static CLO
1, Ltd. (Apres 1) and affirmed the ratings on the class A-1-R,
A-2-R, C-R, D-R and E-R notes of Apres 1 and the class D-1 and D-2
notes of Elevation CLO 2022-16, Ltd. (Elevation 2022-16). The
Rating Outlooks on all rated tranches are Stable.

   Entity/Debt           Rating            Prior
   -----------           ------            -----
Apres Static
CLO 1, Ltd.

   A-1-R 03835JBA0   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-2-R 03835JBC6   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B-R 03835JBE2     LT AAAsf  Upgrade     AA+sf
   C-R 03835JBG7     LT A+sf   Affirmed    A+sf
   D-R 03835KAL4     LT BBB+sf Affirmed    BBB+sf
   E-R 03835KAN0     LT BB+sf  Affirmed    BB+sf

Elevation CLO
2022-16, Ltd.

   D-1 28623YAJ2     LT BBB+sf Affirmed   BBB+sf
   D-2 28623YAN3     LT BBB-sf Affirmed   BBB-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Apres 1 and Elevation 2022-16 are broadly syndicated collateralized
loan obligations (CLOs) serviced and managed by ArrowMark Colorado
Holdings, LLC. Apres 1 is a static CLO that closed in April 2019
and reset in October 2020. Elevation 2022-16 closed in June 2022
and will exit its reinvestment period in July 2026. Both CLOs are
secured primarily by first-lien, senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality, Asset Security, Portfolio Management and
Portfolio Composition

The upgrade of the class B-R notes in Apres 1 is driven by
increased credit enhancement, which stemmed from paydowns of 25.1%
of the class A-1-R notes' original note balance since the last
review in June 2022, contributing to a total paydown of 82.1% of
the original note balance since closing.

Both CLO portfolios exhibited stable performance since their last
rating actions. Since its last review, the credit quality of Apres
1's portfolio as of April 2023 reporting remained in the 'B'/'B-'
rating level, with Fitch's weighted average rating factor (WARF)
increasing to 26.6 from 24.7. The credit quality of Elevation
2022-16's portfolio as of March 2023 reporting remained at the 'B'
rating level, with Fitch WARF increasing to 24.3 from 24.0 at
closing.

Exposure to issuers with a Negative Outlook and Fitch's watchlist
is 22.4% and 14.0%, respectively, for Apres 1, and 14.1% and 3.0%,
respectively, for Elevation 2022-16. Apres 1's portfolio consists
of 103 obligors, and the largest 10 obligors represent 20.8% of the
portfolio (excluding cash). Defaulted obligors account for 1.3% of
Apres 1's portfolio. Elevation 2022-16 has 283 obligors, with the
largest 10 obligors comprising 7.4% of the portfolio (excluding
cash).

Senior secured loans comprise an average of 98.5% of the portfolios
(excluding cash). The Fitch weighted average recovery rate (WARR)
for Apres 1 decreased slightly to 77.3% from 77.4% at last review,
and 75.0% from 75.1% at closing for Elevation CLO 2022-16.

All coverage tests, collateral quality tests (CQTs), and
concentration limitations are in compliance for both transactions.

Cash Flow Analysis

For Apres 1, which is a static portfolio, Fitch conducted an
updated cash flow analysis based on a stressed portfolio that
incorporated a one-notch downgrade on the Fitch Issuer Default
Rating Equivalency Rating for assets with a Negative Outlook on the
driving rating of the obligor. In addition, Fitch extended the
current weighted average life (WAL) of the portfolio to the current
maximum covenant of 3.5 years to consider the issuer's ability to
consent to maturity amendments.

For Elevation 2022-16, Fitch's analysis was based on a newly run
Fitch Stressed Portfolio (FSP) since the transaction is still in
its reinvestment period. The FSP analysis stressed the current
portfolio from the latest trustee report to account for permissible
concentration and CQT limits. The FSP analysis assumed a weighted
average life of 7.5 years. The portfolio's weighted average spread
was stressed to the covenant minimum level of 3.55%. Other FSP
assumptions include 10.0% non-senior secured assets, 3.5% fixed
rate assets and 7.5% 'CCC' assets.

The rating actions for all classes of notes in Apres 1 and
Elevation 2022-16 are in line with their model-implied ratings
(MIRs), as defined in the CLOs and Corporate CDOs Rating Criteria.

The Stable Outlooks on all the rated notes, which also revises the
Outlooks on class B-R, C-R, D-R and E-R notes in Apres 1 from
Positive, reflect Fitch's expectation that the notes have
sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolios in stress
scenarios commensurate with each class' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Downgrades may occur if realized and projected losses of the
portfolio are higher than what was assumed at closing and the
notes' credit enhancement do not compensate for the higher loss
expectation than initially assumed.

A 25% increase of the mean default rate across all ratings, along
with a 25% decrease of the recovery rate at all rating levels for
the current portfolio, would lead to no rating impact for the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, and C-R notes in Apres 1, a one notch downgrade
for the class D-2 notes in Elevation 2022-16, and a three notch
downgrade for the class D-R and E-R notes in Apres 1 and the class
D-1 notes in Elevation 2022-16, based on MIRs.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Except for the tranches already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating,
upgrades may occur in the event of better-than-expected portfolio
credit quality and transaction performance.

A 25% reduction of the mean default rate across all ratings, along
with a 25% increase of the recovery rate at all rating levels for
the current portfolio, would lead to a five-notch upgrade for the
class E-R notes in Apres 1 and the class D-2 notes in Elevation
2022-16 and a three notch upgrade for the class D-R notes in Apres
1 and the class D-1 notes in Elevation 2022-16, based on MIRs.
There would be no rating impact for the other remaining classes in
Apres 1.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


AREIT 2019-CRE3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-CRE3 issued by
AREIT 2019-CRE3 Trust as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the increased credit support to
the bonds as a result of successful loan repayment, as there has
been collateral reduction of 52.2% since issuance. The increased
credit support to the bonds serves as a mitigant to potential
adverse selection in the transaction as four loans are secured by
office properties (56.7% of the current pool balance). As a result
of complications initially arising from impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the ongoing challenges with leasing
available space, the borrowers of these loans have generally been
unable to increase occupancy and rental rates, resulting in lower
than expected cash flows. While all loans remain current, given the
decline in desirability for office product across tenants,
investors, and lenders alike, there is greater uncertainty
regarding the borrowers' exit strategies upon loan maturity. In
conjunction with this press release, DBRS Morningstar has published
a Surveillance Performance Update report with in-depth analysis and
credit metrics for the transaction and with business plan updates
on select loans. For access to this report, please click on the
link under Related Documents below or contact us at
info@dbrsmorningstar.com.

As of the March 2023 remittance, the trust reported an outstanding
balance of $343.0 million with 10 of the original 30 loans
remaining in the trust. Since the previous DBRS Morningstar rating
action in November 2022, there has been collateral reduction of
$36.7 million, including the full repayment of one loan. The
remaining loans in the transaction beyond the office concentration
noted above include five loans secured by hotel properties (38.4%
of the current trust balance) and one loan secured by a retail
property (4.9% of the current pool balance). Unlike office
collateral, the borrowers of the hotel loans generally reported
performance improvement throughout 2022. The property type
concentration of the transaction has remained relatively stable
since June 2022 when 55.3% of the trust balance was secured by
office collateral, and 33.6% of the trust balance was secured by
hotel collateral.

Nine of the 10 loans, representing 96.4% of the current trust
balance, have scheduled maturity dates in 2023. Of these loans,
eight are structured with additional extension options of six or 12
months, which the borrower may exercise if its respective property
meets the required performance-based minimum debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), minimum debt yield and/or maximum loan to value ratio
(LTV) tests. The loan that no longer has an extension option
remaining, the Graduate Hotel State College (Prospectus ID#17; 6.8%
of the current pool balance), is secured by a hotel in State
College, Pennsylvania. According to the trailing 12 months ended
January 31, 2023, STR report, the property appears to be
approaching stabilization as occupancy, average daily rate (ADR)
and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were reported at 69.0%,
$178.34, and $122.99, respectively, with both ADR and RevPAR
achieving penetration rates above 100.0% when compared with the
property's competitive set. According to the servicer, the sponsor
is actively seeking refinance capital ahead of the November 2023
maturity date with a new loan potentially collateralized by the
subject and additional hotel properties carrying the same flag. The
one loan that does not mature in 2023 is secured by a
limited-service hotel property in Pensacola, Florida, and was
recently extended to its final maturity date in February 2024 after
the borrower exercised its extension option as the property
achieved the minimum 1.45 times (x) DSCR, minimum 11.75% debt
yield, and maximum 70.0% LTV tests.

The remaining loans are primarily secured by properties in urban
and suburban markets. Six loans representing 75.2% of the pool are
secured by properties in urban markets as defined by DBRS
Morningstar with a DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks of 6, 7, or 8, and
three loans representing 18.0% of the pool are secured by
properties with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 3, which denotes
a light suburban market. In comparison with the pool composition in
June 2022, properties in urban markets represented 69.8% of the
collateral, and properties in suburban markets represented 24.1% of
the collateral. The location of the assets within urban markets
potentially serves as a mitigant to loan maturity risk, as urban
markets have historically shown greater liquidity and investor
demand.

All properties received updated appraisals in Q2 2022. Based on
these updated property valuations, the current weighted-average
(WA) as-is LTV and stabilized LTV ratios for the transaction are
68.4% and 62.3%, respectively. In comparison with the transaction
as of June 2022, these figures were 68.7% and 60.2%, respectively.

In total, the lender has advanced $28.8 million in loan future
funding to six of the remaining individual borrowers to aid in
property stabilization efforts, with the largest advances made to
the borrowers of the Graduate Hotel State College ($8.1 million)
and 600 Chestnut Street ($6.4 million) loans. The borrow of the
Graduate Hotel State College loan used the advanced funds to cover
debt service payment shortfalls. The 600 Chestnut Street loan is
secured by an office property in Philadelphia, with the advanced
funds used to pay for capital improvement and leasing costs. There
are no longer any available loan future funding dollars available
to any of the remaining borrowers.

No loans are in special servicing; however, nine of the remaining
10 loans, representing 90.1% of the current trust balance, are on
the servicer's watchlist. The loans are generally on the servicer's
watchlist for upcoming maturity, although select loans have also
been flagged for performance issues, such as depressed occupancy
rates and DSCRs. Additionally, seven of the remaining loans,
representing 59.2% of the current trust balance, have either been
modified, or the borrowers have received a forbearance since loan
origination. Loan modifications and forbearances were the preferred
resolution strategy at the onset of the pandemic when commercial
property operations were stressed as well as at loan maturity, as
the required performance-based tests to extend loans were often
waived.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, 110 Tower (Prospectus
ID#1; 26.2% of the current trust balance), is secured by an office
property in downtown Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The loan was flagged
for upcoming maturity; however, the borrower exercised the first of
two, 12-month loan extension options in August 2022, extending loan
maturity to August 2023 as property operations successfully met the
performance-based extension tests. A March 2023 update from the
servicer, noted it expects the borrower to also exercise the second
extension option, potentially extending the loan to a final
maturity date of August 2024.

The single loan not on the servicer's watchlist, Gulf Tower
(Prospectus ID#7; 10.1% of the current pool balance), is secured by
an office property in downtown Pittsburgh. The loan has been
modified twice with the second modification occurring in January
2023, with terms including a 1.0% reduction in the floating
interest rate spread to 1.95%, the suspension of amortizing loan
payments and collection of monthly leasing and capital improvement
reserves, and $0.1 million in cash held in reserve was released to
pay outstanding invoices. The loan matures in June 2023, and
according to a March 2023 update from the servicer, the loan may be
modified again to provide the borrower a short-term extension to
facilitate its exit strategy, which is likely to be a property
sale. The property was re-appraised in June 2022 at a value of
$47.0 million, relatively similar to the 2019 value of $46.3
million and indicative of a current LTV ratio of 74.0%. DBRS
Morningstar expects the loan to remain current to loan maturity;
however, the loan exhibits increased credit risk, and it is
possible the June 2022 appraised value is inflated based on the
YE2022 cash flow of $2.0 million and the prevailing capitalization
rates for non-stabilized office properties.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BBCMS MORTGAGE 2023-C19: Fitch Gives B-sf Rating on Cl. H-RR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Rating Outlooks to
BBCMS Mortgage Trust 2023-C19, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2023-C19 as follows:

- $5,251,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $120,000,000a class A-2A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $176,000,000a class A-2B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $287,500,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $5,800,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $594,551,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $141,144,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $100,861,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $39,283,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $33,974,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $10,617,000cd class D-RR 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $8,494,000cd class E-RR 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

- $8,494,000cd class F-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $14,863,000cd class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

- $9,556,000cd class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not rated by Fitch:

- $28,665,938cd class J-RR.

a) Since Fitch published its expected ratings on April 5, 2023, the
balances for classes A-2A and A-2B were finalized. At the time the
expected ratings were published, the initial certificate balances
of classes A-2A and A-2B were expected to be $296,000,000 in the
aggregate, subject to a 5% variance. The classes above reflect the
final ratings and deal structure.

b) Notional amount and IO;

c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A;

d) Horizontal risk retention interest.

   Entity/Debt      Rating                   Prior
   -----------      ------                   -----
BBCMS 2023-C19

   A-1          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2A         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2B         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-S          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-SB         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   B            LT AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
   C            LT A-sf   New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
   D-RR         LT BBB+sf New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
   E-RR         LT BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
   F-RR         LT BBB-sf New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
   G-RR         LT BB-sf  New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
   H-RR         LT B-sf   New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
   J-RR         LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   X-A          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   X-B          LT AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 36 loans secured by 109
commercial properties with an aggregate principal balance of
$849,358,939 as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc., Societe Generale
Financial Corporation, Argentic Real Estate Finance LLC, Argentic
Real Estate Finance 2 LLC, German American Capital Corporation,
Bank of Montreal, LMF Commercial LLC, Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC
and KeyBank National Association. The master servicer is expected
to be KeyBank National Association, and the special servicer is
expected to be K-Star Asset Management LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Leverage Compared to Recent Transactions. The pool has lower
leverage compared to recent multiborrower transactions rated by
Fitch. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 88.5% is lower
than both the YTD 2023 and 2022 averages of 94.1% and 99.3%,
respectively. The pool's Fitch net cash flow (NCF) debt yield (DY)
of 10.6 % is higher than the YTD 2023 and 2022 averages of 10.3%
and 9.9%, respectively. Excluding credit opinion loans, the pool's
Fitch LTV and DY are 96.5% and 10.0%, respectively, compared to the
equivalent conduit YTD 2023 LTV and DY averages of 95.2% and 10.1%,
respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans representing
27.2% of the pool received an investment-grade credit opinion.
Scottsdale Fashion Square (7.7% of the pool) received a standalone
credit opinion of 'AAsf', Pacific Design Center (7.7%) received a
standalone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf', South Lake at Dulles (4.7%)
received a standalone credit opinion of 'A-sf', Brandywine
Strategic Office Portfolio (4.6%) received a standalone credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf', and Oak Street NLP Fund Portfolio (2.6%)
received a standalone credit opinion of 'A-sf'. The pool's total
credit opinion percentage of 27.2% is above the 2023 YTD and 2022
averages of 15.8% and 14.4%, respectively.

Below-Average Amortization: Based on the scheduled balances at
maturity, the pool will pay down by 1.4%, which is below the YTD
2023 average of 2.6% and below the 2022 average of 3.3%. The pool
has 27 IO loans (85.8 of pool by balance), which is higher than the
2023 YTD average of 71.0% and 2022 average of 77.5%. Three loans
(3.7% of pool by balance) are partial IO, which is below the below
the 2023 YTD and 2022 averages of 12.4% and 10.2%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Reduction in cash flow decreases property value and capacity to
meet its debt service obligations.

The table below indicates the model implied rating sensitivity to
changes to the same one variable, Fitch NCF:

- Original Rating:
'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'A-sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BBBsf'/'BBB-sf'/'BB-sf'/'B-sf';

- 10% NCF Decline:
'AAsf'/'Asf'/'BBB-sf'/'BB+sf'/'BB+sf'/'BBsf'/'B-sf'/'CCCsf'.

Fitch has revised its global economic outlook forecasts as a result
of the war in Ukraine and related economic sanctions. Downside
risks have increased and, therefore, Fitch has published an
assessment of the potential rating and asset performance impact of
a plausible, albeit worse than expected, adverse stagflation
scenario on Fitch's major structured finance and covered bond
subsectors (What a Stagflation Scenario Would Mean for Global
Structured Finance).

Fitch expects the North American CMBS sector in the assumed adverse
scenario to experience virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. Fitch expects the
asset performance impact of the adverse case scenario to be more
modest than the most stressful scenario shown above, which assumes
a further 30% decline from Fitch's NCF at issuance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Similarly, improvement in cash flow increases property value and
capacity to meet its debt service obligations.

The list below indicates the model implied rating sensitivity to
changes in one variable, Fitch NCF:

- Original Rating:
'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'A-sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BBBsf'/'BBB-sf'/'BB-sf'/'B-sf';

- 10% NCF Increase:
'AAAsf'/'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'Asf'/'A-sf'/'BBBsf'/'BBsf'/'B+sf'.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BDS 2020-FL5: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on all classes of notes issued
by BDS 2020-FL5 Ltd. as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at A (sf)
-- Class E Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the increased credit support to
the bonds as a result of successful loan repayment, as there has
been collateral reduction of 38.3% since issuance. The increased
credit support to the bonds serves as a mitigant to potential
adverse selection in the transaction as six loans are secured by
office properties (48.5% of the current trust balance). As a result
of complications initially arising from impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the ongoing challenges with leasing
available space, the borrowers of these loans have generally been
unable to increase occupancy and rental rates to initially
projected levels, resulting in lower-than-expected cash flows.
While all loans remain current, given the decline in desirability
for office product across tenants, investors, and lenders alike,
there is greater uncertainty regarding the borrowers' exit
strategies upon loan maturity. In conjunction with this press
release, DBRS Morningstar has published a Surveillance Performance
Update rating report with in-depth analysis and credit metrics for
the transaction and business plan updates on select loans.

According to the March 2023 remittance report, there are 14
mortgages secured by 13 properties remaining in the pool with a
total trust balance of $339.4 million. At issuance, the trust
consisted of 24 loans secured by transitional real estate
properties with a cut-off pool balance of $492.2 million. The trust
featured a two-year reinvestment period that expired with the
February 2022 payment date. Since issuance, 27 loans have repaid
from the pool (including three loans since the previous DBRS
Morningstar rating action in November 2022), which had a former
cumulative trust balance of $35.3 million. Seven of the outstanding
loans, representing 52.4% of the current trust balance, have
maturity dates throughout 2023; however, all loans have remaining
extension options. While required performance tests may not be met
across all collateral properties, borrowers and lenders may agree
to terms to allow loan maturity dates to be extended. Terms may
include fresh equity contributions from borrowers to pay down loan
balances, fund operating and debt service reserves, and purchase
new interest rate cap agreements.

The remaining loans in the transaction beyond the office
concentration noted above include five loans secured by multifamily
properties (34.7% of the current trust balance), two loans secured
by the same hotel property (8.8% of the current trust balance), and
one loan secured by a student housing property (8.0% of the current
trust balance). The transaction's property type concentration has
remained relatively stable since August 2022, when loans secured by
multifamily properties represented 40.9% of the pool and loans
secured by office properties represented 44.0% of the pool.

The loans are primarily secured by properties in suburban markets
with nine loans, representing 73.9% of the current trust balance,
in locations with DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks of 3, 4, and 5. The
remaining four loans, representing 26.1% of the pool, are secured
by properties in urban locations with DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks
of 6 and 7. In comparison with the pool composition in August 2022,
loans comprising 75.6% of the pool were in suburban markets and
22.9% were in urban markets. In terms of leverage, the pool has a
current weighted-average (WA) appraised loan-to-value ratio (LTV)
of 67.8% and a WA stabilized LTV ratio of 65.8%. By comparison,
these figures were 70.1% and 65.8%, respectively, as of August
2022.

Through February 2023, the collateral manager had advanced $27.3
million in loan future funding to seven individual borrowers to aid
in property stabilization efforts. The largest advance, $18.6
million, was made to the borrower of the Northridge I and II loan,
which is secured by two suburban office buildings in Herndon,
Virginia. The borrower's business plan is to complete a capital
improvement program with upgrades to the lobbies, food service,
conference rooms, fitness centers, tenant collaboration spaces, and
various exterior upgrades with a subsequent lease-up of the
property. An additional $29.3 million of loan future funding,
allocated to five borrowers, remains outstanding. Of this amount,
$13.2 million is allocated to the borrower of the Morris Corporate
Center I and II loan, and $7.5 million is allocated to the borrower
of the 77 Corporate Drive loan for further capital improvement and
prospective leasing costs.

There are no loans in special servicing, and two loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 14.7% of the current trust
balance. Both loans are secured by office properties and are being
monitored for pending loan maturities; however, according to the
collateral manager, the borrowers for both are in negotiation to
execute loan extension options. The Briarwood Office loan (7.8% of
the current trust balance) is secured by a four-building office
property in Englewood, Colorado. The loan matured in March 2023 and
the borrower had not paid debt service since December 2022.
According to servicer commentary, the borrower is expected bring
the loan current in order to commence extension negotiations. The
property was 80.0% occupied as of February 2023; however, YE2022
cash flow was depressed as two large tenant leases commenced in
2022. While a loan extension is expected to be finalized, it is
unclear if the lender will require the borrower to contribute
additional cash equity into the transaction.

The 77 Corporate Drive loan (6.9% of the current pool balance) is
secured by an office property in Bridgewater, New Jersey. The loan
matures in May 2023 after the borrower received a six-month
maturity extension in November 2022 to allow additional time to
sell the property. The property remains 58.9% occupied by one
tenant and, according to the collateral manager, the borrower is
pursuing a letter of intent from a prospective tenant, which, if
executed, would increase the occupancy rate to a stabilized level.
The loan is structured with an additional six-month extension
option followed by a 12-month extension option. Given the potential
pending lease, DBRS Morningstar expects the second six-month
extension option to be executed although it is unknown if the
lender will require the borrower to contribute additional cash
equity. If the potential lease is executed, there is $3.5 million
of available loan future funding to finance tenant build-out and
leasing costs.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-1 Debt to Csf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the rating on one class, and downgraded the rating on one
class in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2004-PWR6 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2022 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2022 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2022 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2022 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Cl. L and Cl. M, were upgraded
primarily due to defeasance as well as an increase in credit
support due to paydowns from loans amortization. Cl. L was upgraded
because the class is fully covered by defeasance, has already paid
down 98% from its original balance, and is expected to fully payoff
in the next month. While Cl. M is also fully covered by defeasance,
the class was previously impacted by interest shortfalls for
several months throughout the certificate's history. The remaining
loans (including defeasance) are all fully amortizing and mature
between October and November 2024

The rating on Cl. N was affirmed because it has already experienced
a 24% realized loss from previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the interest-only (IO) class, Cl. X-1, was downgraded
due to the decline in the credit quality of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
class.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment.  However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is 1.3% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at Moody's last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION:

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except the
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 11, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.2% to $8.5
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans. Two loans, constituting
66.1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities. The remaining loans are all fully amortizing and mature
by November 2024.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $14.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

The three remaining non-defeased loans represent 33.9% of the pool
balance. The largest non-defeased loan is the Castle Rock Portfolio
Loan ($1.3 million – 15.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of six industrial properties and two parcels of land
located in Arizona (1) and Colorado (7). The portfolio is 100%
leased to Karcher North America, Inc. through June 2024, which is
five months prior to the loan maturity date in November 2024. The
loan fully amortizes over its loan term and has paid down 86% since
securitization.

The second largest loan is the Wolverine Brass Loan ($0.9 million
– 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by two industrial
properties located in Concordville, Pennsylvania and Oceanside,
California. The properties are 100% leased to Plumbmaster, Inc.
through January 2024, which is 10 months prior to the loan maturity
date in November 2024. The loan fully amortizes over its loan term
and has already paid down 86% since securitization. The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to the annual inspection issue
at one of the properties.

The third largest loan is the Covington Walgreens Center Loan ($0.6
million – 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
property located in Covington, Washington, approximately 26 miles
SE of Seattle. The largest tenant, Walgreens, accounts for 82% of
NRA with a lease expiration in February 2029, which over four years
beyond the loan maturity date in November 2024. The loan fully
amortizes over its loan term and has already paid down 87% since
securitization.


CAMB COMMERCIAL 2019-LIFE: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-LIFE issued by CAMB
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-LIFE as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect DBRS Morningstar's ongoing
expectations for the underlying portfolio, which has reported
year-over-year cash flow growth from issuance. The $1.17 billion
trust mortgage loan is secured by the sponsor's leasehold interest
in eight life sciences office and laboratory buildings, totaling
approximately 1.3 million square feet in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The senior mortgage loan had an initial two-year term with five
one-year extension options, resulting in a fully extended maturity
date of December 9, 2025. The floating-rate loan pays interest only
(IO) throughout the term. Additionally, the capital stack includes
mezzanine debt of $130.0 million subordinate to and held outside of
the trust. Loan proceeds, along with $448.7 million of borrower
cash equity, facilitated the acquisition of the portfolio
properties by the sponsorship group, Brookfield Asset Management.

All eight properties are on the campus of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology within the Cambridge submarket, which has
limited available land for development and high barriers to entry.
Cambridge has the largest concentration of life sciences
researchers in the U.S. and strong historical occupancy driven by
the high demand for specialized laboratory space by institutional
tenants. As of YE2022, the properties were 100% occupied; this
figure is in line with historical performance as the portfolio has
reported an average physical occupancy rate near 98% since 2008.
The December 2022 rent roll shows that the tenant roster in place
at issuance remains relatively intact with no significant near-term
lease rollover.

The portfolio benefits from a high concentration of
institutional-quality tenants, with the overwhelming majority of
the tenants being public companies and/or major research
institutions. As of the December 2022 rent roll, the largest tenant
was Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. with 31.73% of the net
rentable area (NRA), while Takeda Vaccines, Inc. occupies 5.98% of
the NRA. Other major tenants include Agios Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(15.34% of the NRA), Blueprint Medicines Corporation (12.55% of the
NRA), and Brigham & Women's Hospital Inc. (9.3% of the NRA). Most
of the in-place tenants have invested a considerable amount of
their own capital into their space build-outs, demonstrating their
commitment to the property.

As of September 2022, the servicer reported annualized net cash
flow (NCF) of $124.9 million, which represents an increase of 5.4%
from the YE2021 NCF of $118.6 million, a 42.2% increase from the
YE2020 cash flow of $87.8 million, and an increase of 40.6% from
the DBRS Morningstar NCF figure of $88.8 million derived when
ratings were assigned in July 2020. The improvement is primarily
driven by increases to base rent and parking income. According to
the December 2022 rent roll, the average rental rate was $92.29 per
square foot, up from $84.66 as of December 2021, and below the
market when compared with CB Richard Ellis's Q4 2022 Boston Metro
Lab figures, which reported an asking rental rate in the Cambridge
submarket of $115.96 with a 2.1% vacancy rate and a sublease rate
of 3.9%.

Improvements in cash flow are somewhat tempered by interest rate
volatility combined with the loan's near-term maturity. The loan is
currently scheduled to mature in December 2023, with two one-year
extension options remaining. There was an interest rate cap
agreement in place at issuance that ran through December 15, 2020,
which is required to be extended in conjunction with maturity date
extension options being exercised. Given the current interest rate
environment, DBRS Morningstar has inquired about whether the
borrower purchased a replacement interest rate cap or negotiated
alternative hedging.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFK TRUST 2019-FAX: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-FAX issued by CFK Trust
2019-FAX as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations.

The loan is secured by the Fairfax Multifamily Portfolio, which
consists of three Class B+ multifamily properties totaling 870
units, in Fairfax and Herndon, Virginia. The portfolio benefits
from major highway access, including Interstates 66 and 495, and
public transportation, offering access to Washington, D.C., and
throughout Virginia. The previous owner invested more than $22.8
million in capital improvements and renovated 248 of the 870 units
in the portfolio. The loan is sponsored by Tomas Rosenthal, the
chief executive officer of Hampshire Properties Ltd., a New
York-based privately held real estate investment firm specializing
in value-add opportunities. At acquisition, the sponsor budgeted an
additional $11.0 million, or $12,800 per unit, for future
renovations and upgrades, suggesting potential upside in rental
revenues.

The $82 million trust loan consists of two senior notes and two
junior notes. In addition to the trust loan, five senior notes
comprise a $70 million non-trust pari passu companion loan, a $25
million senior mezzanine loan, and a $20 million junior mezzanine
loan, which are held outside the trust. The loan is interest only
(IO) throughout its 10-year loan term and matures in January 2029.

According to the September 2022 rent roll, the weighted-average
portfolio occupancy was 95.6%, relatively in line with prior years.
The three properties, Ellipse at Fairfax Corner, Windsor at Fair
Lakes, and Townes at Herndon Center, account for 46.3%, 28.2%, and
24.8% of the portfolio, respectively. Ellipse at Fairfax Corner and
Townes at Herndon Center were both 96.3% occupied, and Windsor at
Fair Lakes was 94.8% occupied. The average effective monthly rental
rate for one-bedroom, two-bedroom, and three-bedroom units across
the portfolio were $1,645, $2,220, and $2,301, respectively.
According to Reis, the Western Fairfax County submarket reported
one-, two-, and three-bedroom average effective monthly rental
rates of $1,833, $2,115, and $2,380, respectively. As of September
2022, the sponsor had partially or fully renovated 303 units, with
partially completed units reportedly achieving rental premiums
ranging from $75 to $100 per unit, and completed units ranging from
$175 to $275 per unit. As of April 2023, the replacement reserve
balance was $5.9 million, compared with $6.1 million in April 2022,
suggesting renovations are ongoing. DBRS Morningstar has inquired
about the status of the renovations but has not received a response
as of the time of this writing.

