---

         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 9, 2023, Vol. 27, No. 189

                            Headlines

ALLO ISSUER 2023-1: Fitch Rates BB- Rating on Class C Debt
AMUR EQUIPMENT 2023-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
APIDOS CLO XLVI: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to $500,000 F Notes
BAIN CAPITAL 2023-2: Fitch Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class E Debt
BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 2 Tranches

BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL 2008-4: Moody's Cuts Cl. M-4 Debt Rating to C
BVABS 2023-CAR3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F Notes
CEDAR FUNDING XVII: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Moody's Ups Rating on M-4 Bonds From Ba1
CHNGE MORTGAGE 2023-3: Fitch Rates Class B-2 Certs 'Bsf'

CSAIL 2016-C7: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 4 Tranches
DRYDEN 112: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2023-3: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Confirms 8 Ratings From 4 Trust Deals
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2019-1INV: Moody's Hikes B-5 Debt From Ba1

GOLDENTREE LOAN 17: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on Class F Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2015-GS1: Fitch Cuts Class F Debt to Csf
HALSEYPOINT CLO 7: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $250,000 F Notes
HILDENE TRUPS 2019-P10B: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating to Cl. B Notes
JP MORGAN 2013-C16: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to BBsf

JP MORGAN 2023-5: Fitch Gives B-(EXP) Rating to Class B-5 Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on X-D Certs
KKR CLO 52: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $250,000 Class F Notes
LEHMAN ABS 2001-B: S&P Raises Class M-1 Notes Rating to B+ (sf)
LIBRA SOLUTIONS 2022-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on B Notes

MAD MORTGAGE 2017-330M: S&P Cuts Class E Notes Rating to 'B+ (sf)'
MANUFACTURED HOUSING 2000-4: S&P Cuts A-5/6 Certs Rating to 'D'
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2020-2: Moody's Raises Rating on 5 Tranches to B2
OAKTREE CLO 2023-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Certs
OCP CLO 2023-28: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes

PALMER SQUARE 2023-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
PARALLEL 2023-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
PHH ALTERNATIVE 2007-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on A-4 Debt to Ba3
SARANAC CLO V: Moody's Cuts Rating on $18MM Cl. E-R Notes to Caa2
SHELTER GROWTH 2023-FL5: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on G Notes

SIERRA TIMESHARE 2023-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to D Notes
SLC STUDENT 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2
STRATUS STATIC 2022-1: Fitch Affirms B+sf Rating on Class F Notes
WELLS FARGO 2021-INV2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt to B2
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C23: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs

[*] Fitch Affirms 19 Tranches from 2 Redding Ridge-Managed CLOS
[*] Fitch Assigns Rating to 17 Unrated Towd Point Trust Classes
[*] Fitch Corrects Release on 11 US CMBS 2019 Vintage Deals
[*] Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 73 FFELP Student Loan ABS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $173.8MM of US RMBS Issued 2006

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $582MM of US RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] Moody's Upgrades $14.7MM of US RMBS Issued 2000-2006
[*] Moody's Upgrades $261.8MM of US RMBS Issued 2018-2020
[*] Moody's Upgrades $469MM of US RMBS Issued 2003-2007
[*] S&P Places Seventy-Five CLO Ratings on CreditWatch Positive


                            *********

ALLO ISSUER 2023-1: Fitch Rates BB- Rating on Class C Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Rating Outlooks to
ALLO Issuer, LLC, Secured Fiber Network Revenue Notes, Series
2023-1 as follows:

-- $25 million(a) 2023-1 class A-1-L 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $75 million(b) 2023-1 class A-1-V 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $405 million 2023-1 class A-2 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $58 million 2023-1 class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $113 million 2023-1 class C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not rated by Fitch:

-- $36,00,000(c) series 2023-1, class R.

(a) This note is a Liquidity Funding Note that can be drawn for the
purpose of funding Liquidity Funding Advances subject to the
satisfaction of certain conditions. The balance of the note will be
$0 at issuance and is not counted when calculating debt/Fitch NCF
ratio.

(b) This note is a Variable Funding Note (VFN) and has a maximum
commitment of $75 million contingent on leverage consistent with
the class A-1 notes. This class will reflect a zero balance at
issuance.

(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 5% of
the 2023-1 notes.

The note balances include $20 million of prefunding, which is
allocated between classes B and C. Fitch's expected ratings take
into account the range of prefunding amounts that may be ultimately
be issued in connection with the transaction.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is a securitization of the contract payments
derived from an existing Fiber to the Premise (FTTP) network. Debt
is secured by the net revenue of operations and benefits from a
perfected security interest in the securitized assets, which
includes conduits, cables, network-level equipment, access rights,
customer contracts, transaction accounts and an equity pledge from
the asset entities.

The collateral consists of high-quality fiber lines that support
the provision of internet, cable and telephone services to a
network of approximately 97,000 retail customers located across 15
issuer-defined markets in Nebraska and Colorado. These markets
represented approximately 97.2% of the company's total revenue as
of YE22. For the markets contributed to the transaction, the
majority of the subscriber base, comprising 61.8% of annualized run
rate revenue (ARRR), is located in Lincoln, NE, and 97.9% of ARRR
is attributable to markets in the state of Nebraska.

Transaction proceeds were utilized to repay indebtedness under an
existing credit facility, fund the series 2023-1 prefunding
account, fund the applicable securitization transaction reserves,
pay transaction fees, and for general corporate purposes, which may
include a distribution to the parent for growth capex.

The ratings reflect a structured finance analysis of the cash flows
from the ownership interest in the underlying fiber optic network,
not an assessment of the corporate default risk of the ultimate
parent, ALLO Communications LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Net Cash Flow and Trust Leverage: Fitch Ratings' net cash flow
(NCF) on the pool is $60.3 million in the base case, implying a
19.3% haircut to issuer base case NCF. The debt multiple relative
to Fitch's NCF on the rated classes is 9.2x in this scenario,
versus the debt/issuer NCF leverage of 7.4x.

Inclusive of the cash flow required to draw upon the $75 million
VFN and the $20 million prefunding account balance, Fitch NCF flow
is $71.7 million, implying a 17.9% haircut to the implied issuer
NCF.

Credit Risk Factors: The major factors affecting Fitch's
determination of cash flow and Maximum Potential Leverage (MPL)
include the high quality of the underlying collateral networks,
scale of the network, market concentration, the market position of
the sponsor, capability of the operator, higher barriers to entry
and strength of the transaction structure.

Technology-Dependent Credit: Due to the specialized nature of the
collateral and potential for changes in technology to affect
long-term demand for digital infrastructure, the senior classes of
this transaction are not rated above 'Asf'. The securities have a
rated final payment date 30 years after closing, and the long-term
tenor of the securities increases the risk that an alternative
technology will be developed that renders obsolete the current
transmission of data through fiber optic cables. Fiber optic cable
networks are currently the fastest and most reliable means to
transmit information, and data providers continue to invest in and
utilize this technology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

-- Declining cash flow as a result of higher expenses, contract
   churn, or the development of an alternative technology for the
   transmission of data could lead to downgrades.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

-- Increasing cash flow without an increase in corresponding
    debt, from rate increases, additional contracts, or contract
    amendments could lead to upgrades;

-- Upgrades are unlikely for these transactions given the
    provision for the issuer to issue additional notes, which rank

    pari passu or subordinate to existing notes, without the
    benefit of additional collateral. The transaction is also
    structured with Variable Funding Notes, which will likely
    offset any improvements in cash flow with a corresponding
    increase in debt, keeping leverage levels relatively flat. In
    addition, the transaction is capped at the 'Asf' category,
    given the risk of technological obsolescence.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


AMUR EQUIPMENT 2023-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
Series 2023-1 notes issued by Amur Equipment Finance Receivables
XII LLC (Amur 2023-1). Amur Equipment Finance, Inc. (Amur) is the
sponsor of the securitization, which is backed by fixed-rate loans
and leases secured primarily by trucking, transportation,
industrial and construction equipment. Amur is also the servicer of
the securitized pool. Amur 2023-1 is Amur's twelfth transaction
backed by somewhat similar collateral and the sixth that Moody's
rates.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Amur Equipment Finance Receivables XII LLC, Series 2023-1

Class A-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The definitive ratings for the notes are based on the credit
quality of the securitized equipment loan and lease pool and its
expected performance, the historical performance of Amur's managed
portfolio and that of its prior securitizations, the experience and
expertise of Amur as the originator and servicer of the underlying
pool, the back-up servicing arrangement with UMB Bank, N.A., the
transaction structure including the level of credit enhancement
supporting the notes, and the legal aspects of the transaction.

Key credit strengths of the transaction include a granular
collateral pool, a manual detailed underwriting process and a
sequential pay transaction structure. Key credit challenges include
a small sponsor and servicer, relatively weak collateral
performance and credit quality compared to some other
transportation originators, a high exposure to the trucking and
transportation industry, and a risk of weakening credit quality
owing to contract additions during the prefunding period.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the Amur 2023-1
collateral pool is 4.5% and loss at a Aaa stress is 28.00%. Moody's
cumulative net loss expectation and loss at a Aaa stress is based
on its analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral
pool and the historical performance of similar collateral,
including Amur's managed portfolio performance, the track-record,
ability and expertise of Amur to perform the servicing functions,
and current expectations for the macroeconomic environment during
the life of the transaction.

Additionally, in assigning a P-1 (sf) rating to the Class A-1
Notes, Moody's considered the cash flows the underlying receivables
are expected to generate prior to the Class A-1 notes' legal final
maturity date.

The classes of notes will be paid sequentially. At transaction
closing, the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes
benefit from 33.65%, 26.10%, 19.15%, 12.70%, and 9.90% of hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Initial hard credit enhancement
for the notes consists of (1) subordination (except in the case of
the Class E notes), (2) initial over-collateralization of 8.90%
that can build to a target of 10.80% of the outstanding adjusted
discounted pool balance, and has a floor of 2.00%, and (3) a fully
funded, non-declining reserve account of 1.00% of the initial
adjusted discounted pool balance. The transaction can also benefit
from excess spread. However, unlike prior Amur sponsored deals,
there is very little excess spread available as the discount rate
applied to the underlying contracts is similar to the expected
weighted average coupon rate on the notes and the expected
servicing fee. The sequential-pay structure and non-declining
reserve account will result in a build-up of credit enhancement
supporting the rated notes.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Equipment
Lease and Loan Securitizations Methodology" published in September
2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's then current expectations of
loss may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or slower
depreciation in the value of the equipment securing obligors'
promise of payment. As the primary drivers of performance, positive
changes in the US macro economy and the performance of various
sectors in which the obligors operate could also affect the
ratings. This transaction has a sequential pay structure and
therefore credit enhancement will grow as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes.
Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note principal
payments will accelerate this build-up of enhancement.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit protection
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Credit enhancement could decline if excess
spread is not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Losses
could rise above Moody's original expectations as a result of a
higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of
the equipment securing obligors' promise of payment. As the primary
drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro economy
and the performance of various sectors in which the obligors
operate could also affect the ratings. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties and inadequate transaction
governance. Additionally, Moody's could downgrade the Class A-1
short term rating following a significant slowdown in principal
collections that could result from, among other reasons, high
delinquencies or a servicer disruption that impacts obligors'
payments.


APIDOS CLO XLVI: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to $500,000 F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to two
classes of notes to be issued by Apidos CLO XLVI Ltd (the "Issuer"
or "Apidos XLVI").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$307,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$500,000 Class F Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Apidos XLVI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 96.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 4.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans, first lien last out loans and permitted non-loan
assets. Moody's expect the portfolio to be approximately 85% ramped
as of the closing date.

CVC Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue five other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3180

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.58%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.



BAIN CAPITAL 2023-2: Fitch Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to Bain
Capital Credit CLO 2023-2, Limited.

   Entity/Debt           Rating                   Prior
   -----------           ------                   -----
Bain Capital
Credit CLO
2023-2, Limited

   A-1                 LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2                 LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   B-1                 LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
   B-2                 LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
   C-1                 LT  Asf     New Rating    A(EXP)sf
   C-2                 LT  Asf     New Rating    A(EXP)sf
   D                   LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
   E                   LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
   Subordinated Notes  LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Bain Capital Credit CLO 2023-2, Limited (the issuer) is an
arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will
be managed by Bain Capital Credit U.S. CLO Manager II, L.P. Net
proceeds from the issuance of the secured and subordinated notes
will provide financing on a portfolio of approximately $500.0
million of primarily first lien senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B', which is in line with that of recent
CLOs. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the indicative
portfolio is 24.48, versus a maximum covenant, in accordance with
the initial expected matrix point of 26.25. Issuers rated in the
'B' rating category denote a highly speculative credit quality;
however, the notes benefit from appropriate credit enhancement and
standard U.S. CLO structural features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
99.7% first-lien senior secured loans. The weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) of the indicative portfolio is 75.4% versus a
minimum covenant, in accordance with the initial expected matrix
point of 73.3%.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 38% of the portfolio balance in aggregate while the
top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity resulting from the
industry, obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with
other recent CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 5.1-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other U.S.
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A-1, between
'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A-2, between 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for
class B, between 'B-sf' and 'BBB+sf' for class C, between less than
'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for class D, and between less than 'B-sf' and
'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Upgrade scenarios are not applicable to the class A-1 and A-2
notes, as these notes are in the highest rating category of
'AAAsf'.

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B, 'A+sf' for class C, 'Asf' for
class D, and 'BBB+sf' for class E.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or Credit Opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for its rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for all classes of Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-UBS10 (BACM
2016-UBS10) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates. The
Rating Outlooks for classes D and E and the associated
interest-only (IO) classes X-D and X-E have been revised to
Negative from Stable.

RATING ACTIONS

   ENTITY / DEBT    RATING            PRIOR  

BACM 2016-UBS10

A-3 06054MAD5  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-4 06054MAE3  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-S 06054MAH6  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-SB 06054MAC7 LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
B 06054MAJ2    LT  AA-sf   Affirmed  AA-sf
C 06054MAK9    LT  A-sf    Affirmed  A-sf
D 06054MAW3    LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
E 06054MAY9    LT  Bsf     Affirmed  Bsf
F 06054MBA0    LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf
X-A 06054MAF0  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
X-B 06054MAG8  LT  AA-sf   Affirmed  AA-sf
X-D 06054MAL7  LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
X-E 06054MAN3  LT  Bsf     Affirmed  Bsf
X-F 06054MAQ6  LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Criteria Update: The rating actions reflect the impact of the
updated U.S. and Canadian Multiborrower CMBS Rating Criteria,
published on May 22, 2023, and incorporate any changes in loan
performance and/or credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's prior
rating action.

The affirmations reflect Fitch's 'Bsf' ratings case loss of 9.31%,
which is relatively in-line with Fitch's prior rating action. The
Negative Outlooks on classes D and E and the associated IO classes
X-D and X-E reflect the potential for downgrades due to performance
concerns for larger Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) in the top 15,
including Belk Headquarters (9.2%), 525 Seventh Avenue (7.2%), 2100
Ross (5.7%), Grove City Premium Outlets (4.1%), and Aberdeen
Commons (2.3%).

The Negative Outlooks also factor a 'Bsf' rating sensitivity case
loss of 12.63%, which incorporates additional stresses on the Belk
Headquarters and Aberdeen Commons loans. Fitch has identified seven
loans as FLOCs (34.8% of the pool), including two specially
serviced loans (11.0%). Since the prior rating action, the pool
experienced a small loss following the liquidation of the Comfort
Inn - Cross Lanes, WV asset (1.1%) in February 2023.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Belk Headquarters
loan (FLOC; 9.2%), secured by a 473,698-sf single-tenant office
property built in 1987 in Charlotte, NC. The property is 100%
leased to Belk and has served as Belk's headquarters since 1989.
Property performance has been steady with a drop in debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) in 2018 due to amortization. In July 2021,
Belk announced it was looking to sublease their headquarters
building after the decision to shift to predominantly remote work
for corporate employees. The building remains vacant with no
sublease proposals received to date. Upon the borrower's request,
the loan transferred back to special servicing in December 2022, to
negotiate for a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and a potential
purchase and sale agreement.

Fitch's 'Bsf' ratings case loss of 42.5% reflects an updated dark
value of $30.9 million, which equates to a stressed value of $65
psf. The elevated base case loss reflects the binary nature of the
current resolution. Should talks of a potential purchase and sale
agreement fail to materialize, a prolonged workout is possible.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the Grove City
Premium Outlets loan (4.1%). This FLOC is secured by a 531,200-sf
outlet center located in Grove City, PA, approximately 50 miles
north of Pittsburgh. The loan remains current; however,
property-level NOI continues to decline despite occupancy
increasing to 74.2% as of December 2022 from 71.9% at YE 2022.
Approximately 11.2% of leases expire by the end of 2023, followed
by 12.4% in 2024. A substantial portion of tenants with prior lease
expirations did not renew, and the tenants that have remained
extended for abbreviated lease terms and reduced rates.

As of the third quarter of 2022, servicer-reported NOI DSCR was
2.09x as compared to 2.29x at YE 2021, 2.23x at YE 2020 and 2.71x
prior to the pandemic in 2019. The mall reported in-line TTM
February 2023 sales of $336 psf, which is below $381 psf for YE
2021, $363 for TTM November 2018, and $367 for YE 2017. Sales
reported at issuance were $333 psf.

Fitch's 'Bsf' ratings case loss of 30.4% reflects a 15% cap rate
and a 10% stress to YE 2021 NOI to reflect downward-trending tenant
sales and property level cash flow as well as rollover concerns.

Office Loans of Concern: Two additional office loans are identified
as FLOCs, including 2100 Ross (5.7% of the pool) and the Princeton
Pike Corporate Center (3.3%). Occupancy for the 2100 Ross building
declined to 63.5% as of YE 2022 following the departure of CBRE
(15% of NRA, 20% base rent) in March 2022; the company relocated to
an office tower in the uptown area of Dallas. Per Costar, the
Dallas CBD submarket had a vacancy rate of 25.8% with an elevated
availability rate of 29.8% as of 1Q23.

Fitch's 'Bsf' ratings case loss of 25.4% for 2100 Ross includes a
10% cap rate, 25% stress to YE 2021 NOI, and 100% probability of
default (POD) due to the lack of leasing momentum following the
departure of CBRE in March 2022.

The Princeton Pike Corporate Center loan returned to master
servicing after the close of a modification in September 2021.
Terms of the modification included the conversion of monthly
payments to interest-only for the remaining loan term and an
ongoing cash trap. The loan has remained current since returning to
the master servicer. The property was 73.6% occupied as of March
2023, but the largest tenant, Stark & Stark (11.5% NRA) vacated in
May 2023 prior to their extended lease expiration in July;
occupancy is expected to be approximately 62% following this recent
vacancy.

The 'Bsf' ratings case loss of 17.6% reflects a 10% cap rate, 10%
stress to YE 2021 NOI, and 100% POD given the occupancy decline
following the departure of Stark & Stark.

Increased CE: CE has increased since the prior rating action due to
the defeasance of two additional loans representing 6.2% of the
pool. As of the May 2023 remittance report, the pool's aggregate
balance has been paid down by 33.3% to $582.9 million from $876.3
million at issuance. There are 13 loans (48.4% of the pool) that
had a partial IO component, 20 (28.9%) balloon loans, and eight
loans (22.7%) that are full-term IO.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Downgrades to A-3 through B along with the associated IO classes
are not likely due to the continued expected amortization, position
in the capital structure and sufficient CE relative to loss
expectations, but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these
classes. Downgrades to classes C, D and E along with the associated
IO classes would occur should expected losses for the pool increase
substantially, with continued underperformance of the FLOCs and/or
the transfer of additional loans to special servicing. Downgrades
may also occur with outsized losses at or prior to maturity from
the larger FLOCs, including Belk Headquarters, Burbank Retail
Center, 2100 Ross, Princeton Pike Corporate Center, and/or Grove
City Premium Outlets. A downgrade to class F would occur as losses
are realized or become more certain.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Factors that could lead to positive rating actions would include
stable to improved asset performance, coupled with additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' rated
classes would occur when CE improves; these classes are not reliant
on recoveries from FLOCs. Upgrades to 'AAAsf' will also consider
the concentration of defeased loans in the transaction.

Upgrades to the 'BBB-sf' rated classes are considered unlikely and
would be limited based on the potential for future concentrations
as the deal ages. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there were any likelihood of interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
'Bsf' rated classes are not likely until the later years in the
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and/or there is sufficient CE to the bonds.


BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL 2008-4: Moody's Cuts Cl. M-4 Debt Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on three
tranches issued by Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-4. The loans
are secured primarily by small commercial real estate properties in
the U.S. owned by small businesses.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-4

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade actions are primarily driven by credit related unpaid
interest shortfalls and cumulative realized losses on the bonds. In
addition, Moody's also considered loans with maturities in excess
of the transaction maturity date, as well as recent performance
deterioration. As of the June 2023 payment date, the 30-59 days
delinquent loans increased to 5.9% of current pool balance as
compared to 1.3% of current pool balance a month before.

Lastly, Moody's expect future volatility in small businesses
performance due to tightening credit, high interest rates and
economic slowdown.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations" published in
July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against expected losses could drive the ratings
up. Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of
a decrease in seriously delinquent loans or lower severities than
expected on liquidated loans. As a primary driver of performance,
positive changes in the US macro economy could also affect the
ratings, as can changes in servicing practices. Reimbursement of
interest shortfalls more rapidly than anticipated when applicable.
For loans with maturities in excess of the transaction maturity
date, levels of prepayments above expectations, or the further
modification of those loans such that they mature prior to the
transaction maturity date for their respective transactions.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against expected losses could drive the ratings down.
Moody's expectation of pool losses could increase as a result of an
increase in seriously delinquent loans and higher severities than
expected on liquidated loans. As a primary driver of performance,
negative changes in the US macro economy could also affect the
ratings. Other reasons for worse-than-expected performance include
poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud. Reimbursement of
interest shortfalls slower than anticipated when applicable. For
loans with maturities in excess of the transaction maturity date,
levels of prepayments below expectations, or the modification of
additional loans such that they mature after the transaction
maturity date for their respective transactions.


BVABS 2023-CAR3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by BVABS 2023-CAR3 (BOF-VII AL Funding Trust I). This
is the second auto loan transaction sponsored by Bayview Asset
Selector VII, LLC and the third sponsored by a Bayview
majority-owned affiliate. The notes will be backed by a pool of
prime retail automobile loans originated by U.S. Bank National
Association (A2, A1 (cr), P-1) ("USB"), who is also the servicer
for the transaction.  

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BVABS 2023-CAR3 (BOF-VII AL Funding Trust I)

Class A1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Class F Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the experience and expertise of USB
as the servicer and originator, and the repurchase obligation from
USB for loans that are deemed uncollectable, unenforceable or not
valid as a result of USB not having a perfected lien.

Moody's expected median cumulative net loss expectation for BVABS
2023-CAR3 (BOF-VII AL Funding Trust I) is 0.65% and the loss at a
Aaa stress is 4.75%. Moody's based its cumulative net credit loss
expectation and loss at a Aaa stress on an analysis of the quality
of the underlying collateral; the historical credit loss
performance of similar collateral and managed portfolio
performance; the ability of USB to perform the servicing functions;
and current expectations for the macroeconomic environment during
the life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class A1, Class A2 notes, Class B notes, Class C
notes, Class D notes, Class E notes, and Class F notes are expected
to benefit from 12.50%, 7.52%, 6.02%, 3.70%, 2.90%, 2.00%, and
1.60% of hard credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit
enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, subordination, and a reserve account for the
A2 and B notes. The notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
November 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the Class B, C, D, E, and F notes if levels
of credit enhancement are higher than necessary to protect
investors against current expectations of portfolio losses. Losses
could decline from Moody's original expectations as a result of a
lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of
the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US job market and the market for
used vehicles. Other reasons for better-than-expected performance
include changes to servicing practices that enhance collections or
refinancing opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit enhancement
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US
job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud. Moody's could downgrade the notes if USB's rating is
downgraded considering the repurchase obligation from USB for loans
not having a perfected lien.


CEDAR FUNDING XVII: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Cedar
Funding XVII CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding XVII CLO LLC's floating-rate
debt.

The debt issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and
lower) senior secured term loans.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated debt through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Cedar Funding XVII CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding XVII CLO LLC

  Class A notes, $216.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A loans, $40.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B notes, $44.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C notes (deferrable), $26.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-1A notes (deferrable), $4.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D-1F notes (deferrable), $18.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D-J notes (deferrable) $4.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E notes (deferrable) $12.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $37.40 million: Not rated



CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Moody's Ups Rating on M-4 Bonds From Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven bonds
issued by multiple issuers. The collateral backing this deal
consists of prime jumbo mortgage loans.

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Oaks Mortgage Trust Series 2015-2

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pool.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk of
default on modified loans. Generally, Moody's apply a 7x multiple
to the Probability of Default (PD) for private label modified
mortgage loans and an 8x multiple to the PD for agency-eligible
modified mortgage loans. However, Moody's may apply a lower
multiple to the PD for loans that were granted short-term payment
relief as long as there were no other changes to the loan terms,
such as a reduced interest rate or an extended loan term, which can
be used to lower the monthly payment on the loan. For loans granted
short-term payment relief, servicers will generally defer the
missed payments, which could be added as a non-interest-bearing
balloon payment due at the end of the loan term. Alternatively,
servicers could extend the maturity on the loan to match the number
of missed payments.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicer.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
April 2023.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


CHNGE MORTGAGE 2023-3: Fitch Rates Class B-2 Certs 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates to be issued by CHNGE Mortgage Trust
2023-3 (CHNGE 2023-3).

Entity         Rating             Prior
------         ------             -----

CHNGE 2023-3

A-1      LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf
A-2      LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf  
A-3      LT  Asf    New Rating  A(EXP)sf
A-4      LT  Asf    New Rating  A(EXP)sf
M-1      LT  BBBsf  New Rating  BBB(EXP)sf
B-1      LT  BBsf   New Rating  BB(EXP)sf
B-2      LT  Bsf    New Rating  B(EXP)sf
B-3      LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf
XS       LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf
A-IO-S   LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 732 non-prime loans with a total
balance of approximately $345 million as of the cut-off date. Loans
in the pool were originated by Change Lending. The loans are
currently serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and LoanCare.

CHNGE 2023-3 is the ninth securitization issued by the Sponsor,
Change Lending, LLC (Change) but the second rated by Fitch. Change
is an independent Community Development Financial Institution
(CDFI) lender certified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In
order to maintain its CDFI designation, a CDFI is expected to
originate at least 60% of its volumes (by count and balance) to its
CDFI Target Markets, which generally focus on certain underserved
or low-income communities and individuals.

Since the publication of expected ratings, the issuer updated the
bond sizing due to updated pricing spreads and rate movements.
There was no impact to the expected ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Change Community Mortgage Product (Negative): Change has multiple
lending programs, but this pool is 100% of their Community Mortgage
product. The Community Mortgage product is underwritten to borrower
assets, borrower credit history, FICO and LTV. The Community
Mortgage product does not require income, employment, or
debt-to-income (DTI) documentation. Although this program is
compliant with applicable law and aligned to the CDFI's mandate to
serve low income individuals, low income communities, African
Americans and Hispanics, Fitch considers it a no-ratio and low
documentation product, and, thus, it carries higher risk.

As a CDFI, all loans originated by Change are CDFI loans and are
exempt from certain sections of Reg Z, including the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) qualified mortgage (QM) and
ability-to-repay (ATR) rules. This allows Change to originate
no-ratio consumer mortgage loans without income or DTI
documentation.

While the loans in this pool were originated to creditworthy
borrowers based on their FICO, equity contributions and assets, the
lack of income and employment documentation required to align these
mortgages' underwriting standards post-GFC is a rating concern.
Additionally, with the CDFI ATR exemption, the lack of underwriting
using a DTI is a greater risk. Given this, Fitch capped the highest
possible initial rating at 'Asf'.

Nonprime Credit Quality (Negative): The collateral consists of 732
loans, totaling $345 million and seasoned approximately two months
in aggregate. The borrowers have a strong credit profile of a 743
model FICO and leverage with a 66.7% sustainable loan-to-value
ratio (sLTV) and 62.9% combined current LTV (cLTV).

Of the pool, 91.6% consists of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, 8.4% are loans for second homes, and there are
no investor property loans. 0% are QM, as the QM rule does not
apply to loans in this transaction due to the CDFI exemption.

Fitch's expected loss in the 'Asf' stress is 10%. This is mainly
because most are low doc / no-ratio loans with compensating
factors, including borrower equity, strong FICOs and large
reserves. From an LTV and FICO standpoint, the collateral in this
pool is prime-like; however, due to the low documentation and lack
of DTI underwriting, Fitch considers this collateral nonprime.

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, we view the home price values of
this pool as 6.0% above a long-term sustainable level compared with
7.8% on a national level, as of March 2023, down 2.7% since last
quarter. The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
begun to moderate, with declines in 2H22. Driven by the strong
gains in 1H22, home prices rose 2.0% yoy nationally as of February
2023.

Modified Sequential-Payment Structure with Limited Advancing
(Mixed): The structure distributes principal pro rata among the
senior certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all senior classes are reduced to zero. If a
cumulative loss trigger event or delinquency trigger event occurs
in a given period, principal will be distributed sequentially to
the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates until they are reduced to
zero.

Advances of delinquent principal and interest (P&I) will be made on
the mortgage loans for the first 90 days of delinquency, to the
extent such advances are deemed recoverable. If the P&I advancing
party fails to make a required advance, the master servicer and
then securities administrator will be obligated to make the
advance.

The limited advancing reduces loss severities as a lower amount is
repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and liquidation
proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment over accrued
but unpaid interest. The downside to this is the additional stress
on the structure, as there is limited liquidity in the event of
large and extended delinquencies.

CHNGE 2023-3 has a step-up coupon for the senior classes (A-1, A-2
and A-3). After four years, the senior classes pay the lesser of a
100-bp increase to the fixed coupon or the net weighted average
coupon (WAC) rate. The unrated class B-3 interest allocation goes
toward the senior cap carryover amount (classes A-1, A-2 and A-3)
for as long as any unpaid cap carryover is outstanding. This
increases the P&I allocation for the senior classes.

As a sensitivity to our rating stresses, we took into account a WAC
deterioration that varied by rating stress. The WAC cut was derived
by assuming a 2.5% cut (based on the most common historical
modification rate) on 40% (historical Alt-A modification
percentage) of the performing loans. Although the WAC reduction
stress is based on historical modification rates, Fitch did not
include the WAC reduction stress in its testing of the delinquency
trigger.

Fitch viewed the WAC deterioration as more of a pre-emptive cut
given the ongoing macroeconomic and regulatory environment. A
portion of borrowers will likely be impaired but will not
ultimately default due to modifications and reduced P&I.
Furthermore, this approach had the largest impact on the
back-loaded benchmark scenario.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the
state and national level to assess the effect of higher MVDs for
the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
home prices.

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model projected 29.5% at 'A'. The analysis indicates that there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. A 10% additional
decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by one full
category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'Asf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes. A 10% gain
in home prices would result in a full category upgrade for the
rated class excluding those assigned 'Asf' ratings.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. The loan-level
information Fitch received was provided in the American
Securitization Forum's data layout format.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

CHNGE 2023-3 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social due to human rights, community relations and access &
affordability, which has a negative impact on the credit profile,
and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

CHNGE 2023-3 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Governance due to transaction parties and operational risk, which
has a negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CSAIL 2016-C7: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 4 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Credit Suisse CSAIL
2016-C7 Commercial Mortgage Trust Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates. The criteria observation (UCO) has been resolved.

  Entity/Debt       Rating           Prior
  -----------       ------           -----
CSAIL 2016-C7
  
A-4 12637UAV1   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-5 12637UAW9   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-S 12637UBA6   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-SB 12637UAX7  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
B 12637UBB4     LT  AA-sf   Affirmed  AA-sf
C 12637UBC2     LT  A-sf    Affirmed  A-sf
D 12637UAG4     LT  BBsf    Affirmed  BBsf
E 12637UAJ8     LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf
F 12637UAL3     LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf
X-A 12637UAY5   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
X-B 12637UAZ2   LT  AA-sf   Affirmed  AA-sf
X-E 12637UAA7   LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf
X-F 12637UAC3   LT  CCCsf   Affirmed  CCCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Criteria Update: The rating actions reflect the impact of the
updated U.S. and Canadian Multiborrower CMBS Rating Criteria,
published on May 22, 2023, and incorporate any changes in loan
performance and/or credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's prior
rating action.

The affirmations are based upon the stable performance of the
majority of the pool since issuance. There are seven Fitch Loans of
Concern (32.7% of the pool balance), which includes one asset in
special servicing (1.2%). Fitch's current ratings incorporate a
'Bsf' rating case loss of 7.5%.

Regional Malls/Largest Contributors to Loss: The largest
contributor to Fitch's overall loss expectations is the Gurnee
Mills loan (10.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.7
million-sf portion of a 1.9 million-sf regional mall located in
Gurnee, IL, approximately 45 miles north of Chicago. Non-collateral
anchors include Burlington Coat Factory, Marcus Cinema and Value
City Furniture. Collateral anchors include Macy's, Bass Pro Shops,
Kohl's and a vacant anchor box previously occupied by Sears. The
loan previously transferred to the special servicer in June 2020
for imminent monetary default, returning to the master servicer in
May 2021 after receiving forbearance.

Per the servicer's June 2022 reporting, the property was 80%
occupied, compared to 77% at YE 2021, 86.7% at YE 2020 and 93% at
issuance. Fitch has an outstanding request for an updated rent roll
but has not yet received one. The property faces near-term
rollover, with leases totaling 13.6% of the NRA expiring 2023,
including Bed Bath & Beyond (3.3% of NRA; January 2023 lease
expiration), Lee Wrangler (1.3%; January 2023), Off Broadway Shoes
(1.2%; January 2023) and Rainforest Cafe (1.1%; December 2023).
Fitch's 'Bsf' Rating Case Loss prior to concentration add on is
approximately 31% which utilized a 12% cap rate and 15% stress to
the YE 2021 NOI, and factors in an increased probability of default
given refinancing concerns.

The second largest contributor to overall loss expectations is the
Peachtree Mall loan (3.1%), which is secured by a 621,367-sf
portion of an 822,443-sf regional mall located in Columbus, GA and
sponsored by Brookfield Properties Retail Group. The mall is
anchored by a non-collateral Dillard's and collateral tenants that
include JCPenney, At Home and Macy's. Per the March 2023 rent roll,
the collateral was 93.5% occupied, which is up slightly from 91% in
2021 and 93% in 2020. 24 tenants comprising approximately 32% of
the NRA have leases scheduled to expire by YE 2023.
Servicer-reported NOI DSCR for this amortizing loan was 1.77x as of
the YTD September. 2022, compared with 1.58x at YE 2021 and 1.56x
at YE 2020.