The annualized net cash flow (NCF) for the trailing nine-month
period ended September 30, 2022, was $13.4 million, compared with
$12.6 million at YE2021 and the DBRS Morningstar derived NCF of
$11.4 million. The cash flow increase is attributable to
improvements in rental revenue and other income. The DBRS
Morningstar value of $180.4 million represents a 28.3% haircut to
the issuance appraised value of $251.5 million, and implies a
loan-to-value ratio of 84.2% on the whole loan and 109.2% including
the mezzanine debt.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFMT 2023-HB12: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class M6 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2023-2 to be issued by CFMT 2023-HB12,
LLC:

-- $326.6 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $48.5 million Class M1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $36.6 million Class M2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $38.3 million Class M3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class M4 at BB (sf)
-- $12.3 million Class M5 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $21.8 million Class M6 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating reflects 34.9% of credit enhancement. The AA
(low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (sf), BB (low) (sf),
and B (sf) ratings reflect 25.2%, 17.9%, 10.3%, 5.4%, 2.9%, and
-1.4% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar did not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

Lenders typically offer reverse mortgage loans to people who are at
least 62 years old. Through reverse mortgage loans, borrowers have
access to home equity through a lump sum amount or a stream of
payments without periodically repaying principal or interest,
allowing the loan balance to accumulate over time until a maturity
event occurs. Loan repayment is required (1) if the borrower dies,
(2) if the borrower sells the related residence, (3) if the
borrower no longer occupies the related residence for a period
(usually a year), (4) if it is no longer the borrower's primary
residence, (5) if a tax or insurance default occurs, or (6) if the
borrower fails to properly maintain the related residence. In
addition, borrowers must be current on any homeowner's association
dues if applicable. Reverse mortgages are typically nonrecourse;
borrowers don't have to provide additional assets in cases where
the outstanding loan amount exceeds the property's value (the
crossover point). As a result, liquidation proceeds will fall below
the loan amount in cases where the outstanding balance reaches the
crossover point, contributing to higher loss severities for these
loans.

As of the Cut-Off Date (January 31, 2023), the collateral had
approximately $499.5 million in unpaid principal balance from 1,863
nonperforming home equity conversion mortgage reverse mortgage
loans and real estate owned properties secured by first liens
typically on single-family residential properties, condominiums,
multifamily (two- to four-family) properties, manufactured homes,
and planned unit developments. The mortgage assets were originated
between 1993 and 2016. Of the total assets, 131 have a fixed
interest rate (7.3% of the balance), with a 5.0% weighted-average
coupon (WAC). The remaining 1,732 assets have floating-rate
interest (92.7% of the balance) with a 6.3% WAC, bringing the
entire collateral pool to a 6.2% WAC.

A majority of the mortgage assets (52.7% of the balance) were
previously securitized in the CFMT 2020-HB4 transaction. In
addition to the mortgage assets, the transaction will benefit from
a REO Trust Account from the previous securitization totaling
approximately $2.0 million.

The transaction uses a sequential structure. No subordinate note
shall receive any principal payments until the senior notes (Class
A notes) have been reduced to zero. This structure provides credit
enhancement in the form of subordinate classes and reduces the
effect of realized losses. These features increase the likelihood
that holders of the most senior class of notes will receive regular
distributions of interest and/or principal. All note classes have
available fund caps.

Classes M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, and M6 have principal lockout terms
insofar as they are not entitled to principal payments prior to a
Redemption Date, unless an Acceleration Event or Auction Failure
Event occurs. Available cash will be trapped until these dates, at
which stage the notes will start to receive payments. Note that the
DBRS Morningstar cash flow as it pertains to each note models the
first payment being received after these dates for each of the
respective notes; hence, at the time of issuance, these rules are
not likely to affect the natural cash flow waterfall.

A failure to pay the notes in full on the Mandatory Call Date
(April 2027) will trigger a mandatory auction of all assets. If the
auction fails to elicit sufficient proceeds to pay off the notes,
another auction will follow every three months for up to a year
after the Mandatory Call Date. If these have failed to pay off the
notes, this is deemed an Auction Failure, and subsequent auctions
will proceed every six months.

If the Class M5 and M6 Notes have not been redeemed or paid in full
by the Mandatory Call Date, these notes will accrue Additional
Accrued Amounts. DBRS Morningstar does not rate these Additional
Accrued Amounts.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COLLEGE AVE 2017-A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Transaction
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on all classes of securities
included in six College Ave Student Loans transactions.

College Ave Student Loans, LLC

-- Class A-1 AA (high) (sf)  Confirmed
-- Class A-2 AA (high) (sf)  Confirmed
-- Class B A (sf)         Confirmed
-- Class C BB (sf)         Confirmed

The confirmations are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for
Rated Sovereigns: December 2022 Update," published on December 21,
2022. These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS
Morningstar's moderate and adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic scenarios, which were first published in April 2020.

-- Transaction capital structure, current ratings, and sufficient
credit enhancement levels.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
reserve accounts, and excess spread with senior notes benefiting
from subordination of junior notes.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-expected default and loss severity assumptions under
various stress scenarios.

-- Collateral performance is within expectations, and cumulative
net losses are low. Forbearance and delinquency levels remain
relatively stable.


COLT 2023-1: Fitch Gives Bsf Rating on Cl. B2 Certs, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates to be issued by COLT 2023-1 Mortgage
Loan Trust (COLT 2023-1).

   Entity/Debt     Rating                 Prior
   -----------     ------                 -----
COLT 2023-1

   A1          LT AAAsf New Rating   AAA(EXP)sf
   A2          LT AAsf  New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
   A3          LT Asf   New Rating    A(EXP)sf
   M1          LT BBBsf New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
   B1          LT BBsf  New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
   B2          LT Bsf   New Rating    B(EXP)sf
   B3          LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   AIOS        LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   R           LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   X           LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   COLLAT      LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 585 non-prime loans with a total
balance of approximately $292 million as of the cut-off date. Loans
in the pool were originated by multiple originators, including
Change Lending, Northpointe Bank, Loanstream Mortgage and others.
Loans were aggregated by Hudson Americas L.P. Loans and are
currently serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) or
Northpointe Bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, the home price values of this pool
are viewed as 5.9% above a long-term sustainable level compared
with 7.8% on a national level, as of March 2023, down 2.7% since
last quarter. The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic
has seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22.
Driven by the strong gains seen in 1H22, home prices rose 5.8% yoy
nationally as of December 2022.

Non-QM Credit Quality (Negative): The collateral consists of 585
loans, totaling $292 million and seasoned approximately four months
in aggregate. The borrowers have a moderate credit profile of a 735
model FICO and leverage with a 76.9% sustainable loan-to-value
ratio (sLTV) and 72.4% combined current LTV (cLTV).

The pool consists of 60.0% of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, while 37.7% comprise an investor property.
Additionally, 62.3% are nonqualified mortgage (non-QM). The QM rule
does not apply to the remainder. Fitch's expected loss in the
'AAAsf' stress is 19.75%. This is mainly driven by the non-QM
collateral and the significant investor cash flow product
concentration.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Around 93.1% of loans in the pool
were underwritten to less than full documentation, and 58.6% were
underwritten to a bank statement program for verifying income,
which is not consistent with Appendix Q standards and Fitch's view
of a full documentation program. A key distinction between this
pool and legacy Alt-A loans is these loans adhere to underwriting
and documentation standards required under the Consumer Financial
Protections Bureau's (CFPB) Ability to Repay (ATR) Rule (ATR
Rule).

This reduces risk of borrower default arising from lack of
affordability, misrepresentation or other operational quality risks
due to rigor of the ATR Rule's mandates with respect to the
underwriting and documentation of a borrower's ATR. Fitch's
treatment of alternative loan documentation increased 'AAAsf'
expected loss. 'AAAsf' expected losses for this cohort are 15.8%
compared with 12.5% to fully documented loans.

High Percentage of DSCR Loans (Negative): There are 256 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) products in the pool (43.8% by loan
count). These business purpose loans are available to real estate
investors that are qualified on a cash flow basis, rather than debt
to income (DTI), and borrower income and employment are not
verified.

Compared with standard investment properties, for DSCR loans Fitch
converts the DSCR values to a DTI and treats as low documentation.
The treatment for DSCR loans results in a higher Fitch-reported
non-zero DTI. Expected losses for DSCR loans is 28.5% in the
'AAAsf' stress. Expected losses in this cohort are most
conservative for the low ratio DSCR (less than 0.75x) at a 'AAAsf'
expected loss of 32.8%.

Modified Sequential-Payment Structure with Limited Advancing
(Mixed): The structure distributes principal pro rata among the
senior certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all senior classes are reduced to zero. If a
cumulative loss trigger event, delinquency trigger event or credit
enhancement (CE) trigger event occurs in a given period, principal
will be distributed sequentially to class A-1, A-2 and A-3
certificates until they are reduced to zero.

Advances of delinquent principal and interest (P&I) will be made on
the mortgage loans for the first 90 days of delinquency, to the
extent such advances are deemed recoverable. If the P&I advancing
party fails to make a required advance, the master servicer and
then securities administrator will be obligated to make such
advance.

The limited advancing reduces loss severities, as a lower amount is
repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and liquidation
proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment over accrued
but unpaid interest. The downside to this is the additional stress
on the structure, as there is limited liquidity in the event of
large and extended delinquencies.

COLT 2023-1 has a step-up coupon for the senior classes (A-1, A-2
and A-3). After four years, the senior classes pay the lesser of a
100bps increase to the fixed coupon or the net weighted average
coupon (WAC) rate. The unrated class B-3 interest allocation goes
toward the senior cap carryover amount for as long as the senior
classes are outstanding. This increases the P&I allocation for the
senior classes.

As an additional analysis to rating stresses, Fitch took into
account a WAC deterioration that varied by rating stress. The WAC
cut was derived by assuming a 2.5% cut (based on the most common
historical modification rate) on 40% (historical Alt-A modification
percentage) of the performing loans. Although the WAC reduction
stress is based on historical modification rates, Fitch did not
include the WAC reduction stress in its testing of the delinquency
trigger.

Fitch viewed the WAC deterioration as more of a pre-emptive cut
given the ongoing macroeconomic and regulatory environment. A
portion of borrowers will likely be impaired but will not
ultimately default due to modifications and reduced P&I. This
approach had the largest impact on the back-loaded benchmark
scenario.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the
state and national level to assess the effect of higher MVDs for
the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
home prices.

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model projected 38.8% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. A 10% additional
decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by one full
category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes. A 10% gain
in home prices would result in a full category upgrade for the
rated class excluding those assigned 'AAAsf' ratings.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Consolidated Analytics, Covius, Canopy, Selene, and
Evolve. The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused
on credit, compliance and property valuation review. Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and, as a result, Fitch
made the following adjustment to its analysis: a 5% credit at the
loan level for each loan where satisfactory due diligence was
completed. This adjustment resulted in 46bps reduction to the
'AAAsf' expected loss.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. The loan-level
information Fitch received was provided in the American
Securitization Forum's data layout format.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Csf
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed two classes of
German American Capital Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2012-CCRE1 (COMM 2012-CCRE1). In addition, the
Rating Outlook on class B has been revised to Stable from
Negative.

   Entity/Debt        Rating           Prior
   -----------        ------           -----
COMM 2012-CCRE1
  
   B 12624BAG1    LT Asf   Affirmed    Asf
   C 12624BAH9    LT BBsf  Downgrade   BBBsf
   D 12624BAL0    LT CCsf  Downgrade   CCCsf
   E 12624BAN6    LT Csf   Downgrade   CCCsf
   F 12624BAQ9    LT Csf   Downgrade   CCsf
   G 12624BAS5    LT Csf   Affirmed    Csf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Regional Mall Concentration; High Loss Expectations: Three
specially serviced loans remain in the pool, two (93.4% of pool)
secured by regional malls and one (6.6%) secured by a student
housing property. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a paydown analysis that grouped these loans based on the
likelihood of repayment and expected losses from the liquidation of
these loans. The downgrades of classes C, D, E and F and Negative
Outlook on class C reflect a greater certainty of losses based on
updated servicer valuations, in addition to the reliance on
proceeds from underperforming regional malls with uncertainty
around timing/recovery and ultimate disposition of these loans.

The affirmation and Outlook revision to Stable from Negative on
class B reflect increased/high credit enhancement (CE) and a
greater certainty of recoveries based on current modeled losses.

The largest loan in the pool, Crossgates Mall (63.4%), is secured
by 1.3 million sf of a 1.7 million-sf regional mall in Albany, NY.
The loan, which is sponsored by Pyramid Management Group, initially
transferred to special servicing in April 2020 but returned to the
master servicer in June 2021 after relief was provided and the loan
maturity was extended by one year through May 2023. The loan,
however; re-transferred to special servicing in February 2023 due
to the upcoming loan maturity.

Macy's is the remaining non-collateral anchor after Lord and Taylor
closed at the end of 2020. JCPenney is the largest collateral
anchor (13.9% collateral NRA through May 2023). Other larger
tenants include Regal Cinemas 18, Dick's and Burlington. Collateral
occupancy, excluding specialty long-term tenants, was 83.9% as of
July 2022, compared with 85.4% as of December 2021, and 86.3% in
December 2020. When including specialty long-term tenants,
occupancy was 94.1%. Servicer-reported NOI DSCR for this amortizing
loan was 1.26x at YE 2022 compared with 1.44x as of YE 2021, 0.81x
at YE 2020 and 1.45x at YE 2019.

Fitch's base case loss expectation of 53% reflects a 20% cap rate
and 5% stress to the YE 2022 NOI to account for the ongoing
challenges with refinance/repayment of this loan.

The second largest loan, RiverTown Crossings Mall (30.0%), is
secured by 635,769 sf of a 1.3 million-sf regional mall in
Grandville, MI. The loan, which is sponsored by Brookfield Property
Retail Group, transferred to special servicing in October 2020 and
matured in June 2021 without repayment. A cash management account
is trapping excess cash, and the borrower and lender are working on
either modifying the debt or a deed-in-lieu/foreclosure.

The mall is anchored by three non-collateral tenants: Macy's,
JCPenney and Kohl's. Non-collateral Sears closed in January 2021
and non-collateral Younkers closed in 2018. The collateral anchors
are Dick's, (14.4% collateral NRA through January 2025) and
Celebration Cinemas, (13.6% through December 2024). Collateral
occupancy was 88% as of March 2022 compared with 86% at YE 2020 and
93% as of March 2019. Servicer-reported NOI DSCR for this
amortizing loan was 1.01x at YE 2021, down from 1.51x at YE 2020
and 1.82x at YE 2019.

Fitch's base case loss expectation of 63% reflects a discount to
the recent servicer provided valuation and equates to a 38% cap
rate on the pre-pandemic YE 2019 NOl.

The third largest loan, Philadelphia Square (6.6%), is secured by a
student housing property in Indiana, PA. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2022 and matured without repayment in
May 2022. Per servicer updates, a receiver was appointed in
February 2023. The receiver is managing the property and preparing
for sale. NOI DSCR was 0.78x at YE 2021. Fitch's base case loss of
58.3% reflects a discount to the recent servicer provided valuation
and equates to a stressed value of $19,595 per unit.

Increase in Credit Enhancement: One loan with an $11.5 million
balance paid in full post maturity since Fitch's prior rating
action. As of the April 2023 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 83.5% to $153.8
million from $982.3 million at issuance. No loans are defeased.
Cumulative interest shortfalls of $660,325 are currently affecting
the non-rated class H.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

A downgrade to class B is unlikely due to sufficient CE. A
downgrade to class C would occur if performance and/or valuations
of the regional malls decline further or one of regional malls is
disposed with greater than expected losses. Downgrades to the
distressed classes D, E. F and G would occur as losses are realized
from disposition of the regional malls.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Upgrades are unlikely due to the regional mall concentration but
could occur if performance of the regional malls improves
significantly or one of the regional malls is disposed with better
than expected recoveries.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CONNECTICUT AVE 2023-R03: Moody's Gives Ba1 Rating to 26 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 62
classes of credit risk transfer (CRT) residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) issued by Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust
2023-R03, and sponsored by Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae).

The securities reference a pool of mortgage loans acquired by
Fannie Mae, and originated and serviced by multiple entities.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust 2023-R03

Cl. 2M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2B, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2C, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1B, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A4, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B4, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D4, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D5, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F5, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-X1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2Y, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1Y, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the credit quality of the mortgage loans,
the structural features of the transaction, the GSE's oversight of
originators and servicers, and the third-party review.

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
1.38%, in a baseline scenario median is 1.12% and reaches 6.32% at
a stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2023.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


CSAIL 2016-C5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded one class of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-C5 issued by CSAIL 2016-C5 Commercial
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class C to AA (low) (sf) from A (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes in
the transaction as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The upgrade to Class C reflects the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of the repayment of one loan and additional
defeasance of five loans since DBRS Morningstar's last rating
action in November 2022. DoubleTree Commerce (previously 3.1% of
the pool) was previously specially serviced and was successfully
repaid in November 2022 with a better-than-expected recovery. The
rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect DBRS Morningstar's
expectations for the transaction's continued stable performance.

The trust consists of 48 of the original 59 loans, with an
aggregate principal balance of $624.1 million, reflecting a
collateral reduction of 33.4% since issuance. As of the March 2023
remittance, 19 loans, representing 26.5% of the pool, are fully
defeased, an increase from 22.1% at the time of the last rating
action. As of the March 2023 remittance, there are two loans,
representing 5.1% of the pool, in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan, Sheraton Lincoln Harbor Center
(Prospectus ID#12, 3.2% of the current pool), is secured by a
343-room full-service hotel in Weehawken, New Jersey. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2021 and remains
delinquent. The sponsor is no longer supporting operations at the
hotel and the special servicer is pursuing foreclosure while dual
tracking a potential sale of the asset with the help of an in-place
receiver. An appraisal dated August 2022 valued the property at
$79.0 million, representing a 9.6% decline from the March 2021
value of $87.4 million and a 38.3% decline from the issuance value
of $128.0 million. DBRS Morningstar's analysis included a
liquidation scenario that was based on a stress to the most recent
appraised value to account for additional advances and the
potential for further value decline, resulting in a loss severity
in excess of 35.0%.

The second specially serviced loan, Frisco Plaza (Prospectus ID#23,
1.9% of the pool), is secured by a 61,453-square-foot retail
property in Frisco, Texas. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2019 for imminent default after the former
largest tenant, LA Fitness (previously 73.2% of net rentable area)
defaulted on the terms of its lease by failing to pay rent.
Although the borrower was subsequently able to bring the loan
current, LA Fitness vacated at lease expiration in March 2021,
bringing occupancy down to 16.5%. This resulted in cash flow
shortfalls and an eventual default on the loan payments. The asset
is now real estate owned. A November 2022 appraisal valued the
property at $12.9 million, up from the February 2022 value of $10.8
million but still 30.3% below the issuance appraised value of $18.5
million. DBRS Morningstar's analysis included a liquidation
scenario that was based on a stress to the most recent appraised
value to account for additional advances and the potential for
further value declines, resulting in a loss severity in excess of
30.0%.

The remaining pooled assets are generally well diversified by
property type. The largest property type represented is
multifamily, totaling 28.4% of the pool, followed by office
(19.0%), industrial (17.6%), retail (16.7%), and lodging (11.2%).
All of the outstanding loans, including defeased assets, are
scheduled to mature in the second half of 2025.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DBUBS 2017-BRBK: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BRBK issued by DBUBS
2017-BRBK Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. The underlying loan is secured by four Class A office
properties in Burbank, California, that total approximately 2.1
million square feet (sf). The portfolio includes three office
towers in Burbank's Media District known as The Pointe, 3800
Alameda, and Central Park, as well as a five-building office campus
called Media Studios, which is four miles north of the Media
District near the Hollywood Burbank airport. The loan is sponsored
by a joint venture between Blackstone Group Inc. (80% ownership
interest) and Worthe Real Estate Group Inc. (20% ownership
interest).

The trust loan is part of a split loan structure and includes four
senior notes with an aggregate balance of $249 million and two
junior notes with an aggregate balance of $281 million, resulting
in a total trust balance of $530 million. The $660.0 million whole
loan includes five non-trust senior notes totaling $130 million
that are securitized in other commercial mortgage-backed security
transactions including CD 2017-CD6 Mortgage Trust, which is also
rated by DBRS Morningstar. The whole loan is structured as an
interest-only (IO), fixed-rate loan with a seven-year term that
matures in October 2024.

The portfolio was 91.5% occupied as of December 2022, remaining
relatively stable from prior years. The portfolio's five largest
tenants, representing 61.8% of total portfolio net rentable area
(NRA), include The Walt Disney Company (Disney; 31.0% of portfolio
NRA), AT&T (12.7% of portfolio NRA, primarily through subsidiaries
Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. and Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc.), Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser; 9.3% of
portfolio NRA), Legendary Entertainment (5.1% of portfolio NRA),
and Hasbro, Inc. (3.7% of portfolio NRA). Disney, Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc., Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., and
Kaiser were all considered investment-grade tenants at issuance
and, as of March 2023, these tenants remain investment grade.
Disney and Kaiser have lease expirations in May 2026 and May 2024,
respectively. There is minimal rollover within the next 12 months
with only 7.9% of NRA expected to roll, including several of the
Warner Bros. Entertainment leases that have expirations from
September 2023 through December 2025.

The net cash flow (NCF) was $58.8 million for the trailing 12
months ended December 31, 2020, a 10.2% decrease from the NCF of
$65.5 million at YE2021. The decrease was largely attributed to a
decline in rent, stemming from rent abatements for MSG
Entertainment Group, LLC's lease renewal and an increase costs in
repairs and maintenance. Despite the minor dip in the NCF, the
loans debt service coverage ratio remains healthy at 2.48 times.

DBRS Morningstar did not perform an updated loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) sizing for this review. While cash flow decreased to $58.8
million at YE2022, it remained above the DBRS Morningstar derived
NCF of $49.9 million in 2020. The derived NCF and 6.75%
capitalization rate gives a DBRS Morningstar value of $743.2
million, a -28.4% variance from the appraised value of $1.0 billion
at issuance. The DBRS Morningstar value implies an LTV of 71.3%,
compared with the 51.1% LTV on the appraised value at issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



DIAMOND CLO 2019-1: S&P Affirms BB (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings today raised its ratings on the class C-R and
D-R notes from Diamond CLO 2019-1 Ltd. At the same time, S&P
affirmed its rating on the class E notes from the same transaction.


The rating actions follow its review of the transaction's
performance using data from the March 6, 2023, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $227.7 million in collective
paydowns to the class A-1R, A-2R, B-R, and C-R notes since our
November 2021 rating actions.

These paydowns resulted in the full repayment of the class A-1R,
A-2R, and B-R notes and improved reported overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios since the Sept. 6, 2021, trustee report, which S&P
used for its previous rating actions:

-- The class C-R O/C ratio improved to 511.63% from 148.55%.
-- The class D-R O/C ratio improved to 232.06% from 130.93%.
-- The class E O/C ratio improved to 154.62% from 118.09%

S&P said, "During this time, the collateral portfolio's credit
quality has deteriorated slightly since our last rating actions, as
the portfolio concentration of collateral obligations with ratings
in the 'CCC' category as a percentage has increased to 26.0% from
17.6%, though the par balance of these assets has declined to $39.7
million from $66.8 million. Despite the larger concentration in the
'CCC' category as a percentage, the transaction has benefited from
a decline in the weighted average life to 2.33 years from 3.40
years reported at the time of our November 2021 rating actions.

"The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmation reflects our view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating level.

"Our ratings on the class D-R and E notes were affected by the
application of the largest obligor default test from our corporate
collateralized debt obligation criteria. The test is intended to
address event and model risks that might be present in rated
transactions. Despite cash flow runs that suggested higher ratings,
the largest obligor default test constrained our ratings on the
class D-R and E notes at 'AA+ (sf)' and 'BBB+ (sf)', respectively.

"On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis and
our largest obligor default test indicated a higher rating on the
class E notes. However, because the transaction currently has a
large exposure to 'CCC' rated collateral obligations and a
concentrated pool with only 22 unique obligors remaining, we
preferred to have more cushion at this class to offset future
potential credit migration in the underlying collateral.
In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis--and other qualitative factors as
applicable--demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  RATINGS RAISED

  Diamond CLO 2019-1 Ltd.

                    Rating
  Class       To              From

  C-R         AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
  D-R         AA+ (sf)        A+ (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED

  Diamond CLO 2019-1 Ltd.

  Class       Rating

  E           BB (sf)



DT AUTO 2023-2: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes (the Notes) to be issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2023-2 (the
Issuer or DTAOT 2023-2):

-- $240,440,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $51,240,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $56,890,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $77,490,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $23,940,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(2) DTAOT 2023-2 provides for the Notes' coverage multiples that
are slightly below the DBRS Morningstar range of multiples set
forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS Morningstar
believes that this is warranted, given the magnitude of expected
loss, company history, and structural features of the transaction.

(3) The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 24.55% based on the
expected pool composition.

(4) The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for
Rated Sovereigns: December 2022 Update," published on December 21,
2022. These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS
Morningstar's moderate and adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic scenarios, which were first published in April 2020.

(5) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

(6) The quality and consistency of historical static pool data for
DriveTime originations and performance of the DriveTime auto loan
portfolio.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with DriveTime,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets, and the consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal
Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

The transaction represents a securitization of a portfolio of motor
vehicle retail installment sales contracts originated by DriveTime
Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator). The Originator is a
direct, wholly owned subsidiary of DriveTime, a leading
used-vehicle retailer in the United States that focuses primarily
on the sale and financing of vehicles to the subprime market.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 54.80% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated Notes in the pool,
the reserve account (1.50%), and overcollateralization (12.60%).
The ratings on the Class B, C, D, and E Notes reflect 44.85%,
33.80%, 18.75%, and 14.10% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on four
classes in GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GCJ9, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GCJ9 as follows:

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2021 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2021 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2021
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2021
Affirmed B3 (sf)

*  Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were downgraded due to the
potential for higher losses and increased risk of interest
shortfalls due to the significant exposure to specially serviced
and previously modified loans. The largest performing loan,
Gansevoort Park Avenue (45% of the pool) was modified in August
2021, which extended the maturity date on the loan from June 2022
to June 2024. The loan had an NOI DSCR below 1.00x as of year-end
2022. Furthermore, the Jamaica Center loan (50% of the pool) has
been in special servicing since 2020 and as of the April 2023
remittance statement was last paid through its February 2021
payment date.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-B) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its outstanding reference classes
as well as principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 53.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 5.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

Moody's analysis also incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 55% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 45% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 10, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $128.7
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 5% to
50% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, down from 10 at Moody's last review.

As of the April 2023 remittance report, loans representing 45% were
current on their debt service payments, and 55% were in foreclosure
or were REO.

One loan, constituting 45% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist, and was modified in relation to the coronavirus impact
on the property. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $22.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%). Two loans, constituting 55% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing, both of which have transferred to
special servicing since March 2020.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Jamaica Center loan
($64.1 million -- 50% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in a 215,800 square foot (SF), three-story mixed-use
center located in the Jamaica neighborhood of Queens, NY. The
improvements were constructed in 2002 and contain 95,295 SF of
retail space, 83,000 SF of theater space, and 37,511 SF of office
space. In addition, there is a two-level, below grade parking
garage providing 375 parking spaces. The property is located in an
infill location near multiple public transit options. The property
is anchored by a Showcase Cinemas theatre, Old Navy and Walgreens,
and also has two office tenants totaling 29% of the net rentable
area (NRA). As of year-end 2022, the property was 91% occupied,
compared to 80% as of December 2020. The NOI has declined
significantly since securitization, as a result of a decline in
revenues and a significant increase in expenses. The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2020 due to imminent
default in relation to the coronavirus pandemic.  The loan passed
its initial maturity date in November 2022. The most recent
appraisal from  November 2022 valued the property 26% below the
value at securitization. The special servicer is dual tracking a
foreclosure action while having discussions with borrower. The loan
is last paid through its February 2021 payment date and has
amortized 21% since securitization.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 1300 Woodfield
loan ($6.9 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a
134,000 SF suburban office property located in Schaumburg, IL. The
loan transferred to  special servicing in May 2021 at the borrowers
request due to payment default. Property performance has been
declining since 2017, and the property is not generating sufficient
cash flow to cover debt service since 2020. The property went into
foreclosure and became REO in October 2022. As of June 2022, the
property was 36% occupied, compared to 54% in March 2021, 72% in
2019 and 91% at securitization. The  most recent appraisal from
February 2023 valued the property 72% below the value at
securitization. The loan has amortized 19% since securitization.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability on the
Gansevoort Park Avenue Loan and estimates an aggregate $43.8
million loss for the specially serviced and troubled loans (a 34%
expected loss on average).

The largest troubled loan is the Gansevoort Park Avenue loan ($57.7
million, 45% of the pool) which represents a pari passu portion of
a $124.2 million senior mortgage. The loan is backed by the 249-key
full-service boutique hotel located on East 29th Street and Park
Avenue South in Manhattan, New York. The property was known as the
Gansevoort Park Avenue at securitization, however, the property was
sold for approximately $200,000,000 ($803,213 per key) and renamed
Royalton Park Avenue in late 2017. The property's cash flow had
generally declined annually since securitization due to lower
revenues coupled with increased operating expenses. The property's
performance was further significantly impacted by the pandemic and
the hotel was temporarily closed and re-opened in September 2021.
The asset reported negative NOI for 2020 and 2021, but in 2022
reported an NOI of $4.7 million. However, the year-end 2022 NOI
DSCR was still well below 1.00X. The loan was previously modified
in 2021 and the modification included a two-year extension to June
2024 and a conversion to interest-only through the remainder of the
term. The loan was current on its debt service payments as of the
March 2023 remittance. The servicer watchlist commentary indicates
the borrower is currently in discussion to further modification of
the loan ahead of its June 2024 maturity date. The most recent
appraisal from June 2021 valued the property 65% below the value at
securitization. Due to the continued depressed cash flow and
upcoming maturity date, Moody's has identified this as a troubled
loan.

As of the April 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $3.6 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust (GSMS) Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
2018-GS10. The Rating Outlooks on classes F and G-RR remain
Negative.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
GSMS 2018-GS10

   A-1 36250SAA7    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-2 36250SAB5    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-3 36250SAC3    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 36250SAD1    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-5 36250SAE9    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-AB 36250SAF6   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-S 36250SAJ8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 36250SAK5      LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 36250SAL3      LT A-sf   Affirmed     A-sf
   D 36250SAM1      LT BBBsf  Affirmed    BBBsf
   E 36250SAR0      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   F 36250SAT6      LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   G-RR 36250SAV1   LT B-sf   Affirmed    B-sf
   X-A 36250SAG4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 36250SAH2    LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   X-D 36250SAP4    LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect overall stable
performance for the pool and loss expectations relatively in-line
with Fitch's prior rating action. Fitch's current ratings
incorporate a base case loss of 4.3%. Fitch identified five loans
(13.8% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), which
includes two loans in special servicing (10.6%). There have been
minimal changes to pool metrics since issuance, with no losses to
date and minimal paydown.

The Negative Outlooks on classes F and G-RR reflect losses that
could reach 5.80% when factoring in a sensitivity stress to the
largest loan in the pool, GSK North American HQ loan (9.4%), due to
its sole-tenant vacating and the loan transferring to special
servicing since Fitch's prior rating action for imminent maturity
default.