Fitch's loss expectation of approximately 38% is based on a 20%
stressed cap rate applied to the YE 2022 NOI to account for the
secular consumer shift away from traditional regional mall retail.
Fitch increased the probability of default given refinancing
concerns.

The third largest contributor to loss is the Coconut Point loan
(13.7%), which is secured by a 836,531-sf portion of a 1.2
million-sf open-air, anchored retail property in Estero, FL,
approximately 20 miles from Fort Meyers. The loan, which is
sponsored by a joint venture between Simon Property Group and
Dillard's, Inc., was designated a Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC) due
to occupancy declines and near-term rollover concerns.

The property is anchored by Super Target (non-collateral) and
Dillard's (non-collateral). Larger collateral tenants include T.J.
Maxx (3.8%; May 2026), and Ross Dress for Less (3.6%; 1/2027).
Collateral occupancy has declined to 77.4% as of March 2023
compared with 86% in September 2022. The decline is attributed to
Hollywood Theatres going dark in November 2022.

The servicer reported NOI DSCR was 1.48x at YE 2022 compared with
1.54x at YE 2021.

The collateral has granular near-term rollover. 10 tenants for 8.6%
are set to rollover in 2023 followed by 17 tenants for 16.5% in
2024 and 13 tenants for 8.5% of the NRA in 2025. Fitch utilized a
10% cap rate and 15% haircut to the YE 2022 NOI to reflect the
decline in occupancy and upcoming rollover concerns.

Credit Enhancement: As of the May 2023 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate balance has been paid down by 12.6% to $671.1
million from $767.6 million at issuance. The pool is scheduled to
amortize by 16.2% of the initial pool balance through maturity. Of
the current pool, only one loan (7.4%) is full-term interest only
(IO), and all loans with a partial-term IO period are now
amortizing. The pool has experienced no realized losses since
issuance. 12 loans (17%) have been defeased.

Nine loans are scheduled to mature in 2025 (13.7% of pool), while
the majority of the pool (86.3%) is scheduled to mature in 2026.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' categories could occur with
large improvement in CE and/or defeasance, and with the
stabilization of performance amongst the FLOCs. Upgrades to the
'BBsf' category would also consider these factors, but would be
limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for
future concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. Upgrades to classes E
and F are not likely until the later years in a transaction and
only if the performance of the remaining pool is stable and there
is sufficient CE to the class.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to the 'AA-sf' and 'AAAsf' categories are
unlikely due to increasing CE and expected continued amortization,
but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these classes.
Downgrades to the 'BBsf' and 'A-sf' categories would likely occur
if a high proportion of the pool defaults and/or transfers to
special servicing and expected losses for the pool increase
sizably. Downgrades to the distressed classes E and F would occur
with greater certainty of losses and/or as losses are realized.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Rating Outlook changes. However, for
some transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.


DRYDEN 112: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the class A-2, B, C, D,
and E notes of Dryden 108 CLO, Ltd. (Dryden 108) and the class B,
C, D, and E notes of Dryden 112 CLO, Ltd. (Dryden 112). The Rating
Outlooks on all rated tranches remain Stable.

  Entity/Debt     Rating           Prior
  -----------     ------           -----
Dryden 112 CLO, Ltd.

B 26243DAC7  LT   AAsf    Affirmed  AAsf
C 26243DAE3  LT   Asf     Affirmed  Asf
D 26243DAG8  LT   BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
E 26243BAA5  LT   BB-sf   Affirmed  BB-sf

Dryden 108 CLO, Ltd.


A-2 26253MAC4 LT  AAAsf  Affirmed  AAAsf
B 26253MAE0   LT  AAsf   Affirmed  AAsf
C 26253MAG5   LT  Asf    Affirmed  Asf
D 26253MAJ9   LT  BBB-sf Affirmed  BBB-sf
E 26253NAA6   LT  BB-sf  Affirmed  BB-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Dryden 108 and Dryden 112 are broadly syndicated collateralized
loan obligations (CLOs) managed by PGIM, Inc. Dryden 108 closed in
July 2022 and will exit its reinvestment period in July 2027.
Dryden 112 closed in August 2022 and will exit its reinvestment
period in August 2025. Both CLOs are secured primarily by
first-lien, senior secured leveraged loans.


KEY RATING DRIVERS
Asset Credit Quality, Asset Security, Portfolio Management and
Portfolio Composition

The affirmations are due to the portfolios' stable performance
since closing. The credit quality of Dryden 108 and Dryden 112
portfolios as of April 2023 reporting were at the 'B'/'B-' rating
level on average, with the Fitch weighted average rating factor
(WARF) increasing to 24.5 on average from 23.7 at closing.

The portfolios for Dryden 108 and Dryden 112 consisted of 451 and
401 obligors, respectively, and the largest 10 obligors represented
7.3% and 7.9% of each portfolio, respectively. There were no
reported defaulted assets in Dryden 108 and one defaulted asset
comprised 0.3% for Dryden 112. Exposure to issuers with a Negative
Outlook and Fitch's watchlist averaged 17.4% and 8.6% of the
portfolio, respectively.

On average, first-lien loans, cash and eligible investments
comprise 94.0% of the portfolios and fixed rated assets 4.0% of the
portfolios. Fitch's weighted average recovery rate for Dryden 108
and Dryden 112 portfolios were 75.0% and 74.9%, respectively,
compared to 75.6% and 75.7%, respectively, at closing.

All coverage tests, collateral quality tests (CQTs), and
concentration limitations are in compliance for both transactions.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch conducted updated cash flow analyses based on newly run Fitch
Stressed Portfolio (FSP) since both transactions are still in their
reinvestment periods. The FSP analysis stressed the current
portfolio from the April trustee reports to account for permissible
concentration and CQT limits. The FSP analysis was conducted at
weighted average life of 7.3 years for Dryden 108 and 6.2 years for
Dryden 112. Weighted average spreads were stressed to the covenant
minimum levels of 3.18% for Dryden 108 and 3.45% Dryden 112.
Maximum limitations for non-senior secured assets were 10% and 7.5%
for Dryden 108 and Dryden 112, respectively. Other FSP assumptions
include, 5.0% fixed rate assets, and 7.5% CCC assets.

The rating actions are in line with the model implied ratings
(MIRs) as defined in the criteria, except for the class B notes in
Dryden 112. The class B notes were affirmed one notch below its
MIR, due to the minimal cushions derived on the MIRs, remaining
reinvestment periods, and growing macroeconomic headwinds.

The Stable Outlooks reflect Fitch's expectation that the notes have
sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolios in stress
scenarios commensurate with each class' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Downgrades may occur if realized and projected losses of the
portfolio are higher than what was assumed at closing and the
notes' credit enhancement do not compensate for the higher loss
expectation than initially assumed.

A 25% increase of the mean default rate across all ratings, along
with a 25% decrease of the recovery rate at all rating levels for
the current portfolio, would lead to downgrades of up to two rating
notches for Dryden 108 and up to three rating notches for Dryden
112, based on the MIRs.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Except for tranches already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating, upgrades
may occur in the event of better-than-expected portfolio credit
quality and transaction performance.

A 25% reduction of the mean default rate across all ratings, along
with a 25% increase of the recovery rate at all rating levels for
the current portfolio, would lead to upgrades of up to five rating
notches for both Dryden 108 and Dryden 112, based on the MIRs.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2023-3: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Exeter Automobile
Receivables Trust 2023-3's automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of approximately 61.80%, 53.30%, 44.60%,
33.70%, and 27.0% credit support--hard credit enhancement and
haircut to excess spread--for the class A (collectively, classes
A-1, A-2, and A-3), B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on
final post-pricing stressed cash flow scenarios. These credit
support levels provide at least 2.70x, 2.40x, 2.00x, 1.50x, and
1.20x coverage of S&P's expected cumulative net loss of 22.00% for
classes A, B, C, D, and E, respectively.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.50x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, its 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' ratings on
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, will be within its
credit stability limits.

-- The timely payment of interest and principal repayment by the
designated legal final maturity dates under our stressed cash flow
modeling scenarios for the assigned ratings.

-- The collateral characteristics of the series' subprime
automobile loans, S&P's view of the collateral's credit risk, S&P's
updated macroeconomic forecast, and forward-looking view of the
auto finance sector.

-- S&P's assessment of the series' bank accounts at Citibank N.A.
(Citibank), which do not constrain the ratings.

-- S&P's operational risk assessment of Exeter Finance LLC as
servicer, along with S&P's view of the company's underwriting and
the backup servicing arrangement with Citibank.

-- S&P's assessment of the transaction's potential exposure to
environmental, social, and governance credit factors, which are in
line with our sector benchmark.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  Ratings Assigned

  Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2023-3

  Class A-1, $71.29 million: A-1+ (sf)
  Class A-2, $114.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3, $63.32 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $94.73 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $83.30 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $84.88 million: BBB (sf)
  Class E, $75.98 million: BB- (sf)



EXETER AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Confirms 8 Ratings From 4 Trust Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded 10 ratings and confirmed eight ratings from
four Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust transactions:

Rating Actions

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2019-1

Class D Notes   AAA (sf)   Confirmed
Class E Notes   AAA (sf)   Upgraded

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2021-4

Class B Notes   AAA (sf)   Upgraded
Class C Notes   AAA (sf)   Upgraded
Class D Notes   BBB (high) Upgraded
Class E Notes   BB (sf)    Confirmed
Class F Notes   B (sf)     Confirmed

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2022-1

Class A-3 Notes  AAA (sf)  Confirmed
Class B Notes    AAA (sf)  Upgraded
Class C Notes    AA (sf)   Upgraded
Class D Notes    BBB (high)  Upgraded
Class E Notes    BB (sf)   Confirmed

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2022-4

Class A-2 Notes  AAA (sf)   Confirmed
Class A-3 Notes  AAA (sf)   Confirmed
Class B Notes    AAA (sf)   Upgraded
Class C Notes    AA (sf)    Upgraded
Class D Notes    BBB (high) Upgraded
Class E Notes    BB (sf)    Confirmed

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns - April 2023 Update, published on April 28, 2023.
These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's
moderate and adverse COVID-19 pandemic scenarios, which were first
published in April 2020.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originating, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The rating actions are the result of collateral performance to
date, DBRS Morningstar's assessment of future performance
assumptions, and the increasing levels of credit enhancement.

-- The transaction's capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar-projected remaining cumulative net loss
assumption at a multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2019-1INV: Moody's Hikes B-5 Debt From Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four bonds
from three US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS). The
collateral backing these deals consist primarily of 30-year,
prime-quality, fixed-rate, first-lien residential mortgage loans,
except for Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2019-1INV, which is a
securitization of investment property mortgage loans.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6xnHHs

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Home Lending Mortgage Trust 2019-ATR1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2021 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2019-1INV

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. B4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk of
default on modified loans. Generally, Moody's apply a 7x multiple
to the Probability of Default (PD) for private label modified
mortgage loans and an 8x multiple to the PD for agency-eligible
modified mortgage loans. However, Moody's may apply a lower
multiple to the PD for loans that were granted short-term payment
relief as long as there were no other changes to the loan terms,
such as a reduced interest rate or an extended loan term, which can
be used to lower the monthly payment on the loan. For loans granted
short-term payment relief, servicers will generally defer the
missed payments, which could be added as a non-interest-bearing
balloon payment due at the end of the loan term. Alternatively,
servicers could extend the maturity on the loan to match the number
of missed payments.

Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1 features a structural deal
mechanism that the servicer and the securities administrator will
not advance principal and interest to loans that are 120 days or
more delinquent. The interest distribution amount will be reduced
by the interest accrued on the stop advance mortgage loans (SAML)
and this interest reduction will be allocated reverse sequentially
first to the subordinate bonds, then to the senior support bond,
and then pro-rata among senior bonds. Once a SAML is liquidated,
the net recovery from that loan's liquidation is allocated first to
pay down the loan's outstanding principal amount and then to repay
its accrued interest. The recovered accrued interest on the loan is
used to repay the interest reduction incurred by the bonds that
resulted from that SAML. The elevated delinquency levels in this
transaction has increased the risk of interest shortfalls due to
stop advancing.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicer.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
April 2023.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


GOLDENTREE LOAN 17: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to
GoldenTree Loan Management US CLO 17, Ltd.

RATING ACTIONS

  ENTITY / DEBT        RATING                PRIOR  

GoldenTree Loan Management US CLO 17, Ltd.

A                  LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf  
B                  LT  AAsf   New Rating  AA(EXP)sf
C                  LT  Asf    New Rating  A(EXP)sf
D                  LT  BBB-sf New Rating  BBB-(EXP)sf
E                  LT  BB-sf  New Rating  BB-(EXP)sf
F                  LT  B-sf   New Rating  B-(EXP)sf
Subordinated Notes LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf
X                  LT  NRsf   New Rating  NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

GoldenTree Loan Management US CLO 17, Ltd., is an arbitrage cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by
GLM II, LP. Net proceeds from the issuance of the secured and
subordinated notes will provide financing on a portfolio of
approximately $500 million of primarily first lien senior secured
leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B', which is in line with that of recent
CLOs. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the indicative
portfolio is 23.94, versus a maximum covenant, in accordance with
the initial expected matrix point of 25.75. Issuers rated in the
'B' rating category denote a highly speculative credit quality;
however, the notes benefit from appropriate credit enhancement and
standard U.S. CLO structural features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
98.8% first lien senior secured loans. The weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) of the indicative portfolio is 75.5% versus a
minimum covenant, in accordance with the initial expected matrix
point of 71.6%.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
constitute up to 44.5% of the portfolio balance in aggregate, while
the top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity required by industry,
obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with other recent
U.S. CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 5.1-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other U.S.
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
making adjustments to the indicative portfolio to reflect
permissible concentration limits and collateral quality test
levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls,
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, at the initial expected
matrix point, the rated notes can withstand default and recovery
assumptions consistent with their assigned ratings. The weighted
average life (WAL) used for the transaction stress portfolio and
matrices analyses is 12 months less than the WAL covenant to
account for structural and reinvestment conditions after the
reinvestment period. In Fitch's opinion, these conditions would
reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio during stress
periods. The performance of the rated notes at the other permitted
matrix points is in line with that of other recent CLOs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for class B, between 'B+sf'
and 'BBB+sf' for class C, between less than 'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for
class D, between less than 'B-sf' and 'B+sf' for class E, and
between less than 'B-sf' and 'B-sf' for class F.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade       

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B, 'A+sf' for class C, 'A-sf' for
class D, 'BBB+sf' for class E, and 'BB+sf' for class F.


GS MORTGAGE 2015-GS1: Fitch Cuts Class F Debt to Csf
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight and affirmed five classes of GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-GS1. The Rating Outlooks on classes
B, C, X-B and PEZ remain Negative. In addition, the Rating Outlooks
on classes A-S and X-A have been revised to Negative from Stable.

Debt              Rating          Prior
----              ------          -----
GSMS 2015-GS1

A-2 36252AAB2  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed  AAAsf
A-3 36252AAC0  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed  AAAsf
A-AB 36252AAD8 LT  AAAsf  Affirmed  AAAsf
A-S 36252AAG1  LT  AAsf   Affirmed  AAsf
B 36252AAH9    LT  BBB+sf Downgrade Asf
C 36252AAK2    LT  BBsf   Downgrade BBBsf
D 36252AAL0    LT  CCCsf  Downgrade B-sf
E 36252AAN6    LT  CCsf   Downgrade CCCsf
F 36252AAQ9    LT  Csf    Downgrade CCsf
PEZ 36252AAJ5  LT  BBsf   Downgrade BBBsf
X-A 36252AAE6  LT  AAsf   Affirmed  AAsf
X-B 36252AAF3  LT  BBB+sf Downgrade Asf
X-D 36252AAM8  LT  CCCsf  Downgrade B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Criteria Update: The rating actions reflect the impact of the
updated U.S. and Canadian Multiborrower CMBS Rating Criteria,
published on May 22, 2023, and incorporate any changes in loan
performance and/or credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's prior
rating action.

High Loss Expectations: Loss expectations for the pool remain high.
The downgrades and Negative Outlooks reflect concerns and high
expected losses on the South Plains Mall and specially serviced
Glenbrook Square and Latham Crossing & Crossroads Plaza loans.
Additionally, Deerfield Crossing (3.8% of the pool), a suburban
office property within the top 15 has exhibited a declining
performance and may deteriorate further. Seven loans are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 32.1% of the pool) including two
specially serviced loans (8.8% of the pool). Fitch's current
ratings reflect a 'Bsf' rating case loss of 10.34%.

Specially Serviced Loans: Glenbrook Square (7.0%), which is secured
by 784,604-sf of a 1,005,604-sf super-regional Mall in Fort Wayne,
IN. The loan which is sponsored by Brookfield Property Partners
transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for payment default.
The loan has been periodically brought current on payments through
the application of trapped cash throughout 2021 and 2022. According
to the special servicer, the property is currently in receivership
(Spinoso Real Estate), and the property is expected to be marketed
for sale by the receiver.

Collateral anchors include Macy's (24% of NRA leased through
January 2027) and JCPenney (19%; May 2028). Former collateral
anchor Carson's (12.1%) and non-collateral anchor Sears both closed
their stores at the property in 2018, and the Sears store has been
demolished. Collateral occupancy was 80.2% as of March 2022 from
79.3% in August 2021, 80.4% in December 2020, 82.3% in March 2019
and 96.8% in September 2017.

Comparable inline sales for tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf
were $491 psf as of TTM February 2023 compared with $521 psf at TTM
March 2022, $497 psf at August 2021, $384 psf at YE 2020, $436 psf
at YE 2019, $415 psf as of TTM September 2018, $414 psf at YE 2017
and $443 psf at issuance.

Fitch's 'Bsf' case loss of 63% prior to a concentration adjustment
considers a discount to the updated January 2023 appraisal value
and implies a 19% cap rate to the YE 2022 NOI.

Latham Crossing & Crossroads Plaza (1.8%), which is secured by two
multi-anchored shopping centers totaling 100,726-sf, located a half
a mile apart in Latham, NY. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2020 for monetary default.

According to the watchlist commentary, Kinkaid Furniture (NRA
11.9%) vacated at lease expiration in December 2019. The former
Kinkaid Furniture space is being occupied by Spirit Halloween on a
seasonal lease. In March 2020, Chuck E Cheese (NRA 11.3%) stopped
paying rent following the company's announcement it would file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Most other tenants made partial payments or
stopped paying rent as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. There
have been no updated financial statements provided since issuance.
In April 2022, the borrower's most recent modification proposal was
declined and the special servicer filed a foreclosure complaint in
May 2022, a discovery was expected to begin in June 2023.

Fitch's 'Bsf' case loss of 26% prior to a concentration adjustment
considers a discount to the most recent March 2023 appraisal
value.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest contributor to expected losses
is the South Plains Mall loan (9.1%), which is secured by
992,140-sf portion of a 1,135,840-sf super-regional mall located in
Lubbock, TX. The loan is sponsored by the Macerich Company and GIC
Realty. Collateral anchors include JCPenney (20.4% of collateral
NRA; July 2028 lease expiry), Dillard's Women (16.4%;
month-to-month [MTM]), Dillard's Men & Children (9.5%; MTM) and a
non-collateral former Sears (143,700 sf), which closed in late 2018
and was previously temporarily leased by Spirit Halloween during
the fall season of 2020. The Dillard's leases were scheduled to
expire in April 2023, however, the tenant converted to MTM.
According to the servicer, Dillard's is still in-place until
construction of their new location is completed.

The April 2023 rent roll shows near term lease rollover as 36% in
2023, which includes the Dillard's leases, and 5% in 2024. YE 2022
performance showed an improvement with occupancy of 96%, up from
84% at YE 2021 and 79% at YE 2020. NOI debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) also increased to 1.87x as of YE 2022 compared with 1.69x at
YE 2021 and 1.77x at YE 2019.

Comparable in-line sales for tenants less than 10,000 sf were
reported at $558 psf as of the TTM ended March 2023, $573 psf as of
YE 2021, from $418 psf at YE 2020, $502 psf at TTM June 2019 and
$461 psf as of TTM August 2018.

Fitch's 'Bsf' case loss of 31% prior to a concentration adjustment
is based on a 15% cap rate to the YE 2021 NOI.

Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the June 2023 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by
6.2% to $769.5 million from $820.6 million at issuance. Nine loans
(16.0% of current pool) are fully defeased. All of the loans in the
pool mature between September 2025 and November 2025. There have
been no realized losses since issuance.

Alternate Loss Considerations: Fitch conducted a sensitivity
scenario which incorporates additional stresses to two FLOCs, the
South Plains Mall (9.1% of the pool) and Glenbrook Square (7.0%)
loans. In addition, an assumption of 24 months of seasoning and a
successful payoff of the only credit opinion loan (COL) in the
pool, 590 Madison Avenue (13.0%) was incorporated into the
sensitivity scenario. In this scenario, the pools 'Bsf' rating case
loss is 12.1%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-2 through A-AB are not likely
due to the position in the capital structure, but may occur should
interest shortfalls affect these classes. Downgrades to the B, C,
X-B and the exchangeable PEZ class are possible should the
Glenbrook Square, South Plains Mall and Deerfield Crossing loans
experience outsized losses or if interest shortfalls occur.

Downgrades to classes D, E, F and X-D class would occur should loss
expectations increase from continued performance decline of the
FLOCs, additional loans default or transfer to special servicing or
higher losses are incurred on the specially serviced loans than
expected.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the two
regional mall loans and other FLOCs, coupled with additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the A-S, B, C, X-A, X-B and
the exchangeable PEZ class would likely occur with significant
improvement in CE and/or defeasance and/or the stabilization of the
Glenbrook Square, South Plains Mall and Deerfield Crossing loans
and would be limited based on the sensitivity to concentrations or
the potential for future concentrations. Classes would not be
upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood of interest
shortfalls.

The classes D, E, F and X-D are unlikely to be upgraded absent
significant performance improvement on the South Plains Mall and
Deerfield Crossing loans, other FLOCs and higher recoveries than
expected on the Glenbrook Square loan.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


HALSEYPOINT CLO 7: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $250,000 F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to two classes of
notes issued by HalseyPoint CLO 7, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"HalseyPoint 7").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$266,316,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2036,
Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$250,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2036, Assigned B3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

HalseyPoint 7 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans and permitted non-loan assets. The portfolio is
approximately 76% ramped as of the closing date.

HalseyPoint Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued four other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $430,000,000

Diversity Score: 77

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2958

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): SOFR + 3.78%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


HILDENE TRUPS 2019-P10B: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating to Cl. B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Hildene TruPS Resecuritization 2019-P10B, LLC:

US$77,379,002 Class A Notes due July 2033 (the "Class A Notes"),
Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on October 10, 2019 Assigned A3 (sf)

US$27,982,075 Class B Notes due July 2033 (the "Class B Notes"),
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on October 10, 2019 Assigned Ba3
(sf)

Hildene TruPS Resecuritization 2019-P10B, LLC (the "Issuer"),
originally issued in October 2019, is backed by a collection of the
Class B-1, Class B-2, and Class B-3 notes issued by Preferred Term
Securities X, Ltd. (the "Underlying TruPS CDO"), a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

These affirmations reflect the steady performance associated with
the over-collateralization levels provided for the Issuer's notes
and the portfolio of the Underlying TruPS CDO.  Based on Moody's
calculation, the OC ratio for the Issuer's Class A and Class B
notes are currently 154.10% and 116.53%, respectively. Furthermore,
the OC ratio for the Underlying TruPs CDO's Class B notes is
currently 86.27% compared to 84.78% as of the Issuer's closing
date.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the Underlying TruPS CDO's
portfolio has deteriorated since the Issuer's closing date. Based
on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF)
is currently 760 compared to 656 at that time. The Underlying TruPS
CDO's portfolio's diversity has decreased as well and its five
large obligors constitute approximately 49% of the portfolio.

The affirmations also take into account the upsizing of the
Issuer's notes that have gone effective as of June 28, 2023, where
the Issuer purchased additional Class B-1, B-2 and B-3 notes of the
Underlying TruPS CDO and issued additional Class A and Class B
notes in the same proportion.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool of the Underlying TruPS CDO as having a performing
par (after treating deferring securities as performing if they meet
certain criteria) of $163.3 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$73.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 6.12%
(implying a WARF of 760), and a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 10%.

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's considered additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. The
additional scenario includes, among others, deteriorating credit
quality of the portfolio.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in July 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


JP MORGAN 2013-C16: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to BBsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 11 classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMCC)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-C16. In
addition, Fitch has assigned Negative Outlooks on one class after
downgrade, has revised four Outlooks to Negative from Stable and
one Outlook to Negative from Positive.

  Entity/Debt       Rating             Prior
  -----------       ------             -----
JPMCC 2013-C16

A-3 46641BAC7   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-4 46641BAD5   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-S 46641BAH6   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-SB 46641BAE3  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
B 46641BAJ2     LT  AA-sf   Affirmed   AA-sf
C 46641BAK9     LT  A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf
D 46641BAP8     LT  BBsf    Downgrade  BBB-sf
E 46641BAR4     LT  Bsf     Affirmed   Bsf
EC 46641BAL7    LT  A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf
F 46641BAT0     LT  CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf
X-A 46641BAF0   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
X-B 46641BAG8   LT  AA-sf   Affirmed   AA-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Criteria Update: The rating actions reflect the impact of Fitch's
updated "U.S. and Canadian Multiborrower CMBS Rating Criteria,"
published on May 22, 2023, and incorporate any changes in loan
performance and/or credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's prior
rating action.

The downgrade reflects impact of the criteria and higher losses for
office and underperforming loans within the pool. The Negative
Outlooks reflect imminent refinance risk with the potential for
further downgrade should loans fail to repay at maturity and remain
within the pool.

The affirmations reflect increased credit enhancement due to loan
payoffs, continued scheduled amortization and high concentration of
defeasance. As of June 2023, the pool's aggregate principal balance
has been reduced by 45.9% to $614.1 million from $1.136 billion at
issuance. There are 21 loans (36%) that are fully defeased,
including one loan (0.5%) which has defeased since the last rating
action. One loan, 1615 L Street (5.6%), is full-term, interest
only. Approximately 54% of the pool had partial interest-only
payments, all of which are now amortizing.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a 'Bsf' rating case loss of
8.19%. Eight loans (41.0% of the pool) are considered Fitch Loans
of Concern (FLOCs) which include three loans in special servicing
(23.7% of the pool).

Loans in Special Servicing: The largest loan in the pool is The
Aire (17.6%), which is secured by a 310-unit luxury, multifamily
property located in the Upper West Side of Manhattan across the
street from Lincoln Center and within walking distance of Central
Park and Columbus Circle. The loan recently transferred to special
servicing as of the June 2023 remittance. Although occupancy has
remained stable, property cash flow has consistently struggled to
cover debt service. As of March 2023, occupancy improved to 97%
from 93% at YE 2022 and 70% in 2020; however, NOI DSCR as of March
2023 was 0.78x, lower than 0.84x at YE 2022. A cash flow sweep was
triggered in 2017 for low DSCR.

The performance declines are primarily related to escalating
operating expenses, predominantly from real estate taxes, which
have increased to $6.7 million at YE 2022 from issuance levels of
$1.1 million due to the expiration of a 10-year tax abatement.
Additionally, retail occupancy improved to 100% as of April 2023
from 85.7% (as of September 2022). The borrower has funded debt
service and operating shortfalls through 2022.

Fitch's modeled loss of 9.0% reflects a 7.0% cap rate to the YE
2022 NOI and accounts for the loan's heightened maturity default
risk. The loan continues to amortize through the term.

The second loan in special servicing and the largest loss
contributor is the Northpointe Centre (1.8% of the pool), which is
a 190,196 sf retail center located in Zanesville, OH. The property
is shadow anchored by a Home Depot and Kohl's. Several anchor
tenants have vacated the center including Hobby Lobby (29% of NRA),
TJ Maxx (15%) and MC Sports (13%) resulting in property occupancy
falling to 35% as of YE 2022 with NOI DSCR of 0.66x. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2020 and has been REO
since June 2021. The asset has been marketed for sale with the
servicer reviewing offers received in May 2023.

Fitch's analysis reflects a discount to a recent appraisal value
resulting in a 56% loss severity.

The third loan in special servicing and the second largest loss
contributor is the Riverview Office Tower (2.5%), which is secured
by a 235,271 sf, 16-story, multi-tenant office property located in
Bloomington, Minnesota. The tower was built in 1973 and renovated
in 2006 & 2012. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
August 2022 due to monetary default. A major tenant who occupied
30% of the property's NRA went dark in 2019 and stopped paying rent
in 2022, which was the cause of the borrower's monetary default.

As of YE 2022, occupancy has declined to 47% from 68% at YE 2021.
The largest tenant Life Link III (7.8% of NRA) has a lease that
expired in March 2023. A receiver was appointed in January 2023 and
the servicer is evaluating workout options.

Fitch's analysis reflects a discount to a recent appraisal value
resulting in a 34% loss severity.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Due to the large concentration of
loan maturities in 2023, Fitch performed a sensitivity and
liquidation analysis, which grouped the remaining loans based on
their current status and collateral quality and ranked them by
their perceived likelihood of repayment and/ or loss expectation.

Fitch considered scenarios where only the specially serviced and
office loans/assets remain in the pool. Fitch assumed expected
paydown from defeased loans, as well as loans with sufficient cash
flow for assumed ability to refinance in a higher interest rate
environment using Fitch's stressed refinance constants. The ratings
and Outlooks reflect these scenarios.

Maturity Concentration: All of the remaining loans mature between
August and November 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Downgrades to 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' category rated classes are not
expected, but could occur if deal-level expected losses increase
significantly and/or interest shortfalls occur. For 'AAAsf' rated
bonds, additional stresses applied to defeased collateral if the
U.S. sovereign rating is lower than 'AAA' could also contribute to
downgrades.

Downgrades to 'Asf' category rated classes could occur if
deal-level losses increase significantly on non-defeased loans in
the transactions and with outsized losses on larger FLOCs.

Downgrades to 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' category rated classes are possible
with higher expected losses from continued performance of the FLOCs
and with greater certainty of near-term losses on specially
serviced assets and other FLOCs.

Downgrades to distressed ratings would occur as losses become more
certain and/or as losses are incurred.


Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Upgrades to 'AAsf' and 'Asf' category rated classes are not
expected, but possible with significantly increased CE from
paydowns, coupled with stable-to-improved pool-level loss
expectations and performance stabilization of FLOCs. Upgrades of
these classes to 'AAAsf' will also consider the concentration of
defeased loans in the transaction.

Upgrades to the 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' category rated classes would be
limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for
future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is likelihood for interest shortfalls.

Upgrades to distressed ratings are not expected, but possible with
significantly higher values on FLOCs.


JP MORGAN 2023-5: Fitch Gives B-(EXP) Rating to Class B-5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to JP Morgan Mortgage
Trust 2023-5 (JPMMT 2023-5).

ENTITY   RATING  
------   ------
JPMMT 2023-5

A-1   LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-2   LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-3   LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-4   LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-5   LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-X-1 LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
PT    LT AA+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-1   LT AA-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-2   LT A-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-3   LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating
B-4   LT BB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-5   LT B-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-6   LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed certificates
issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2023-5 (JPMMT 2023-5) as
indicated above. The certificates are supported by 235 loans with a
total balance of approximately $288.63 million as of the cutoff
date. The pool consists of prime-quality fixed-rate mortgages from
various mortgage originators.

The pool consists of loans mainly originated by Rocket Mortgage,
LLC (31.5%) and United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (31.1%) with the
remaining 37.4% of the loans originated by various originators,
each contributing less than 10% to the pool. The loan-level
representations and warranties are provided by the various
originators or MAXEX (aggregator).

NewRez LLC (f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC), d/b/a Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint), will act as interim servicer for
approximately 66.2% of the pool from the closing date until the
servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
Sept. 1, 2023. After the servicing transfer date, these mortgage
loans will be serviced by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
(Chase). Since Chase will service these loans after the transfer
date, Fitch performed its analysis assuming Chase is the servicer
for these loans. The other main servicer in the transaction is
United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (servicing 31.1% of the loans); the
remaining 2.7% of the loans are being serviced by LoanDepot.com,
LLC. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the master
servicer.

Most of the loans (99.7%) qualify as safe-harbor qualified mortgage
(SHQM) or SHQM (average prime offer rate [APOR]); the remaining
0.3% qualify as QM rebuttable presumption.

There is no exposure to Libor in this transaction. The collateral
comprises 100% fixed-rate loans, and the certificates are fixed
rate and capped at the net weighted average coupon (WAC) or based
on the net WAC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 6.1% above a long-term sustainable level (vs. 7.8%
on a national level as of March 2023, down 2.7% since the last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
begun to moderate, with a decline in 3Q22. Driven by the strong
gains in 1H22, home prices rose 5.8% YoY nationally as of December
2022.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of
high-quality, fixed-rate, fully amortizing prime quality loans with
maturities of up to 30 years. Most of the loans (99.7%) qualify as
SHQM or SHQM (APOR); the remaining 0.3% qualify as QM rebuttable
presumption. The loans were made to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid reserves.

The loans are seasoned at an average of seven months, according to
Fitch (five months per the transaction documents). The pool has a
WA original FICO score of 760, as determined by Fitch, which is
indicative of very high credit quality borrowers. Approximately
63.4%, as determined by Fitch, of the loans have a borrower with an
original FICO score equal to or above 750. In addition, the
original WA combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 75.0%,
translating to a sustainable loan-to-value (sLTV) ratio of 78.2%,
represents moderate borrower equity in the property and reduced
default risk compared with a borrower with a CLTV over 80%.

Nonconforming loans comprise 97.6% of the pool, while the remaining
2.4% represents conforming loans. All of the loans are designated
as QM loans, with 52.4% of the pool originated by a retail and
correspondent channel.

Of the pool, 100.0% comprises loans where the borrower maintains a
primary or secondary residence. Single-family homes, planned unit
developments (PUDs), townhouses and single-family attached
dwellings constitute 94.8% of the pool; condominiums make up 4.6%;
and multifamily homes make up 0.6%. The pool consists of loans with
the following loan purposes, as determined by Fitch: purchases
(83.6%), cashout refinances (11.9%) and rate-term refinances
(4.5%). Fitch views favorably that there are no loans to investment
properties and the majority of the mortgages are purchases.

A total of 159 loans in the pool are over $1.0 million, and the
largest loan is approximately $2.90 million.

Loan Count Concentration (Negative): The loan count of this pool
(235 loans) resulted in a loan count concentration penalty. The
loan count concentration penalty applies when the weighted average
number of loans is less than 300. The loan count concentration of
this pool resulted in a 1.17x penalty, which increased the loss
expectations by 107 basis points (bps) at the 'AAAsf' rating
category.