Specially Serviced Loans: The largest contributor to loss and
largest increase in base case loss expectations since Fitch's prior
rating action is the specially serviced GSK North American HQ loan
(9.4%), which is secured by a 207,779-sf suburban office property
located in the Navy Yards district of Philadelphia, PA. The
property was built to suit for British pharmaceutical company
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in 2013, who leases the entire building on a
NNN basis through September 2028 with no termination options. The
loan transferred to special servicing in November 2022 after GSK
vacated in August 2022. The loan, which is sponsored by Korea
Investment Management Corporation, has remained current as the
tenant has committed to continue paying rent under their current
lease which expires in September 2028. As of March 2023, the lender
is unaware of subleasing efforts. Total reserves amount to $4.74
million as of March 2023.

Per servicer updates, the borrower requested consent to a lease
termination with GSK and the right to utilize any collected
termination fees, as well as a 12-month maturity extension from its
initial maturity date of June 2023. The lender did not approve the
termination agreement with GSK or the maturity extension. The
borrower is expected to submit another extension proposal and the
lender will continue monitoring the loan due to the upcoming
maturity.

Fitch's base case analysis reflects a 15% stress to the YE 2021 NOI
and an increased cap rate of 9.25%, which considers GSK's
commitment to fulfill their current lease obligations, however,
factors in office sector concerns and submarket vacancy. Fitch also
applied a sensitivity scenario with an outsized loss of 25% on the
maturity balance, which considered a dark value with assumptions
for market rent, downtime between leases, carrying costs, and
re-tenanting costs.

The second specially serviced loan, Capital Complex (1.1%), is
secured by a 178,328-sf suburban office property located in
Frankfurt, KY. The subject is host to a number of GSE tenants
including the Attorney General (26.6% of the NRA; June 2026 lease
expiration), Department of Juvenile Justice (9.8%; June 2026),
Cabinet for Health & Family Services (4.3%; June 2027), and the
Council of Developmental Disabilities (2.7%; June 2025).

The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2023 due to
imminent monetary default after occupancy fell to 53.2% as of
September 2022 from 63% at YE 2021, 81.7% at YE 2019, and 99% at
issuance. Major tenant vacancy included Commonwealth Credit Union
(12.6% of the NRA) at their June 2022 lease expiration. The space
was partially backfilled by the Council on Developmental
Disabilities (2.4%) in June 2022. The NOI debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) has remained just below a 1.00x threshold since YE
2020.

Fitch did not receive an updated appraised value for the property.
Loss expectations of 36.5% are based off the YE 2021 NOI with 10%
cap rate and a 5% stress to the YE 2021 NOI. Fitch's stressed
property value equates to a value of $33 psf and a 21% cap rate on
YE 2019 NOI.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2023
distribution date, the aggregate pool balance has been reduced by
1.50% to $798.7 million from $810.7 million at issuance. No loans
have disposed and one loan, U.S. Industrial (0.2% of the pool) has
partially defeased from the larger U.S. Industrial Portfolio
(5.0%). Sixteen loans (64.1% of the pool) are full-term, IO; nine
loans (14.3%) are currently amortizing; and 10 loans (21.7%) are
partial IO.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase
in pool level losses from underperforming loans. Downgrades to the
'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' categories are not likely due to the position in
the capital structure, but may happen should interest shortfalls
occur.

- Downgrades to the 'BBBsf' and 'Asf' categories would occur should
overall pool losses increase significantly and/or one or more large
loans have an outsized loss, which would erode credit enhancement
(CE).

- Downgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' category would occur should
loss expectations increase due to an increase in defaulted and/or
specially serviced loans and continued performance deterioration of
the FLOCs, particularly the GSK North American HQ loan.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however, adverse
selection, increased concentrations and further underperformance of
the FLOCs could cause this trend to reverse.

- Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would also take into account
these factors, but would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood for
interest shortfalls.

- Upgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories are not likely until
the later years in a transaction and only if the performance of the
remaining pool is stable and there is sufficient CE to the
classes.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


INDEPENDENCE PLAZA 2018-INDP: DBRS Confirms B Rating on HRR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-INDP
issued by Independence Plaza Trust 2018-INDP:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-ECP at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-ENP at B (high) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction, which remains in line with
DBRS Morningstar's expectations.

The transaction is secured by the borrower's fee and leasehold
interest in a 1.5 million-square-foot mixed-use, retail and
multifamily property in the Tribeca neighborhood of Manhattan, New
York. The property consists of three, 39-story apartment towers and
connecting townhomes, in addition to the commercial space. The
three towers are at 310 Greenwich Street, 40 Harrison Street, and
80 North Moore Street. The property offers panoramic views of the
city and Hudson River. The fee interest covers the entire property,
and the leasehold interest includes the South Podium, North Podium,
and Tower Development parcels. The property is close to Goldman
Sachs' headquarters, Brookfield Place (formerly the World Financial
Center), and the Financial District. The loan is sponsored by a
joint venture between real estate investment fund Vornado Realty
L.P. and property manager and redeveloper Stellar Management.

The $675 million trust loan proceeds repaid existing debt of $551.6
million, returned $112.8 million of equity to the sponsor, and
covered closing costs. The loan is interest only (IO) throughout
its seven-year loan term and matures in July 2025.

The property was originally built under an affordable housing
initiative in 1975 for lower- and middle-income families. Since the
property exited the program in June 2004, the borrower has been
working to renovate the rent-regulated apartments as they become
available and re-leasing them at market rates. According to the
September 2022 rent roll, 674 units were listed as fair market; 281
units were Section 8; and 286 units were listed under the Landlord
Rental Assistance Program (LRAP). The average monthly rental rates
for the fair market, Section 8, and LRAP units were $5,229, $862,
and $1,852, respectively.

According to the September 2022 rent roll, the residential portion
of the property was 90.9% occupied, up from 84.1% in September
2021. The multifamily component represents approximately 80% of the
net rentable area (NRA), and the commercial space represents the
remaining 20%. The property's average fair market monthly rental
rate of $5,229 is in line with Reis' reported West Village/Downtown
submarket effective average rental rate of $5,511. The property's
vacancy rate of 9.1% is slightly above the submarket vacancy rate
of 4.1%; the difference is most likely attributable to vacant units
undergoing renovations. The commercial portion was 82.2% occupied,
down from 88.3% at September 2021 following former tenant Public
School 150 (previously 6.2% of NRA) vacating in July 2022 at its
lease expiration. The largest commercial tenant, Patriot Parking,
LLC (representing 74.4% of NRA), leases the entire 550-space
parking garage and has a lease expiration in August 2024.

The annualized trailing nine-month net cash flow, for the period
ended September 30, 2022, was $36.4 million, up from $35.5 million
at YE2021, but remains below $41.8 million at YE2019. The decrease
in cash flow is primarily a result of interruptions in revenue as
the borrower continues unit renovations, combined with
year-over-year increases in real estate taxes since 2019. Despite
this, the debt service coverage ratio remains relatively stable at
1.25 times. DBRS Morningstar expects the loan to exhibit stable to
improved performance in the near to moderate term given the
property's desirable location, strong submarket fundamentals, and
ongoing capital projects, which indicate increased upside
potential.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2012-LC9: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. F Certs to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the ratings on seven classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-LC9 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. EC, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed due to the significant
credit support and expected recoveries from specially serviced
loans as well as one performing loan. The deal has paid down 49%
since Moody's last review.

The ratings on five P&I classes were downgraded due to potential
higher losses and increased risk of interest shortfall  driven
primarily by the significant exposure to special servicing. All of
the loans are currently in special servicing. The specially
serviced loans include the West County Center loan (59% of the
pool), which is secured by a regional mall that has had a decline
in performance since 2018; and the One South Broad Street loan
(20.5% of the pool), which is secured by an office property that
has had a significant decline in net operating income (NOI) and
occupancy. The third loan is the Salem Center loan (15% of the
pool), which is secured by an underperforming regional mall that
has already recognized an appraisal reduction of 78% of its
outstanding loan balance and has become REO as of the April 2023
remittance date. In the rating action Moody's also analyzed loss
and recovery scenarios to reflect the recovery value on the
remaining loans, the current cash flow at the properties and the
timing to ultimate resolution.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit quality of its referenced classes resulting from principal
paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's regard e-commerce competition as a social risk under
Moody's ESG framework. The rise in e-commerce and changing consumer
behavior presents challenges to brick-and-mortar discretionary
retailers.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 43.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 16.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since all of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17th, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 83% to $185 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans representing 5%, 15%, 21% and
59% of the pool, respectively.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

As of the April 2023 remittance report, loans representing 100% of
the pool were past their maturity dates. Four loans, constituting
100% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the West County Center Loan
($109.7million – 59.3% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu portion of a $160.4 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by the 744,000 square feet (SF) collateral portion of a 1.2
million SF super-regional mall in Des Peres, Missouri, a suburb of
St. Louis. As of the September 2022 rent roll, the mall was 97%
leased, compared to 98% leased as of the December 2021 rent roll.
Anchor tenants include Macy's (non-collateral), JC Penney
(non-collateral), Dick's Sporting Goods and Nordstrom. Other
notable tenants are Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Forever 21, H&M,
and Apple. The mall is owned by a joint venture comprised of
entities affiliated with CBL, TIAA-CREF, and the Dutch pension fund
APG. The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2020
for imminent monetary default at the borrower's request as a result
of the Covid-19 pandemic. In November 2020, the parent company of
the borrower, CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. filed for
bankruptcy, and subsequently exited bankruptcy in November 2021.
The loan's status was non-performing maturity balloon as of April
2023. Property performance has declined since securitization due to
lower revenues and the 2022 NOI was approximately 30% below
underwritten levels. The mall also faces competition from six
regional and super regional malls within the St. Louis MSA. The
loan has amortized 16% since securitization. An updated appraised
value in December 2022 valued the property 29% lower than the
securitization value but still above the outstanding loan amount.
Based on servicer commentary, borrower and special servicer entered
into a loan modification agreement in March 2023, effective in
December 2022. The term of the extension is two years plus an
additional two years subject to certain performance hurdles.
Special servicer continues to monitor the loan and the property.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the One South Broad
Street Loan ($37.8 million – 20.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 25-story, Class B office building with a Walgreens in its
street-level retail space located in the Philadelphia CBD, directly
south of City Hall. The property was built in 1932 with the most
recent significant renovation occurring in 2001 and property
benefits from its CBD location just south of Philadelphia City
Hall. The loan transferred to special servicer in September 2022
due to imminent balloon payment for its original maturity in
December 2022. A cash trap was implemented due to a trigger event
when the largest tenant, Wells Fargo, failed to renew their lease
18 months prior to lease expiration. As of the rent roll dated June
2022, occupancy was at 51% largely in part to Wells Fargo vacating
at lease expiration in December 2020. Based on servicer commentary,
borrower and borrower's third party advisor executed a
pre-negotiation letter. The parties have been in active
negotiations regarding a loan modification/extension.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Salem Center Loan
($27.5 million – 14.9% of the pool), which is secured by the
212,007 SF collateral portion of a 649,624 SF regional mall,
located in Salem, Oregon. At securitization, the mall's
non-collateral anchors included Kohl's, Nordstrom, JCPenney, and
Macy's. However, Nordstrom closed its location in April 2018, and
JCPenney announced it would close its location as part of its
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceedings. Property performance declined
from securitization as a result of declining occupancy and revenue.
The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2017 due to
imminent default and was foreclosed in August 2018. The mall was
temporarily closed as a result of the coronavirus outbreak but
re-opened in late May 2020 with limited stores. As of April 2023
remittance, this loan has amortized by 17% since securitization and
is presently REO. An updated appraised value in September 2022
valued the property 80% lower than the value at securitization and
67% below the outstanding loan amount. As a result, an appraisal
reduction of $21.4 million has been recognized on this loan as of
the April 2023 remittance statement.

The fourth specially serviced loan is the Covington Portfolio Loan
($9.8 million – 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of four standalone retail outparcels. As of September
2022, the portfolio totals about 35,000 SF and was 100% leased to
five tenants including Walgreens(39% of the NRA) , Mattress Firm
(20% of the NRA), Advance Auto (17% of the NRA), Chase Bank (12% of
the NRA) and The American National Red Cross (12% of the NRA). The
properties are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted, located in
three different states: IL, TX and NJ. The loan is being monitored
for it passed the anticipated repayment date (ARD) on December 1,
2022, with maturity on April 1, 2024 and the lockbox was activated.
The loan transferred to special servicer for non-compliance with
non-monetary defaults in April 2023. Based on the commentary, the
special servicer is reaching out to borrower and determining next
steps.

As of the April 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $2.7 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C16 issued by JP Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C16 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

The rating recommendations reflect the overall stable performance
of this transaction since the last rating action in November 2022.
The pool continues to wind down, with all remaining loans having an
upcoming maturity date before the end of November 2023. As such,
DBRS Morningstar looked to a recovery analysis as part of the
ratings rationale. Additionally, loans backed by office properties
(18.4% of the pool) were generally stressed given the proximity to
maturity and low investor appetite for the property type, resulting
in a weighted average expected loss that was approximately 80.0%
higher than the expected loss for the pool.

Per the March 2023 remittance, 45 of the original 60 loans remain
in the trust, with an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$685.9 million, representing a collateral reduction of 39.6% since
issuance. The pool benefits from 25 loans that are fully defeased,
representing 37.6% of the pool. There are nine loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 34.9% of the pool, which are
primarily being monitored for upcoming loan maturities and/or
performance concerns. There are two loans in special servicing,
representing 4.3% of the pool.

To date, two loans have been liquidated from the trust with losses
totaling $6.7 million contained to the nonrated Class NR
Certificate, which has been reduced to $45.8 million. With this
review, DBRS Morningstar applied a liquidation approach on the two
loans in special servicing, applying haircuts to most recent
appraisals, resulting in an implied loss to the trust contained to
the nonrated Class NR, thereby supporting the rating
confirmations.

The largest loan in special servicing, Riverview Office Tower
(Prospectus ID#15; 2.5% of the current pool), is secured by a
235,271-square-foot (sf), suburban office property in Bloomington,
Minnesota. The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2022
due to monetary default following the departure of its largest
tenant, CoreLogic (which previously occupied 29.9% of the net
rentable area (NRA)). The loan was last paid through May 2022, and
according to the March 2023 remittance, the servicer is pursuing a
foreclosure, and a receiver was recently appointed in January 2023.
Per the December 2022 rent roll, the property was 47.3%, below the
YE2021 occupancy rate of 67.8% and a further decrease from the
issuance occupancy rate of 89.7%. Given the increased vacancy,
trailing nine months (T-9) ended September 30, 2022, financials
reported a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.34 times(x),
compared with the YE2021 DSCR of 1.13x and the YE2020 DSCR of
1.30x.

The December 2022 appraisal value was made available with the March
2023 remittance, which reported a value of $16.5 million,
representing a 46.8% decline from the issuance value of $31.0
million. Given the low in-place occupancy, significant value
decline, and the soft submarket with Reis reporting a YE2022
vacancy rate of 19.1% for the Southwest/Northeast Scott County
submarket, DBRS Morningstar liquidated this loan from the trust,
resulting in a loss severity in excess of 40%.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist and also the largest
loan in the pool, The Aire (Prospectus ID#1; 17.2% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a 310-unit luxury apartment on the
Upper West Side of Manhattan. The loan was initially added to the
watchlist in February 2017 because of a low DSCR, primarily driven
by the rising real estate taxes after the property's 10-year tax
abatement burned off, leading to increases of 20.0% every two years
since 2014. The situation was further exacerbated during the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic when occupancy dropped to
70.3% at YE2020. The loan reported below break-even DSCRs even
before the onset of the pandemic with the T-9 ended September 30,
2022, DSCR at 0.77x; however, occupancy for the same period
improved to 93.2%. According to the servicer commentary, the
residential market in New York was severely affected by the
pandemic, and it was common to offer rent abatements and
concessions to retain existing tenants and attract prospective
tenants. The loan is currently in cash management due to a DSCR
trigger, although significant excess cash, if any at all, is not
expected to have been reserved given that the loan has been
reporting less than 1.0x for the last several years.

According to Reis, multifamily properties in the Upper West Side
submarket reported a YE2022 vacancy rate of 3.8% with a projected
five-year forecast vacancy rate of 2.5%. Given the decline in
performance and increased refinance risk with the upcoming
scheduled loan maturity, DBRS Morningstar applied an elevated
probability of default penalty adjustment in the analysis of this
loan to increase the expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



JP MORGAN 2023-3: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to JP Morgan Mortgage
Trust 2023-3 (JPMMT 2023-3).

   Entity/Debt     Rating                   Prior
   -----------     ------                   -----
JPMMT 2023-3

   A-1         LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-1-A       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-1-B       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-1-C       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-1-X       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-2         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-3         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-3-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-3-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-3-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9-A       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9-B       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9-C       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9-X       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10        LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10-A      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10-B      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10-C      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10-X      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-11        LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-11-A      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-11-B      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-11-C      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-11-X      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-12        LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-12-A      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-12-B      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-12-C      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-12-X      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-13        LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-13-A      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-13-B      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-13-C      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-13-X      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-14        LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-14-A      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-14-B      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-14-C      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-14-X      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-15        LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-15-A      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-15-B      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-15-C      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-15-X      LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-X-1       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-X-2       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-X-3       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-X-4       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   A-X-5       LT AA+sf  New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
   B-1         LT AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
   B-2         LT A-sf   New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
   B-3         LT BBB-sf New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
   B-4         LT BB-sf  New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
   B-5         LT B-sf   New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
   B-6         LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has assigned final ratings to the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2023-3 (JPMMT
2023-3) as indicated. The certificates are supported by 374 loans
with a total balance of approximately $424.34 million as of the
cutoff date. The pool consists of prime-quality fixed-rate
mortgages from various mortgage originators.

The pool consists of loans mainly originated by United Wholesale
Mortgage, LLC (57.5%) with the remaining 42.5% of the loans
originated by various originators, each contributing less than 10%
to the pool. The loan-level representations and warranties are
provided by the various originators, Maxex or Verus (aggregators).

NewRez LLC (f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC), d/b/a Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint), will act as interim servicer for
approximately 30.5% of the pool from the closing date until the
servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
June 1, 2023. After the servicing transfer date, these mortgage
loans will be serviced by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
(Chase). Since Chase will service these loans after the transfer
date, Fitch performed its analysis assuming Chase is the servicer
for these loans.

The other main servicer in the transaction is United Wholesale
Mortgage, LLC (servicing 57.5% of the loans); the remaining 12.0%
of the loans are being serviced by various servicers, each
contributing less than 10% to the pool. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar) will be the master servicer.

99.8% of the loans qualify as safe-harbor qualified mortgage
(SHQM), or QM safe-harbor (average prime offer rate [APOR]); the
remaining 0.2% qualify as QM rebuttable presumption (APOR).

There is no exposure to LIBOR in this transaction. The collateral
comprises 100% fixed-rate loans, and the certificates are
fixed-rate and capped at the net weighted average coupon (WAC) or
based on the net WAC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 6.2% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
7.8% on a national level as of March 2023, down 2.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in Q3 2022. Driven
by the strong gains seen in H1 2022, home prices rose 5.8% yoy
nationally as of December 2022.

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of
high-quality, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans with maturities of
up to 30 years. 99.8% of the loans qualify as safe-harbor qualified
mortgage (SHQM) or QM safe-harbor (average prime offer rate
[APOR]); the remaining 0.2% qualify as QM rebuttable presumption
(APOR). The loans were made to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid reserves.

The loans are seasoned at an average of nine months, according to
Fitch (seven months per the transaction documents). The pool has a
WA original FICO score of 755, as determined by Fitch, which is
indicative of very high credit quality borrowers. Approximately
59.3%, as determined by Fitch, of the loans have a borrower with an
original FICO score equal to or above 750. In addition, the
original WA combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 74.9%,
translating to a sustainable loan-to-value (sLTV) ratio of 77.5%,
represents moderate borrower equity in the property and reduced
default risk compared with a borrower with a CLTV over 80%.

A 96.0% portion of the pool comprises nonconforming loans, while
the remaining 4.0% represents conforming loans. All of the loans
are designated as QM loans, with 46.3% of the pool originated by a
retail and correspondent channel.

Of the pool, 100.0% comprises loans where the borrower maintains a
primary or secondary residence. Single-family homes, planned unit
developments (PUDs) and single-family attached dwellings constitute
92.8% of the pool; condominiums and site condos make up 5.8%;
co-ops make up 0.1% and multifamily homes make up 1.3%. The pool
consists of loans with the following loan purposes: purchases
(77.1%), cashout refinances (18.2%) and rate-term refinances
(4.7%). Fitch views favorably that there are no loans to investment
properties and the majority of the mortgages are purchases.

A total of 211 loans in the pool are over $1.0 million, and the
largest loan is approximately $2.95 million.

Of the pool, 31.5% is concentrated in California. The largest MSA
concentration is in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA
(11.9%), followed by the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL MSA
(7.2%) and New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA
(5.6%). The top three MSAs account for 25% of the pool. As a
result, there was no probability of default (PD) penalty applied
for geographic concentration.

Shifting-Interest Structure with Full Advancing (Mixed): The
mortgage cash flow and loss allocation are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps to maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the
transaction. The applicable credit support percentage feature
redirects subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if
specified credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

The servicers will provide full advancing for the life of the
transaction; each servicer is expected to advance delinquent P&I on
loans that enter into a coronavirus pandemic-related forbearance
plan. Although full P&I advancing will provide liquidity to the
certificates, it will also increase the loan-level loss severity
(LS) since the servicer looks to recoup P&I advances from
liquidation proceeds, which results in less recoveries.

Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicer
is unable to do so. If the master servicer is unable to advance,
then the securities administrator (Citibank) will advance.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 2.30%
has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and loss
exposure for senior tranches as the pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. Additionally, a junior
subordination floor of 1.30% has been considered to mitigate
potential tail-end risk and loss exposure for subordinate tranches
as the pool size declines and performance volatility increases due
to adverse loan selection and small loan count concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the
state and national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for
the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
home prices.

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model-projected 39.0% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC and Clayton. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on four areas: compliance review,
credit review, valuation review and data integrity. Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and, as a result, Fitch
decreased its loss expectations by 0.32% at the 'AAAsf' stress due
to 100% due diligence with no material findings.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, and Clayton were engaged to perform the review. Loans
reviewed under this engagement were given compliance, credit and
valuation grades and assigned initial grades for each subcategory.
Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due diligence
reports.

Fitch also utilized data files provided by the issuer on its SEC
Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received loan level
information based on the ResiPLS data layout format, and the data
are considered comprehensive. The data contained in the ResiPLS
layout data tape was reviewed by the due diligence companies, and
no material discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

JPMMT 2023-3 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4+' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled
for in JPMMT 2023-3, including strong transaction due diligence, an
'Above Average' aggregator, the majority of the pool originated by
an 'Above Average' originator, and the majority of the pool being
serviced by an 'RPS1-' servicer. All of these attributes have a
positive impact on the credit profile that resulted in a reduction
in expected losses and are relevant to the ratings in conjunction
with other factors.

Although this transaction has loans purchased in connection with
the sponsor's Elevate Diversity and Inclusion program or the
sponsor's Clean Energy program, Fitch did not take these programs
into consideration when assigning an ESG Relevance Score, as the
programs did not directly affect the expected losses assigned or
were not relevant to the rating, in Fitch's view.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C26: DBRS Cut Rating on Cl. E Certs to B(low)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded its ratings on two classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C26 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C26 as follows:

-- Class X-E to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to B (low) (sf) from B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed its ratings on the
following 13 classes:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes D, E, X-D, and X-E
to Negative from Stable, while Class F has a rating that does not
typically carry a trend in commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) ratings. The trends on all other classes are Stable.

The rating actions reflect an increase in DBRS Morningstar's loss
expectations for loans in special servicing, primarily driven by
the Heron Lakes (Prospectus ID#4; 4.5% of the pool) loan, as
further described below, and the higher-than-expected realized loss
attributed to one loan that has been disposed from the pool since
the last rating action.

At the last rating action in November 2022, DBRS Morningstar
downgraded Class F and changed the trends on Classes D and E to
Stable from Negative as two loans were liquidated from the trust
with an implied loss of $37.3 million, which was less than 70% of
the outstanding balance for the non-rated Class NR at the time. As
part of the analysis for this review, DBRS Morningstar liquidated
two loans in special servicing from the trust, resulting in an
implied loss of approximately $47.7 million. DBRS Morningstar's
projected losses would deplete more than 95% of the outstanding
principal balance of the nonrated Class NR and significantly erode
the credit support provided to Classes D through F.

The rating actions also reflect the overall increased credit risk
to the certificates, as a result of additional concerns for select
loans on the servicer's watchlist and the pool's concentration of
office properties, which total 40.2% of the current pool balance.
In general, DBRS Morningstar's outlook for the office sector has
deteriorated in recent months as vacancy rates in many submarkets
remain elevated because of a shift in workplace dynamics leading
companies opting for remote and hybrid environments to vacate their
spaces entirely or reduce their footprint at or prior to their
lease expiration dates. Loans secured by office properties had a
weighted-average expected loss that was 26% higher than the pool
expected loss, excluding Heron Lakes.

The rating confirmations reflect the otherwise stable performance
of the transaction, with the remaining loans in the pool having
experienced minimal changes since DBRS Morningstar's last review.
As of the March 2023 remittance, 52 of the original 69 loans remain
in the trust with an aggregate principal balance of $1.01 billion,
reflecting collateral reduction of 30.1% since issuance. In
addition, 15 loans, representing 26.0% of the pool, are secured by
collateral that has fully defeased. To date, three loans have been
liquidated from the pool with realized losses totaling $8.2
million, which have been contained to the nonrated Class NR
certificate. Nine loans, representing 22.5% of the pool, are on the
servicer's watchlist, and two loans, representing 6.6% of the pool,
are in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan and largest contributor to DBRS
Morningstar's loss projections for the pool, Heron Lakes
(Prospectus ID#4; 4.6% of the pool), is secured by seven Class A
office buildings in the West Belt submarket of Houston. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in December 2018 after the
borrower filed for bankruptcy. The asset has been real estate owned
since February 2020, when the lender foreclosed on the property.
Although the pandemic has been the most significant contributor to
recent cash flow declines, it is noteworthy that the portfolio has
underperformed since 2018, primarily as a result of tenant losses
and increasing vacancy rates within the subject's submarket.
Performance has consistently lagged issuance expectations with the
occupancy rate and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) declining
from 98.2% and 1.19 times (x) at issuance to 58.0% and -0.05x,
respectively, as of October 2021.

The servicer marketed the properties for sale and reportedly
received a purchase offer, which was subsequently terminated during
the due diligence period. The collateral was last appraised in
December 2022 at a value of $22.7 million, down significantly from
the 2019 appraisal value of $58.0 million and the issuance
appraisal value of $71.0 million. Based on a haircut to the most
recent valuation, DBRS Morningstar assumed a full loss for this
loan.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is 1515 Market. The
loan is secured by a 502,213-square foot office property in the
central business district of Philadelphia. The loan was added to
the servicer's watchlist in January 2023 following declines in
occupancy rate and DSCR, which fell to 74.0% and 0.96x,
respectively, as of YE2022, down from 79% and 1.19x, respectively,
at YE2021 and 83% and 1.47x at YE 2020, respectively. The decline
in performance is largely because of the departure of the former
second largest tenant, Heffler Radetich & Saitta LLP, representing
approximately 4% of net rentable area (NRA) at their lease
expiration in August 2021. According to the October 2022 rent roll,
there is minimal near-term rollover risk. Tenants occupying 5.6% of
the NRA including the third-largest tenant, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (3.0% of NRA; lease expiry in May 2023) have leases
set to expire in 2023, and tenants occupying 3.0% of NRA have
leases set to expire in 2024. DBRS Morningstar's analysis included
an elevated probability of default for this loan, as well as an LTV
adjustment to reflect the probable value decline of the collateral
since issuance. The resulting expected loss was approximately
150.1% higher than the pool average.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C25: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on all classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C25 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-C25 as follows:

-- Class A-4A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

The trends on Classes C, EC, D, E, X-C, X-D, and X-E were changed
to Negative from Stable. The trends on the remaining classes are
Stable, with the exception of Class F, which has a rating that does
not carry a trend.

The Negative trends primarily reflect DBRS Morningstar's increasing
concerns surrounding the pool's exposure to the office space sector
and the potential refinance risk of certain loans given their
upcoming 2024 scheduled maturities. The pool is most concentrated
by office properties, which represent 38.4% of the pool, including
the City Place (Prospectus ID #1; 11.6% of the pool) and 9525 West
Bryn Mawr Ave (Prospectus ID#10; 2.9% of the pool) loans. For this
review, DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of default (POD)
assumptions for these two loans, given the increased risks of
either tenant rollover or increased vacancy rate. Office space
supply is on the rise because of low space utilization amid the
pandemic and the resulting change in workers' preferences, a
dynamic that has led to an increase in office space being offered
for sublease and tenants downsizing or vacating.

One of the office loans that DBRS Morningstar has particular
concerns about, 9525 West Bryn Mawr Ave, was added to the
servicer's watchlist in August 2022 for performance-related issues
following the departure Life Fitness (32.7% of the net rentable
area (NRA)), which vacated its space upon lease expiration at
YE2021. The loan is secured by a 246,841 square foot (sf) office
property in Rosemont, Illinois. As a result of the increased
vacancy rate, financials have plummeted, most recently reporting a
net cash flow (NCF) of -$314,190 and a debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.37 times (x) for the trailing six months ended June 30,
2022, compared with the NCF of $3.8 million and DSCR of 2.19x for
YE2021, and the NCF of $2.7 million and DSCR of 1.55x for YE2020.

According to the servicer's commentary, however, the borrower has
had some recent leasing momentum, signing Chicago Mortgage (22.4%
of NRA) to a short-term lease through June 2025 and re-signing Life
Fitness (22.8% of NRA) to a portion of its former space through
February 2030 (the Life Fitness lease is currently with the
servicer for consent). With both tenants in place, this would boost
the property's occupancy rate to approximately 73.0%. According to
Q4 2022 Reis data, office properties in the O'Hare submarket
reported an average effective rental rate of $21.22 per square foot
(psf) and an average asking rental rate of $27.59 psf, compared
with the subject property's average in-place rental rate of $17.28
psf, which is exclusive of Life Fitness' rent upon lease execution.
Reis also reported that the O'Hare submarket had a vacancy rate of
22.8%, an increase over the YE2021 and YE2020 rates of 22.0% and
22.5%, respectively. Given the performance declines coupled with
the soft submarket conditions, DBRS Morningstar elevated the POD
for this loan to increase its expected loss.

Outside of the office sector exposure discussed above, the rating
confirmations and Stable trends reflect the otherwise continued
performance of the transaction, with the remaining loans in the
pool generally having experienced minimal changes since the last
rating action. As of the March 2023 remittance, 52 of the original
65 loans remain in the trust with an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $885.2 million, representing a collateral reduction
of 25.1% since issuance as a result of loan repayments, scheduled
amortization, and loan liquidations. The pool benefits from 12
loans, representing 15.5% of the pool, that are fully defeased.
Seven loans, representing 10.9% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist and three loans, representing 8.4% of the pool, are in
special servicing.

To date, four loans have been liquidated from the trust with losses
totaling $14.0 million contained to the nonrated Class NR
Certificate, which has been reduced by nearly 30% to $37.4 million.
With this review, DBRS Morningstar maintained its liquidation
approach on two loans, applying haircuts to the most recent
appraisals that result in an implied loss to the trust of
approximately $21.5 million, further eroding the credit support
provided to the more junior classes.

The largest loan in special servicing, Hilton Houston Post Oak
(Prospectus ID#6; 4.6% of the pool) is secured by a luxury hotel in
Houston. The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2020 for
imminent monetary default and has been real estate owned since
September 2022. Although the loan's transfer to special servicing
came with the onset of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic,
the loan was significantly underperforming its issuance
expectations for several years prior to the 2020 default. A
November 2022 appraisal obtained by the servicer valued the
property at $67.5 million, reflecting moderate growth from the
previously reported figures of $65.3 million in 2021 and $57.5
million in 2020, but remaining well below the issuance value of
$126.2 million, reflecting an overall decline in value of 46.5%
since issuance. With this review, DBRS Morningstar maintained its
liquidation of this loan from the trust, with an implied loss of
nearly $17.0 million or a loss severity in excess of 40%.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Southport Plaza
(Prospectus ID#13; 2.8% of the pool), is secured by a 192,080-sf
mixed-use property in Staten Island, New York. The loan transferred
to special servicing in June 2020 for payment default and is
delinquent as of the March 2023 reporting. The lender is currently
negotiating with the borrower to replace the deceased guarantor
while at the same time working to implement a receiver and pursuing
foreclosure. Per the July 2022 rent roll, the property was 86.9%
occupied, above the 82.2% occupancy rate at YE2021, but below the
97.0% rate at issuance. The largest tenants are Supreme (33.6% of
the NRA, lease expiry in December 2026), Conduent (30.7% of the
NRA, lease expiry in March 2024), and VNS Choice (5.5% of the NRA,
lease expiry in June 2027). Three tenants, representing 32.7% of
the NRA, have scheduled lease expirations within the next 12
months, including the second-largest tenant. Additionally, LoopNet
currently lists the space currently occupied by the largest tenant,
Supreme, as available for lease, signaling that tenant's potential
departure prior to lease expiration.

The most recent appraisal obtained by the special servicer is dated
November 2022 and valued the property at $38.4 million, marking a
28.9% decline from the appraised value of $54.0 million at
issuance. Based on the loan's current total exposure and the
November 2022 appraisal, the loan-to-value ratio was still moderate
at 67.0%, however, given that the special servicer's workout
strategy involves a potential foreclosure and with occupancy
concerns about the largest two tenants (combining for 64.3% of the
NRA), DBRS Morningstar remains concerned about the refinance
prospects for this loan, which has had a prolonged time for
resolution. As a result, DBRS Morningstar increased the POD for
this loan in its analysis to increase the loan's expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C31: DBRS Cuts X-D Certs Rating to B(low)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on five classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C31 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-C31 as follows:

-- Class C to BBB (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC to BBB (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C to BBB (high) (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D to B (high) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D to BB (low) (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed its ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class E at CCC (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

Additionally, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes B, C,
D, X-B, X-C, X-D, and EC to Negative from Stable. Classes E and F
have ratings that do not typically carry trends in commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings. The trends on Classes
A-3, A-SB, A-S, and X-A are Stable.

At the last rating action in November 2022, DBRS Morningstar
downgraded Classes E and F to CCC (sf) and C (sf), respectively,
and changed the trends on Classes D and X-D to Stable from
Negative. The rating downgrades with the November 2022 review were
driven by concerns surrounding the largest loan in the pool, the
Civic Opera Building (Prospectus ID#2, 10.3% of the pool), with
losses projected based on a February 2021 appraisal (the most
recent at the time of the review). Since that time, however, a
September 2022 appraisal has been provided, showing further value
decline—that development, along with increased concerns
surrounding the high office concentration (and underperforming
office loans) in this pool support the rating downgrades and
Negative trends with this review. Office properties and mixed-use
properties with some office component back loans representing 32.6%
of the pool balance. Where applicable, DBRS Morningstar applied
probability of default (POD) and/or loan-to-value stresses in the
analysis to increase the expected loss. As a result, the loan-level
expected losses for the office loans averaged a 70% increase over
the expected loss for the pool as a whole.

As of the March 2023 remittance, 51 of the original 58 loans
remained outstanding with a pool balance of approximately $801.6
million, representing a collateral reduction of 22.0% since
issuance. Of the remaining loans, 14 loans, representing 24.4% of
the pool balance, have been fully defeased. Four loans are in
special servicing, totaling 20.0% of the pool balance, including
the two largest office loans in the pool. In addition, 16 loans,
totaling 22.6% of the pool balance, are on the servicer's
watchlist.

The largest loan in special servicing, the Civic Opera Building, is
secured by the borrower's fee-simple interest in a Class B office
property in Chicago's West Loop District. The loan is part of a
pari passu whole loan, with a companion note in the JPMBB 2015-C32
transaction, which is also rated by DBRS Morningstar. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2020 following the
borrower's request for forbearance and has been delinquent since
May 2021. According to the most recent servicer commentary, the
servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

The most recent appraisal obtained by the special servicer, dated
September 2022, valued the property at $159.4 million compared with
the February 2021 value of $165.0 million. At issuance, the
property was valued at $220.0 million. The property's occupancy
rate continues to fall, most recently reported at 63.7% as of
September 2022, when the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
well below breakeven at 0.54 times (x). The tenancy is granular,
with the largest tenant representing less than 8.0% of the net
rentable area, but the submarket is quite soft, particularly for
old, Class B office stock that can't compete with the newer Class A
developments situated in the West Loop. Based on a haircut to the
most recent appraisal and accounting for outstanding and future
advances, DBRS Morningstar assumed a liquidation scenario for this
loan, with a loss severity in excess of 45%.

The second-largest office loan in special servicing, Sunbelt
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#3, 8.2% of the pool), is secured by the
fee-simple interests in a portfolio of three office properties in
Birmingham, Alabama, and Columbia, South Carolina. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2022 for imminent
monetary default; the most recent commentary suggests an agreement
has been reached with the borrower, and the loan is expected to
return to the master servicer in the near term. The portfolio has
experienced precipitous occupancy declines in recent years, with
the most recent figure showing the properties were 71.5% occupied
as of September 2022. Because of the declining occupancy, cash
flows have fallen with the September 2022 DSCR at 1.15x, down from
1.34x in YE2021. The portfolio's location within secondary and
tertiary markets will likely trim demand as the sponsor works to
build occupancy and recover lost cash flow—these issues will
further stress the possibilities for a refinance at loan maturity
next year. As such, in the analysis for this review, DBRS
Morningstar applied a POD stress to increase the expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 3 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C20 issued by JPMCC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C20 as follows:

-- Class A-4A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class EC at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at CCC (sf)
-- Class E at C (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)
-- Class G at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exceptions of Classes D, E, F, and
G, which have ratings that do not carry a trend.

As of the March 2023 remittance, 21 of the original 37 loans remain
in the trust, with an aggregate balance of approximately $496.2
million, representing a collateral reduction of 43.5% since
issuance. Five loans are fully defeased, representing 9.9% of the
pool balance. One loan is with the special servicer, representing
8.3% of the pool balance. Four loans are on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 19.2% of the pool balance. The transaction
is concentrated by property type with 49.0% of the loans in the
pool collateralized by retail properties and 27.9% of the pool
backed by office properties. Loans backed by office properties were
generally stressed given the proximity to maturity and low investor
appetite for the property type, with a resulting weighted-average
expected loss that was approximately 60% higher than the expected
loss for the pool as a whole.

The Lincoln Town Center loan (Prospectus ID#4, 8.3% of the pool
balance) is in special servicing and is backed by a regional mall
in the northern Chicago suburb of Lincolnwood, Illinois. The
property became real estate owned (REO) in August 2021. The largest
tenants at the subject include Kohl's (24.2% of the net rentable
area (NRA), lease expiry in January 2024) and The Room Place (20.0%
of the NRA, lease expiry in August 2029). The most recent appraisal
reported by the servicer, dated May 2022, valued the property at
$15.2 million, a drastic decline from the issuance value of $89.1
million. DBRS Morningstar's liquidation scenario for this loan,
which assumed a 20% haircut to the May 2022 value and considered
outstanding and expected future advances, suggested a loss in
excess of 100% could be realized at disposition.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is 200 West Monroe
(Prospectus ID#6, 9.5% of the pool balance), which is secured by a
23-story, Class B office property in Chicago. The loan has been
monitored for performance declines related to occupancy losses over
the last several years. According to the September 2022 rent roll,
the property was 70.1% occupied, down from 84.2% at issuance, with
a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) at Q3 2022 of 0.98 times (x).
The subject benefits from a granular tenant roster, with no tenant
representing more than 6.3% of the NRA and near-term rollover is
limited with tenants representing less than 10.0% of the NRA
scheduled to expire in the next year. Per a Reis report from Q4
2022, office properties within the Central Loop submarket reported
a vacancy rate of 14.2% with a projected five-year vacancy rate of
13.7%. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated
probability of default (POD) penalty and loan-to-value ratio (LTV),
reflecting the increased risks since issuance. The resulting
expected loss was approximately 180% higher than the pool average.

The Westminster Mall pari passu loan (Prospectus ID#11, 4.6% of the
pool balance) is secured by a regional mall in Orange County,
California, and is on the servicer's watchlist for performance
declines following the loss of former noncollateral anchors Sears
and Macy's. The empty noncollateral anchor boxes have reportedly
been acquired by Shopoff Realty and Investments' (Shopoff), with
the Westminster City Council reported to have approved new
framework for the redevelopment of those two sites as of December
2022. The mall is in a densely populated area that should support a
variety of options for those parcels.

According to the September 2022 rent roll, the collateral portion
of the property reported an occupancy rate of 87.2%, slightly below
the YE2021 occupancy rate of 90.5%. At YE2019, prior to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the property reported an
occupancy rate of approximately 95.0%. There is a moderate amount
of rollover risk of 8.1% in the next 12 months. According to the
most recent financial reporting, the loan reported a trailing
nine-month ended September 30, 2022, DSCR of 0.16x compared with
YE2021, YE2020, and YE2019 DSCRs of 0.37x, 0.89x, and 1.21x,
respectively. Despite the low cash flows, the loan has been kept
current; DBRS Morningstar expects the sponsor's commitment is
likely related to the redevelopment value for the property given
the Shopoff acquisition and plans for the vacant anchor spaces.
However, the near-term maturity will likely require the sponsor,
Washington Prime Group, to come out of pocket to repay the trust
loan and it is unclear what the sponsor's financial position is
given the firm was taken private after filing for bankruptcy in
2021. Given these risks, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with a
significantly stressed POD penalty, with the resulting expected
loss almost three times the pool average.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2016-JP2: DBRS Cuts Class F Certs Rating to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on the following two classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-JP2
issued by JPMCC Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-JP2:

-- Class E to B (high) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes C, D, X-C, and
E to Stable from Negative and removed the trend on Class F, which
is assigned a rating that does not typically carry trends in
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings. All remaining
classes carry Stable trends.

The rating downgrades are reflective of DBRS Morningstar's concerns
about the specially serviced loan, 693 Fifth Avenue (Prospectus
ID#3; 6.8% of the pool), as well as increased risks for the
second-largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Hagerstown Premium
Outlets (Prospectus ID#9; 3.3% of the pool).

The subject pool has a notable concentration of office properties
(24.4% of the outstanding balance). Given the shift in demand for
office space following the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic,
DBRS Morningstar anticipates upward pressure on vacancy rates in
the broader office market, challenging efforts to backfill
vacancies and contributing to the larger trend of value declines,
particularly for assets in non-core markets and/or those with
disadvantages in location, building quality, or amenities offered.
In the analysis for this review, loans backed by office and other
properties that were showing performance declines from issuance or
otherwise exhibiting increased risks from issuance were analyzed
with stressed scenarios to increase the expected losses as
applicable.

Two office loans on the servicer's watchlist, 7083 Hollywood
Boulevard (Prospectus ID#11; 2.6% of the pool) and 700 17th Street
(Prospectus ID#12; 2.4% of the pool), were analyzed with a stressed
probability of default (POD) to reflect performance declines driven
by occupancy losses for both collateral buildings. According to the
financials for the year to date ended September 30, 2022, the debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the 7083 Hollywood Boulevard loan
was reported at -0.66 times (x) with a 50.4% occupancy rate, while
the reported figures for 700 17th Street were 0.05x and 52.3%,
respectively. The 700 17th Street loan was also reported less than
30 days delinquent as of the March 2023 remittance. DBRS
Morningstar's stressed analysis for these loans resulted in
expected loss figures that were approximately 175% higher than the
pool average expected loss.

The rating confirmations and the trend changes for three classes
reflect the generally stable performance of the underlying loans,
outside of those loans previously mentioned. DBRS Morningstar
previously noted its concerns about one of the top 10 loans
previously in special servicing, Marriott Atlanta Buckhead
(Prospectus ID#4; 5.9% of the pool). The loan was returned to the
master servicer as of October 2022 after a loan modification was
executed, requiring the borrower to provide approximately $500,000
in new equity to establish reserves and bring the loan current. The
underlying hotel's performance remains depressed, but cash flows
are trending up. Given that the DSCR remains below breakeven and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) metrics continue to
significantly lag the issuance figure, a stressed analysis was
applied with the resulting expected loss at approximately 5% over
the pool average.

According to the March 2023 remittance, 43 of the original 47 loans
remain in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of $845.8
million, representing a collateral reduction of 9.3% since issuance
as a result of scheduled loan amortization and loan repayments.
Eight loans, representing 18.9% of the pool, are fully defeased.
Fourteen loans, representing 27.4% of the pool, are on the
servicer's watchlist for low DSCR and/or occupancy rates.

The specially-serviced 693 Fifth Avenue loan is secured by a
mixed-use office and retail property in Midtown Manhattan. The loan
has been monitored since the property's largest retail tenant at
issuance, Valentino, which occupied approximately 15.1% of the net
rentable area (NRA) and contributed more than 80% of rental income,
vacated its space and initiated legal action against the borrower
in June 2020. The legal action was an attempt to nullify
Valentino's lease, which was set to expire in 2029. The borrower
filed suit to collect the back rents and, according to an April
2022 Real Deal article, Valentino has settled the rent dispute for
an undisclosed sum, finalizing its lease termination. Since
Valentino's departure, occupancy has been holding at approximately
51.5% since YE2020, with an average annual rental rate of $57.09
per square foot (psf). However, according to the special servicer,
a new retail lease for Burberry Limited (Burberry) has been
approved. The improvement in cash flows will be limited, however,
as the leased rate of $372 psf for Burberry contrasts starkly with
Valentino's in-place rate at issuance of $1,144 psf and is also
notably below the Q4 2022 average asking rent of $615 psf for
Manhattan's retail corridors, according to CBRE.

Although the loan has remained current since Valentino's exit with
the sponsor continuously funding shortfalls, DBRS Morningstar notes
that the property was reporting low cash flows because of declining
occupancy even prior to the pandemic. The net cash flow for the
trailing nine months (T-9) ended September 30, 2022, was reported
at -$4.8 million (with a DSCR of -0.31x), down from $274,000 (with
a DSCR of 0.02x) at YE2021, and well below the issuance figure of
$15.7 million (with a DSCR of 1.55x). Given these factors and the
below-market rental rate for Burberry, a stressed scenario was
assumed for this loan to increase the expected loss.

The Hagerstown Premium Outlets loan is secured by an open-air
retail outlet center in Hagerstown, Maryland, approximately 70
miles northwest of Washington, D.C. The property is owned and
operated by Simon Property Group. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist because of low performance as the occupancy rate has been
precipitously declining in recent years, most notably beginning
with the loss of Nike Factory Store in 2019 and Wolf's Furniture in
2020, both anchor stores. As of the September 2022 financials, the
property was 42.2% occupied compared with 44.5% at YE2021 and 90.4%
at issuance. The DSCR for the T-9 ended September 30, 2022, was
reported at 0.64x, compared with the DSCR of 0.90x at YE2021 and
the DSCR of 3.20x at issuance. Near-term rollover risk is high,
with the second- and third-largest tenants (Banana Republic Factory
and The North Face, respectively), included among the tenants
representing 14.0% of the NRA that have leases expiring in 2023.
Although this loan is current, DBRS Morningstar considered a
liquidation scenario given the very low in-place occupancy rate and
the related decline in as-is value since issuance. Based on a
significant haircut to the issuance value, DBRS Morningstar
analyzed a loss severity in excess of 35% for this loan.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated one loan, The Shops at
Crystals (Prospectus ID#6; 5.9% of the pool), as investment grade.
This assessment was supported by the loan's above-average property
quality and strong sponsorship. With this review, DBRS Morningstar
confirms that the performance of the loan remains consistent with
investment-grade characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-3: S&P Affirms CC(sf) Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes, lowered its
ratings on three classes, and affirmed its ratings on nine classes
from three Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
transactions. These transactions are asset-backed securitizations
backed by payments from small business loans primarily
collateralized by first-liens on commercial real estate. The
transactions are serviced by PHH Mortgage Corp. (formerly Ocwen
Loan Servicing LLC).

S&P summarizes each transaction's performance below.

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1

According to the February 2023 servicer report, the transaction has
paid down to a pool factor of 2.85%, with 43 loans outstanding. The
total pool balance is $9.3 million, the reserve account is $4.8
million, and the outstanding certificate balance is $4.4 million.
The performing pool balance is also $9.3 million, as there are no
90-plus-day delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed, or real estate-owned
(REO) loans. Cumulative realized losses are 13.65% of the original
pool balance, and 16.3% of the pool is delinquent. The class B
certificates are covered by performing collateral combined with the
reserve fund for a total of $14.0 million, which provides 3.16x
coverage of the outstanding certificate balance.

Overcollateralization comprises approximately 52.1% of the current
performing collateral balance. The reserve account is at its
target, which is the ending certificate balance of the prior period
and equates to 107.0% of the outstanding certificate balance. Since
this transaction is below the 10.0% pool factor threshold, the
reserve fund target is reset monthly to the lesser of the
certificate balance at the end of the prior payment period and the
reserve fund account balance. There are no interest shortfalls or
carry-forward interest. S&P upgraded our rating on the class B
certificates to 'AA (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' given the significant
improvement in credit enhancement.

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1

According to the February 2023 servicer report, the transaction has
paid down to a pool factor of 5.94%, with 56 loans remaining in the
pool with an outstanding balance of $19.4 million, and the total
outstanding certificate balance of $40.6 million. The performing
balance, defined as outstanding collateral excluding 90-plus-day
delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed, and REO loans is $16.2 million.
Cumulative realized losses are 24.5% of the original pool balance.
The reserve account is depleted, and the transaction is currently
undercollateralized, with the certificate balance exceeding the
collateral balance by 52.2% (i.e., classes M2, M3, M4, and B do not
have sufficient collateral to cover their full outstanding
balance). Total delinquencies are 1.1% of the pool balance, 3.03%
of the pool are bankruptcy loans, 9.05% are foreclosed loans, and
4.67% are REO loans.

S&P said, "We affirmed our 'BBB- (sf)' ratings on classes 1A and
2A3, which are both receiving principal and interest. We affirmed
our 'CCC (sf)' rating on class M1, which is receiving interest and
is fully collateralized. We affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating on
class M2 because interest payments are still current and there are
no accumulated interest or principal shortfalls, though sufficient
collateral is lacking to support its full outstanding balance. We
downgraded our rating on class M3 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'
because there is insufficient collateral to support its certificate
balance and it is not receiving interest. We affirmed our 'CC (sf)'
ratings on classes M4 and B for the same reasons."

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3

According to the February 2023 servicer report, the transaction has
paid down to a pool factor of 7.23% of the original balance, with
148 loans remaining in the pool with an outstanding balance of
$50.6 million, and the outstanding certificate balance of $94.5
million. The performing balance, defined as outstanding collateral
excluding 90-plus-day delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed, and REO
loans is $46.8 million. Cumulative realized losses are 20.5% of the
original pool balance. The reserve account is depleted, and the
transaction is undercollateralized, with the certificate balance
exceeding the collateral balance by 46.4% (i.e., classes M2, M3,
M4, M5, and B do not have sufficient collateral to cover their full
outstanding balance). Total delinquencies are 3.80% of the pool
balance, and 6.98% of the pool consists of bankrupt and foreclosed
loans; there are no REO loans.

Currently, classes M1 and M2 are receiving interest, and class M1
is receiving principal payments. Neither class M1 nor class M2 have
any carryforward interest amounts. S&P said, "We raised our rating
on class M1 to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)' because it is covered by
performing collateral, which provides 2.7x coverage of the
outstanding certificate balance. We affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on class M2, which, though undercollateralized, is still receiving
interest and has no accumulated interest or principal shortfalls.
The class M3, M4, M5, and B certificates are not receiving any
principal or interest and have significant carry-forward amounts.
Therefore, we downgraded our ratings on classes M3 and M4 to 'CC
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)', and we affirmed our 'CC (sf)' ratings on
classes M5 and B."

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the certificates remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and it will take further
rating actions as we deem necessary.

  Ratings Raised

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust2006-1

   Class B to 'AA (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3

   Class M1 to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)'


  Ratings Lowered

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1

   Class M3 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3

   Class M3 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'
   Class M4 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'

  Ratings Affirmed

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1

   Class 1A: BBB- (sf)
   Class 2A3: BBB- (sf)
   Class M1: CCC (sf)
   Class M2: CCC- (sf)
   Class M4: CC (sf)
   Class B: CC (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3

   Class M2: CCC- (sf)
   Class M5: CC (sf)
   Class B: CC (sf)





MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on nine
classes and placed seven classes on review for downgrade in Morgan
Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C9, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C9 as follows:

Cl. A-S, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 4, 2023 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 4, 2023 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 4, 2023 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 4, 2023 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2023
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2023
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2023
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2023 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. PST, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 4, 2023 Downgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 4, 2023 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 4, 2023 Downgraded to A3
(sf)

*Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes, Cl. B through Cl. H, were
downgraded due to the increase in interest shortfalls caused by the
non-recoverability determination of the largest loan in the pool,
the Milford Plaza Fee loan (51% of the pool). The loan is in
special servicing and was deemed non-recoverable as of the April
2023 remittance date. The loan has incurred significant loan
advances and was last paid through its April 2020 payment date.
Additionally, several other loans in the pool were unable to
pay-off at their scheduled maturity dates and may pose further risk
of additional interest shortfalls and higher potential losses.

The rating on the P&I class, Cl. A-S, was placed on review for
possible downgrade, and the ratings on three P&I classes that were
downgraded, Cl. B, Cl. C and Cl. D, were also placed on review for
possible downgrade due to the current spike in interest shortfalls
and the potential for increased interest shortfalls as well as the
uncertainty of payoffs for the remaining loans in the pool.

The rating on the interest only (IO) class X-A was placed on review
for possible downgrade due to its referenced P&I class that is
placed on review for possible downgrade.

The rating on the IO Cl. X-B was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit quality of its referenced classes and was also placed on
review for possible downgrade due to its referenced P&I classes
that are placed on review for possible downgrade.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PST, was downgraded based
on principal paydowns of higher quality reference exchangeable
classes and a decline in the credit quality of its referenced
exchangeable classes. Cl. PST was also placed on review for
possible downgrade due to its referenced exchangeable P&I classes
that are placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 17.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 14.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 6.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 51% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 2% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 75% to $321.1
million from $1.28 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 51%
of the pool. One loan, 51% of the pool is in special servicing, and
seven additional loans, (28% of the pool) have either recently
passed their original maturity dates or have a maturity date in May
2023.

No loans have liquidated from the pool with a loss, however, an
aggregate realized loss of $17.8 million has been incurred due to
the reimbursement for non-recoverable advances on the specially
serviced loan, Milford Plaza Fee Loan ($165 million -- 51.4% of the
pool). As of the April 2023 remittance date, the loan remained last
paid through April 2020 and has incurred $46 million of outstanding
servicer advances. The outstanding advances are expected to
decrease based on the servicer's reimbursement for non-recoverable
loan advances mentioned above.

As of the April 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $1.8 million and impact up to Cl. D. Moody's
anticipates interest shortfalls will continue on CL. D because of
the non-recoverable determination on the Milford Plaza Fee loan as
well as the potential for additional loans to transfer to special
servicing if they are unable to payoff at or near their scheduled
maturity dates. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing
fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement
reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust
expenses.

The specially serviced loan is the Milford Plaza Fee Loan ($165
million -- 51.4% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
portion of a $275 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the
ground interest underlying the Row Hotel, a 1,331 key full service
hotel located on 8th avenue in New York City. The ground lease
commenced in 2013 and runs through 2112, and has annual CPI
increases. The loan transferred to the special servicer in June
2020 due to payment default on the ground rent due to the
significant decline in performance of the non-collateral hotel
improvements. As of the April 2023 remittance date, the loan
incurred significant loan advances due to ongoing litigation and
pursuit of foreclosure on the leasehold improvements as well as the
ground lease hotel tenant failing to remit cash flow. The loan had
not received any prior appraisal reduction amounts due to the most
recent appraisal values remaining above the outstanding mortgage
loan  balance. Special servicer commentary indicates they are dual
tracking foreclosure with workout discussions and that a prior
proposed sale and loan assumption (which would have collapsed the
ground lease and allowed the new owner to directly control the
hotel) failed to materialize. Moody's analysis considered the value
of the non-collateral improvements that the leased fee interest
underlies when assessing the risk of the loan, as the subject loan
is senior to any debt on the improvements. Due to the recent
non-recoverability determination, delinquent payment status,
significant servicer advances and decline in performance of the
non-collateral hotel property, Moody's has assumed a moderate loss
on this loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 1.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $49.2 million (a 28.9% expected loss on
average) from these specially serviced and troubled loans.

The top three non-specially serviced loans represent 17% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Dartmouth Mall Loan ($53.2
million -- 16.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 530,800 square
foot (SF) component of a 671,000 SF regional mall located in
Dartmouth, MA. The mall is anchored by a non-collateral Macy's, and
the collateral is anchored by JC Penny's and an AMC theatre. A
108,000 SF Sear's closed in 2019, but was partially backfilled by
Burlington. The loan sponsor, PREIT, classified the property in the
"Top 6 Malls" under its "Core" malls in its fourth quarter
financial statements. As of year-end 2022, the property was 98%
occupied, the same as at year-end 2020. The property's 2022 NOI was
25% higher than in 2013 and the loan has amortized more than 20%
since securitization. The loan failed to pay off at its scheduled
maturity date in April 2023 but remains current on its monthly debt
service payments, with a NOI DSCR of 2.14X as of December 2022.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 1.05X, respectively,
unchanged from the last review.

The second largest loan is the Apthorp Retail Condominium Loan
($53.0 million -- 16.5% of the pool), which is secured by the
12,850 SF ground floor retail portion interest of the Apthorp, a 12
story condo building that is historically landmarked in New York
City. The collateral sits along Broadway between 79th and 78th
streets. The largest tenant is a Chase Bank Branch, occupying 56%
of property NRA through 2029. Occupancy has fluctuated in recent
years, with a low of 63% at year-end 2020. Two new tenants signed
leases during 2021, bringing occupancy to 75%, however, the 2022
year-end NOI DSCR was still only 0.72X. The loan has amortized 18%
since securitization and the loan matures in March 2033. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 137% and 0.67X, respectively, unchanged
from the last review.

The third largest loan is the South Loop Shops Loan ($13.5 million
-- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 62,265 SF retail space
and parking garage component located in Chicago, IL. The property
was reported to be 78% occupied as of the October 2022 servicer
site inspection. The borrower has requested a three month extension
of the maturity date based on a possible sale of the property. The
loan has amortized 19% and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95%
and 1.20X, respectively, unchanged from the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-150E: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-150E issued by
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2014-150E as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmation reflects the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. Despite concerns surrounding the weakened office
market conditions and the underlying loan's near-term maturity in
September 2024, the collateral property benefits from strong
investment-grade tenancy and a favorable location within Midtown
Manhattan. In addition, the loan benefits from a significant amount
of reserves on hand with the servicer.

The $525.0 million transaction is secured by the leasehold interest
and sub-leasehold interest in 150 East 42nd Street, a 42-story
Class A office tower totaling 1.7 million square feet (sf) located
directly across from Grand Central Terminal. The tower occupies the
entire block bounded by Lexington Avenue, East 42nd Street, Third
Avenue, and East 41st Street. The total debt stack of $700 million
includes a $175 million mezzanine loan that is co-terminus with the
trust's interest-only 10-year loan. The ground lease spans 99
years, expiring in 2113, and the borrower sub-ground leases the
entire parcel to a condominium board, which created a 47-unit
condominium, with the sub-ground lease expiring in 2046. Currently,
the borrower is paying an annual ground rent payment of $21.9
million, a figure that will increase to $24.0 million in 2025.

The property was 96.9% occupied as of the October 2022 rent roll,
with investment-grade tenants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo;
rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) (27.0% of the net
rentable area (NRA), lease expiry in December 2028) and Mount Sinai
Hospital (28.8% of the NRA, lease expiry in March 2046). The
third-largest tenant is Dentsu Aegis Network (Dentsu) (12.7% of the
NRA, lease expiry in December 2028). The loan exhibits minimal
near-term rollover risk with tenants representing only 5.8% of the
NRA having lease expirations within the next 12 months. One of the
tenants rolling in the next year includes the fourth-largest
tenant, Marubeni America (5.1% of the NRA, lease expiry in May
2023). The tenant has confirmed its intention to vacate upon lease
expiration in May 2023. Previously, DBRS Morningstar noted concerns
regarding the relocation plans of the two largest tenants. The
servicer verified that it has no knowledge of either tenant either
downsizing or vacating space ahead of the respective lease end
dates.

Based on DBRS Morningstar's concluded value of $506.3 million, the
DBRS Morningstar loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is high, at 104.0%.
However, DBRS Morningstar notes conservative assumptions, including
a cap rate of 8.0% and a cash flow of $40.3 million (based on the
YE2019 figures reported by the servicer), which is less than the
most recently reported figures, as discussed below. In addition,
the DBRS Morningstar value is much less than the appraised value at
issuance of $900.0 million. The 8.0% cap rate is within DBRS
Morningstar's Cap Rate Ranges for office properties and is chosen
based on the property's location and leasehold interest.