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Of the pool, 46.9% is
concentrated in California. The largest MSA concentration is in the
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA (20.0%), followed by the
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA (7.4%) and
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ MSA (6.8%). The top three MSAs account
for 34% of the pool. As a result, there was a 1.01x probability of
default (PD) penalty applied for geographic concentration which
increased the 'AAAsf' loss by 6 bps.

Shifting-Interest Structure with Full Advancing (Mixed): The
mortgage cash flow and loss allocation are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the
transaction. The applicable credit support percentage feature
redirects subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if
specified credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

The servicers will provide full advancing for the life of the
transaction; each servicer is expected to advance delinquent
principal and interest (P&I) on loans that entered into a
coronavirus pandemic-related forbearance plan. Although full P&I
advancing will provide liquidity to the certificates, it will also
increase the loan-level loss severity (LS) since the servicer looks
to recoup P&I advances from liquidation proceeds, which results in
less recoveries.

Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicer
is unable to do so. If the master servicer is unable to advance,
then the securities administrator (Citibank) will advance.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 3.50%
has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and loss
exposure for senior tranches as the pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. Additionally, a junior
subordination floor of 2.00% has been considered to mitigate
potential tail-end risk and loss exposure for subordinate tranches
as the pool size declines and performance volatility increases due
to adverse loan selection and small loan count concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the
state and national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for
the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
home prices.

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model-projected 39.0% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as
lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on X-D Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C21 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C21 as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect DBRS
Morningstar’s current outlook and loss expectations for the
transaction, which remains relatively unchanged from the November
2022 rating action. Since then, Charlottesville Fashion Square
(Prospectus ID#16) was disposed from the pool with a better
recovery than DBRS Morningstar had previously anticipated.

To date, seven loans have been liquidated from the trust, with
losses totaling $30.0 million. Losses have been contained to the
nonrated class, which has been reduced by 52.8% to $26.9 million as
of May 2023. At issuance, the transaction consisted of 73
fixed-rate loans secured by 84 commercial and multifamily
properties, with a total trust balance of $1.26 billion. As of the
May 2023 remittance, 55 loans remained in the trust, with an
aggregate principal balance of $910.9 million, reflecting
collateral reduction of 28.0% since issuance. Sixteen loans have
been fully defeased, representing 18.5% of the current pool
balance. The transaction is concentrated by property type, with
retail and office properties representing 32.4% and 15.1% of the
pool, respectively. Twelve loans, representing 30.2% of the pool,
are on the servicer's watchlist. There are currently no loans in
special servicing.

The loan with the highest DBRS Morningstar expected loss,
Westminster Mall (Prospectus ID#6; 5.0% of the pool), is secured by
a 771,884-square-foot (sf) portion of a 1.2 million-sf regional
mall in Orange County, California. The property has experienced
year-over-year cash flow declines since issuance following the loss
of the former noncollateral anchor Sears. Shopoff Realty
Investments (Shopoff) purchased two parcels, totalling 26 acres of
the Westminster Mall in 2022. The Macy's parcel, totalling 11.9
acres included an operating Macy's department store (subsequently
leased back to Macy's) and adjacent parking lot. The Sears parcel
totalling 14.1 acres included a vacant former Sears building and
adjacent parking lot. Shopoff announced plans to bookend the mall
by repositioning the two parcels into a mixed-use community of
multifamily homes that are adjacent to walkable community spaces,
restaurants, retail and a nearby hotel. The Westminster City
Council approved a new framework for the redevelopment of those two
sites in December 2022.

According to the March 2023 rent roll, the property reported an
occupancy rate of 88.3%, marginally below the YE2021 occupancy rate
of 90.5%. At YE2019, prior to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic, the property reported an occupancy rate of approximately
95.0%. There is concentrated lease rollover in the near term, as
tenant leases representing approximately 17.5% of the net rentable
area (NRA) have already expired or are scheduled to expire within
the next 12 months. For YE2022, the loan reported a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.23 times (x), compared with YE2021,
YE2020, and YE2019 DSCRs of 0.37x, 0.89x, and 1.21x, respectively.
Despite the declining trend in cash flow, the loan has remained
current. DBRS Morningstar believes the sponsor's commitment is
likely related to the redevelopment value for the property given
the Shopoff acquisition and plans for the vacant anchor spaces.
However, the near-term maturity will likely require the sponsor,
Washington Prime Group, to come out of pocket to repay the trust
loan, and it is unclear what the sponsor's financial position is
given the firm was taken private after filing for bankruptcy in
2021. Given these risks, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with a
significantly stressed probability of default (POD) penalty, with
the resulting expected loss almost 4x the pool average.

The loan with the second-highest DBRS Morningstar expected loss is
200 West Monroe (Prospectus ID#18; 2.6% of the pool), is secured by
a 23-story, Class B office property in Chicago. The loan is being
monitored on the servicer's watchlist for deteriorating operating
performance, largely related to declines in occupancy over the last
several years. According to the March 2023 rent roll, the property
was 68.5% occupied, down from 84.2% at issuance, with a DSCR of
0.49x as of YE2022, compared with 1.37x at issuance. The subject
benefits from a granular tenant roster, with no tenant representing
more than 6.0% of the NRA. In addition, near-term lease rollover is
limited, with tenant leases representing less than 10.0% of the
total NRA scheduled to roll within the next 12 months. According to
a Reis report, dated Q4 2022, office properties within the Central
Loop submarket reported a vacancy rate of 14.2% with a projected
five-year vacancy rate of 13.7%. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this
loan with an elevated POD penalty and stressed loan-to-value ratio
(LTV), reflecting the increased risks since issuance. The resulting
expected loss was approximately 3x higher than the pool average.

Although the majority of loans secured by office properties
reported generally healthy credit metrics, there is continued
uncertainty related to end-user demand and investor appetite for
this property type. DBRS Morningstar anticipates higher vacancy
rates in the broader office market, challenging landlords' efforts
to backfill vacant space, and, in certain instances, contributing
to value declines, particularly for assets in noncore markets
and/or with disadvantages in location, building quality, or
amenities offered. Where applicable, DBRS Morningstar increased the
POD penalties and, in certain cases, applied stressed LTVs for
loans that are secured by office properties.

At the time of the last rating action, DBRS Morningstar
shadow-rated one loan—Miami International Mall—investment
grade. DBRS Morningstar expects the property to have some
volatility in the near term following noncollateral anchor tenant
Sears' closure at this location. In addition, competition is likely
to increase as there are plans to construct a new mall, American
Dream Miami, near the subject. Although the loan's credit metrics
remain strong, DBRS Morningstar took a conservative approach in its
analysis by removing the shadow rating to reflect the projected
near-term weakening of the collateral's performance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


KKR CLO 52: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $250,000 Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to three classes of
notes issued by KKR CLO 52 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "KKR 52").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$210,750,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2036, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$10,250,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2036, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$250,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Notes due
2036, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

KKR 52 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 5.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans and permitted non-loan assets. The portfolio is
approximately 95% ramped as of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued five other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $340,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2816

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.03 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


LEHMAN ABS 2001-B: S&P Raises Class M-1 Notes Rating to B+ (sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review on two classes of
certificates from Madison Avenue  Manufactured Housing Contract
Trust 2002-A and Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing  Contract Trust
2001-B. S&P raised its ratings on both classes. The transactions
are U.S. ABS transactions backed by pools of manufactured  housing
installment sale contracts and installment loan agreements that are
currently serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing.  The rating
actions reflect the transactions' collateral performance to  date,
its views regarding future collateral performance, the
transactions'  structures, and the credit enhancement available.

  Table 1

  Collateral performance (%)(i)
                                              Prior    Current
                                 60+ day   expected   expected
               Current  Current  delinq.   lifetime   lifetime
            Mo. PF (%)  CNL (%) (%)(ii)    CNL (%)    CNL (%)
  Madison
  2002-A   255  4.34     30.00   8.67   31.50-32.50  31.25-32.25
  Lehman
  2001-B   260  4.16     21.29   7.35   22.50-23.50  22.25-23.25

(i)As of the June 2023 distribution date for Madison 2002-A and
Lehman 2001-B.  
(ii)Aggregate 60-plus-day delinquencies as a percentage of the
current pool  balance.
PF--Pool factor.
CNL--Cumulative net loss.

Madison 2002-A--Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2002-A.
Lehman 2001-B--Lehman ABS  Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2001-B.   

The upgrades reflect S&P's view that the total credit support as a
percentage of the amortizing pool balances, compared with its
expected  remaining cumulative net losses, is sufficient to support
the ratings.   

  Table 2

  Hard credit support (%)
                            Prior total hard  Current total hard
                              credit support      credit support
                   Class       (% of current)      (% of current)
  Madison 2002-A   B-2(i)              58.97               78.15
  Lehman 2001-B    M-1(i)              36.35               43.72

(i)As of the June 2023 distribution date.

Madison 2002-A--Madison Avenue  Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2002-A.
Lehman 2001-B--Lehman ABS  Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2001-B.   

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the transactions
relative to  their cumulative net loss expectations and the
available credit enhancement,  and will take further rating actions
as it deems appropriate.

  RATINGS RAISED

  Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

                           Rating
  Series    Class     To            From

  2001-B    M-1       B+ (sf)       B (sf)

  Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                           Rating
  Series    Class     To            From

  2002-A    B-2       BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)




LIBRA SOLUTIONS 2022-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed five ratings on one Oasis LLC transaction and
two Libra Solutions LLC transactions as follows:

Oasis 2021-2 LLC

-- Class A Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class B Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)

Libra Solutions 2022-1 LLC

-- Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes confirmed at A (low) (sf)

Libra Solutions 2022-2 LLC

-- Class A Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes confirmed at A (low)
(sf)
-- Class B Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for
Rated Sovereigns: April 2023 Update," published on April 28, 2023.
These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's
moderate and adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic
scenarios, which were first published in April 2020.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination (as applicable) and a liquidity reserve.

-- The transactions feature a full-turbo principal payment
structure, which allow credit enhancement to build up rapidly.

-- Overall, the collateral performance of the transactions has
been in line with expectations.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities regarding origination and
servicing.

-- While the impact of the pandemic has had an adverse effect on
U.S. borrowers in general, DBRS Morningstar expects the performance
of the underlying receivables in the transaction to remain
resilient because litigation funding receivables and medical
funding receivables are underwritten based on the strength of the
case to reach a successful resolution rather than the plaintiff's
ability to repay.

-- Advances are often repaid by insurance companies. While there
is exposure to the insurance industry in this transaction, DBRS
Morningstar does not expect the economic stress caused by the
pandemic to adversely affect insurance carriers' ability to pay in
the short to medium term.


MAD MORTGAGE 2017-330M: S&P Cuts Class E Notes Rating to 'B+ (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class D and E
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from MAD Mortgage
Trust 2017-330M, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
three classes from the transaction.

This U.S. stand-alone (single-borrower) CMBS transaction is backed
by a seven-year, fixed-rate, interest-only (IO) mortgage loan
secured by the borrower's fee simple interest in 330 Madison
Avenue, an office building in midtown Manhattan's Grand Central
office submarket.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The downgrades on classes D and E reflect our revised
valuation, which is lower than the valuation we derived in our last
review in August 2020, due primarily to our higher vacancy
assumptions and our concerns that based on the property's current
reported performance, weakening office market fundamentals, and
higher interest rate environment, the borrower may have difficulty
refinancing the loan by its Aug. 11, 2024, maturity date. On the
other hand, our affirmations on classes A, B, and C consider the
moderate debt per sq. ft. (about $459.63 per sq. ft. through class
C) and the possibility that property performance improves, among
other factors.

"Since our last review in August 2020, the servicer reported that
occupancy at the property declined at the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic to 89.2% in 2020 and 87.4% in 2021 from 95.1% in 2019.
While occupancy rebounded to 94.4% in 2022, net cash flow (NCF)
remains below pre-pandemic levels. The reported NCF was $41.1
million in 2019 and $43.0 million in 2020, then fell 19.9% to $34.4
million in 2021 and another -15.1% to $29.2 million in 2022. We
attributed the lower NCF in 2021 and 2022 mainly to lower occupancy
and the significant rent concessions, which may include up to two
years of free rent, that the borrower has offered to attract and
retain tenants at the property. According to the March 31, 2023,
rent roll, the property was 93.2% leased. We have yet to receive an
update from the servicer on the property's utilization rate and any
dark or sublet spaces. However, CoStar did not identify any spaces
being marketed for subleasing. In addition, according to various
media reports, the largest tenant, GPFT Holdco LLC (Guggenheim
Partners) whose leases expire in 2028, representing 28.5% of net
rentable area (NRA), is currently exploring its option to
potentially relocate its office in Chicago to Miami. While the news
articles did not mention the tenant's intent in Manhattan, we
considered the possibility that the tenant contracts its leased
space or relocates to another office building.

"Our current property-level analysis considers the weakened office
submarket conditions from lower demand and longer re-leasing
timeframes as companies continue to embrace remote or hybrid work
arrangements. Reflecting these factors, we revised and lowered our
sustainable NCF to $31.7 million (down 17.4% from our last review
NCF of $38.4 million) utilizing a 12.0% vacancy rate (in between
the current office submarket vacancy and in-place property vacancy
rates; see below), S&P Global Ratings' base rent of $78.27 per sq.
ft. and gross rent of $83.10 per sq. ft., and a 42.6% operating
expense ratio. Our revised NCF, which includes the effective net
rents of tenants with leases that commenced in 2022 and had free
rent periods, is 8.5% higher than the 2022 servicer-reported NCF of
$29.2 million. Using an S&P Global Ratings' capitalization rate of
6.50% (unchanged from our last review) and adding to value $3.1
million for the present value of the future rent steps for
investment-grade rated tenants, we arrived at an expected-case
value of $490.8 million, or $578 per sq. ft.--a decline of 18.2%
from our last review value of $600.0 million, or $706 per sq. ft.,
and 48.3% lower than the issuance appraisal value of $950.0
million. This yielded an S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio of
101.9% on the mortgage loan balance, up from 83.3% in our last
review.

"Although the model-indicated ratings were lower than the current
or revised ratings on the classes, we affirmed our ratings on
classes A, B, and C, and tempered our downgrades on classes D and E
based on certain weighed qualitative considerations." These
include:

-- The property's desirable location in midtown Manhattan's Grand
Central office submarket;

-- The potential that the office property's operating performance
could improve above S&P's revised expectations;

-- The relatively high appraised land value of $300.0 million in
2017;

-- The significant market value decline that would need to occur
before these classes experience principal losses;

-- The liquidity support provided in the form of servicer
advancing; and

-- The relative positions of classes A, B, C, and D in the payment
waterfall.

S&P said, "While the servicer-reported debt service coverage (DSC)
is 1.68x as of year-end 2022 and 1.98x as of year-end 2021, we note
that the existing mortgage interest rate of 3.42% is well below
prevailing rates for office properties, even for class A office
buildings like the subject. We will continue to monitor interest
rates in tandem with the property's cash flows and value, as DSC
considerations may constrain the size of a refinance mortgage at
the loan maturity in 2024.

"We may take additional rating action if the property's performance
does not improve or if there are reported changes in the
performance beyond what we have already considered."

Property-Level Analysis

The loan collateral consists of 330 Madison Avenue, a 1965-built,
39-story, LEED Gold, class A, 849,372-sq.-ft. office building (of
which 48,465 sq. ft. is retail, storage, and management space)
located at the northwest corner of 42nd Street and Madison Avenue
in midtown Manhattan's Grand Central office submarket. The property
is directly across the street from One Vanderbilt and one block
west of Grand Central Terminal, which provide access to New York
City's major transportation hubs. The loan's current sponsor is
Munich RE, a German insurance company, which purchased the office
property for $900.0 million from Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth fund
in late 2019. The prior sponsor, a joint venture between affiliates
of Vornado Realty L.P. and Chadison Investment Co. LLC, an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority,
owned the property for approximately 35 years and spent
approximately $120.0 million in 2012 to install new exterior glass
façade, reconfigure the lobby with high-end granite and a widened
double-height glass entrance, modernize the elevators, and upgrade
the building systems, among others. In 2019, Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority acquired Vornado Realty L.P.'s 25% interest for $1,000
per sq. ft.

The property has historically been well-occupied, averaging 94.3%
occupancy since 2001. According to the March 31, 2023, rent roll,
the office building was 93.2% leased. The five largest tenants
comprised 65.9% of NRA and included:

-- Guggenheim Partners (28.2% of NRA, 29.1% of in-place gross
rent, as calculated by S&P Global Ratings; March 2028 lease
expiry);

-- Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. (16.7%, 16.0%, May 2032);

-- Munich RE America Services, Inc. (8.7%, 8.7%, January 2033).

--The tenant signed a new lease that commenced in July 2022;

-- Glencore Ltd. (7.5%, 7.4%, August 2030); and

-- American Century Investment Management Inc. (4.8%, 5.1%,
September 2031).

-- The property has staggered tenant rollover until 2028 when
30.6% of NRA--mainly attributable to Guggenheim Partners--expires.

According to CoStar, the Grand Central office submarket, like the
general New York City office market, continues to experience
limited leasing activity, as office utilization remains below
pre-pandemic levels. CoStar surmised that companies remain
attracted to office properties near Grand Central Terminal, which
provides easy commuter access via the subway, bus, the Long Island
Rail Road, and the Metro-North commuter rail line that services
Westchester County, as well as Fairfield and New Haven counties in
Connecticut. As of year-to-date June 2023, the four- and five-star
office properties in the submarket had a 16.1% vacancy rate, 20.8%
availability rate, and $78.53 per sq. ft. asking rent. This
compares with a 10.4% vacancy rate and $78.51 per sq. ft. asking
rent at issuance in 2017, 9.7% vacancy rate and $78.17 per sq. ft.
asking rent in 2020, and the property's current 6.8% in-place
vacancy rate and $83.10 per sq. ft. S&P Global Ratings' gross rent.
CoStar projects vacancy to climb to 20.6% in 2024 and 21.7% in 2025
and asking rent to contract to $73.52 per sq. ft. and $72.48 per
sq. ft. for the same periods.