According to the most recent financials, the loan reported a debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.85 times (x), compared with the
YE2021 DSCR of 1.82x and DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 1.91x. The
trailing nine months ended September 30, 2022, annualized net cash
flow (NCF) was reported at $42.3 million, compared with YE2021 NCF
of $41.6 million and DBRS Morningstar NCF of $40.3 million.
According to Q4 2022 Reis, the Grand Central submarket reported a
vacancy rate of 12.8% with asking rents of $76.27 per square foot
(psf), compared with YE2021 vacancy of 10.7% with asking rents of
$75.50 psf.

Given the current lending environment, the sponsor could encounter
difficulty securing a replacement loan at maturity in 2024, despite
the stable performance and limited near-term rollover risk. The
loan reports capital and leasing reserves of approximately $10.0
million, and also benefits from a sizable equity injection from the
sponsors at issuance of $260 million, stable cash flow and tenancy
since 2020, and a prime location in the Midtown Manhattan
submarket.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C19: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on all classes of the Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C19 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C19 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class E at B (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Class F, which is
assigned a rating that does not typically carry trends in
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar
expectations. The C (sf) rating on Class F is reflective of DBRS
Morningstar's continued loss expectations for several loans in
special servicing, as discussed below. In addition, the transaction
is concentrated by property type with approximately 28.0% of the
pool secured by office properties, including the largest loan, 300
North LaSalle (Prospectus ID#2, 11.4%). Loans backed by office
properties were generally stressed given the proximity to maturity
and low investor appetite for the property type, with a resulting
weighted-average expected loss that was almost triple the expected
loss for the pool as a whole.

Per the March 2023 remittance, 63 of the original 77 loans remain
in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 28.5% since
issuance as a result of loan amortization, loan repayments, and the
liquidation of six loans from the pool. The liquidation resulted in
a realized loss of $10.8 million, which was contained to the
nonrated Class G. Thirteen loans, representing 16.4% of the current
trust balance, are fully defeased. There are seven loans in special
servicing (11.0% of the current pool balance), three of which are
lodging, two are multifamily, and the remaining two are mixed-use
and retail properties. There are also seven loans (4.8% of the
current pool balance) on the servicer's watchlist.

The largest loan in the pool, 300 North LaSalle, is secured by a
trophy Class A office building in Chicago, Illinois, totalling 1.3
million square feet (sf). According to the YE2022 rent roll, the
property was 92.9% occupied; 21 tenants, representing 23.5% of the
net rentable area (NRA), have leases scheduled to roll in the next
12 months. The largest tenant, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP (Kirkland &
Ellis, 51.5% of NRA), has a lease extending to February 2029 but
has a one-time termination available, effective February 2025, for
which the borrower must provide a 24-month notice and pay a
termination fee of $51.2 million. In August 2021, the Chicago Sun
Times reported that Kirland & Ellis will be relocating from the
subject to the newly constructed Salesforce Tower Chicago at
Wolfpoint, which is expected to open by Spring 2023. This suggests
the tenant may exercise its termination option in the near term to
facilitate the move. DBRS Morningstar has requested an update from
the servicer.

In addition, the second-largest tenant, Boston Consulting Group
(BCG, 11.4% of NRA), is leaving the subject upon its December 2024
lease expiration and relocating to 360 North Green Street, as
reported by The Real Deal in December 2021. However, a potential
replacement tenant, Winston & Strawn, is in discussions with the
borrower to backfill majority of BCG's space. A March 2023 article
from The Real Deal reported that Irvine Company, which is
affiliated with the loan sponsor, is planning to complete a $30
million upgrade to the subject in order to retain and attract
tenants, which speaks to the sponsor's continued commitment to the
property. Also, at issuance, $380.0 million of equity was
contributed to purchase the property at a price of $850.0 million.
The loan continues to report a healthy debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.71 times (x) based on the trailing 12-month ended
(T-12) June 30, 2022, financials. At issuance, the loan was
shadow-rated investment grade given the strong sponsorship strength
and historically stable performance; currently, DBRS Morningstar
believes the subject is better positioned than others in the
submarket that have reported performance declines and have upcoming
loan maturities. However, the overall refinance risk has elevated
given the current environment and the significant tenant rollover
risk. As such, DBRS Morningstar took a conservative approach in its
review by removing the shadow rating and increased the expected
loss in its analysis.

The largest loan in special servicing, PacStar Retail Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#9.0, 4.4% of the pool), is secured by two anchored
retail properties totaling 398,131 sf. The larger of the two
properties, Yards Plaza, is a 259,137-sf shopping center located
eight miles southwest of downtown Chicago. The smaller property,
Willowbrook Court Shopping Center, is a 137,650-sf shopping center
located within a highly trafficked retail corridor of northwest
Houston. The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2021 for imminent nonmonetary default but defaulted on its payment
as the loan was last paid through April 2022. Willowbrook Court has
reported depressed occupancy and cash flows after former anchor
tenant, Toys R' Us (42.3% of NRA) filed for bankruptcy and vacated
the property in 2018. However, according to the servicer
commentary, the 58,000-sf space was backfilled by Best Buy as of
October 2022, bringing occupancy up to approximately 60.0%.
According to the June 2022 rent roll, Yards Plaza was 97.5%
occupied but tenants representing 56.7% of NRA are currently on
month-to-month leases. The borrower had indicated its willingness
to transition the properties to the lender upon the loan's transfer
to special servicing. A receiver was appointed in 2022 but
structural damage to the Yards Plaza property, which the borrower
had incurred unpermitted debt, triggered recourse to the
guarantors, which the special servicer is pursuing through
litigation. Based on the November 2022 value, the properties were
valued at $30.9 million, a decrease from the issuance value of
$69.6 million and below the outstanding loan balance of $43.6
million. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with a liquidation
scenario, resulting in a loss severity in excess of 50.0%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2023-1 (MSRM 2023-1).

   Entity/Debt      Rating                   Prior
   -----------      ------                   -----
MSRM 2023-1

   A-1          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-1-IO       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2-IO       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-3          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-4-IO       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-5          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-6-IO       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-7          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-8-IO       LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-9          LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10         LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-10-IO      LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   B-1          LT AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
   B-2          LT A-sf   New Rating     A-(EXP)sf
   B-3          LT BBB-sf New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
   B-4          LT BB-sf  New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
   B-5          LT B-sf   New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
   B-6          LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   R            LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has assigned final ratings to the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by Morgan Stanley Residential Mortgage Loan
Trust 2023-1 (MSRM 2023-1), as indicated.

This is the 11th post-crisis transaction off the Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust shelf; the first transaction was
issued in 2014. This is the ninth MSRM transaction that comprises
loans from various sellers and is acquired by Morgan Stanley in its
prime-jumbo aggregation process.

The certificates are supported by 355 prime-quality loans with a
total balance of approximately $349.48 million as of the cutoff
date. The pool consists of 100% fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) from
various mortgage originators. The servicers for this transaction
are Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and First National Bank
of Pennsylvania. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the
master servicer.

Of the loans, 100.0% qualify as safe-harbor qualified mortgage
(SHQM) or SHQM average prime offer rate (APOR) loans. There are no
high-priced QM loans or non-QM loans in the pool.

There is no exposure to LIBOR in this transaction. The collateral
comprises 100% fixed-rate loans, and the certificates are fixed
rate and capped at the net weighted average coupon (WAC).

Like other prime transactions, this transaction utilizes a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure with subordination
floors to protect against tail risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 6.5% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
7.8% on a national level as of March 2023, down 2.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22. Driven by
the strong gains seen in 1H 2022, home prices rose 5.8% yoy
nationally as of December 2022.

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists of
30-year, fixed-rate fully amortizing loans seasoned at
approximately 14.9 months in aggregate as determined by Fitch. Of
the loans, 62.1% were originated through the sellers' retail
channels. The borrowers in this pool have strong credit profiles (a
765 FICO, as determined by Fitch) and relatively low leverage (a
73.6% sustainable loan-to-value ratio [sLTV], as determined by
Fitch). A total of 136 loans are over $1.0 million, and the largest
loan totals $2.5 million. Fitch considered 100% of the loans in the
pool to be fully documented loans. Lastly, 11 loans in the pool
comprise nonpermanent residents, and none of the loans in the pool
were made to foreign nationals.

Approximately 38% of the pool is concentrated in California with
moderate MSA concentration. The largest MSA concentration is in the
Los Angeles MSA (13.1%), followed by the San Francisco MSA (5.5%)
and the Riverside MSA (5.1%). The top three MSAs account for 24% of
the pool. There was no adjustment for geographic concentration.

Shifting-Interest Structure and Full Advancing (Mixed): The
mortgage cash flow and loss allocation are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps to maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the
transaction. The applicable credit support percentage feature
redirects subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if
specified credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

The servicers will provide full advancing for the life of the
transaction (the servicers are expected to advance delinquent P&I
on loans that enter a coronavirus forbearance plan). Although full
P&I advancing will provide liquidity to the certificates, it will
also increase the loan-level loss severity (LS) since the servicers
look to recoup P&I advances from liquidation proceeds, which
results in fewer recoveries.

Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicers
are unable to. If the master servicer is not able to advance, then
the securities administrator (Citibank, N.A.) will advance.

Credit Enhancement Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination
floor of 1.80% has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end
risk and loss exposure for senior tranches as the pool size
declines and performance volatility increases due to adverse loan
selection and small loan count concentration. Additionally, a
junior subordination floor of 1.10% has been considered to mitigate
potential tail-end risk and loss exposure for subordinate tranches
as the pool size declines and performance volatility increases due
to adverse loan selection and small loan count concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
Sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and national
levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as
well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected MVD, which is 39.2% in the 'AAAsf' stress. The analysis
indicates that there is some potential rating migration with higher
MVDs, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC, Clayton, and Covius. The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on four areas: compliance
review, credit review, valuation review and data integrity. Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and, as a result, Fitch
did not make any adjustments to its analysis based on the findings.
Due to the fact that there was 100% due diligence provided and
there were no material findings, Fitch reduced the 'AAAsf' expected
loss by 0.24%.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Clayton and Covius were engaged to perform the review.
Loans reviewed under this engagement were given compliance, credit
and valuation grades, and assigned initial grades for each
subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due
diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section
of the presale report for more detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data is considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Fitch Cuts Rating on B Notes to Dsf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the class B notes, the only
outstanding class of National Collegiate Trust (NCT) 2005-GATE, to
'Dsf' from 'CCsf'.

   Entity/Debt         Rating          Prior
   -----------         ------          -----
National
Collegiate
Trust 2005-GATE

   B 63544AAQ1     LT Dsf  Downgrade    CCsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The 'Dsf' rating on the class B notes reflects the default in the
payment of their outstanding principal balance on their legal final
maturity date occurred on the April 2023 payment date.

Fitch will continue to monitor remedies to the occurrence of the
event of default (EOD) implemented by the noteholders or
transaction parties, as provided under the trust indenture, and
take any additional rating action based on the impact of those
remedies, if warranted.

AUTOMATIC WITHDRAWAL OF THE LAST DEFAULT RATING

Default ratings ('Dsf') assigned to the last rated class of a
transaction will be automatically withdrawn within 11 months from
the date of this rating action. A separate RAC will not be issued
at that time.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has downgraded the outstanding subordinate B class of NCT
2005-GATE to 'Dsf' due to the default on their legal final maturity
date occurred on the April 2023 payment date. The trust has had an
EOD, and will remain at 'Dsf' so long as the EOD is continuing.
According to the trust indenture, the EOD may result in
acceleration of the notes as declared by the indenture trustee or
by a majority of noteholders.

The EOD may also result in a liquidation of the trust depending on
the remedies decided on by the noteholders or the indenture
trustee, in accordance with the terms of the trust indenture. Under
Fitch's base case cashflow analysis, the outstanding notes of class
B would eventually be paid in full with no principal shortfall.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Due to the occurrence of the EOD, class B notes will remain at
'Dsf' so long as the EOD is continuing. The rating assigned is the
lowest rating available; therefore, additional factors would not
lead to a further negative rating action.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The class B notes are rated at 'Dsf' due to an EOD from this class
not paying the principal balance in full prior to the legal final
maturity date. Therefore, so long as the EOD is continuing, and
class B remains outstanding, there are no factors that would lead
to a positive rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2017-75B: DBRS Confirms B(high) on 3 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-75B issued by Natixis
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-75B as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class V1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class XA at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class V1B at AA (sf)
-- Class V1XB at A (high) (sf)
-- Class XB at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class V1C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class V1D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class V1E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class V2 at B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on all classes to
Negative from Stable as a result of cash flows that have continued
to underperform expectations.

The subject loan is secured by the fee-simple interest in a
671,369-square-foot (sf), Class B office tower in the Financial
District of New York City. The largest tenants at the property are
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York (15.2% of net rentable area (NRA), lease through January
2035), AT&T Corporation (4.3% of NRA, lease through February 2034),
and Northsouth Production (4.1% of NRA, lease through April 2025).
The property was 85.5% occupied at issuance. Occupancy had been in
decline prior to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, a
trend that was exacerbated in 2020 when 10 tenants, representing
9.7% of NRA, vacated or downsized causing occupancy to drop to
77.0% by YE2020. According to the December 2022 reporting,
occupancy has risen slightly to 79.0% as a result of new leasing
and the fourth-largest tenant, PaeTec Communications, Inc. (3.0% of
NRA), extending its lease to December 2027. The servicer indicated
in March 2023 that three new tenants, representing 4.5% of NRA,
have signed leases, with five additional prospective leases
currently in discussion. There are seven tenants, representing 6.3%
of the NRA, with leases scheduled to roll within the next 12
months.

The YE2022 net cash flow (NCF) was reported to be $12.8 million
(representing a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.16
times(x)), in line with the YE2021 figure of $12.8 million (DSCR of
1.14x) but down from prior years and below the DBRS Morningstar NCF
of $13.2 million. According to Reis, the New York Metro submarket
has seen vacancy rates rise to 14.3% at YE2022 from 11.4% at
YE2021. Although the decline in cash flow from the DBRS Morningstar
figure has not been substantial, DBRS Morningstar believes
increasing vacancy rates both at the subject and within the market
will pose challenges in the borrower's ability to back-fill space,
and submarket availability combined with the Class B finishes of
the property will limit rent growth. DBRS Morningstar believes it
is unlikely the property will be able to recapture lost cash flow
in the near to moderate term.

The $250.0 million financing consisted of $59.0 million of pooled
trust debt, $84.0 million of a subordinated B note held in the
trust, $33.0 million of nonpooled pari passu debt outside the
trust, and $54.0 million of a subordinated B note held outside the
trust. The 10-year loan pays interest only (IO) for the entire
term. The total mortgage debt of $230.0 million was supplemented by
$20.0 million of mezzanine debt.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-ALXA: DBRS Confirms BB(high) on E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-ALXA issued by
Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ALXA:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the underlying collateral, which remains in line with DBRS
Morningstar's expectations. The loan is secured by Centre 425
Bellevue, a 356,909-square-foot (sf) Class A, LEED Silver-certified
office building in downtown Bellevue, Washington, approximately 10
miles east of Seattle. The condominium interest includes 98.3% of
the leasable square footage within the 16-story structure in
addition to an eight-level underground parking garage. The property
is predominantly occupied by the investment-grade tenant
Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) under a 16-year triple net lease that
extends to September 2033.

The 10-year fixed-rate interest-only mortgage loan has an
anticipated repayment date in 2027 and final loan maturity in 2033.
The $124.5 million trust balance includes a $10 million piece of a
split pari passu senior loan and a $114.5 million subordinate B
note. A pari passu piece of the senior loan is held in the CSAIL
2017-CX10 transaction, also rated by DBRS Morningstar. Additional
debt consists of a $57.6 million mezzanine loan, which is
co-terminus with the trust mortgage loan. The loan is sponsored by
RFR Holdings LLC and Tristar Capital LLC, whose principals serve as
guarantors for the transaction.

According to the January 2023 rent roll, the property was 100.0%
occupied. Amazon accounted for 99.4% of the net rentable area,
paying a base rent of $38.73 per sf, subject to annual rent
escalations of 2.25%. Per the lease agreement, Amazon's initial
lease expiry is on September 30, 2033, with three five-year
extension options remaining and no termination options available.
The lease is also guaranteed by Amazon, subject to a cap of $190.0
million for the first five years, which reduces by $19.0 million
each year thereafter. As of January 19, 2023, The Star reported
that Amazon planned to lay off 18,000 employees, 2,300 of whom were
in the Seattle and Bellevue area. While these changes are
noteworthy, DBRS Morningstar does not believe the layoffs pose
significantly increased risks for the subject transaction given
Amazon's long-term lease with no termination options and the
company's investment-grade status.

Per the year-end (YE) 2022 financials, the loan reported a net cash
flow (NCF) of $16.3 million, with a debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.81 times (x), an increase from the YE2021 NCF of $16.0
million and DSCR of 1.78x. Given the long-term credit tenant status
of Amazon, the DBRS Morningstar NCF considers a straight-line rent
credit for the entirety of the space occupied by the tenant.

The DBRS Morningstar rating assigned to Class E is lower than the
results implied by the loan-to-value sizing benchmarks. This
variance is warranted given DBRS Morningstar's concerns surrounding
the general uncertainty in the office market.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2020-2PAC: DBRS Confirms B(low) on 2 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-2PAC, Amazon Phase VII Loan
Specific Certificates issued by Natixis Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2020-2PAC (NCMS 2020-2PAC) as follows:

-- Class AMZ1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class AMZ2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class AMZ3 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class V-AMZ at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the loan, which remains consistent with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations at issuance. The loan is secured by the borrower's
fee-simple interest in Amazon Phase VII, a 12-story, Class A office
property in Seattle, Washington. The Amazon Phase VII whole loan of
$220.0 million is composed of $160.0 million of senior debt and
$60.0 million of junior debt. The fixed-rate, interest-only loan
has an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in April 2025, with a final
maturity in December 2026. The Amazon Phase VII A note was
contributed to the subject trust and split into four components:
one senior pooled component with an outstanding principal balance
of $100.1 million and three subordinate nonpooled components
totalling $59.9 million, which serve as collateral for these rated
loan-specific certificates. DBRS Morningstar does not rate the NCMS
2020-2PAC pooled certificates. The sponsors cashed out $17.5
million as part of the transaction; however, they still have
approximately $68.0 million of implied equity behind the deal based
on the issuance appraised value.

The property was constructed in 2015 and was built to suit for
Amazon Corporate LLC (Amazon), a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc, an
investment-grade-rated tenant. The building is LEED Gold certified
and totals 318,617 square feet (sf), including 5,651 sf of
ground-floor retail space, a four-level subterranean parking garage
containing 429 parking spaces, a public plaza, and a landscaped
rooftop terrace with sweeping views of Seattle. The property is one
of more than 40 office buildings comprising Amazon's corporate
headquarters campus in Seattle's South Lake Union submarket. Amazon
occupies 98.2% of the net rentable area and its lease is structured
with a 9.3% rent increase every three years and is fully guaranteed
by the parent company. The lease commenced on September 2015 and
expires in August 2031, well beyond the ARD of April 2025 and the
final maturity of December 2026. In addition, the lease is
structured with two five-year extension options and no early
termination options. At issuance, the tenant was paying a rental
rate of $33.98 per sf (psf) and, according to the September 2022
rent roll, the tenant is paying $37.13 psf with the next rent step
occurring in September 2024 at $40.57 psf.

According to recent publications, Amazon announced a round of
layoffs and will be terminating 9,000 employees, bringing the total
number of layoffs to 27,000. This decision was tied to cost-cutting
measures from the company due to the slowdown in the current
economic environment and slow growth in its core retail business.
The latest round of layoffs is expected to affect Amazon's cloud
computing, human resources, advertising, and Twitch livestreaming
business and it is uncertain whether this will affect the subject
property. DBRS Morningstar will continue to closely monitor for
developments but notes a mitigating factor in the lease guarantee
from the parent company.

According to the trailing nine month ended September 30, 2022,
financials, the property was 100.0% occupied and reported an
annualized net cash flow (NCF) figure of $12.1 million, an increase
from the year-end (YE) 2021 NCF of $11.0 million, YE2020 NCF of
$10.6 million, and the DBRS Morningstar NCF of $10.9 million. DBRS
Morningstar assumed a straight-line credit for Amazon's rent over
the loan term given its consideration as a long-term credit
tenant.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



NRPL 2023-RPL1: DBRS Gives B Rating on Class B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2023-RPL1 (the Notes) issued by NRPL 2023-RPL1 Trust (the
Trust):

-- $117.8 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $13.4 million Class M-1 at A (sf)
-- $11.3 million Class M-2 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $6.5 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 40.40% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinate notes. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 31.20%, 24.40%,
18.70%, 14.95%, and 11.65% of credit enhancement, respectively.

This is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned performing and
reperforming first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 1,216 loans with a
total principal balance of $197,640,059 as of the Cut-Off Date
(February 28, 2023).

The mortgage loans are approximately 174 months seasoned. As of the
Cut-Off Date, 94.6% of the loans are current (including 3.8%
bankruptcy-performing loans), and 5.4% of the loans are 30 days
delinquent (including 0.1% bankruptcy nonperforming loans) under
the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency method. Under
the MBA delinquency method, 14.9% and 59.4% of the mortgage loans
have been zero times 30 days delinquent for the past 24 months and
12 months, respectively.

The portfolio contains 75.0% modified loans as determined by the
Issuer. The modifications happened more than two years ago for
57.6% of the loans that DBRS Morningstar classified as modified.
Within the pool, 492 mortgages have an aggregate
non-interest-bearing deferred amount of $11,381,319, which
comprises 5.8% of the total principal balance.

NRPL 2023-RPL1 Trust represents the first rated securitization of
the seasoned performing and reperforming residential mortgage loans
issued by the Sponsor, Nomura Corporate Funding Americas, LLC
(NCFA). The Sponsor is registered with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission and incorporated in the state of Delaware. NCFA
has been purchasing reperforming loans since 2014, and became more
focused in this sector in the last four years.

The Seller, NNPL Trust Series 2012-1, acquired the mortgage loans
from a third-party aggregator. The Seller will then contribute the
loans to the Trust through an affiliate, Nomura Asset Depositor
Company, LLC (the Depositor). As the Sponsor, NCFA or one of its
majority-owned affiliates will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of Notes (other than the Class R
Notes) and the Trust certificate to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements. The loans were originated and previously
serviced by various entities.

As of the Cut-Off Date, all of the loans are being serviced by an
interim servicer. All servicing will be transferred to Newrez LLC
doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing on or before April
24, 2023. There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal
and interest (P&I) on any mortgages by the Servicer or any other
party to the transaction; however, the Servicer is obligated to
make advances in respect of homeowner's association fees in super
lien states and, in certain cases, taxes and insurance as well as
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

When the aggregate pool balance is reduced to less than 10% of the
balance as of the Cut-Off Date, the directing noteholder may
purchase all of the mortgage loans and real estate owned properties
from the Issuer, as long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum
price that meets or exceeds par plus interest.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M-1 and more subordinate P&I
bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds until the more
senior classes are retired.

The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's baseline
macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies, available in
its commentary Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for Rated
Sovereigns: December 2022 Update, published December 21, 2022.
These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's
moderate and adverse coronavirus pandemic scenarios, which were
first published in April 2020.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.




OBX TRUST 2023-INV1: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to OBX 2023-INV1
Trust.

   Entity/Debt     Rating        
   -----------     ------        
OBX 2023-INV1
Trust

   A-1         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-2         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-3         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-4         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-5         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-6         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-7         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-8         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-9         LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-10        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-11        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-12        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-13        LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-14        LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-15        LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-16        LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO1       LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO2       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO4       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO6       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO8       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO10      LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO12      LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO14      LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO16      LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-1A        LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-1         LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-IO1       LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-2A        LT A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
   B-2         LT A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
   B-IO2       LT A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
   B-3A        LT BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-3         LT BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-IO3       LT BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-4         LT BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-5         LT B(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
   B-6         LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   A-1-A       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-2-A       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   R           LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed notes issued
by OBX 2023-INV1 Trust (OBX 2023-INV1), as indicated above. The
notes are supported by 910 fixed-rate, first lien conforming
mortgage loans underwritten through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
automated underwriting systems (AUS), primarily investment
properties and one second home.

The collateral pool has a total balance of approximately $315
million as of the cutoff date. The loans were originated by
loanDepot.com LLC (loanDepot) and were subsequently acquired by an
affiliate of the Rep and Warranty Provider (MFA Financial, Inc.)
and then sold to Bank of America National Association (BANA) prior
to the closing date. On the closing date, Onslow Bay Financial LLC,
the seller, will purchase the Mortgage Loans from BANA.

Distributions of P&I and loss allocations are based on a
traditional senior subordinate, shifting interest structure.
LoanDepot is the named servicer and will be responsible for making
full advances in respect of delinquent P&I for the life of the
transaction, with Computershare Trust Company, N.A (Computershare),
as master servicer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 7.8% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
7.8% on a national level as of March 2023, down 2.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22. Driven by
the strong gains seen in 1H22, home prices rose 5.8% YoY nationally
as of December 2022.

Prime Credit Quality (Positive): The collateral consists of 15-year
and 30-year fixed-rate, first lien, conforming loans, underwritten
through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's AUS. All loans were
underwritten using a GSE AUS and were treated as full documentation
in Fitch's analysis. The loans are seasoned approximated 21 months,
as calculated by Fitch, and roughly 67.4% were originated through a
retail channel. The borrowers have a strong credit profile (768
FICO and 34% debt to income [DTI]) and low leverage (58% sLTV).

Non-Owner-Occupied and Multi-Family Loans (Negative): The pool
consists of 99.9% investor properties. All loans were underwritten
to the borrower's credit risk, unlike investor cash flow loans,
which are underwritten to the property's income. Single-family
homes account for 65.8% of the pool, condos account for 14.5%, and
multifamily homes make up the remaining 19.7%. Fitch views investor
property multifamily homes as riskier than owner-occupied
single-family homes as rental property owners who rely on income
from rent to repay the mortgage are exposed to risks, such as a
high vacancy rate. To account for the additional risk, Fitch
adjusts the PD upwards by 35% from the baseline for multifamily
homes. Additionally, there were eight loans (0.65% by UPB) made to
foreign national borrowers.

For the loss analysis of this pool, Fitch used a customized version
of the U.S. RMBS Loan Loss model that has a 1.25x PD penalty for
agency investor loans. The 1.25x PD penalty was applied to 100% of
the loans in the pool, as all loans were underwritten using a GSE
AUS. Post-crisis performance indicates that loans underwritten to
Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriter (DU) and Freddie Mac's Loan
Product Advisor (LPA) guidelines have relatively lower default
rates compared to normal investor loans used in regression data
with all other attributes controlled. The implied penalty has been
reduced to approximately 25% for agency eligible investor loans in
the customized model from approximately 55% for regular investor
loans in the production model.

Shifting Interest Structure with Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed):
The mortgage cash flow and loss allocations are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure, whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the deal.
The applicable credit support percentage feature redirects
subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if specified
CE levels are not maintained. Due to the leakage to the subordinate
bonds the shifting interest structure requires more credit
enhancement.

The servicer will provide full advancing for the life of the
transaction. Although full P&I advancing will provide liquidity to
the certificates, it will also increase the loan-level loss
severity (LS) since the servicer looks to recoup P&I advances from
liquidation proceeds, which results in less recoveries.
Computershare, as master servicer, will advance if the servicer
fails to do so.

Subordination Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor
of 1.00% has been considered in order to mitigate potential
tail-end risk and loss exposure for senior tranches as pool size
declines and performance volatility increases due to adverse loan
selection and small loan count concentration. Also, a junior
subordination floor of 0.70% will be maintained to mitigate tail
risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer loans are
outstanding. Additionally, the stepdown tests do not allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders in the first five
years following deal closing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model-projected 40.0% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Consolidated Analytics. Third-party due diligence was
performed on approximately 62% loans in the pool by loan count. The
third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on three
areas: compliance review, credit review and valuation review.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
Fitch decreased its loss expectation by 13bps due to the 62% due
diligence sample with no material findings.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


OBX TRUST 2023-NQM3: Fitch Gives Bsf Rating on B-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to OBX 2023-NQM3 Trust.

   Entity/Debt       Rating                 Prior
   -----------       ------                 -----
OBX 2023 - NQM3

   A-1           LT AAAsf New Rating   AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2           LT AAsf  New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
   A-3           LT Asf   New Rating     A(EXP)sf
   M-1           LT BBBsf New Rating   BBB(EXP)sf
   B-1           LT BBsf  New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
   B-2           LT Bsf   New Rating     B(EXP)sf
   B-3           LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   A-IO-S        LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   XS            LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   R             LT NRsf  New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch rates the residential mortgage-backed notes issued by the OBX
2023-NQM3 Trust as indicated above. The notes are supported by 807
loans with an unpaid principal balance of approximately $407.5
million as of the cutoff date. The pool consists of fixed-rate
mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages acquired by Annaly Capital
Management, Inc. from various originators and aggregators.

Distributions of P&I and loss allocations are based on a modified
sequential-payment structure. The transaction has a stop-advance
feature where the P&I advancing party will advance delinquent P&I
for up to 120 days. Of the loans, approximately 70.7% are
designated as non-qualified mortgage (non-QM), 0.9% are safe-harbor
QM (SHQM), and the remaining 28.4% are investment properties not
subject to the Ability to Repay (ATR) Rule.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, it views the home price values of
this pool as 5.3% above a long-term sustainable level (versus 7.8%
on a national level as of March 2023, down 2.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22. Driven by
the strong gains seen in 1H22, home prices rose 5.8% yoy nationally
as of December 2022.

Nonprime Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists of
15-year, 30-year and 40-year fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans.
Adjustable-rate loans constitute 14.06% of the pool as calculated
by Fitch, which includes 3.7% debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
loans with a default interest rate feature; 12.4% are interest-only
(IO) loans, and the remaining 85.94% are fully amortizing loans.

The pool is seasoned approximately 10 months in aggregate, as
calculated by Fitch (eight months per the transaction documents).
Borrowers in this pool have a moderate credit profile with a
Fitch-calculated weighted average (WA) FICO score of 742,
debt-to-income ratio of 40% and moderate leverage of 74%
sustainable loan-to-value ratio. Pool characteristics resemble
recent nonprime collateral.

Investor Properties, Non-QM and Alternative Documentation
(Negative): The pool contains a meaningful amount of investor
properties (28.4%) and non-QM loans (70.7%). The remaining loans
are SHQM (0.9%). Fitch's loss expectations reflect the higher
default risk associated with these attributes as well as loss
severity (LS) adjustments for potential ATR challenges. Higher LS
assumptions are assumed for the investor property product to
reflect potential risk of a distressed sale or disrepair.