As previously mentioned, after considering the property's
competitive position, history performance, known tenancy movements,
upcoming tenant rollover, and continued deteriorating market
conditions, we assumed a 12.0% vacancy rate for the property when
determining our long-term sustainable NCF.

Transaction Summary

The seven-year, fixed rate IO mortgage loan had an initial and
current balance of $500.0 million (according to the June 16, 2023,
trustee remittance report), pays an annual fixed interest rate of
3.42%, and matures on Aug. 11, 2024. There is no additional debt,
and the transaction has not experienced any principal losses to
date.

  Ratings Lowered

  MAD Mortgage Trust 2017-330M

  Class D to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class E to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'

  Ratings Affirmed

  MAD Mortgage Trust 2017-330M

  Class A: AAA (sf)
  Class B: AA- (sf)
  Class C: A- (sf)



MANUFACTURED HOUSING 2000-4: S&P Cuts A-5/6 Certs Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'
on classes A-5 and A-6 from Manufactured Housing Contract Sr/Sub
Pass-thru Certs Series 2000-4, and on class B-1 from Green Tree
Financial Corp. Man Hsg Trust 1996-3. S&P subsequently withdrew its
ratings on the three classes.

The transactions are U.S. ABS transactions backed by manufactured
housing loans.

The downgrades follow the transactions' failure to make timely
interest payments for 12 consecutive months.



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2020-2: Moody's Raises Rating on 5 Tranches to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 44 bonds
issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2020-2. The
transaction is backed by seasoned performing and modified
re-performing residential mortgage loans (RPL). The collateral has
multiple servicers and Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the master
servicer.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2020-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1G, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1H, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2G, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2H, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4H, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5C, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-7, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are driven by stronger performance of the
underlying loans in the pool relative to initial expectations and
an increase in the credit enhancement available to the rated bonds
due to prepayments. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pool which incorporate Moody's assessment of
the representations and warranties framework of the transaction,
the due diligence findings of the third-party review at the time of
issuance, and the transaction's servicing arrangement.

The loans underlying the pool have fewer delinquencies and have
prepaid at a faster rate than originally anticipated, resulting in
an improvement in Moody's loss projections for the pool (link above
provides Moody's current estimates). In Moody's analysis, Moody's
also considered the likelihood of higher future pool expected
losses due to rising borrower defaults driven by an increase in
unemployment and inflation while prepayments remain broadly subdued
amid elevated interest rates.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loan Securitizations Methodology" published in July
2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


OAKTREE CLO 2023-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Oaktree CLO
2023-2 Ltd./Oaktree CLO 2023-2 LLC's floating-rate notes. The
transaction is managed by Oaktree Capital Management L.P.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 29,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- S&P's view of the collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Oaktree CLO 2023-2 Ltd./Oaktree CLO 2023-2 LLC

  Class A, $252 million: Not rated
  Class A-J, $8 million: Not rated
  Class B, $44 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $20 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $14 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $38 million: Not rated



OCP CLO 2023-28: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to OCP CLO
2023-28 Ltd./OCP CLO 2023-28 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The notes issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
securitization governed by investment criteria and backed primarily
by broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower)
senior secured term loans. The transaction is managed by Onex
Credit Partners LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 5,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings assigned to the notes reflect S&P's
assessment of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and
lower) senior secured term loans.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  OCP CLO 2023-28 Ltd./OCP CLO 2023-28 LLC

  Class A, $299.2500 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $61.7500 million: AA+ (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $27.3125 million: A+ (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $27.3125 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $16.6250 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $42.4000 million: Not rated



PALMER SQUARE 2023-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Palmer Square Loan Funding 2023-1, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "Palmer Square 2023-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$292,400,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$51,600,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$21,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Assigned A2 (sf)

US$18,275,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$16,125,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Palmer Square 2023-1 is a static cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. The portfolio is 100% ramped as of the
closing date.

Palmer Square Capital Management LLC (the "Servicer") may engage in
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer during the life
of the transaction. Reinvestment is not permitted and all sale and
unscheduled principal proceeds received will be used to amortize
the debt in sequential order.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $430,004,213

Diversity Score: 78

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2462

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.51% (actual spread vector of the
portfolio)

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.62%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.54%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.65 years (actual amortization vector
of the portfolio)

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Servicer's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


PARALLEL 2023-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Parallel 2023-1
Ltd./Parallel 2023-1 LLC's floating-rate notes. The transaction is
managed by DoubleLine Capital L.P.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term
loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- S&P view of the collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Parallel 2023-1 Ltd./Parallel 2023-1 LLC

  Class A-1, $240.00 million: Not rated
  Class A-2, $64.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B (deferrable), $20.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $22.40 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $12.60 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $39.45 million: Not rated



PHH ALTERNATIVE 2007-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on A-4 Debt to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six bonds and
downgraded the rating of one bond from five US residential
mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by Alt-A, option ARM
and subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=dUObD2

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-7

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2022 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH1

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: PHH Alternative Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-3

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2022 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds. The rating downgrade is primarily due to a
deterioration in collateral performance.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


SARANAC CLO V: Moody's Cuts Rating on $18MM Cl. E-R Notes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by SARANAC CLO V LIMITED:

US$27,000,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
May 27, 2022 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's has also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$18,000,000 Class E-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously
on May 27, 2022 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

SARANAC CLO V LIMITED, originally issued in November 2013 and
refinanced in August 2017, is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in July 2021.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action on the Class C-R notes is primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2022.
The Class A-R notes have been paid down by approximately 47.5% or
$75.4 million since June 2022. Based on the trustee's June 2023
report[1], the OC ratios for the Class A-R/B-R and Class C-R notes
are 159.29% and 128.11%, respectively, versus June 2022 levels
[2]of 142.53% and 124.49% respectively.  

The downgrade rating action on the Class E-R notes reflects the
specific risks to the junior notes posed by par loss observed in
the underlying CLO portfolio.  Based on the trustee's June 2023[3]
report, the OC ratio for the Class E-R notes is reported at 100.44%
versus June 2022[4] level of 105.67%. Moreover the Class E-R notes'
overcollateralization and interest coverage test ratios of 100.44%
and 100.11% reported as of June 2023[5] are failing their covenant
levels of 103.90% and 105.00%. Additionally, the credit quality of
the portfolio has deteriorated over the last year. In particular,
the trustee-reported levels as of June 2023[6] for weighted average
spread (WAS), diversity score (DS) and weighted average life (WAL)
of 3.63%, 47 and 3.04, respectively, are failing their covenant
levels of 3.94%, 69, and 2.37, respectively.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
spread, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $177,710,040

Defaulted par:  $10,452,023

Diversity Score: 46

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3133

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for reference rate
floors): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 10.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.66%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 3.3 years

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's ran additional scenarios
where outcomes could diverge from the base case. The additional
scenarios consider one or more factors individually or in
combination, and include: defaults by obligors whose low ratings or
debt prices suggest distress, defaults by obligors with potential
refinancing risk, deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio, decrease in overall WAS or net interest
income, lower recoveries on defaulted assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.



SHELTER GROWTH 2023-FL5: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Shelter Growth CRE 2023-FL5 Issuer Ltd (the
Issuer or the Trust):

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

RATING RATIONALE/DESCRIPTION

The static transaction consists of 15 short-term, floating-rate
mortgage loans, secured by 16 properties, with an aggregate cut-off
date balance of $345.5 million. The aggregate unfunded future
funding commitment of the future funding participations as of the
cut-off date is approximately $48.7 million. The holder of the
future funding companion participations, Shelter Growth Master
Commercial Real Estate Credit Fund B IV LP (Credit Fund B Seller),
Shelter Growth Capital Partners LLC (SGCP), or another affiliate or
entity managed by or under common management with SGCP, has full
responsibility to fund the future funding companion participations.
The collateral pool for the transaction is static with no ramp-up
period or reinvestment period. However, the Issuer has the right to
use principal proceeds to acquire funded pari passu companion
participations subject to stated Acquisition Criteria during the
Permitted Funded Companion Participation Acquisition period, which
ends on the payment date in December 2024. Acquisition of future
funding participations (when funded) of $500,000 or greater will
require a DBRS Morningstar No Downgrade Confirmation.

The pool includes one delayed-close mortgage asset, Fontana Truck
Yard, representing 2.3% of the total trust balance, which has not
closed. The Issuer has 60 days after closing to acquire the
delayed-close collateral interest. If the delayed-close collateral
interest does not close, the $7.8 million deposited into the Unused
Proceeds Account at deal closing will be distributed as principal
proceeds according to the priority of payments. Fontana Truck Yard
has an expected loss similar to the deal average.

The loans are primarily secured by cash-flowing assets, most of
which are in a period of transition with plans to stabilize and
improve the asset's value. All loans are closed and have
origination dates ranging from May 2022 to May 2023. Two loans are
whole loans (11.4% of the mortgage asset cut-off date balance),
while the other 13 loans (88.6% of the mortgage asset cut-off date
balance) are participations with companion participations that have
remaining future funding commitments totaling approximately $48.7
million. The future funding for each loan is generally to be used
for capital expenditures to renovate the property or build out
space for new tenants.

All of the loans in the pool have floating interest rates indexed
to Term Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) and are interest
only (IO) through their initial terms and extensions. DBRS
Morningstar considered a stressed index rate, constrained by the
strike price of the interest rate cap with the respective
contractual loan spread added. The properties are often
transitioning with potential upside in cash flow; however, DBRS
Morningstar does not give full credit to the stabilization if there
are no holdbacks or if the other loan structural features are
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even if the
structure is acceptable, DBRS Morningstar generally does not assume
the assets will stabilize above market levels.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2023-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Sierra Timeshare 2023-2 Receivables Funding
LLC (Sierra 2023-2). Sierra 2023-2 is backed by a pool of timeshare
loans originated by Wyndham Resort Development Corporation (WRDC),
Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. (WVRI) and certain WVRI affiliates.
WVRI and WRDC are wholly owned subsidiaries of Wyndham Vacation
Ownership, Inc. (WVO). WVO, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Travel + Leisure Co. (T+L, Ba3 stable). T+L is a global
timeshare company engaged in developing and acquiring vacation
ownership resorts, marketing and selling VOIs, offering consumer
financing in connection with such sales and providing property
management services to property owners' associations (POAs).
Wyndham Consumer Finance, Inc. (WCF) will act as the servicer of
the transaction and T+L will act as the performance guarantor.     
        

Issuer: Sierra Timeshare 2023-2 Receivables Funding LLC

Class A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the capital structure, and the
experience and expertise of WCF as servicer.

Moody's expected median cumulative net loss expectation for Sierra
2023-2 is 22.1% and the loss at a Aaa stress is 60%. Moody's based
its net loss expectations on an analysis of the credit quality of
the underlying collateral; the historical performance of similar
collateral, including securitization performance and managed
portfolio performance; the ability of WCF to perform the servicing
functions; and current expectations for the macroeconomic
environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes and
Class D notes are expected to benefit from 64.75%, 41.15%, 22.00%
and 10.80% of hard credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit
enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, a reserve account and subordination. The
notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US Vacation
Timeshare Loan Securitizations Methodology" published in July
2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the Class B, C and D notes if, given current
expectations of portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with higher ratings. This transaction has a pro-rata
structure with sequential pay triggers. Moody's expectation of pool
losses could decline as a result of better than expected
improvements in the economy, changes to servicing practices that
enhance collections or refinancing opportunities that result in
prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if pool losses
exceed its expectations and levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if
excess spread is not sufficient to cover losses in a given month.
Moody's expectation of pool losses may increase, for example, due
to performance deterioration stemming from a downturn in the US
economy, deficient servicing, errors on the part of transaction
parties, inadequate transaction governance or fraud.


SLC STUDENT 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two classes of notes
issued by SLC Student Loan Trust 2004-1 (SLC 2004-1) serviced by
Navient Solutions, LLC. The securitization is backed by student
loans originated under the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP) that are guaranteed by the US government for a minimum of
97% of defaulted principal and accrued interest.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SLC Student Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2022
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade action is primarily a result of the notes'
approaching their legal final maturities and the reliance on
Navient's support to pay off the notes in full by their legal final
maturity dates. The maturity dates for these notes are between
November 2027 to August 2031.

The transaction includes a 10% optional clean-up call provision by
Navient. In May 2023 distribution period, the pool factor is 11.43%
for SLC 2004-1. In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the
likelihood of Navient exercising the call and pay-off the notes
prior to their legal final maturity dates.  

Additionally, in Moody's analysis Moody's also considered the
likelihood of the trigger event being in effect. The transaction
allows for a trigger event to be in effect (i) if the outstanding
note balance exceeds the pool balance plus the reserve account, or
(ii) if there has not been an optional purchase or sale of the
trust student loans after the pool balance falls below 10% of the
initial pool balance. If a trigger event is in effect, the Class B
notes will not receive any principal payments until the Class A
notes have been paid in full.

The action also reflects the updated performance of the
transactions and updated expected loss on the tranches across
Moody's cash flow scenarios. Moody's quantitative analysis derives
the expected loss for a tranche using 28 cash flow scenarios with
weights accorded to each scenario.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in April 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the loan
pool increases as a result of declining borrower usage of
deferment, forbearance and IBR, increasing voluntary prepayment
rates, or prepayments with proceeds from sponsor repurchases of
student loan collateral. Moody's could also upgrade the ratings
owing to a build-up in credit enhancement or upgrades of the CR
Assessment on the swap counterparty.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the
loan pool declines as a result of lower than expected voluntary
prepayments, and higher than expected deferment, forbearance and
IBR rates, which would threaten full repayment of the class by its
final maturity date. In addition, because the US Department of
Education guarantees at least 97% of principal and accrued interest
on defaulted loans, Moody's could downgrade the rating of the notes
if it were to downgrade the rating on the United States government.
Moody's could also downgrade the rating owing to downgrades of the
CR Assessment on the swap counterparty.


STRATUS STATIC 2022-1: Fitch Affirms B+sf Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on class A, B, C, D, E, and
F notes for both Stratus Static CLO 2022-1, Ltd. (Stratus 2022-1)
and Stratus Static CLO 2022-2, Ltd. (Stratus 2022-2). The Rating
Outlooks on all rated tranches remain Stable.

  Entity/Debt       Rating           Prior
  -----------       ------           -----
Stratus Static
CLO 2022-2, Ltd.

A 86317YAA0    LT  AAAsf    Affirmed  AAAsf
B 86317YAC6    LT  AAsf     Affirmed  AAsf
C 86317YAE2    LT  Asf      Affirmed  Asf
D 86317YAG7    LT  BBB-sf   Affirmed  BBB-sf
E 86317UAA8    LT  BB-sf    Affirmed  BB-sf
F 86317UAC4    LT  B+sf     Affirmed  B+sf

Stratus Static
CLO 2022-1, Ltd.

A 86317WAA4    LT  AAAsf    Affirmed  AAAsf
B 86317WAC0    LT  AAsf     Affirmed  AAsf
C 86317WAE6    LT  Asf      Affirmed  Asf
D 86317WAG1    LT  BBB+sf   Affirmed  BBB+sf
E 86317XAA2    LT  BB+sf    Affirmed  BB+sf
F 86317XAC8    LT  B+sf     Affirmed  B+sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Stratus 2022-1 and Stratus 2022-2 are a broadly syndicated
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Blackstone CLO
Management LLC and Blackstone Liquid Credit Strategies LLC,
respectively. Both transactions are static CLOs that closed in July
2022 and are secured primarily by first-lien, senior secured
leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality, Asset Security, Portfolio Management and
Portfolio Composition

The affirmations are due to the portfolios' stable performance
since their respective closing dates. Approximately 6.2% and 6.7%
of the original class A note balances of Stratus 2022-1 and Stratus
2022-2, respectively, have amortized since closing, slightly
increasing credit enhancement levels.

The credit quality of both portfolios as of May 2023 reporting
remain at the 'B' rating level on average. The Fitch weighted
average rating factors (WARF) for both CLOs' portfolios were 24.4
on average, compared to average 24.3 at closing.

The portfolios for Stratus 2022-1 and 2022-2 consist of 180
obligors on average, and the largest 10 obligors represent average
6.9% of the portfolios. There are no defaults in either of the
portfolios. Exposure to issuers with a Negative Outlook and on
Fitch's watchlist is 12.8% and 2.1%, respectively, for Stratus
2022-1, and 11.5% and 2.6%, respectively, for Stratus 2022-2.

First lien loans, cash and eligible investments comprised 100% of
the portfolios and there were no fixed rate assets. Fitch's
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolios averaged 75.9%,
compared to average 75.6% at closing.

All coverage tests and concentration limitations are in compliance
for both transactions.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch conducted an updated cash flow analysis based on a stressed
portfolio that incorporated a one-notch downgrade on the Fitch
Issuer Default Rating Equivalency Rating for assets with a Negative
Outlook on the driving rating of the obligor. In addition, the
stressed analysis extended the weighted average lives (WAL) of each
portfolio to the current maximum covenant of 5.2 years to reflect
the issuers' ability to consent to maturity amendments.