Fitch viewed approximately 92.3% of the pool as less than full
documentation, and alternative documentation was used to underwrite
the loans. Of this, 57.6% of loans were underwritten to a bank
statement program to verify income, which is not consistent with
Appendix Q standards or Fitch's view of a full-documentation
program. To reflect the additional risk, Fitch increases the
probability of default (PD) by 1.4x on the bank statement loans.
Besides loans underwritten to a bank statement program, 17.8% of
the loans are a DSCR product, 6.0% are profit & loss (P&L)
statement loans, 4.7% are a WVOE product and 1.9% constitute an
asset depletion product.

Modified Sequential-Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes principal pro rata among the senior notes while
shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal payments until
all senior classes are paid in full. If a credit event, either a
cumulative loss trigger event or a delinquency trigger event,
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to class A-1, A-2 and A-3 notes until each class
balance is reduced to zero.

The delinquency trigger for this transaction is tighter than seen
in many other recent NQM transactions. Under Fitch's stresses, the
triggers trip early in the life of the deal, switching the deal to
sequential pay under Fitch's stresses. By paying sequentially, the
structure does not leak principal to the A-2 and A-3 classes, which
results in a smaller differential between Fitch's rating case
expected losses and actual tranche credit enhancement relative to
other recent NQM deals.

The structure includes a step-up coupon feature where the fixed
interest rate for class A-1, A-2 and A-3 will increase by 100 bps
starting on the May 2027 payment date. This reduces the modest
excess spread available to repay losses. However, the interest rate
is subject to the net WA coupon (WAC), and any unpaid cap carryover
amount for class A-1, A-2 and A-3 may be reimbursed from the
distribution amounts otherwise allocable to the unrated class B-3,
to the extent available.

As an additional analysis to Fitch's rating stresses, Fitch ran a
WAC deterioration scenario that varied by rating stress. The
ratings are based off of the most conservative rating scenario.

The WAC cut was derived by assuming a 2.5% cut (based on the most
common historical modification rate) on 40% (historical Alt-A
modification percentage) of the performing loans. Although the WAC
reduction stress is based on historical modification rates, Fitch
did not include the WAC reduction stress in its testing of the
delinquency trigger.

Fitch viewed the WAC deterioration as more of a pre-emptive cut
given the ongoing macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Under
the WAC deterioration scenario, a portion of borrowers will likely
be impaired but will not ultimately default due to modifications
and reduced P&I. The WAC deterioration scenario had the largest
impact on the back-loaded benchmark scenario and resulted in higher
credit enhancement being needed to achieve the same ratings as the
non-WAC deterioration scenario.

Limited Advancing (Mixed): Advances of delinquent P&I will be made
on the mortgage loans for the first 120 days of delinquency, to the
extent such advances are deemed recoverable. The P&I advancing
party (Onslow Bay Financial LLC) is obligated to fund delinquent
P&I advances. If the P&I advancing party fails to remit any P&I
advance required to be funded, the master servicer (Computershare
Trust Company, N.A.) will fund the advance. The ultimate advancing
party in the transaction is the master servicer, Computershare,
rated 'BBB'/'F3' by Fitch.

The stop-advance feature limits the external liquidity to the bonds
in the event of large and extended delinquencies, but the
loan-level LS is less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I for the life of the
transaction, as P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become
delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to
the trust.

High California Concentration (Negative): Approximately 38.5% of
the pool is located in California. Additionally, the top three MSAs
— Los Angeles (21.7%), New York (10.3%) and Miami (7.8%) —
account for 39.8% of the pool. As a result, a geographic
concentration penalty of 1.02x was applied to the PD.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) at
the national level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and
30.0%, in addition to the model-projected 5.8% in the base case.
The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the
model projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all the rated classes. Specifically,
a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full category upgrade
for the rated class excluding those being assigned ratings of
'AAAsf'.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC, Canopy Financial Technology Partners, Clayton
Services, Consolidated Analytics, Edge Mortgage Advisory Company,
LLC and Evolve Mortgage Servicers. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on three areas: compliance review,
credit review and valuation review.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
Fitch did not make any adjustments to its analysis due to
loan-level due diligence findings. Based on the results of the 100%
due diligence performed on the pool, the overall expected loss was
reduced by 47 bps.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


OCTAGON LTD 16: Fitch Gives B- Rating on F Notes, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to Octagon
61, Ltd.

   Entity/Debt          Rating        
   -----------          ------        
Octagon 61, Ltd.

   A                LT NRsf   New Rating
   B                LT AAsf   New Rating
   C                LT Asf    New Rating
   D                LT BBB-sf New Rating
   E                LT BB-sf  New Rating
   F                LT B-sf   New Rating
   Subordinated A   LT NRsf   New Rating
   Subordinated B   LT NRsf   New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Octagon 61, Ltd. (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by
Octagon Credit Investors, LLC. Net proceeds from the issuance of
the secured and subordinated notes will provide financing on a
portfolio of approximately $400 million of primarily first lien
senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B', which is in line with that of recent
CLOs. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the indicative
portfolio is 23.81, versus a maximum covenant, in accordance with
the initial expected matrix point of 26.00. Issuers rated in the
'B' rating category denote a highly speculative credit quality;
however, the notes benefit from appropriate credit enhancement and
standard U.S. CLO structural features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
97.9% first-lien senior secured loans. The weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) of the indicative portfolio is 74.28% versus a
minimum covenant, in accordance with the initial expected matrix
point of 72.60%.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 39.0% of the portfolio balance in aggregate while
the top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity resulting from the
industry, obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with
other recent CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 5.0-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other U.S.
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, at the initial expected
matrix point, the rated notes can withstand default and recovery
assumptions consistent with their assigned ratings. The weighted
average life (WAL) used for the transaction stress portfolio and
matrices analysis is 12 months less than the WAL covenant to
account for structural and reinvestment conditions after the
reinvestment period. In Fitch's opinion, these conditions would
reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio during stress
periods. The performance of the rated notes at the other permitted
matrix points is in line with other recent CLOs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for class B notes, between
'Bsf' and 'BBB+sf' for class C notes, between less than 'B-sf' and
'BB+sf' for class D notes, between less than 'B-sf' and 'B+sf' for
class E notes, and less than 'B-sf' for class F notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B notes, 'A+sf' for class C notes,
'A-sf' for class D notes, 'BBB+sf' for class E notes, and 'BB+sf'
for class F notes.

Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further described
in the new issue report, which is available to investors.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


OHA CREDIT 15: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to OHA Credit
Funding 15 Ltd./OHA Credit Funding 15 LLC's fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 3, 2023.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  OHA Credit Funding 15 Ltd./OHA Credit Funding 15 LLC

  Class A, $202.00 million: Not rated
  Class A-L, $50.00 million: Not rated
  Class B-1, $35.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $15.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $26.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $23.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $13.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $36.00 million: Not rated



POST ROAD 2021-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded four ratings and confirmed seven ratings from
Post Road Equipment Finance, LLC transactions as follows:

Post Road Equipment Finance 2021-1, LLC:

-- Class A-2 Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes upgraded to AA (sf) from A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes upgraded to A (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

Post Road Equipment Finance 2022-1, LLC

-- Class A-1 Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for
Rated Sovereigns: December 2022 Update," published on December 21,
2022. These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS
Morningstar's moderate and adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic scenarios, which were first published in April 2020.

-- The currently available hard credit enhancement in the form of
overcollateralization, subordination (as applicable), and amounts
of deposit in the cash reserve account, as well as the change in
the level of protection afforded by each form of credit enhancement
since the closing of each transaction.

-- The collateral performance of the transaction, with performance
metrics within the expected range.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originating, underwriting, and servicing.


READY CAPITAL 2022-FL9: DBRS Puts Class G Notes Under Review Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. placed the following class of Ready Capital Mortgage
Financing 2022-FL9, LLC Under Review with Negative Implications:

-- Class G Notes rated B (low) (sf)

The Under Review with Negative Implications designation on the
Class G Notes is the result of accumulated interest shortfalls,
which have persisted for more than six consecutive months. As per
DBRS Morningstar's Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Ratings
Committee Global Procedure dated October 2022, the tolerance
threshold for a DBRS Morningstar credit rating in the BB or B
rating category is six months. The shortfalls stem from the
difference in the floating interest rate benchmark between the
bonds and some of the individual loans remaining in the
transaction. While cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.8
million remain outstanding on the Class G Notes, interest
shortfalls are beginning to be recouped as the benchmark rate on
the remaining loans is beginning to transition to the Secured
Overnight Financing Rate, the same benchmark rate on the rated
bonds. As of March 2023 reporting, prior cumulative interest
shortfalls on the Class F Notes were repaid, with funds now being
applied to the cumulative shortfalls on the Class G Notes. While
DBRS Morningstar believes the interest shortfalls on the Class G
Notes will ultimately be repaid, provided there are no future
appraisal reductions stemming from defaulted loans, it is possible
that shortfalls on the Class G Notes will remain outstanding beyond
90 days henceforth.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


RFMSII HOME 2005-HS2: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-I-3 Debt Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A-I-3
issued by RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HS2. The collateral
backing this deal consists of second lien mortgages.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/41Th26x

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HS2

Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2022
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26,
2022 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

RATING RATIONALE

The rating downgrade of Class A-I-3 from RFMSII Home Equity Loan
Trust 2005-HS2 reflects the heightened likelihood that this bond
may not be paid in full prior to its final scheduled distribution
date in July 2024. The rating action also reflects the recent
performance as well as Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying pool.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


RLGH TRUST 2021-TROT: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-TROT issued by RLGH Trust
2021-TROT as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-Y at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-Z at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations at issuance. The transaction is collateralized by the
borrower's fee-simple and leasehold interests in 53 properties,
including 48 flex industrial properties, three industrial
properties, one parcel of land, and one unanchored retail strip
center, totaling approximately 2.6 million square feet across six
business parks in the Raleigh-Durham region of North Carolina. The
Raleigh-Durham metropolitan area is known as the Research Triangle,
which is an attractive region for research and development,
advanced technology, and biotechnology. The portfolio has a
weighted-average (WA) year built of 1995 and comprises primarily
older buildings in a smaller and secondary market. The sponsors, a
joint venture partnership between Equus Capital Partners, Ltd.
(Equus) and Corebridge Real Estate Investors (formerly AIG Global
Real Estate Investment Corp.), contributed $132.9 million in cash
equity as a part of the transaction to acquire the portfolio for a
purchase price of $422.3 million. Equus is a private real estate
investment firm focused on commercial real estate investments.
Corebridge Real Estate Investors is a real estate investment arm of
AIG Inc. and focuses on real estate investments globally.

The two-year floating-rate loan is interest only (IO) for the full
term with an initial maturity in April 2023. The loan has three
one-year extension options available. According to the servicer,
the borrower intends to exercise its first option, and the
extension is currently in process. The borrower also entered into
an interest rate cap agreement with SMBC Capital Markets, Inc.,
with a strike rate of 3.5% for the two-year initial term. To get an
extension, the borrower must obtain a replacement interest rate cap
agreement. Given the current environment, DBRS Morningstar has
inquired about whether the borrower has purchased a replacement
interest rate cap or if it has negotiated alternative hedging.

The collateral portfolio benefits from a diversified tenant roster,
with only six of the portfolio's 53 properties currently leased to
single-tenant users. At issuance, the portfolio was leased to 306
distinct tenants across multiple industries with a WA occupancy
rate of 95.3%. Performance metrics have remained stable since
issuance. According to the September 2022 rent roll, occupancy was
96.5%, in line with the servicer-reported YE2021 rate of 96.0%.
More than 70 leases representing 20.7% of the net rentable area are
scheduled to roll in 2023, highlighting the tenant granularity. The
portfolio's historical occupancy has been stable, with a WA
occupancy rate of at least 95.0% since 2007. According to Reis,
availability in Raleigh-Durham's industrial market is tight,
reporting an average vacancy of 4.5% as of Q4 2022. The servicer
reported net cash flow (NCF) of $22.3 million for the trailing
12-month period ended June 2022, compared with NCF of $22.2 million
as of YE2021. This reflects generally stable performance since
issuance and remains above the DBRS Morningstar NCF figure of $21.7
million.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



SLC STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on A-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on SLC Student Loan Trust
2007-2 and 2008-2 along with SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-10. Fitch
has also revised the Rating Outlooks on the SLC 2007-2 class A-3
and B notes to Negative from Stable.

   Entity/Debt         Rating          Prior
   -----------         ------          -----
SLC Student
Loan Trust
2007-2

   A-3 784422AC1   LT AAsf  Affirmed    AAsf

   B 784422AD9     LT Asf   Affirmed     Asf

SLM Student
Loan Trust
2003-10

   A-4 78442GJH0   LT AAAsf Affirmed   AAAsf
   B 78442GJF4     LT Asf   Affirmed     Asf

SLC Student
Loan Trust
2008-2

   A-4 78444NAD1   LT Dsf   Affirmed     Dsf
   B 78444NAE9     LT Csf   Affirmed     Csf

SLC 2007-2: The class A-3 and B notes have been affirmed at 'AAsf'
and 'Asf', respectively. The transaction continues to face
increased maturity risk as shown by the weighted average increasing
remaining loan term, now at 184 months from 181 months at the prior
review in April 2022. The affirmation of the class A-3 notes is
within one category of the model-implied rating of 'Asf', as
permitted by Fitch's Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP)
rating criteria.

The Rating Outlooks for the notes have been revised to Negative
from Stable, reflecting the possibility of further negative rating
pressure in the next one to two years if remaining term continues
to increase.

SLC 2008-2: The affirmation of the class A-4 notes at 'Dsf'
reflects the default on the senior class A-4 notes in the payment
of their outstanding principal on their legal final maturity date
on June 15, 2021. The notes will remain at 'Dsf' so long as the
event of default is continuing. The class B notes are affirmed at
'Csf', reflective of the high level of credit risk for the notes,
resulting from the occurrence of an event of default in the
transaction. Thus far the Class B notes have continued to make
interest payments; however, pursuant to the trust indenture, the
trust could switch to a post-event of default waterfall, directing
all payments to the class A-4 notes until the balance is paid in
full, which would result in interest payments being diverted away
from the class B notes. If this course of action were followed, the
class B notes would not pass Fitch's base case cashflow scenarios,
as reflected by the current rating on the notes. Fitch will
continue monitoring remedies to the occurrence of the event of
default implemented by the noteholders or transaction parties, as
provided under the trust indenture, and take any additional rating
action based on the impact of those remedies, as deemed
appropriate.

SLM 2003-10: The class A-4 notes pass all credit and maturity
stresses in cashflow modeling with sufficient hard CE. The
affirmation of the notes reflects the stable collateral performance
for the notes, in line with Fitch's expectations since the last
review.

The affirmation of the class B notes at 'Asf' reflects the stable
collateral performance for the notes, in line with Fitch's
expectations since the last review. The affirmation is one category
higher than the current model-implied rating of 'BBBsf', reflective
of the length of time to the legal final maturity date of the notes
(45 years away) and within one rating category of the current
rating, as permitted by Fitch's FFELP rating criteria. Both Rating
Outlooks remain Stable.

For SLC 2007-2 and SLM 2003-10, Fitch modeled customized servicing
fees instead of Fitch's criteria-defined assumption of $3.25 per
borrower, per month, due to higher contractual servicing fees for
these transactions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: For all transactions, after applying the
default timing curve per criteria, the effective default rate is
unchanged from the cumulative default rate. Fitch applies the
standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash flow
analysis. Additionally, defaults have remained in line with
expectations, while consolidation from the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program, which ended in October 2022, drove the
short-term inflation of CPR. Voluntary prepayments are expected to
return to historical levels. The claim reject rate is assumed to be
0.25% in the base case and 2.00% in the 'AAA' case.

SLC 2007-2: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 14.75% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 44.25% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sustainable constant
default rate (sCDR) of 2.10% and the sustainable constant
prepayment rate (sCPR; voluntary and involuntary prepayments) of
8.50% in cash flow modeling. The trailing-twelve-month (TTM) levels
of deferment, forbearance, and income-based repayment (IBR; prior
to adjustment) are 4.18% (4.10% at April 30, 2022), 12.50% (11.36%)
and 20.33% (21.07%). These assumptions are used as the starting
point in cash flow modelling and subsequent declines or increases
are modelled as per criteria. The 31-60 DPD and the 91-120 DPD have
decreased at Jan. 31, 2023, and are currently 2.14% for 31 DPD and
1.12% for 91 DPD compared to 3.16% and 1.29% at April 30, 2022 for
31 DPD and 91 DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is
approximately 0.12%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

SLC 2008-2: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 29.50% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 88.50% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sustainable constant
default rate (sCDR) of 4.30% and the sustainable constant
prepayment rate (sCPR; voluntary and involuntary prepayments) of
8.00% in cash flow modeling. The trailing-twelve-month (TTM) levels
of deferment, forbearance, and income-based repayment (IBR; prior
to adjustment) are 6.44% (7.54% at February 28, 2022), 16.97%
(18.13%) and 27.17% (29.39%), respectively.

These assumptions are used as the starting point in cash flow
modelling and subsequent declines or increases are modelled as per
criteria. The 31-60 DPD have decreased and the 91-120 DPD have
increased from one year ago and are currently 5.38% for 31 DPD and
2.11% for 91 DPD compared with 8.25% and 1.64% at February 28, 2022
for 31 DPD and 91 DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is
approximately 0.12%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Occurrence of an Event of Default: The affirmation of 'D' for the
Class A-4 notes is based on the EoD and the continuation of the EoD
on the legal final maturity date of the class A-4 notes. For class
B notes, default remains a real possibility depending on remedies
adopted by the transaction parties under the transaction's
indenture, which include among others the acceleration of the notes
and/or the liquidation of the trust assets.

SLM 2003-10: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 17.50% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 52.50% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sustainable constant
default rate (sCDR) of 2.50% and the sustainable constant
prepayment rate (sCPR; voluntary and involuntary prepayments) of
8.00% in cash flow modeling. The trailing-twelve-month (TTM) levels
of deferment, forbearance, and income-based repayment (IBR; prior
to adjustment) are 2.83% (3.13% at February 28, 2022), 10.89%
(9.87%) and 21.67% (21.63%), respectively.

These assumptions are used as the starting point in cash flow
modelling and subsequent declines or increases are modelled as per
criteria. The 31-60 DPD have decreased and the 91-120 DPD have
increased from one year ago and are currently 3.33% for 31 DPD and
1.13% for 91 DPD compared with 4.09% and 1.09% at February 28, 2022
for 31 DPD and 91 DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is
approximately 0.15%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for these transactions
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for Special Allowance Payments (SAP) and the
securities. As of the most recent distribution dates, approximately
92.43%, 79.89% and 88.16% of the student loans in SLC 2007-2, SLC
2008-2, and SLM 2003-10, respectively, are indexed to LIBOR, and
the balance of the loans is indexed to the 91-day T-bill rate. All
of the outstanding notes are indexed to three-month LIBOR. All
notes in SLM 2011-3 and SLM 2012-7 are indexed to one-month LIBOR.
Fitch applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses to the
transactions as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
over-collateralization (OC), excess spread, and for the class A
notes, subordination provided by the class B notes. As of the most
recent collection period, Fitch's senior parity ratios (including
the reserve account) are 105.97% (5.63% CE), 146.32% (31.66% CE)
and 113.87% (12.18% CE) for SLC 2007-2, SLC 2008-2, and SLM
2003-10, respectively.

Fitch's total parity ratios (including the reserve account) are
100.35% (0.35% CE), 104.64% (4.43% CE) and 100.22% (0.22% CE) for
SLC 2007-2, SLC 2008-2, and SLM 2003-10, respectively. Liquidity
support is provided by a reserve account sized at 0.25% of the
outstanding pool balance for SLC 2007-2 and SLM 2003-10. As of the
most recent collection period, the reserve accounts are at their
floors of $2,550,668, and $3,012,925 for SLC 2007-2 and SLM
2003-10, respectively. The reserve account for SLC 2008-2 is sized
at $0. SLM 2003-10 and SLC 2007-2 will release cash once 100.0%
reported total parity is reached.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, LLC. Fitch believes Navient to be an adequate
servicer, due to its extensive track record as one of the largest
servicers of FFELP loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

'AAAsf'-rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign, by nature of the reinsurance
provided by the ED. Aside from the U.S. sovereign rating, defaults,
basis risk and loan extension risk account for the majority of the
risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. Fitch conducts credit and maturity stress
sensitivity analysis by increasing or decreasing key assumptions by
25% and 50% over the base case. The credit stress sensitivity is
viewed by stressing both the base case default rate and the basis
spread. The maturity stress sensitivity is viewed by stressing
remaining term, IBR usage and prepayments. The results below should
only be considered as one potential outcome, as the transaction is
exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors and should not be used as
an indicator of possible future performance.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2007-2

Current Ratings: class A-3 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-3 'Asf' (Credit Stress) /
'AAsf' (Maturity Stress); class B 'Asf' (Credit and Maturity
Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBBsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBBsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'BBsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2008-2

Current Ratings: class A-4 'Dsf'; class B 'Csf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-4 'CCCsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-10

Current Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B 'BBBsf' (Credit Stress) / 'Asf'

(Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBBsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBBsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'BBsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

SLC Student Loan Trust 2007-2

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2008-2

The current ratings are most sensitive to Fitch's maturity risk
scenario. Key factors that may lead to positive rating action are
increased payment rate and a material reduction in weighted average
remaining loan term. A material increase of CE from lower defaults
and positive excess spread, given favorable basis spread
conditions, is a secondary factor that may lead higher loss
coverage multiples.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-10

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBBsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SLM STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Lowers Rating on Two Tranches to Dsf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings of all outstanding classes
of SLM Student Loan Trust (SLM) 2008-2 to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf'.

   Entity/Debt         Rating         Prior
   -----------         ------         -----
SLM Student Loan
Trust 2008-2

   A-3 784442AC9   LT Dsf  Downgrade   CCsf
   B 784442AD7     LT Dsf  Downgrade   CCsf

The 'Dsf' rating on the class A-3 notes reflects the default on the
senior notes in the payment of their outstanding principal balance
on their legal final maturity date of April 25, 2023.

The downgrade of the class B notes to 'Dsf' reflects the fact that
interest payments are being diverted to the class A-3 notes until
they are paid in full, given the provisions in the indenture that
change the cashflow waterfall while an event of default is
continuing. Under the terms of the indenture, non-payment of class
B interest when due and payable also constitutes an event of
default.

The A-3 and B classes are the final rated classes of the
transaction, as such the default ratings will be withdrawn within
11 months.

AUTOMATIC WITHDRAWAL OF THE LAST DEFAULT RATING

Default ratings ('Dsf') assigned to the last rated class of a
transaction will be automatically withdrawn within 11 months from
the date of this rating action. A separate RAC will not be issued
at that time.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Effects of Event of Default for class A-3: Fitch is downgrading the
outstanding senior class A-3 notes of SLM 2008-2 to 'Dsf' due to an
event of default on the legal final maturity date of this class of
notes. The notes will remain at 'Dsf' so long as the event of
default is continuing. According to the trust indenture, the event
of default may result in acceleration of the notes as declared by
the indenture trustee or by a majority of noteholders.

The event of default may also result in a liquidation of the trust
depending upon the remedies decided upon by the noteholders or the
indenture trustee, in accordance with the terms of the trust
indenture. Under Fitch's base case cashflow analysis, the
outstanding notes of class A-3 would eventually be paid in full
with no principal shortfall.

Effects of Event of Default for class B: Pursuant to the trust
indenture, the trust has switched to a post-event of default
waterfall following the default of the class A-3 notes, directing
all payments to the class A-3 notes until the balance is paid in
full, which results in interest payments being diverted away from
the class B notes. This occurred on the April 25, 2023 payment
date, and the class B notes are not expected to receive any further
interest until the class A-3 notes are paid in full.

Because of this diversion of interest and the class A-3 notes'
default, Fitch is downgrading the class B notes to 'Dsf' from
'CCsf'. The event of default may also result in a liquidation of
the trust depending upon the remedies decided upon by the
noteholders or the indenture trustee, in accordance with the terms
of the trust indenture.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
Due to the occurrence of the event of default, all notes will
remain at 'Dsf' so long as the event of default is continuing.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

All notes will remain at 'Dsf' so long as the event of default is
continuing, and class A-3 remains outstanding.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SYMPHONY CLO 30: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to Symphony
CLO 30, Ltd.

   Entity/Debt        Rating        
   -----------        ------        
Symphony
CLO 30, Ltd.

   A-L            LT NRsf   New Rating

   A-N            LT NRsf   New Rating

   B              LT AAsf   New Rating

   C              LT Asf    New Rating

   D              LT BBB-sf New Rating

   E              LT BB-sf  New Rating

   F              LT NRsf   New Rating

   Subordinated
   Notes          LT NRsf   New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Symphony CLO 30, Ltd. (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by
Symphony Alternative Asset Management LLC. Net proceeds from the
issuance of the secured and subordinated notes will provide
financing on a portfolio of approximately $400.0 million of
primarily first lien senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B', which is in line with that of recent
CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly
speculative credit quality; however, the notes benefit from
appropriate credit enhancement and standard CLO structural
features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
96.6% first-lien senior secured loans and has a weighted average
recovery assumption of 76.6%. Fitch stressed the indicative
portfolio by assuming a higher portfolio concentration of assets
with lower recovery prospects and further reduced recovery
assumptions for higher rating stresses.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 40% of the portfolio balance in aggregate while the
top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity resulting from the
industry, obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with
other recent CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a three-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting to the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings.

The WAL used for the transaction stress portfolio is 12 months less
than the WAL covenant to account for structural and reinvestment
conditions after the reinvestment period. In Fitch's opinion, these
conditions would reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio
during stress periods.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for class B, between 'B+sf'
and 'BBB+sf' for class C, between less than 'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for
class D, and between less than 'B-sf' and 'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B, 'A+sf' for class C, 'A+sf' for
class D, and 'BBB+sf' for class E.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


SYMPHONY CLO 30: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $100,000 Cl. F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to two classes of
notes issued and one class of loans incurred by Symphony CLO 30,
Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Symphony CLO 30").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$246,000,000 Class A-L Loans maturing 2035, Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-N Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$100,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2035, Assigned B3 (sf)

The notes and loans listed are referred to herein, collectively, as
the "Rated Debt."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Symphony CLO 30 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and non-loan assets. The portfolio is approximately 47%
ramped as of the closing date.

Symphony Alternative Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's three year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer issued four other classes
of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2880

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3mS + 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.


TPR FUNDING 2022-1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on E Advances
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Class A-1
Advances, the Class A-2 Advances, the Class B Advances, the Class C
Advances, the Class D Advances, and the Class E Advances (together,
the Advances) issued by TPR Funding 2022-1, LLC pursuant to the
Loan, Security and Servicing Agreement, dated as of December 15,
2022 (the Loan Agreement), entered into by and among TPR Funding
2022-1, LLC as the Borrower; Delaware Life Insurance Company as the
Servicer; Capital One, National Association (rated "A" with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) as the Administrative Agent,
Hedge Counterparty and Arranger; Citibank, N.A. (rated AA (low)
with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) as Collateral Custodian
and Document Custodian; Virtus Group, LP as Collateral
Administrator; and each of the Lenders and Subordinated Lenders
from time to time party thereto:

-- Class A-1 Advances at AA (sf)
-- Class A-2 Advances at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Advances at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C Advances at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D Advances at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E Advances at B (low) (sf)

The credit rating on the Class A-1 Advances addresses the timely
payment of interest (other than Interest attributable to Excess
Interest Amounts, as defined in the Loan Agreement referred to
above) and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Facility Maturity Date (as defined in the Loan Agreement referred
to above).

The credit ratings on the Class A-2 Advances, the Class B Advances,
the Class C Advances, the Class D Advances, and the Class E
Advances address the ultimate payment of interest (other than
Interest attributable to Excess Interest Amounts, as defined in the
Loan Agreement referred to above) and the ultimate payment of
principal on or before the Facility Maturity Date (as defined in
the Loan Agreement referred to above).

The Advances are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of U.S.
middle-market corporate loans. The servicer for TPR Funding 2022-1,
LLC is Delaware Life Insurance Company. DBRS Morningstar considers
Delaware Life Insurance Company to be an acceptable collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) servicer. The Scheduled Revolving Period End
Date is December 15, 2025. The Facility Maturity Date is December
15, 2032.

RATING RATIONALE

The finalization of the ratings was a result of the following
conditions being met by the transaction:
(1) Each of the Collateral Quality Tests and Coverage Tests
relevant to DBRS Morningstar's analysis were in compliance as of
February 15, 2023.
(2) Each of the transaction's underlying collateral participations
have been elevated to assignment.
(3) The transaction's Diversity Score was greater than 20 as of
February 15, 2023 (21.10).

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also considered the following
aspects of the transaction:

(1) The transaction's capital structure and the form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.
(2) Relevant credit enhancement in the form of subordination and
excess spread.
(3) The ability of the Advances to withstand projected collateral
loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios.
(4) The credit quality of the underlying collateral and the ability
of the transaction to reinvest Principal Proceeds into new
Collateral Obligations, subject to the Eligibility Criteria, which
include testing the Concentration Limitations, Collateral Quality
Tests, and Coverage Tests.
(5) DBRS Morningstar's assessment of the origination, servicing,
and CLO management capabilities of Delaware Life Insurance
Company.
(6) The legal structure as well as legal opinions addressing
certain matters of the Borrower and the consistency with the DBRS
Morningstar "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance"
methodology.

The transaction has a dynamic structural configuration that permits
variations of certain asset metrics via a selection of an
applicable row from a collateral quality matrix (the CQM, as
defined in Schedule V of the Loan Agreement). Depending on a given
Diversity Score, the following metrics are selected accordingly
from the applicable row of the CQM: DBRS Morningstar Risk Score and
Weighted-Average Spread. DBRS Morningstar analyzed each structural
configuration as a unique transaction, and all configurations
(matrix points) passed the applicable DBRS Morningstar rating
stress levels. The Coverage Tests and triggers as well as the
Collateral Quality Tests that DBRS Morningstar modeled during its
analysis are presented below.

(1) Class A-1 Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 142.86%
(2) Class A-2 Junior Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 138.15%
(3) Class B Junior Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 118.21%
(4) Class C Junior Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 113.21%
(5) Class D Junior Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 106.68%
(6) Class E Junior Overcollateralization Ratio Test: 103.70%
(7) Maximum Weighted-Average Life Test: 6.00
(8) Minimum Diversity Test: Subject to CQM; 20
(9) Maximum DBRS Morningstar Risk Score Test: Subject to CQM;
41.27%
(10) Minimum Weighted-Average DBRS Morningstar Recovery Rate Test:
51.90%
(11) Minimum Weighted-Average Spread Test: Subject to CQM; 4.25%
(12) Minimum Weighted-Average Coupon Test: 6.00%

Some particular strengths of the transaction are (1) the collateral
quality, which will consist mostly of senior-secured middle-market
loans; and (2) the expected adequate diversification of the
portfolio of collateral obligations (Diversity Score, matrix
driven).

Some challenges were identified: (1) the expected weighted-average
credit quality of the underlying obligors may fall below investment
grade (per the CQM), and the majority may not have public ratings
once purchased and (2) the underlying collateral portfolio may be
insufficient to redeem the Advances in an Event of Default.

DBRS Morningstar modeled the transaction using the DBRS Morningstar
CLO Asset Model and its proprietary cash flow engine, which
incorporated assumptions regarding principal amortization, amount
of interest generated, default timings, and recovery rates, among
other credit considerations referenced in the DBRS Morningstar
rating methodology "Cash Flow Assumptions for Corporate Credit
Securitizations." Model-based analysis produced satisfactory
results, which supported the assignment of the provisional ratings
on the Advances.

Considering the transaction structure, its legal aspects, and the
results produced by the models, DBRS Morningstar finalized the
provisional ratings specified above on each class of Advances
issued by TPR Funding 2022-1, LLC.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS Morningstar provides a
credit estimate or internal assessment for each nonfinancial
corporate obligor in the portfolio not rated by DBRS Morningstar.
Credit estimates are not ratings; rather, they represent a
model-driven default probability for each obligor that DBRS
Morningstar uses when rating the Advances.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TRINITAS CLO XXII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating in E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Trinitas CLO
XXII Ltd./Trinitas CLO XXII LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Trinitas Capital Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 27,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Trinitas CLO XXII Ltd./Trinitas CLO XXII LLC

  Class A-1, $252.00 million: Not rated
  Class A-2, $8.00 million: Not rated
  Class B-1, $37.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $7.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $22.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $12.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $40.46 million: Not rated



TRTX 2019-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on all classes of notes issued by
TRTX 2019-FL3 Issuer, Ltd. as follows:

-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the increased credit support to
the bonds as a result of successful loan repayment, as there has
been collateral reduction of 60.6% since issuance. The increased
credit support to the bonds serves as a mitigant to potential
adverse selection in the transaction as seven loans are secured by
office properties (64.0% of the current trust balance). As a result
of complications initially arising from impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the ongoing challenges with leasing
available space, the borrowers of these loans have generally been
unable to increase occupancy and rental rates to initially
projected levels, resulting in lower-than-expected cash flows.
While all loans remain current, given the decline in desirability
for office product across tenants, investors, and lenders alike,
there is greater uncertainty regarding the borrowers' exit
strategies upon loan maturity. In conjunction with this press
release, DBRS Morningstar has published a Surveillance Performance
Update report with in-depth analysis and credit metrics for the
transaction and with business plan updates on select loans. For
access to this report, please click on the link under Related
Documents below or contact us at info@dbrsmorningstar.com.

As of the March 2023 remittance, the trust reported an outstanding
balance of $485.2 million with nine loans remaining in the trust.
The transaction had a 24-month reinvestment period that ended in
October 2021. Two of the remaining nine loans, representing 17.0%
of the current trust balance, were in the transaction at closing.
Since the previous DBRS Morningstar rating action in November 2022,
there has been collateral reduction of $229.4 million, including
the full repayment of four loans. The remaining loans in the
transaction beyond the office concentration noted above include one
loan secured by a mixed-use property (22.6% of the current trust
balance) and one loan secured by a portfolio of multifamily
properties (13.4% of the current trust balance). The transaction's
property type concentration has remained relatively stable since
June 2022 when 64.4% of the trust balance was secured by office
collateral, 13.2% of the trust balance was secured by hotel
collateral, 12.4% of the trust balance was secured by mixed-use
collateral, and 10.1% of the trust balance was secured by
multifamily collateral.

Seven of the 10 loans, representing 78.0% of the current trust
balance, have scheduled maturity dates in 2023. Of these loans,
three are structured with additional extension options of 12
months, which the borrower may exercise if its respective property
meets the required performance-based minimum debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), minimum debt yield, and/or maximum loan-to-value
ratio tests. Loans that no longer have an extension option
remaining include 1825 Park, 300 Lafayette, 888 Broadway, and Lenox
Park Portfolio, which cumulatively account for 40.6% of the current
trust balance.

The 1825 Park loan (Prospectus ID#28; 1.0% of the current trust
balance) is secured by an office property in the Harlem
neighborhood of Manhattan, New York. The loan matures in April 2023
after the borrower and lender agreed to a 60-day extension in
February 2023. The loan is currently on the servicer's watchlist
for the upcoming maturity and the property was 81.0% occupied as of
YE2022, according to the collateral manager; however, property
operations currently do not cover debt service. DBRS Morningstar
did not receive confirmation regarding the borrower's exit
strategy; however, the collateral manager noted that further loan
extensions are possible if terms between the lender and borrower
are mutually beneficial, subject to the servicing standard.

The 300 Lafayette loan (Prospectus ID#23; 22.6% of the current
trust balance) is secured by a mixed-use property in the SoHo
neighborhood of Lower Manhattan, New York. The loan matures in
September 2023 and is discussed in greater detail below as it is
the largest loan on the servicer's watchlist.

The 888 Broadway loan (Prospectus ID#4; 13.4% of the current trust
balance) is secured by an office property in the Gramercy
Park/Union Square neighborhood of Manhattan. The loan matures in
December 2023 and, according to the collateral manager, the
property was 72.9% leased to three tenants at YE2022. The
collateral manager provided a YE2022 net operating income (NOI) of
$13.0 million based on trailing one-month revenue and trailing
12-month expenses, equating to a 1.15 times (x) DSCR. The borrower
appears committed to the property as it has paid the loan down by
$25.0 million over multiple extensions, as the loan has a current A
note balance of $175.0 million. The property was valued at $240.0
million at loan closing in 2019, implying a 5.4% capitalization
rate using the NOI noted above. While the current market value may
be lower, DBRS Morningstar believes there remains sufficient market
equity in the transaction.

The Lenox Park Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#2; 3.5% of the current
trust balance) is secured by four office properties in Brookhaven,
Georgia. The portfolio originally consisted of five properties;
however, one of the larger assets was sold in Q2 2022, and the A
note was paid down by $72.0 million and an additional $65.3 million
was swept into a leasing reserve. In March 2023, the A note was
paid down by an additional $75.6 million from existing reserves,
resulting in a currently funded A note balance of $72.4 million. In
conjunction with the paydown of the loan, existing loan future
funding for accretive leasing was reduced to $10.0 million from
$42.3 million. The collateral manager report noted the YE2022
leased rate across the property was 81.8% and the YE2022 NOI was
$12.0 million based on trailing one-month revenue and trailing
12-month expenses, equating to a 2.39x DSCR taking into account the
recent loan repayment. The four remaining properties had a combined
property value of $174.5 million at loan closing in 2018, implying
a 6.9% capitalization rate using the NOI noted above. While the
current market value may be lower, DBRS Morningstar also believes
there remains sufficient market equity in the transaction.

The remaining loans are primarily secured by properties in urban
and suburban markets. Seven loans, representing 81.9% of the pool,
are secured by properties in urban markets, as defined by DBRS
Morningstar, with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 6, 7, or 8, and
two loans representing 18.1% of the pool are secured by properties
with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 4 or 5, which denotes a
suburban market. In comparison with the pool composition in June
2022, properties in urban markets represented 61.2% of the
collateral, and properties in suburban markets represented 38.8% of
the collateral. The location of the assets within urban markets
potentially serves as a mitigant to loan maturity risk, as urban
markets have historically shown greater liquidity and investor
demand.

In total, the lender has advanced $165.2 million in loan future
funding to eight of the remaining individual borrowers to aid in
property stabilization efforts, with the largest advances made to
the borrowers of the 888 Broadway ($43.6 million), 300 Lafayette
($36.2 million), and 575 Fifth Avenue ($32.5 million) loans. All
loans are secured by office or mixed-use properties in Manhattan
with the advanced funds used to pay for capital improvements and
leasing costs. An additional $52.3 million of loan future funding
allocated to eight borrowers remains outstanding. The largest
portion of available dollars ($14.5 million) is allocated to the
borrower of the 1525 Wilson loan for capital improvements and
leasing costs. The loan is secured by an office property in
Arlington, Virginia.

No loans are in special servicing; however, two loans, representing
23.6% of the current trust balance, are on the servicer's watchlist
for upcoming maturity or performance issues. The loans are
generally on the servicer's watchlist for upcoming maturity.
Additionally, seven of the remaining loans, representing 57.1% of
the current trust balance, have either been modified or the
borrowers have received a forbearance since loan origination. Loan
modifications and forbearances were the preferred resolution
strategy at the onset of the pandemic when commercial property
operations were stressed as well as at loan maturity, as the
required performance-based tests to extend loans were often
waived.

The 300 Lafayette loan was flagged for a May 2023 maturity;
however, according to the Q4 2022 collateral manager report, it
appears the loan was modified in September 2022 when the borrower
made a $2.0 million loan principal curtailment, and the loan
maturity was extended to September 2023. The report also noted the
loan was in technical default as the borrower had not provided
proof of a new interest rate cap agreement; however, according to
an update from the collateral manager, a rate cap agreement with a
3.50% strike price is in place. The property remains 77.1%
occupied, as Microsoft occupies the entire office component on a
long-term lease expiring in June 2036, while the retail component
remains vacant. According to the collateral manager, the property
reported YE2022 NOI of $3.6 million based on trailing one-month
revenue and trailing 12-month expenses, equating to a DSCR of
0.45x. The loan was originally structured with $28.5 million of
future funding for debt service shortfalls, and as of YE2022, $2.0
million of debt service advances remained available to the
borrower, equal to roughly three months' worth of debt service
payments. There is also $6.5 million of loan future funding
available to the borrower to fund leasing costs for the vacant
retail space, equating to $345.00 per square foot (psf). In its
original analysis, DBRS Morningstar assumed necessary leasing costs
ranging from $100.00 psf to $225.00 psf for the three ground-floor
retail spaces and $100.00 psf for the below-grade space. The
assumptions were based on 15-year lease terms with starting rental
rates ranging from $300.00 psf to $500.00 psf for ground-floor
space and $100.00 psf for below-grade space.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


US AUTO 2021-1: Moody's Puts 'B3' Rating on D Notes on Review
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
ratings of 11 classes of notes from three asset-backed
securitizations backed by non-prime retail automobile loan
contracts originated by U.S. Auto Sales, Inc. (US Auto), an
affiliate of U.S. Auto Finance Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: U.S. Auto Funding Trust 2020-1

Class C Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Dec 8, 2022 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Class D Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 18, 2020 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: U.S. Auto Funding Trust 2021-1

Class B Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 11, 2021 Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 11, 2021 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Class D Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 11, 2021 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Mar 31, 2023 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: U.S. Auto Funding Trust 2022-1

Class A Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 28, 2022 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Class B Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Jun 28, 2022 Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 31, 2023 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Mar 31, 2023 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 31, 2023 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is primarily driven by the occurrence of events
of default and servicer replacement events on the three
transactions and an unexplained shortfall in funds remitted for
U.S. Auto Funding Trust (USAUT) 2022-1 on the April 2023 payment
date.

On April 20, Moody's received notifications from USASF Servicing
LLC (USASF), the servicer of the transactions and a wholly owned
subsidiary of U.S. Auto Finance Inc., that events of default and
servicer replacement events had occurred for the three transactions
due to the failure of USASF to remit trust collections to the trust
collections accounts within two business days as required under
Section 8.2 of the underlying Indentures. The notifications further
stated that USASF has engaged financial advisors to formulate a
plan to cure the failure by the servicer to deposit collections
within two business days of identification.

Furthermore, the April 2023 servicer report for USAUT 2022-1
indicated a $2.2 million shortfall out of $7.9 million in total
available funds. This shortfall arose from a difference in
collections available to make trust payments compared to the
servicer's calculated pool collections.

On April 23, US Auto announced the closure of its dealership
operations.

In Moody's rating action, Moody's considered the high governance
risk due to elevated uncertainty regarding USASF's ability to
reconcile funds to be remitted to the trusts and cure the
shortfall, as well as concerns related to the quality of data
provided by USASF, including recent restatement of performance data
and failure to accurately account for trust collections. The risk
of increased trust losses due to loss of commingled funds is high
if the servicer files for bankruptcy before the shortfalls or any
other commingled funds, including repossession proceeds, are
remitted to the trust. This risk is elevated following the closure
of US Auto's dealership operations, which increases the likelihood
of servicer bankruptcy.

Moody's base case lifetime loss estimates of 35% for USAUT 2020-1,
40% for USAUT 2021-1, and 46% for USAUT 2022-1 reflect the recent
weak performance of the pools, including a recent restatement of
gross and net loss data. Hard credit enhancement, including
overcollateralization (OC), reserve account, and subordination,
continues to decline for most tranches. OC declined to 11.9% of the
pool balance from 14.6% as of March 2023 for USAUT 2022-1, in part
due to the shortfall in remitted funds noted above. Although no
such shortfall was disclosed for U.S. Auto Funding Trust 2021-1, OC
declined to 18.4% in April'23 from 18.7% in March'23 for this
trust. OC increased to 47.6% from 45.9% for USAUT 2020-1 over the
same period.

During the review period, Moody's will seek additional information
on the reconciliation of the noted shortfall for USAUT 2022-1 and
remittance of funds to the trusts, internal controls established by
USASF to prevent any future shortfalls/delays and updated
performance of the underlying pools. Moody's will consider overall
data quality and the accuracy and completeness of the information
provided.  Any concerns with regard to data quality may result in a
downgrade or lead to withdrawal of the assigned ratings if Moody's
have insufficient information to maintain the ratings.

Moody's will further consider the impact of servicing disruption
relating to a servicing transfer, if any, on the ongoing
performance of the pools and paydown of the rated notes, as well as
any increases in servicing related fees associated with the
transfer.  According to the transaction provisions, following the
servicer replacement event, a servicer termination can occur upon
the direction of noteholders representing at least a majority of
the note balance of the controlling class. And in the event the
servicer is removed or resigns, the indenture trustee shall appoint
the backup servicer as successor servicer pursuant to the backup
servicing agreement. Computershare Trust Company, N.A., is the
indenture trustee and backup servicer for the transactions.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
November 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the ratings. Losses could decline from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor
defaults or greater recoveries from the value of the vehicles
securing the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the
market for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the
transaction's performance. Other reasons for better-than-expected
performance include changes in servicing practices to maximize
collections on the loans or refinancing opportunities that result
in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Losses could increase from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor
defaults or a deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing
the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the market
for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the transaction's
performance. Other reasons for worse-than-expected performance
include poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties
including further restatement of performance data, lack of
transactional governance and fraud.


VERUS SECURITIZATION 2023-3: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Verus Securitization
Trust 2023-3's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by primarily
newly originated first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate residential
mortgage loans (including mortgage loans with initial interest-only
periods) to both prime and non-prime borrowers. The loans are
secured by single-family residences, townhouses, planned-unit
developments, two- to four-family residential properties,
condominiums, condotels, manufactured housing and five- to 10-unit
multifamily residences. The pool has 795 loans backed by 803
properties, which are primarily non-qualified mortgage/ATR
compliant and ATR-exempt loans. Of the 795 loans, two are
cross-collateralized loans backed by 10 properties.

S&P said, "After we assigned preliminary ratings on April 13, 2023,
the class M-1 note rate was changed from the net weighted average
coupon (WAC) rate to the lesser of a fixed rate and the net WAC
rate. After analyzing the final bond coupons, we assigned final
ratings that are unchanged from the preliminary ratings we assigned
for all classes."

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, representations and warranties framework, and geographic
concentration;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Invictus Capital Partners;

-- The mortgage originator, Hometown Equity Mortgage LLC; and

-- The potential impact current and near-term macroeconomic
conditions may have on the performance of the mortgage borrowers in
the pool. S&P said, "Per our latest macroeconomic update, we
continue to expect the U.S. will fall into a shallow recession in
2023. We now expect U.S. GDP to decline 0.3% from its peak in
first-quarter 2023 to its third-quarter trough. If correct, this
will beat the 2001 recession as the softest recession in recent
history, since 1960. Although safeguards from the Fed and other
regulators have stabilized conditions, banking concerns increase
risks of a worse outcome. Chances for a worsening recession have
increased, with inflation moderating faster than expected in our
baseline forecast. As a result, we continue to maintain the revised
outlook per the April 2020 update to the guidance to our RMBS
criteria (which increased the archetypal 'B' projected foreclosure
frequency to 3.25% from 2.50%)."

  Ratings Assigned

  Verus Securitization Trust 2023-3(i)

  Class A-1, $251,311,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $37,860,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $54,615,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $34,596,000: BBB- (sf)
  Class B-1, $22,193,000: BB- (sf)
  Class B-2, $16,972,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-3, $17,625,182: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): Not rated
  Class XS, notional(ii): Not rated
  Class R, not applicable: Not rated

(i)The collateral and structural information reflect the private
placement memorandum dated April 14, 2023. The ratings address the
ultimate payment of interest and principal; they do not address
payment of the cap carryover amounts.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' aggregate unpaid
principal balance.




WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Certs to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2014-LC16, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-LC16 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

*  Reflects interest-only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-5, Cl. A-SB, and
Cl. A-S, were affirmed because of their significant credit support
and the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The rating on one P&I class, Cl. B, was downgraded due to increased
risk of interest shortfalls driven primarily by the significant
exposure to specially serviced and poorly performing loans. Four
loans, representing 21.9% of the pool are in special servicing, all
of which have recognized significant appraisal reductions as of the
April 2023 remittance statement. The two largest specially serviced
loans include the Woodbridge Center Loan (18.1% of the pool) and
Oak Court Mall (2.2%), which are in foreclosure and real estate
owned (REO), respectively. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls
will likely continue and may increase due to the exposure to
specially serviced loans and all of the remaining loans mature by
June 2024.

The rating on the one P&I class, Cl. C, was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit quality of its reference classes resulting from principal
paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's regard e-commerce competition as a social risk under
Moody's ESG framework. The rise in e-commerce and changing consumer
behavior presents challenges to brick-and-mortar discretionary
retailers.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 20.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 17.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology" published
in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38.7% to $597
million from $974 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18.1% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 48.5% of the pool. Twenty loans,
constituting 21.5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

As of the April 2023 remittance report, loans representing 96.3%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, and 3.7% were over 90+ days delinquent.

Fifteen loans, constituting 23.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 28.4%). Four loans, constituting 21.9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Woodbridge Center Loan
($108.1 million – 18.1% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu portion of a $225.2 million senior mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by a 1.1 million square foot (SF) component of a
two-story regional mall in Woodbridge, New Jersey. The mall's
anchors now include Macy's, Boscov's, JCPenney, and Dick's Sporting
Goods. Two anchor spaces are currently vacant following the
December 2019 closure of Lord and Taylor (120,000 SF) and the April
2020 closure of Sears (274,100 SF). Macy's, JCPenney, and the
former Lord & Taylor space are not included as collateral for the
loan. Other major tenants include Dave & Busters, and Seaquest. As
of December 2022, collateral occupancy was 70%, compared to 68% in
December 2021, 69% in December 2020, 97% in December 2019, and 97%
at securitization. Inline occupancy was 86% as of December 2022
compared to 79% as of December 2021. Property performance has
declined annually since 2015, and the 2021 net operating income
(NOI) was nearly 46% lower than in 2014. The NOI further declined
in 2022 due to lower revenues, and the 2022 NOI was 35% lower than
in 2021. As a result, the 2022 NOI DSCR was below 1.00X. The
property was closed temporarily in 2020 due to the pandemic, and
the loan was transferred to special servicing in June 2020. The
loan is last paid through its March 2022 payment date. A receiver
was appointed in October 2021, and foreclosure is currently being
pursued. The property faces significant competition with seven
competitive regional and super-regional centers located within a
20-mile radius. The property was appraised in January 2023 at a
value significantly below the outstanding loan balance, and the
master servicer subsequently recognized an appraisal reduction of
$92 million or 78% of the outstanding loan amount. Due to the
continued decline in performance, Moody's anticipates a significant
loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is Oak Court Mall Loan
($13.4 million – 2.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion of a $34.9 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by an approximate 240,000 SF component of a 723,386 SF
enclosed regional mall and a 126,184 SF office building eight miles
east of downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Anchors at the property
include Macy's and Dillard's, neither of which are part of the
collateral. A second Dillard's store leased the third 50,000 SF
anchor store; however, that closed prior to the lease expiration in
2020. The retail collateral is 74% leased as of March 2023, while
the office component is 89% leased. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2020 due to imminent monetary default. A
foreclosure notice was filed in December 2022, and in March 2023,
the property was sold to the trust. An updated appraised value in
March 2023 was 57% lower than the value at securitization and below
the outstanding loan balance. As of the March 2023 remittance
statement, the loan was last paid through the July 2022 payment
date.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Hilton Garden Inn
- Covington Loan ($7.6 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is
secured by the borrower's fee simple interest in a 116-room,
limited-service hotel located in Covington, Louisiana. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2022 and was REO as of
the March 2023 remittance statement. Property performance had
deteriorated since securitization through 2019 and was further
impacted due to the business disruptions caused by the coronavirus
pandemic. The property experienced material damages due to
Hurricane Ida. However, as of July 2022, the hotel is fully open
and back online. The property is not generating sufficient cash
flow to cover debt service. An updated appraisal value from
December 2022 valued the property 48% below the value at
securitization and slightly below the outstanding loan amount. As
of the April 2023 remittance, the loan has amortized 19.7% since
securitization, and the loan is last paid through its October 2020
payment date.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a multifamily
property which is over 90 days delinquent. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $103.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans
(79.0% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4.1 million (a 20.6% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans. The largest troubled loan is
the Orchard Falls loan ($16.8 million – 2.8% of the pool), which
is secured by a 146,300 SF office property located in Greenwood
Village, Colorado. The building was constructed in 1982 and
renovated in 2013. The property's performance has declined since
2019 due to the departure of a large tenant, Colorado State
University (15.6% of net rentable area (NRA)). Since then, the
occupancy has generally remained unchanged. As of September 2022,
the property was 79% leased, compared to 76% in 2021 and 94% at
securitization. The loan is currently on the watchlist and is being
monitored for low DSCR. The second troubled loan is the Quality Inn
College Station loan ($3.3 million –0.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 62-room limited-service hotel located in Bryan, Texas.
Property performance had deteriorated since securitization and was
further impacted due to the business disruptions caused by the
coronavirus pandemic. The property is not generating sufficient
cash flow to cover debt service.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this
transaction, Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's
adjust the MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects
capitalization (cap) rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap
rates and market cap rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan
balance that reflects each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV
reported in this publication reflects the MLTV before the
adjustments described in the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2021 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2022 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 100%, compared to 89% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.73X and 1.33X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 13.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Harlequin Plaza Loan ($28.0 million –
4.7% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent Class-B office
buildings located in Greenwood Village, Colorado, approximately 14
miles southeast of the Denver CBD. The buildings, built in 1980 and
renovated in 2013, are three and four stories tall. The property
was 86% occupied as of December 2022. The property's three largest
tenants represent an aggregate of 53% of the property's square
footage and do not have lease expirations prior to November 2024.
The loan is interest only for its entire term, and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.08X, respectively, unchanged from the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Weatherford Ridge loan ($27.9
million – 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a power center
located in Weatherford, Texas, approximately 25 miles west of
downtown Fort Worth and positioned at the intersection of I-20 and
Main Street. The property was 94% leased as of June 2020. Tenants
at the property consist of a mix of national retailers, including
Belk, TJ Maxx, Bed Bath & Beyond, and Michaels. A non-collateral JC
Penney serves as a shadow anchor at the property, and this location
has not appeared on any store closing lists. Bed Bath & Beyond has
a co-tenancy provision related to JC Penney going dark. The loan
was initially transferred to special servicing in July 2020 in
relation to the coronavirus impact on the property and was modified
and returned to the master servicer in January 2023. As of December
2022, the property was 100% leased, compared to 98% at
securitization. The loan has amortized 10% since securitization and
is current on its debt service payments. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 140% and 0.73X, respectively, compared to 131% and 0.78X
at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Market Square at Montrose Loan ($23.0
million – 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 207,250 SF
component of a 510,400 SF power center located in the Fairlawn
trade area in Akron, Ohio. The collateral is made up of six
single-story buildings. Major tenants at the property include
JCPenney, Home Depot, Dick's Sporting Goods, and Regal Cinemas.
Home Depot is the only anchor owned by the borrower and contributed
as collateral for the loan. Dick's Sporting Goods and Regal Cinemas
own their respective boxes and pay ground rent to the borrower. The
collateral is 100% leased as of December 2022, compared to an
average occupancy of 99% since securitization. The property's NOI
declined slightly in 2020 but has since rebounded to the
securitization levels. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and
0.94X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.92X at the last review.



WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC18 issued by
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-LC18 as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since DBRS Morningstar's last review in November
2022. DBRS Morningstar notes the transaction does contain loans
collateralized by office properties and other assets exhibiting
performance declines since issuance or otherwise demonstrating
increased risks. For those loans showing the most pronounced risks,
stressed scenarios were applied to increase the expected losses.
Loans collateralized by office properties constitute 13.5% of the
pool balance, including 2900 Fairview Park Drive (Prospectus ID#4;
4.4% of the pool), One Towne Square (Prospectus ID#7; 3.7% of the
pool), and YRC Headquarters (Prospectus ID#13; 2.1% of the pool).
The analyzed weighted-average expected loss for these office loans
was approximately 70% higher than the average expected loss for the
pool. These scenarios increased the expected loss for the pool, but
the effects were moderate as the transaction also benefits from the
stable performance of loans backed by retail and lodging
properties, which account for 29.0% and 14.4% of the pool balance,
respectively.

As of the March 2023 remittance, 82 of the original 99 loans remain
in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 26.6% since
issuance with a current trust balance of approximately $835.2
million. Fifteen loans, representing 13.9% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. In total, three loans, representing
4.6% of the pool, are in special servicing. Nine loans,
representing 11.8% of the pool balance, are on the servicer's
watchlist, with seven of those loans being monitored for occupancy
issues as well as low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs).

The largest office loan in the pool, 2900 Fairview Park Drive
(Prospectus ID#4; 4.4% of the pool), is secured by a 147,000 square
foot (sf) office building in Falls Church, Virginia. As of
September 2022, the loan reported a DSCR of 2.18 times (x),
compared with the YE2021 DSCR of 2.12x and DBRS Morningstar DSCR of
1.37x. The subject property is solely occupied by HITT Contracting,
Inc. (lease expiry in September 2024), with the single tenant
exposure presenting obvious concerns about rollover risk as the
loan matures in the same month as the lease expiry date. The
subject property serves as the corporate headquarters for HITT,
which has invested $12.5 million toward its build-out and has two
five-year extension options remaining. The loan is structured with
a full cash flow sweep that will be triggered if the tenant does
not renew at least 12 months prior to lease expiration. At
issuance, it was noted the cash sweep was expected to net slightly
more than $3.0 million in funds to be held as additional collateral
on the loan or to fund leasing costs to backfill the space.
According to Q4 2022 Reis data, the Marrifield and Annandale
submarket reported a 15.3% vacancy rate, suggesting that re-leasing
such a large block of space could be challenging. Given these
increased risks, the loan was analyzed with an increased
probability of default to increase the expected loss in the
analysis.

The largest office loan on the servicer's watchlist, YRC
Headquarters (Prospectus ID#13; 2.1% of the pool), is secured by a
332,937sf office property built in 1972 in the Kansas City suburb
of Overland Park, Kansas. The property's single tenant, YRC
Enterprise (YRC; lease expiry in March 2024) expanded into
Nashville and officially moved its headquarters, formerly housed at
the subject property, there in 2021. The subject building has been
fully vacant for at least a year, with all space listed as
available in online listings located by DBRS Morningstar as of
April 2023. The building is well situated within Overland Park,
just south of I-435 on Roe Avenue, a heavily trafficked
thoroughfare. A cash sweep was initiated when the YRC lease was not
renewed and, as of March 2023 loan reserve report, there is
approximately $1.9 million in tenant reserves. According to Q4 2022
Reis data, the South Johnson County submarket reported a 10.5%
vacancy rate, compared with YE2021 vacancy rate of 12.0%. Given the
significantly increased risks for this loan, DBRS Morningstar
assumed a stressed scenario to increase the expected loss, which
was 300% higher than the pool average expected loss.

The largest loan in special servicing, Hilton Garden Inn Austin
Northwest (Prospectus ID#16; 2.0% of the pool), is secured by a
138-room hotel in Austin, Texas. This loan has been in special
servicing since May 2020 but is expected to return to the master
servicer in the near term as a forbearance agreement has been
reached. According to the STR report, the hotel reported an
occupancy rate of 70.2%, average daily rate (ADR) of $101.88, and
revenue per room (RevPAR) of $71.51 for March 2022, showing
improvement from the YE2021 occupancy rate of 41.5%, ADR of $69.73,
and RevPAR of $28.94. The performance improvements had a positive
impact on the financials, with the DSCR of 0.87x reported for the
trailing nine months ended September 30, 2022, compared with the
DSCR of 0.34x at YE2021 and DSCR of 1.67x at issuance. A December
2022 appraisal, obtained by the servicer, reported a value of $18.5
million for the property, a slight decline from the February 2022
appraised value of $18.6 million, and a 39.4% decrease from the
$30.4 million value at issuance. Given the decline from the
appraised value and the low in-place DSCR, DBRS Morningstar
analyzed the loan with a stressed scenario to increase the expected
loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS2: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on two classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-NXS2
(the Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2015-NXS2 as follows:

-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed its ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes B, C, D, E, X-E, and
PEX to Negative from Stable. Class F has a rating that does not
generally carry a trend in commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS). All other trends are Stable.

The downgrades and Negative trends reflect DBRS Morningstar's
increasing concerns surrounding the pool's exposure to the office
sector, specifically loans in the top 15. Office properties
represent 23.4% of the pool balance, including Campbell Technology
Park (Prospectus ID#2, 8.5% of the pool balance), Sea Harbor Office
Center (Prospectus ID#6, 5.7% of the pool balance), and Colman
Building (Prospectus ID#10, 3.2% of the pool balance). Given the
shift in demand for office space that has continued to take shape
following the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, DBRS
Morningstar anticipates higher vacancy rates, longer re-leasing
periods, and related effects in lower investor demand and value
declines, even for performing assets. In the analysis for this
review, DBRS Morningstar analyzed loans backed by office and other
properties that were showing performance declines from issuance or
otherwise exhibiting increased risks from issuance with stressed
scenarios to increase the expected loss as applicable. This
includes the aforementioned loans, where the expected loss was
about 130% above the pool's weighted-average (WA) expected loss.

As of the March 2023 remittance, 56 of the original 63 loans remain
in the pool with an aggregate balance of $704.1 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 23.0% since issuance. Eleven
loans, representing 18.1% of the pool balance, are fully defeased.
In addition, eight loans are in special servicing, totaling 19.8%
of the current pool balance, and two of those loans, representing
7.4% of the pool, are likely to return to the master servicer soon.
Twelve loans, representing 29.6% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist, with 11 of those loans being monitored for occupancy
issues as well as low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs).