The rating actions for all classes of notes in Stratus 2022-1 and
Stratus 2022-2 are in line with their model-implied ratings (MIRs),
as defined in the CLOs and Corporate CDOs Rating Criteria, except
for the class B and C notes for Stratus 2022-1, and class B, C, D,
and E notes for Stratus 2022-2. The class B and C notes for both
transactions were affirmed one notch below their respective MIRs
due to the limited positive cushions at the MIR rating levels. The
class D and E notes for Stratus 2022-2 were also affirmed two
notches below their respective MIRs due to minimal positive
cushions at rating stresses above the notes' current rating levels
amid recessionary macroeconomic headwinds.

The Stable Outlooks reflect Fitch's expectation that the notes have
sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolios in stress
scenarios commensurate with each class' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

-- Downgrades may occur if realized and projected losses of the
   portfolio are higher than what was assumed at closing and the
   notes' credit enhancement do not compensate for the higher loss

   expectation than initially assumed.

-- A 25% increase of the mean default rate across all ratings,
   along with a 25% decrease of the recovery rate at all rating
   levels for the current portfolio, would lead to no rating
   change for the class A notes in Stratus 2022-1, and downgrades
   of one notch for the class A notes in Stratus 2022-2, two
   notches for the class B and C notes in both transactions, and
   at least one rating category for the class D, E and F notes in
   both transactions, based on MIRs.


Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

-- Except for the tranches already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating,
   upgrades may occur in the event of better-than-expected
   portfolio credit quality and transaction performance.

-- A 25% reduction of the mean default rate across all ratings,
   along with a 25% increase of the recovery rate at all rating
   levels for the current portfolio, would lead to upgrades of one

   notch for the class C notes in both transactions, and at least
   one rating category for the class B, D and E notes in both
   transactions, and two rating categories for the class F notes
   in both transactions, based on MIRs.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


WELLS FARGO 2021-INV2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 bonds from
3 US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by GSE
eligible and prime jumbo mortgage loans originated and serviced by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=mNYsDh

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2020-1 Trust

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2020-RR1 Trust

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2021-INV2 Trust

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2021 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2021 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pool.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk of
default on modified loans. Generally, Moody's apply a 7x multiple
to the Probability of Default (PD) for private label modified
mortgage loans and an 8x multiple to the PD for agency-eligible
modified mortgage loans. However, Moody's may apply a lower
multiple to the PD for loans that were granted short-term payment
relief as long as there were no other changes to the loan terms,
such as a reduced interest rate or an extended loan term, which can
be used to lower the monthly payment on the loan. For loans granted
short-term payment relief, servicers will generally defer the
missed payments, which could be added as a non-interest-bearing
balloon payment due at the end of the loan term. Alternatively,
servicers could extend the maturity on the loan to match the number
of missed payments.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicer.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
April 2023.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C23: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C23 issued by WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C23:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-Y at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. The rating confirmations reflect the stable
performance of the transaction since the last rating action.

As per the May 2023 remittance, 67 of the original 92 loans remain
in the pool, with an aggregate principal balance of $750.6 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 20.2% since issuance as a
result of loan amortization and repayment. Additionally, there are
24 loans, representing 21.6% of the current pool balance, that are
fully defeased. Since the last rating action, the fifth-largest
loan in the pool (Centennial Center & Two Century Center, 5.2% of
the pool balance) has fully defeased. By property type, the pool
consists primarily of retail and office properties, representing
25.7% and 25.5% of the pool, respectively. Fifteen loans,
representing 43.7% of the current pool balance, are on the
servicer's watchlist and are being monitored primarily for low
occupancy rates, cash flows, and debt service coverage ratios
(DSCR). There are no loans currently in special servicing.

In general, the office sector has been challenged, given the low
investor appetite for the property type and high vacancy rates in
many submarkets following the shift in workplace dynamics since the
onset of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar stressed the probability of default
(POD) and/or loan-to-value (LTV) ratio where applicable for loans
backed by office and other properties or otherwise exhibiting
increased risks from issuance. The resulting weighted-average
expected loss for these loans was approximately 16% higher than the
overall pool average.

The largest loan in the pool, Bank of America Plaza (Prospectus
ID#1, 15.5% of the pool), is secured by a 1.4 million-square-foot
(sf) Class A office complex in the central business district of Los
Angeles. The loan saw a decline in performance throughout 2022,
reporting a net cash flow (NCF) of $28.9 million (a DSCR of 1.76
times (x)) for YE2022, a decrease from $34.4 million (a DSCR of
2.10x) at YE2021 and $34.2 million at issuance. The property was
84.8% occupied as of the December 2022 rent roll, relatively flat
from the December 2021 occupancy figure of 84.3%. Throughout 2023,
17 tenants, representing 10.0% of total NRA, have leases scheduled
to expire, and 10.6% of the total NRA is scheduled to roll before
the loan's maturity in May 2024. Additionally, according to the
servicer, the fourth-largest tenant at the property, Alston & Bird
LLP (5.6% of total NRA), will vacate upon lease expiry in December
2023. Vacancy and average asking rental rates for Class A office
properties within a one-mile radius for YE2022 were reported at
13.0% and $42.30 per sf (psf), respectively, according to Reis. In
comparison, the subject property achieved an average rental rate of
$25.54 psf as of the YE2022 rent roll. Given the increased vacancy
in the submarket and DBRS Morningstar's cautious outlook on office
properties, DBRS Morningstar has elected to take a conservative
approach in its review and applied a stressed LTV ratio and
stressed POD for this loan. The resulting expected loss for this
loan is approximately 0.7x the pool average.

Another driver in DBRS Morningstar's expected loss figure is 677
Broadway (Prospectus ID#6, 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
177,039-sf Class A office building built in 2005 and located in
Albany, New York. The loan transferred to the special servicer in
May 2020 for imminent default following a decline in occupancy to
67.0% from 91.0% at YE2019 because of tenant departures and
downsizing, as well as a lack of leasing momentum during the
pandemic. In October 2020, the mezzanine holder took possession of
the loan after remitting funds to cure loan delinquencies. The loan
was then modified, including terms of a one-year maturity extension
to September 2025 and interest-only (IO) payments through January
2023. The initial decreased pay rate included 2.0% IO payments
between February 2021 and January 2022, followed by 3.0% payments
from February 2022 through January 2023. The loan has since resumed
full interest payments at a 4.48% coupon. Deferred principal and
interest were to be repaid from excess cash flows; however, the
YE2022 DSCR was reported to be 0.32x, indicating there is no excess
cash flow to fund these payments. The loan has remained on the
servicer's watchlist since August 2021.

According to the October 2022 rent roll, the property was 65.6%
leased and 58.6% occupied, a moderate increase from the YE2021
figure of 59.6% but well below the issuance figure at 96.2%. The
largest five tenants at the property account for 46.4% of total
NRA, with the earliest expiration in May 2026. Since October 2022,
two new tenants, representing 4.4% of total NRA, have signed leases
that commenced rent payments in February 2023. Three tenants,
representing 12.4% of total NRA, have scheduled lease expirations
in 2023. According to Reis, the average asking rent and vacancy
within a two-mile radius of the property were $19.30 psf and 21.0%
as of YE2022. In comparison, the subject property achieved an
average rental rate of $13.90 psf as of the October 2022 rent roll.
Per the annualized trailing nine-month financials ended September
30, 2022, the loan reported an NCF of $63,000, a decline from
YE2021 at $308,000 and the issuance figure of $2.7 million. Given
the high submarket vacancy, declining cash flows and below-market
rental rates, DBRS Morningstar was conservative in its approach and
applied a stressed LTV ratio and stressed POD, resulting in an
expected loss that was more than 3.0x the pool's expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


[*] Fitch Affirms 19 Tranches from 2 Redding Ridge-Managed CLOS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 tranches from three U.S.
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) managed by Redding Ridge
Asset Management LLC. The Rating Outlooks for all the rated classes
remain Stable.

Entity                 Rating             Prior
------                 ------             -----
RR 23 Ltd.

A-1b 75000GAE6      LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-2 75000GAG1       LT  AAsf    Affirmed  AAsf
B 75000GAJ5         LT  Asf     Affirmed  Asf
C-1 75000GAL0       LT  BBB+sf  Affirmed  BBB+sf
C-2 75000GAN6       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
D 78111FAA6         LT  BB+sf   Affirmed  BB+sf

RR 22 Ltd.

A-2 75000DAC7       LT  AA+sf   Affirmed  AA+sf
B-1 75000DAE3       LT  A+sf    Affirmed  A+sf
B-2 75000DAG8       LT  Asf     Affirmed  Asf
C-1 75000DAJ2       LT  BBB+sf  Affirmed  BBB+sf
C-2 75000DAL7       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
D 75000FAA6         LT  BB+sf   Affirmed  BB+sf

RR 21 LTD


A-1b 78110TAC3      LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  AAAsf
A-2 78110TAE9       LT  AAsf    Affirmed  AAsf
B-1 78110TAG4       LT  Asf     Affirmed  Asf
B-2a 78110TAL3      LT  A+sf    Affirmed  A+sf
B-2b 78110TAN9      LT  Asf     Affirmed  Asf
C 78110TAJ8         LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  BBB-sf
D 78090GAA9         LT  BBsf    Affirmed  BBsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

RR 21 LTD (RR 21), RR 22 LTD (RR 22), and RR 23 LTD (RR 23) are
broadly syndicated CLOs managed by Redding Ridge Asset Management
LLC. The transactions closed in 2022 and are in their reinvestment
periods until 2025 and 2027. The notes are securitized primarily by
first-lien, senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality, Asset Security, Portfolio Management and
Portfolio Composition

As of May 2023 reporting, the Fitch weighted average rating factor
(WARF) for all portfolios was 25.3 (B/B-) on average, compared with
an average of 24.3 (B/B-) at closing.

Obligor count averaged 161, with the average top 10 obligors'
weight at 10.9% across all three portfolios (excluding cash). There
were no reported defaults. Exposure to issuers with a Negative
Outlook and Fitch's watchlist averaged 17.1% and 2.6%,
respectively.

First lien loans, cash and eligible investments comprised 98.6% on
average. Fitch's weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
portfolios averaged 74.7%, compared with an average of 75.0% at
closing.

All coverage tests, collateral quality tests (CQTs), and
concentration limitations are in compliance for all three
transactions.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch conducted updated cash flow analyses based on newly run Fitch
Stressed Portfolio (FSP) since all three transactions are still in
their reinvestment periods. The rating actions for all classes of
notes are in line with their model-implied ratings (MIRs), as
defined in the CLOs and Corporate CDOs Rating Criteria.

The FSP analysis stressed the current portfolio from the latest
trustee reports to account for permissible concentration and CQT
limits. The FSP analysis assumed weighted average lives of 7.5
years for RR 21 and 6.5 years for both RR 22 and RR 23. Other FSP
assumptions include 5.0% fixed-rate assets and maximized limits for
non-senior secured assets, industries and 'CCC' assets.

The Stable Outlooks reflect Fitch's expectation that the notes have
a sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolios in stress
scenarios commensurate with each class' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

-- Downgrades may occur if realized and projected losses of the
   portfolio are higher than what was assumed at closing and the
   notes' credit enhancement does not compensate for the higher
   loss expectation than initially assumed;

-- A 25% increase of the mean default rate across all ratings,
   along with a 25% decrease of the recovery rate at all rating
   levels for the current portfolio, would lead to downgrades of
   up to two rating notches for RR 21, and downgrades of up to
   three notches for RR 22 and RR 23, based on the MIRs.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

-- Except for tranches already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating,
   upgrades may occur in the event of better-than-expected
   portfolio credit quality and transaction performance;

-- A 25% reduction of the mean default rate across all ratings,
   along with a 25% increase of the recovery rate at all rating
   levels for the current portfolio, would lead to upgrades of up
   to five rating notches for all three transactions, based on the

   MIRs.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.



[*] Fitch Assigns Rating to 17 Unrated Towd Point Trust Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and outlooks to 17 previously
unrated classes from 12 Towd Point Mortgage Trust (TPMT)
transactions issued between 2016 and 2020.

RATING ACTIONS

     ENTITY / DEBT                    RATING  

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2016-4         B5 89172UAJ7   LT  Bsf    New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2018-2         B4 89175VAH6   LT  BB-sf  New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2018-4         B3 89175TAG3   LT  Bsf    New Rating
                     B4 89175TAH1   LT  B-sf   New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2018-5         B3 89176VAG7   LT  Bsf    New Rating
                     B4 89176VAH5   LT  B-sf   New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2018-6         B3 89176LAH7   LT  Bsf    New Rating
                     B4 89176LAJ3   LT  B-sf   New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2019-1         B3 89177BAG0   LT  Bsf    New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2019-2         B4 89177JAH1   LT  Bsf    New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2019-3         B3 89177LAJ2   LT  Bsf    New Rating
                     B4 89177LAK9   LT  B-sf   New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2020-1         B3 89178WAG3   LT  Bsf    New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2020-2         B3 89176UAJ3   LT  BBsf   New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2020-3         B3 89178UAH5   LT  BBsf   New Rating
                     B4 89178UAJ1   LT  Bsf    New Rating

Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2020-4         B3 89179JAG1   LT  BBsf   New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has rated other classes within these transactions since deal
close. The additional classes with ratings assigned today are more
junior than the classes with existing ratings and were unrated at
deal close. All of the transactions have performed well since
closing with many of the previously rated bonds upgraded or
assigned a Positive Rating Outlook. All of the transactions are
U.S. RMBS transactions collateralized by pools of re-performing
loans (RPL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Loss Expectations (Positive): The expected losses for the
underlying pools backing the rated notes have decreased since
issuance. Reduced loss expectation is driven by home price
appreciation over the past few years along with continued borrower
performance and minimal defaults. On average LTVs for the pools
reviewed decreased by 29.4% since issuance, average LTV is
currently 51%.

Stable Performance (Positive): Delinquencies have increased since
issuance for each transaction under review with an average 30+ DQ
of 7.6% with the highest delinquency of 11.6%. This is still less
than the DQ of 14.1% for the overall sector in May 2023. On
average, 76.4% of borrowers have been continuously performing over
the past 24 months (clean current). TPMT 2019-2 has had the best
performance as 83.8% of borrowers have been clean current for the
past 24 months while the worst performing pool was TPMT 2016-4 at
66.5%. Borrowers are receiving the PD benefit as they continue to
perform since transaction close. Realized losses have also been
limited with losses as a percentage of original balance of less
than 1%, which is outperforming Fitch's initial expectations.

Sequential Structure (Positive): The transactions are structured to
a sequential payment priority and loss allocation with no servicer
advancing. The impact of this is lower model output loss severity
that is made up for by a higher required credit enhancement to
provide for bond level liquidity. Additionally, pools have
experienced material paydowns, for an average factor of 45%. As a
result of deleveraging, the newly rated classes have experienced an
average increase in CE of 360bps since issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

This defined negative stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model projected decline at the base case. This analysis indicates
that there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs
compared with the model projection.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth with no
assumed overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price
growth of 10.0%. Excluding the senior classes already rated 'AAAsf'
as well as classes that are constrained due to qualitative rating
caps, the analysis indicates there is potential positive rating
migration for all of the other rated classes.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance. For enhanced disclosure of Fitch's
stresses and sensitivities, please refer to U.S. RMBS Loss Metrics.


[*] Fitch Corrects Release on 11 US CMBS 2019 Vintage Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction of a release on 11 U.S. CMBS 2019
Vintage Transactions published on June 12, 2023. It corrects the
previous Rating Outlook of Class X-A in the BMARK 2019-B10
transaction to Stable from Negative as incorrectly stated in the
rating actions table of the original release.

The amended release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14, upgraded six and affirmed 152
classes from 11 U.S. CMBS 2019 vintage conduit transactions. In
addition, the Rating Outlooks for seven classes were revised to
Negative from Stable and three classes were assigned Negative
Outlooks following downgrades. The Rating Outlooks remain Negative
on 10 classes. Fitch has also removed all classes from these
transactions from Under Criteria Observation (UCO).

The entities involved in the rating action are:

JPMCC Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2019-COR5
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2019-GC39
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2019-H6
CSAIL 2019-C16 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C49
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C16
CSAIL 2019-C15 Commercial Mortgage Trust
CF 2019-CF1
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2019-L2
Benchmark 2019-B10 Mortgage Trust
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C50

A list of the ratings is available at https://tinyurl.com/mmabd58c


KEY RATING DRIVERS

Criteria Update: The rating actions reflect the impact of the
updated U.S. and Canadian Multiborrower CMBS Rating Criteria,
published on May 22, 2023, and incorporate any changes in loan
performance and/or credit enhancement (CE) since our prior rating
action of these transactions between January and April 2023.

Performance and 'Bsf' Loss Expectations: Deal-level 'Bsf' rating
case losses range from 3.02% to 5.75%.

These transactions have concentrations of Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs) averaging 17.5% (ranging from 3.7% to 31.3%) and specially
serviced loans averaging 3.8% (ranging from 0.0% to 12.7%).

Downgrades reflect the impact of the criteria and higher expected
losses on FLOCs, most notably larger top 15 loans and specially
serviced assets in the transactions. The transactions with
downgrades have concentrations of FLOCs averaging in excess of 18%,
primarily consisting of office and retail assets.

Upgrades reflect the impact of the criteria on classes in
transactions with increased CE and stable performance since Fitch's
prior rating action. The six upgraded classes were from the MSC
2019-H6 transaction, which has a low FLOC concentration of 7.7%,
and the lowest weighted average Fitch-stressed loan to value (LTV)
and highest weighted-average Fitch-stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) amongst the 11 transactions at 79.8% and 1.70x,
respectively.