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Campbell Technology
Park, was added to the watchlist in February 2022 because of a low
DSCR and declining occupancy figures. The loan is secured by a
four-building office complex in Campbell, California, totaling
approximately 280,000 square feet (sf). As of the September 2022
rent roll, the property's occupancy rate was 62.0%, compared with
64.7% by YE2021, and well below 93.4% at issuance. There is
elevated tenant rollover risk within the next 12 months,
representing 33.2% of the net rentable area (NRA). This includes
the largest tenants, Dialog-Renesas (16.0% of NRA, lease expired in
February 2023) and Moss Adams (14.2% of NRA), which has a lease
expiring near the 12-month mark in May 2024. Cushman & Wakefield
listed approximately 178,000 sf, or 63.5% of NRA, as available for
lease, indicating an effective occupancy of 36.5%. The two largest
tenants' spaces were not listed as available; however, DBRS
Morningstar has requested a leasing update from the servicer. As
expected, financial performance continues to decline, with the
YE2022 DSCR at 1.32 times (x), compared with the YE2021 DSCR of
1.77x and the DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 1.67x. Per Q4 2022 Reis
data, the Campbell submarket reported a 17.4% vacancy rate and an
average asking rent of $47.27 per square foot (psf), compared with
the Q4 2021 vacancy rate of 17.2% and average asking rents of
$46.68 psf. Given the declining trend in occupancy, significant
tenant rollover risk, and weak submarket, the property's value has
likely decreased from issuance. As such, DBRS Morningstar analyzed
this loan with an increased probability of default (POD) and a
stressed loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for this review, resulting in an
expected loss that was 160% above the pool's WA expected loss.

The largest loan in special servicing, Sea Harbor Office Center, is
secured by a 359,514-sf suburban office building in Orlando. The
loan originally transferred to special servicing in January 2019
for nonmonetary imminent default where the borrower was disputing a
cash flow trigger with the servicer related to a credit rating
downgrade on the largest tenant, Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,
and as such, the borrower did not comply with setting up a cash
management account. However, cash management was eventually
implemented in June 2021 because Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. had
exercised a one-time termination option to give back a floor,
reducing its footprint to 72.4% of NRA on a lease through October
2025 from 84.6% of NRA at issuance. According to the March 2023
loan-level reserve report, the loan reported $3.2 million across
all reserves, including $2.7 million in other reserves and
approximately $335,000 in tenant reserves. The loan was current
through to February 2023, but the borrower did not make its March
2023 payment. However, the borrower remains in the 30-day grace
period. The loan initially was pending a return to the master
servicer in 2022 but with the most recent reporting, the workout
has yet to be determined. As of the September 2022 rent roll, the
subject's occupancy rate was 87.8%, compared with 88.0% by YE2021
and 100.0% by YE2020.

Besides the downsizing of the largest tenant, the second-largest
tenant, Visit Orlando (12.4% of the NRA), has a lease expiring in
December 2024, prior to the loan maturity of June 2025. The special
servicer continues to monitor the lease-up of the vacant space as
well as ongoing discussions with the borrower regarding the renewal
probability of the two largest tenants. Although performance
remains healthy with a trailing six months ended June 2022 DSCR of
2.19x with a moderate amount in reserves, the significant tenant
rollover risk near loan maturity reflects the increased refinance
risk, especially during the current office and economic
environment. As such, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an
elevated POD and stressed LTV, resulting in an expected loss that
was about 40% above the pool's WA expected loss.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Embassy Suites
Nashville (Prospectus ID#5, 5.5% of the pool balance), is secured
by a 208-room full-service hotel in Nashville. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in June 2020 because of payment
default as a result of the pandemic. The borrower has complied with
all terms under the February 2021 forbearance agreement, and the
loan is likely to return to the master servicer. As of the December
2022 STR report, the trailing 12-month occupancy was 72.9%, average
daily rate was $213.82, and revenue per available room (RevPAR) was
$155.94, outperforming its competitive set with a RevPAR
penetration of 149.6%. Financial performance has recovered from its
initial transfer, with the trailing nine-month ended September 2022
financials reporting a DSCR of 1.78x, compared with theYE2021 and
YE2020 DSCRs of 0.50x and -0.17x, respectively. A September 2022
appraisal obtained by the servicer reported a valuation of $66.7
million, slightly above the issuance appraised value of $66.4
million.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Confirms C Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C34 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C34 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class E at CCC (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)
-- Class G at C (sf)

All classes have Stable trends with the exception of Classes E, F,
and G which have ratings that generally do not carry trends in
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). The rating
confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since last review. The CCC (sf) and C (sf) ratings on
Classes E, F, and G are reflective of DBRS Morningstar's loss
expectations for the largest loan in special servicing, Regent
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#1; 11.8% of the pool), as discussed
below.

According to the March 2023 remittance, 62 of the original 68 loans
remain in the pool, representing a 19.3% collateral reduction from
issuance. The pool benefits from 10 loans, representing 7.6% of the
pool, that are fully defeased. Four loans, representing 17.4% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing and 10 loans,
representing approximately 13.0% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist. The pool has an office property concentration of
approximately 13%, including the largest loan in the pool, Regent
Portfolio, which is also the largest loan in special servicing.

At issuance, Regent Portfolio was secured by 13 buildings in New
Jersey, New York, and Florida consisting of traditional office,
medical office, and warehouse spaces. The loan sponsor is also the
primary owner of the portfolio's largest tenant, Sovereign Medical
Services Inc. The loan transferred to special servicing in June
2019 and the borrower filed for bankruptcy in February 2020.
Previously, a consensual bankruptcy was agreed upon in February
2022 that would give the borrower six months to pay off the loan
with one three-month extension option. The initial six-month period
ended in January 2023 at which point the borrower did not exercise
its one extension option. As of the March 2023 reporting, the loan
has become real estate owned (REO). Since the loan's transfer to
special servicing, one medical office building property in Wayne,
New Jersey, was sold with net proceeds of $11.3 million,
approximately $2.6 million below the issuance value. That amount
was used to recover outstanding servicer advances and to pay past
due debt service payments. The lack of updated financial reporting
available and prolonged period likely needed to sell the remaining
properties suggest the value has declined significantly from
issuance. As such, DBRS Morningstar applied a stressed value in its
liquidation scenario with this review, resulting in a loss severity
in excess of 25.0%.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Nolitan Hotel
(Prospectus ID#8; 3.8% of the pool), is secured by a 57-room,
full-service boutique hotel in New York City. The loan transferred
to special servicing in December 2020 for payment default as it was
last paid through September 2020. Dual tracking is underway, with
workout discussions ongoing while foreclosure has been filed and a
receivership appointed by the courts. Based on the December 2022
appraisal, the subject was valued at $36.8 million, an improvement
from the January 2022 valuation of $30.2 million but still below
the issuance value of $39.5 million. Based on the December 2022
value and the outstanding loan balance, this represents a generally
healthy loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 58.3%. An updated STR, Inc.
report was not provided but based on the YE2022 financials, the
occupancy rate, average daily rate (ADR), and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) were reported at 91.1%, $239, and $217, respectively.
At issuance, however, the subject reported an occupancy rate, ADR,
and RevPAR of 87.7%, $320, and $280, respectively. Although
performance has not returned to issuance levels and indeed remains
delinquent, the strong LTV based on the December 2022 value
suggests that the ultimate resolution will result in a relatively a
minor loss to the trust. For this review, DBRS Morningstar
maintained the elevated probability of default to increase the
expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS5: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on three classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-NXS5
issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-NXS5 as
follows:

-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)
-- Class G to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed its rating on the following
12 classes:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-6FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also discontinued the rating on Class X-F, as the
reference obligation is now rated CCC (sf). DBRS Morningstar
changed the trends on Classes D and E to Negative from Stable,
while Classes F and G have ratings that do not typically carry a
trend in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings. All
other trends are Stable.

The rating downgrades on Classes E, F, and G reflect an increase in
DBRS Morningstar's loss expectations for loans in special
servicing, primarily driven by the liquidation of the 10 South
LaSalle Street (Prospectus ID#2; 11.2% of the pool) loan, as
further described below. As part of the analysis for this review,
DBRS Morningstar liquidated five loans in special servicing from
the trust, resulting in an implied loss of approximately $46.0
million. At the last rating action in November 2022, DBRS
Morningstar changed the trends on Classes D, E, and F to Stable
from Negative, as only two loans were liquidated from the trust
with an implied loss of $17.4 million, which was contained to the
nonrated Class H. Based on the analysis for this review, projected
losses entirely depleted the nonrated Class H along with the
majority of Class G and significantly erode the credit support
provided to Classes E and F, warranting the downgrade actions. For
this review, the Negative trends assigned to Classes D and E
reflect the overall increased credit risk to those certificates, as
well as additional concerns surrounding select loans on the
servicer's watchlist and the pool's concentration of office
properties, which totals 21.4%. In general, office properties have
faced a heightened level of concern and scrutiny in recent months.
Vacancy rates in many submarkets remain elevated primarily because
of low space utilization, resulting from a change in workers'
preferences. This dynamic has led to an increase in office space
being offered for sublease and tenants downsizing or vacating.
Loans secured by office properties (excluding 10 South LaSalle
Street) had a weighted-average debt yield of 7.3% based on the most
recent financials available.

The rating confirmations reflect the otherwise stable performance
of the transaction, with the remaining loans in the pool having
experienced minimal changes since DBRS Morningstar's last review.
As of the March 2023 remittance, 56 of the original 64 loans
remained in the trust. with an aggregate principal balance of
$669.8 million, reflecting collateral reduction of 23.6% since
issuance. In addition, 10 loans, representing 15.5% of the pool,
are secured by collateral that has fully defeased. To date, two
loans have been liquidated from the pool with realized losses
totaling $3.3 million, which have been contained to the nonrated
Class H certificate. There are seven loans, representing 7.8% of
the pool, on the servicer's watchlist, and six loans, representing
19.7% of the pool, in special servicing.

The largest loan in special servicing and in the pool is 10 South
Lasalle Street, which is collateralized by a 781,426-square-foot
(sf), Class B office property in the Central Loop submarket of
Chicago. The 37-story building was built in 1987. Despite
undergoing $17.8 million worth of renovations over the past five
years, aimed at making the property more competitive, occupancy at
the property has remained depressed since 2020 and is currently
below 75.0%. The loan transferred to special servicing in August
2022 for imminent default; however, as of the most recent
remittance, the loan remains current. The special servicer remains
in contact with the borrower to evaluate next steps, with a
resolution targeted for June 2023.

The annualized net cash flow (NCF) for the trailing seven-month
period ended July 31, 2022, was $4.5 million, a significant decline
from the YE2020 and issuance NCF figures of $8.1 million and $10.7
million, respectively. Likewise, the debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) remains stressed, with the July 2022 figure below breakeven
at 0.95 times (x). As of the July 2022 rent roll, the property was
74.4% occupied, compared with the YE2020 and issuance rates of
72.0% and 89.0%, respectively. Rollover risk is elevated during the
next 12 months, with tenant leases representing 12.4% of net
rentable area (NRA) set to roll. Only $0.9 million remains in
reserves to aid the borrower's leasing efforts. The largest three
tenants at the property are Chicago Title Co. (13.6% of NRA; lease
expiry in March 2025), Amwins Brokerage of Illinois (7.4% of NRA;
lease expiry in August 2027), and Clausen Miller PC (5.4% of NRA;
lease expiry in December 2025).

The building is within the City of Chicago's planned LaSalle Street
re-development project, which is seeking to create a more mixed-use
neighborhood along the LaSalle corridor in the Central Loop. As
part of the initiative, developers plan to convert existing office
space to residential units; however, the collateral is not included
in a preliminary pool of participating properties. The subject
property was most recently appraised in December 2015 at a value of
$166.5 million; however, given the declines in occupancy and cash
flow, coupled with the diminished investor appetite for this
property type, the asset's value has likely declined significantly,
elevating the loan's leverage and credit risk to the trust. It is
noteworthy that an appraisal dated January 2023 was obtained for
135 South LaSalle Street, a Class A office building 0.1 mile from
the subject property, which indicated a value decline in excess of
70.0% from issuance following a precipitous decline in occupancy to
below 20.0%. DBRS Morningstar's liquidation scenario for this loan,
which resulted in an implied loss severity in excess of 30.0%, was
based on a haircut to the issuance appraised value with
consideration given to the outdated appraisal and soft market
conditions.

The third-largest loan in special servicing, with the
second-largest projected loss amount, is 1006 Madison Avenue. The
loan is secured by a 3,917-sf single-tenant retail property on the
Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York. Sponsorship for the loan is
provided by Joseph Sitt, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Thor Equities LLC. Sitt owns multiple properties in New York that
are in various stages of foreclosure, the most notable among them
being 597-599 Fifth Avenue, 3 East 48th Street, and 446 West 14th
Street. The loan transferred to the special servicer in October
2018 for imminent monetary default, following the departure of the
property's sole tenant in late 2018, with the property remaining
vacant since. The collateral has been real estate owned since July
2022. A November 2022 appraisal valued the property at $6.6
million, a 72.5% decline from the issuance appraised value of $24.0
million, reflecting a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 317.0% based on
the total exposure. In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar liquidated
the loan from the pool, resulting in an implied loss severity of
nearly 95.0%.

DBRS Morningstar also has concerns about the largest loan on the
servicer's watchlist, 4400 Jenifer Street (Prospectus ID#8; 3.9% of
pool balance). The loan is secured by a three-story, 83,777-sf
Class B office property in the Friendship Heights neighborhood of
Washington, D.C. The loan was added to the servicer's watchlist in
March 2022 following a decline in occupancy, which fell to 65.0% at
YE2021 from the pre-Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic figure
of 86.0% at YE2019. Financials have shown a similar decline, with a
YE2021 DSCR of 0.74x compared with the YE2019 figure of 1.51x.
According to the October 2022 rent roll, occupancy had improved to
73.4%; however, there is significant near-term rollover risk.
Tenants occupying 36.6% of NRA have leases set to expire within the
next 12 months, including a major tenant, DC Radio Assets (27.3% of
NRA; lease expiry in June 2023). DBRS Morningstar has reached out
to the servicer to inquire about new leasing prospects at the
property and to request updates related to potential lease
extensions for existing tenants. In its analysis for this review,
DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an elevated probability of
default penalty and made an adjustment to the LTV assumption to
reflect the probable value decline of the collateral since
issuance. The resulting expected loss was approximately 60.0%
higher than the pool average.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-NXS6 issued by
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-NXS6, as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to B (high) (sf)
-- Class G to CCC (sf)

The trends on all classes are Stable, with the exception of Class
G, which is assigned a rating that does not typically carry trends
in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings. The rating
confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall stable to
improved performance of the pool, which has remained in line with
DBRS Morningstar's expectations.

Since DBRS Morningstar's last rating action, one specially serviced
loan, White Marsh Portfolio (Prospectus ID#19; 1.7% of the pool),
has been returned to the master servicer. In addition, one loan
previously on the servicer's watchlist, Sixty Soho (Prospectus
ID#10; 4.4% of the pool), has been fully defeased, bringing the
total pool defeasance to six loans, representing 8.4% of the pool.
As of the March 2023 remittance, 46 of the original 50 loans remain
in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 20.4% since
issuance.

Per the March 2023 reporting, only one loan, Cassa Times Square
(Prospectus ID#6; 5.7% of the pool), is in special servicing. The
loan is secured by a mixed-use property consisting of an 86-key
boutique hotel along with 8,827 square feet (sf) of retail space in
Manhattan, New York. The loan transferred to special servicing in
May 2020 and has been delinquent since February 2020. A receiver
was appointed in March 2022 to manage property operations.
According to the servicer's most recent update, the property was
underperforming relative to the competitive set based on the
occupancy, average daily rate, and revenue per available room
penetration rates of 81.5%, 93.0%, and 75.8%, respectively, for the
trailing three-month period ended January 31, 2023. A YE2022
financial report was received that indicates the operating expenses
almost exceed revenues. The special servicer is pursuing
foreclosure. As of December 2022, the property was re-appraised at
$30.2 million, a decrease from the February 2022 value of $32.4
million, and well below the issuance value of $68.9 million. Given
the significant decline in value and the depressed performance,
DBRS Morningstar's analysis includes a liquidation scenario for the
subject loan, resulting in a loss severity of nearly 55.0%.

Financial reporting indicates that cash flows and overall
performances of the underlying properties in the pool have
generally recovered to pre-pandemic levels. Excluding the specially
serviced loan, according to the Q3 2022 and YE2022 financials, the
top 10 loans in the pool (56.0% of the current pool balance),
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 2.20 times (x), which is in line with the issuer's WA DSCR of
2.12x for the same loans. Six loans—only two of which are in the
top 10—representing 9.6% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist. The pool is well diversified by property type, with the
four largest concentrations being retail (25.8% of the pool),
mixed-use (20.0% of the pool), office (18.3% of the pool), and
multifamily properties (18.1% of the pool). All but four of the
outstanding loans are scheduled to mature in 2026.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Cuts Cl. C Certs Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the ratings on three classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2014-C24, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-C24, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. PEX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. SJ-A***, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. SJ-B***, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed
A2 (sf)

Cl. SJ-C***, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. SJ-D***, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2021 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

*** Reflects Rake Bonds Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five pooled P&I classes were affirmed because of
their credit support and the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index
(Herf), are within acceptable ranges. Defeasance also now
represents 22% of the pooled balance.

The ratings on two pooled P&I classes, Cl. B and Cl. C, were
downgraded due to the share of loans with a Moody's LTV above 120%
(32% of the pool), increased refinancing risk for certain poorly
performing loans and the deterioration of credit support from
higher than anticipated losses from previously liquidated loans.
Specially serviced loans make up 5.4% of the pool and an additional
10.8% of the pool were recognized as troubled loans due to declines
in net operating income (NOI) and DSCR since securitization. All
the loans mature by November 2024 and if certain loans are unable
to pay off at their maturity dates, the outstanding classes may
face increased interest shortfall risk.

The ratings on four non-pooled rake classes, Cl. SJ-A, SJ-B, SJ-C
and SJ-D, were affirmed based the Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio
and the dominant nature of the asset backing the loan. The rake
classes are supported by the subordinate debt associated with the
St. John's Town Center loan, a super-regional outdoor mall located
in Jacksonville, Florida.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PEX, was downgraded due
to decline in the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.9% of the
current pooled balance, unchanged from last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 12.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except rake
bond classes was "US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology" published in July
2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 23.8% to
$828.6 million from $1.088 billion at securitization. The pooled
certificates are collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
(excluding defeasance) constituting 47.5% of the pool. One loan,
constituting 12.5% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured
credit assessment. Twenty-four loans, constituting 21.9% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 22 at Moody's last review.

As of the April 2023 remittance report, loans representing 95% were
current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 2% were beyond their grace period but less than 30 days
delinquent and 3% were in foreclosure.

Fourteen loans, constituting 20.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $73.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 75.4%). Three loans, constituting 5.4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. All of the specially serviced loans
have transferred to special servicing since April 2020.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Greenwich Center Loan
($18.9 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 183,000
square foot (SF) open-air retail center located in Greenwich
Township, New Jersey. The loan transferred to special servicing in
May 2020 due to payment default. A discounted payoff agreement was
executed and the loan is expected to be transferred back to the
master servicer. The property was reported to be 96% occupied as of
December 2022.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Orlando Plaza
Retail Center Loan ($18.1 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 101,330 SF retail property located in Orlando,
Florida. The collateral consists of two retail condo units (retail
and theater). The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2020 due to imminent monetary default. The special servicer has
filed a foreclosure complaint and is engaging in workout
discussions. The borrower has listed the property for sale and has
agreed to a consensual receivership. The property was 92% leased as
of December 2022 compared to 85% in 2021 and 93% at
securitization.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a portfolio of
two parking garages located in Chicago, Illinois. Moody's has also
assumed a high default probability for five poorly performing
loans, constituting 10.8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $41.5 million (a 30.9% expected loss on average)
from these specially serviced and troubled loans. The largest
troubled loan is the Crossings at Corona (7.6% of the pool) which
is discussed in detail further below.

As of the April 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $1.9 million and impacted up to Cl. D. Moody's
anticipates interest shortfalls will continue because of the
exposure to specially serviced loans and/or modified loans.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this
transaction, Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's
adjust the MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects
capitalization (cap) rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap
rates and market cap rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan
balance that reflects each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV
reported in this publication reflects the MLTV before the
adjustments described in the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2021 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2022 operating results for 99% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 104%, compared to 107% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.84X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.77X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the St. Johns Town
Center Loan ($103.5 million -- 12.5% of the pooled balance), which
is secured by a 981,000 SF component of a 1.4 million SF
super-regional outdoor mall located in Jacksonville, Florida. The
loan represents a pari passu interest in a $203.5 million senior
mortgage loan. The property is also encumbered by a $146.5 million
B-note which contributes to the transaction as non-pooled rake
bonds. The loan sponsor is a joint venture between subsidiaries of
Simon Property Group (SPG), Inc. and Deutsche Bank Asset & Wealth
Management. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, Target, Dick's
Sporting Goods, Ashley Furniture, and Nordstrom. Dillard's, Target
and Ashley Furniture are not part of the collateral and own their
own spaces. As of December 2022, the property was 90% occupied
compared to 95% as of December 2019 and 99% at securitization.
Overall performance as of year-end 2022 remained above expectations
at securitization with a 2022 NOI DSCR of 2.92X compared to 2.71X
at year-end 2019. The property is considered the dominant mall in
the area. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR on
the pooled portion are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.61X, respectively, the
same as at last review. The Moody's total debt LTV including the
B-note is 95.1%.

The top three performing loans represent 20.0% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Gateway Center Phase II Loan ($75.0 million
-- 9.1% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a
$300 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 602,000 SF
retail center located in Brooklyn, New York. The center is the
second phase of a larger retail power center. As of September 2022,
the property was 100% leased, the same as in December 2019 and at
securitization. Retailers at the property include JC Penney (which
owns their improvements and leases the land from the borrower),
ShopRite, and Burlington Coat Factory. JC Penney represents 20% of
the total property's square footage but less than 5% of the base
rental revenue. The reported year-end 2022 NOI DSCR was 1.97X
compared to 2.02X at year-end 2019 and 1.81X at securitization. The
loan is interest-only throughout the loan term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.76X, respectively, unchanged from the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Crossings at Corona Loan ($63.0
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion
of a $130.6 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by an
834,000 SF component of an approximately 962,200 SF power center
located 50 miles south-east of Los Angeles in Corona, California.
The center is anchored by a Kohl's, Edwards Cinemas (Regal) and
Best Buy and is also shadow anchored by a Target. The three largest
collateral tenants all have lease expiration dates in 2024. As of
September 2022, the property was 78% leased, compared to 97% at
securitization. Toys R Us (7.6% of the NRA) closed in April 2018 in
conjunction with the company's bankruptcy. As a result, the loan is
on the servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR with an NCF DSCR of
0.97X and low occupancy. Due to the significant upcoming tenant
lease expirations and sustained decline in revenue, Moody's
considers this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Hilton Biltmore Park Loan ($27.5
million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 165 unit,
full-service hotel located in Asheville, North Carolina and was
built in 2008. The property was impacted by business disruptions
stemming from the pandemic but remained current on debt service
payments and has since rebounded significantly. As of December
2022, the occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 72%, $182 and $131,
respectively, compared to 65%, $182 and $117 as of December 2021.
While the property has had improving cash flow since 2020, the NOI
is still moderately below expectations at securitization. The loan
has amortized 13% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 118% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 140% and 0.89X
at the last review.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 128 Classes From 20 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 128 ratings from 20 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued between 2001 and 2007 that are backed by
prime jumbo collateral. The review yielded 13 upgrades, 14
downgrades, 97 affirmations, and four withdrawals. For RAMP Series
2004-SL1 Trust's series 2004-SL1 class A-VII and A-VIII, S&P
subsequently withdrew the ratings.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/3HE1ITo

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance and/or structural
characteristics and their potential effects on certain classes.
Some of these considerations may include:

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends;

-- Erosion of or increases in credit support;

-- Small loan count; and

-- Tail risk.

Rating Actions

The rating changes reflect its opinion regarding the associated
transaction-specific collateral performance and/or structural
characteristics, as well as the application of specific criteria
applicable to these classes.

The downgrades are mostly due to the payment allocation triggers
passing, which allows principal payments to be made to more
subordinate classes and thus erodes projected credit support for
the affected classes.

S&P said, "The rating affirmations reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support, collateral performance, and
credit-related reductions in interest on these classes has remained
relatively consistent with our prior projections.

"We withdrew our ratings on six classes from three transactions due
to the small number of loans remaining in the related group. Once a
pool has declined to a de minimis amount, its future performance
becomes more difficult to project. As such, we believe there is a
high degree of credit instability that is incompatible with any
rating level."



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 36 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed a review of its ratings on 36 classes
from six U.S. RMBS transactions issued between 2020 and 2021. The
review yielded seven upgrades and 29 affirmations.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/3AURwSL

S&P Said, "We performed a credit analysis of each transaction using
updated loan-level information from which we determined foreclosure
frequency, loss severity, and loss coverage amounts commensurate
with each rating level. We also used the same mortgage operational
assessment, representation and warranty, and due diligence factors
that were applied at issuance. Our geographic concentration and
prior-credit-event adjustment factors reflect the transactions'
current pool composition. We did not apply additional adjustment
factors relating to forbearance or repayment plan activity."

The upgrades primarily reflect deleveraging due to the respective
transactions benefitting from low or zero accumulated losses to
date and, although declining, elevated observed prepayment speeds
over the past year, which resulted in a greater percentage of
credit support for the rated classes. In addition, improved
loan-to-value ratios due to significant home price appreciation
resulted in lower projected default expectations. S&P ultimately
believes these classes have sufficient credit support to withstand
projected losses at higher rating levels.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the classes' projected
collateral performance relative to our projected credit support
remain relatively consistent with our previous expectations.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by the application of its criteria. These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes. They include:

-- Collateral performance (including prepayment and delinquency
trends),

-- Priority of principal payments,

-- Priority of loss allocation, and

-- Available subordination and excess spread.



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 55 Classes From Eight US RMBS Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of the ratings on 55
classes from eight U.S. RMBS non-qualified mortgage transactions
issued between 2019 and 2021. The review yielded 26 upgrades and 29
affirmations.

S&P said, "We performed a credit analysis for each transaction
using updated loan-level information from which we determined
foreclosure frequency, loss severity, and loss coverage amounts
commensurate for each rating level. We also used the same mortgage
operational assessment, representation and warranty, and due
diligence factors that were applied at issuance. Our geographic
concentration and prior credit event adjustment factors reflect the
transactions' current pool composition. We did not apply additional
adjustment factors relating to forbearance or repayment plan
activity.

"The upgrades primarily reflect deleveraging due to the respective
transactions benefitting from low or zero accumulated losses to
date and, although declining, elevated observed prepayment speeds
over the past year, which resulted in a greater percentage of
credit support for the rated classes. In addition, improved
loan-to-value ratios due to significant home price appreciation
resulted in lower projected default expectations. Ultimately, we
believe these classes have sufficient credit support to withstand
projected losses at higher rating levels.

"The affirmations reflect our view that the classes' projected
collateral performance relative to our projected credit support
remain relatively consistent with our previous expectations."

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by the application of our criteria. These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes. These considerations include:

-- Collateral performance (including prepayment and delinquency
trends),

-- Priority of principal payments,

-- Priority of loss allocation, and

-- Available subordination and excess spread.

  Ratings List

                                                    RATING
  ISSUER           SERIES  CLASS   CUSIP         TO        FROM
  MAIN RATIONALE

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   A-1    92537KAA2   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   A-2    92537KAB0   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   A-3    92537KAC8   AA (sf)    AA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   M-1    92537KAD6   A+ (sf)    A- (sf)
                   
    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   B-1     92537KAE4  BBB (sf)   BB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   B-2     92537KAF1  B+ (sf)    B- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization    
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   A-1X    92537KAH7  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2019-4     2019-4   A-1B    92537KAJ3  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization   
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   A-1     92536PAA2  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization  
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   A-1X    92536PAB0  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   A-1B    92536PAC8  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   A-2     92536PAD6  AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   A-3     92536PAE4  AA (sf)    AA- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   M-1     92536PAF1  A- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   B-1     92536PAG9  BBB- (sf)  BB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-1     2020-1   B-2     92536PAH7  B- (sf)    B- (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   A-1     92537UAA0  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   A-2     92537UAB8  AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   A-3     92537UAC6  AA (sf)    AA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   M-1     92537UAD4  A+ (sf)     A (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus S
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   B-1     92537UAE2  BBB+ (sf) BBB- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-2     2020-2   B-2     92537UAF9  BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   A-1     92538LAA9  AAA (sf) AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   A-2     92538LAB7  AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   A-3     92538LAC5  AA (sf)   AA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   M-1     92538LAD3  A+ (sf)   A- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   B-1     92538LAE1  BBB (sf)  BB+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-4     2020-4   B-2     92538LAF8  BB- (sf)  B+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  rust 2020-5      2020-5   A-1     92538CAA9  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-5     2020-5   A-2     92538CAB7  AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization T
  rust 2020-5      2020-5   A-3     92538CAC5  AA (sf)   AA- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-5     2020-5   M-1     92538CAD3  A- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-5     2020-5   B-1     92538CAE1  BBB- (sf)  BB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2020-5     2020-5   B-2     92538CAF8  BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-1     92537QAA9  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-1X-1  92537QAB7  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-1X-2  92537QAC5  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-1B    92537QAD3  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-2     92537QAE1  AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   A-3     92537QAF8  AA (sf)   AA- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   M-1     92537QAG6  A- (sf)   BBB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   B-1     92537QAH4  BB+ (sf)  BB- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-1     2021-1   B-2     92537QAJ0  B+ (sf)     B (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   A-1     92538FAA2  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization   
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   A-2     92538FAB0  AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)

  Verus  
  Securitization    
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   A-3     92538FAC8  AA (sf)    A+ (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   M-1     92538FAD6  A- (sf)   BBB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   B-1     92538FAE4  BB (sf)   BB- (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-2     2021-2   B-2     92538FAF1  B- (sf)    B- (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   A-1     92539LAA8  AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   A-2     92539LAB6  AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   A-3     92539LAC4  AA- (sf)    A (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus  
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   M-1     92539LAD2  BBB+ (sf) BBB (sf)

    Main Rationale: Increased credit support.

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   B-1     92539LAE0  BB (sf)    BB (sf)

  Verus
  Securitization
  Trust 2021-3     2021-3   B-2     92539LAF7  B- (sf)    B- (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., USA.
Randy Antoni, Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante,
Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Psyche A. Castillon,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***