The Negative Outlooks in the following transactions reflect
performance concerns and/or an additional sensitivity scenario that
applies higher default and/or loss expectations on the loans noted
below.

BMARK 2019-B10: Saint Louis Galleria (5.0% of the pool), 101
California (3.3%) and 166 Geary Street (1.6%).

CF 2019-CF1: 65 Broadway (12.8%), 625 North Michigan Avenue (6.7%)
and 394 Broadway loan (2.5%).

CSAIL 2019-C15: Embassy Suites Portland Washington Square (6.9%),
Saint Louis Galleria (4.1%) and Continental Towers (3.1%).

CSAIL 2019-C16: Embassy Suites Seattle Bellevue (5.4%), Hampton Inn
Livonia (1.4%) and Comfort Suites Grand Rapids North (0.8%).

JPMCC 2019-COR5: Brooklyn Renaissance Plaza (9.0%), Hampton Roads
Office Portfolio (7.0%) and Gateway Center (4.2%).

UBS 2019-C16: The Colonnade Office Complex (7.7%), SkyLoft Austin
(5.9%) and 16300 Roscoe Blvd (1.3%).

WFCM 2019-C49: Residence Inn Denver City Center (6.3%), Shops at
Trace Fork (5.3%) and The Nostrand Avenue Shopping Center (3.5%).

WFCM 2019-C50: 839 Broadway (2.8%), InnVite Hospitality Portfolio
(2.3%) and 24 Commerce Street (1.7%).

The Negative Outlooks in the following transactions reflect the
high concentration of office and/or specially serviced (SS) loans.

-- GSMS 2019-GC39 (office, 38.8%);

-- MSC 2019-L2 (office, 38.7%; SS loans, 10.7%).

Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2023 distribution
date, paydown since issuance averaged 4.2% (ranging from 1.1% to
14.4%). No losses have been incurred to date.

Defeasance: On average, the transactions have a 2.9% concentration
of defeasance; with the largest concentrations in MSC 2019-L2
(9.1%) and WFCM 2019-C49 (6.1%).

Fitch is currently evaluating the treatment of defeased loans in
CMBS transactions and may consider higher stress assumptions on
government obligations that have a rating lower than 'AAA'. The
U.S. sovereign rating remains at 'AAA'/Rating Watch Negative.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

The Negative Outlooks reflect possible future downgrades stemming
from concerns with potential further declines in performance that
could result in higher expected losses on FLOCs. If expected losses
do increase, downgrades to these classes are anticipated.

Downgrades to 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' category rated classes could occur
if deal-level expected losses increase significantly and/or
interest shortfalls occur. For 'AAAsf' rated bonds, additional
stresses applied to defeased collateral if the U.S. sovereign
rating is lower than 'AAA' could also contribute to downgrades.

Downgrades to 'Asf' and 'BBBsf' category rated classes could occur
if deal-level losses increase significantly on non-defeased loans
in the transactions and with outsized losses on larger FLOCs.

Downgrades to 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' category rated classes are possible
with higher expected losses from continued performance of the FLOCs
and with greater certainty of near-term losses on specially
serviced assets and other FLOCs.

Downgrades to distressed ratings of 'CCCsf' through 'Csf' would
occur as losses become more certain and/or as losses are incurred.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Upgrades to 'AAsf' and 'Asf' category rated classes are possible
with significantly increased CE from paydowns, coupled with
stable-to-improved pool-level loss expectations and performance
stabilization of FLOCs. Upgrades of these classes to 'AAAsf' will
also consider the concentration of defeased loans in the
transaction.

Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category rated classes would be limited
based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is likelihood for interest shortfalls.

Upgrades to 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' category rated classes are not likely
until the later years in a transaction and only if the performance
of the remaining pool is stable and there is sufficient CE to the
classes.

Upgrades to distressed ratings of 'CCCsf' through 'Csf' are not
expected, but possible with better than expected recoveries on
specially serviced loans or significantly higher values on FLOCs.


[*] Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 73 FFELP Student Loan ABS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained 52 Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP) student loan ABS (SLABS) ratings from 36
transactions on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). Fitch placed the
trusts on RWN on May 26, 2023 following the placement of the United
States' 'AAA' Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) on RWN on May 24, 2023. All of the notes are rated 'AAAsf'.

Fitch has also affirmed 21 FFELP SLABS ratings from 10 transactions
at their current levels.

The ratings are available at https://tinyurl.com/26jzxevv

The Entities involved are:

Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2005-2
Navient Student Loan Trust 2017-5
SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-7
Scholar Funding Trust 2013-A
Education Loan Finance, Inc. Indenture No. 3, LLC
Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corporation Series
2013-I
Scholar Funding Trust 2010-A
Scholar Funding Trust 2011-A
Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2004-3
Brazos Education Loan Authority, Inc. Indenture

All FFELP loans are guaranteed against default by a third-party
guarantor for at least 97% of principal and accrued interest,
depending on the loan disbursement date. The U.S. Department of
Education (ED) reinsures or reimburses the guarantor for amounts
paid on the loans. In addition, the ED provides special allowance
payments (SAP) and interest subsidy payments (ISP) to FFELP SLABS.

The FFELP SLABS maintained on RWN pass all credit and maturity
stresses in cashflow modeling with sufficient hard credit
enhancement (CE) under Fitch's assumptions at current ratings. The
transactions have low maturity risk as their legal final maturity
dates are 2035 or later.

The affirmations of ratings in the 'Bsf' category are supported by
qualitative factors such as the ability of the sponsor to call the
notes upon reaching 10% pool factor or evidence of sponsor support
such as a revolving credit agreement, which allows the servicer to
purchase loans from the trusts. Because the sponsor has the option
but not the obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch does not give
quantitative credit to these agreements. However, these agreements
provide qualitative comfort that the sponsor is committed to
limiting investors' exposure to maturity risk.

For SLC Student Loan Trust 2008-2, the affirmation of the class A-4
notes at 'Dsf' reflects the default on the senior class A-4 notes
in the payment of their outstanding principal on their legal final
maturity date on June 15, 2021. The notes will remain at 'Dsf' so
long as the event of default is continuing. The class B notes are
affirmed at 'Csf', reflective of the high level of credit risk for
the notes, resulting from the occurrence of an event of default in
the transaction. Thus far the class B notes have continued to make
interest payments; however, pursuant to the trust indenture, the
trust could switch to a post-event of default waterfall, directing
all payments to the class A-4 notes until the balance is paid in
full, which would result in interest payments being diverted away
from the class B notes. If this course of action were followed, the
class B notes would not pass Fitch's base case cashflow scenarios,
as reflected by the current rating on the notes. Fitch will
continue monitoring remedies to the occurrence of the event of
default implemented by the noteholders or transaction parties, as
provided under the trust indenture, and take any additional rating
action based on the impact of those remedies, as deemed
appropriate.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign: The trust collateral comprises 100% FFELP loans
with guaranties provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance
provided by the U.S. Department of Education for at least 97% of
principal and accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is
currently 'AAA'/Rating Watch Negative.

Collateral Performance: Fitch is maintaining the sustainable
constant default rate assumptions ranging between 1.50% to 9.00%
and the sustainable constant prepayment assumptions of between
7.00% - 15.00%. The 'AAAsf' default rates ranges from approximately
35.47% to 100.00% and the 'Bsf' default rate ranges from 12.00% to
74.75%. The TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, and income-based
repayment (prior to adjustment) ranges from 2.38% to 6.96%, 3.49%
to 22.50%, and 12.80% to 34.31%, respectively, and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.25% in the base case and 2.0% in the 'AAA' case.
The borrower benefits range from 0.00% to 0.98%, based on
information provided by the sponsor. Transaction specific
performance can be found at the link above.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for these transactions
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. As of the most recent
collection period all trust student loans are indexed to either
91-day T-bill or one-month LIBOR and the notes are indexed to
LIBOR. Fitch applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses
to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: CE is provided by overcollateralization and
excess spread where available and class A notes benefit from
subordination provided by class B. As of the most recent
distribution, reported total parity ratio ranges between
approximately 100%-300%. Transactions are releasing cash as long as
the required overcollateralization (OC) or CE is maintained.
Liquidity support is provided by reserve accounts, most of which
are at their floors.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing for the trust's
entire portfolio is performed by Navient, Nelnet Inc. and
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, which Fitch
believes are acceptable servicers of FFELP student loans due to
their long servicing history.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign, by nature of the reinsurance
provided by the ED. Aside from the U.S. sovereign rating, defaults,
basis risk and loan extension risk account for the majority of the
risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.

Fitch conducts credit and maturity stress sensitivity analysis by
increasing or decreasing key assumptions by 50% over the base case.
The credit stress sensitivity is viewed by stressing both the base
case default rate and the basis spread. The maturity stress
sensitivity is viewed by stressing remaining term, IBR usage and
prepayments. The results should only be considered as one potential
outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk
factors and should not be used as an indicator of possible future
performance.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

No upgrade credit or maturity stress sensitivity is provided for
the notes maintained on RWN, as they are at their highest possible
current and model-implied ratings.

For the notes affirmed at 'Bsf' and below, the current ratings are
most sensitive to Fitch's maturity risk scenario. Key factors that
may lead to positive rating action are sustained increases in
payment rate and a material reduction in weighted average remaining
loan term. A material increase of CE from lower defaults and
positive excess spread, given favorable basis spread conditions, is
a secondary factor that may lead positive rating action.



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $173.8MM of US RMBS Issued 2006
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 10 bonds from
eight US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed
subprime mortgages issued by RAMP in 2006.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-EFC2 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2020 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-NC1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-NC3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2020 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS2 Trust

Cl. A-3A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2019 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ2 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ4 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $582MM of US RMBS Issued 2004-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 38
bonds from 25 US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS),
backed by subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX3 Trust

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS11 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS12 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS4 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS5 Trust

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS7 Trust

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS8 Trust

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS9 Trust

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2018 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX2 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX3 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 15, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX4 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2019 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS2 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2019 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS4 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS5 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS7 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2020 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS8 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2021 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2021 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS4 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2020 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2018
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds. The rating downgrades are primarily due to the
deteriorating performance of the related pool, and/or a decrease in
credit enhancement available to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $14.7MM of US RMBS Issued 2000-2006
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four bonds US
residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by Alt-A
and subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Long Beach Home Equity
Loan Trust 2000-LB1, Home

Cl. AF5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2018 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-8

Cl. I-2A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE10

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2022
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $261.8MM of US RMBS Issued 2018-2020
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 60 bonds from
15 US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
prime jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Everbank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-9

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-2

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-5

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2020 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2020 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-6

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-7

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-8

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-9

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-INV1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-INV3

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-LTV1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-LTV3

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2021 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-INV1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-LTV1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-LTV2

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3-X*, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2022
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-X*, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pool.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk of
default on modified loans. Generally, Moody's apply a 7x multiple
to the Probability of Default (PD) for private label modified
mortgage loans and an 8x multiple to the PD for agency-eligible
modified mortgage loans. However, Moody's may apply a lower
multiple to the PD for loans that were granted short-term payment
relief as long as there were no other changes to the loan terms,
such as a reduced interest rate or an extended loan term, which can
be used to lower the monthly payment on the loan. For loans granted
short-term payment relief, servicers will generally defer the
missed payments, which could be added as a non-interest-bearing
balloon payment due at the end of the loan term. Alternatively,
servicers could extend the maturity on the loan to match the number
of missed payments.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicer.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2023.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $469MM of US RMBS Issued 2003-2007
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 20 bonds from
11 US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
Alt-A and subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=3DN2WM

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-4

Cl. B1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2018 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2018 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-EQ1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT5

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2006-BC5

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2020 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-EQ1

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC4

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-WF2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2021 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2021 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] S&P Places Seventy-Five CLO Ratings on CreditWatch Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed 75 ratings on CreditWatch with positive
implications and 17 ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications from 41 CLO transactions, all of which are in their
amortization phase. The portfolios of all but one CLO backing these
notes are broadly syndicated loans. Sequoia Infrastructure Funding
I Ltd. is a broadly syndicated CLO that also has exposure to
infrastructure project finance loans.

Most of the classes placed on CreditWatch positive are in the
senior part of their respective capital structure. The continued
paydowns to the senior notes of the CLOs increased the
overcollateralization support to these tranches. In addition, S&P
also considered their indicative cash flow results, the CLO's 'CCC'
exposure, and the concentration of the portfolio when it placed
their ratings on CreditWatch positive.

Though the uncertainty in the general economic conditions and risk
of recession are still present, S&P believes that the senior notes
placed on CreditWatch positive are in a relatively strong position
and could potentially support a rating higher than their current
rating.

Some of the ratings placed on CreditWatch positive are lower down
the capital stack and were downgraded previously. The paydowns to
the senior notes and stable performance of the transaction since
the last rating actions have improved their cash flow results and
credit support. As a result, they will be considered for a
potential upgrade.

While paydowns to senior notes are generally a positive for the
credit enhancement of the senior portion of the capital structure,
increased exposure to lower quality assets and portfolio
concentration in such amortizing transactions can increase the
credit risk of the junior CLO notes.

This seems to occur for 17 tranches, five in the 'BB' category, and
12 in the 'B' category, the ratings on which are being placed on
CreditWatch with negative implications. The placement reflects the
decline in their overcollateralization levels, which is likely due
to a combination of par losses, increases in defaults, and
increases in haircuts due to excess exposure to 'CCC' collateral.
In addition, S&P considered other factors, such as indicative cash
flow runs, current exposure to 'CCC' and lower collateral, and an
estimate of the tranches' current overcollateralization ratios
without 'CCC' haircuts in relation to the overall market average.

S&P intends to resolve these CreditWatch placements within 90 days,
following a committee review.

S&P said, "We are aware that the transition away from LIBOR is
likely to occur on or after July 1 for most transactions. Our
CreditWatch resolutions will consider the transition, but, based on
the analysis we have completed, we do not expect the transition, in
and of itself, to have an impact on ratings.

"We will continue to monitor the transactions we rate and take
rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, as we deem
appropriate."

  Ratings list

                                             RATING

  ISSUER         CLASS     CUSIP      TO                  FROM

  AMMC CLO
  20 Ltd.         C-R   00177TAN3   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  AMMC CLO
  20 Ltd.         B-R   00177TAL7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  AMMC CLO
  20 Ltd.         D-R   00177TAQ6   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+(sf)

  Anchorage
  Capital CLO
  3-R Ltd.        E     03330BAA8   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Anchorage
  Capital CLO
  4-R Ltd.        E     03329JAA4   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Anchorage
  Capital
  CLO 5-R Ltd.    C     03329AAG0   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Anchorage
  Capital
  CLO 5-R Ltd.    B     03329AAE5   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Atlas Senior
  Loan Fund
  IX Ltd.         B     04941VAE5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Atlas Senior
  Loan Fund  
  X Ltd.          E     0497KAA6    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Atlas Senior
  Loan Fund
  X Ltd.          F     04942KAC2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Atlas Senior
  Secured Loan
  Fund VIII Ltd.  F     04942LAG1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Atlas Senior
  Secured Loan
  Fund VIII Ltd.  E     04942LAE6   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  Barings CLO
  Ltd. 2018-III   C     06760PAL5   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Barings CLO
  Ltd. 2018-III   F     06760RAC1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Barings CLO
  Ltd. 2018-III   B-1   06760PAG6   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Barings CLO
  Ltd. 2018-III   B-2-R 06760PAQ4   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Benefit Street
  Partners
  CLO II Ltd.     B-R2  08179XBC8   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Benefit Street
  Partners
  CLO II Ltd.   A-2-R2  08179XBA2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Benefit Street
  Partners
  CLO III Ltd.  A2-R2   08180EBL7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Benefit Street
  Partners
  CLO III Ltd.   B-R2   08180EBN3   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Diamond CLO
  2018-1 Ltd.     D     25256LAG6   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Fortress
  Credit BSL
  V Ltd.          B-1   34961PAC4   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Fortress
  Credit
  BSL V Ltd.      E     34961NAA3   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)

  Fortress
  Credit
  BSL V Ltd.    B-2-R   34961PAL4   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  GoldenTree
  Loan
  Opportunities
  IX Ltd.        C-R-2  38123HAU8   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  GoldenTree
  Loan
  Opportunities
  IX Ltd.       B-R-2   38123HAS3   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  JFIN CLO
  2012 Ltd.      C-R    46616AAW6   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  JFIN CLO
  2012 Ltd.       B-R   46616AAU0   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  JFIN CLO
  2013 Ltd.      A-2-R  46616KAN4   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  JFIN CLO
  2013 Ltd.       B-R   46616KAQ7   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  KKR CLO
  10 Ltd.         B-R   48250GAS9   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  KKR CLO
  10 Ltd.         C-R   48250GAU4   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  KVK CLO  
  013-1 Ltd.      D-R   482739AJ8   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

  KVK CLO
  2013-1 Ltd.     C-R   482739AH2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  LCM 26 Ltd.     E     50200GAA5   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  LCM XIII L.P.   E-R   50184KBA5   B (sf)/Watch Neg      B (sf)

  LCM XIII L.P.   C-R3  50184KBQ0   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  LCM XIII L.P.   B-R3  50184KBN7   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  LCM XIX L.P.    E-1   50188VAJ9   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

  LCM XIX L.P.    C     50188QAE1   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  LCM XIX L.P.    D     50188QAG6   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

  LCM XIX L.P.    E-2   50188VAA8   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

  Longfellow
  Place
  CLO Ltd.        B-R3  54303PBA2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Longfellow
  Place
  CLO Ltd.        C-R3  54303PBC8   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XI Ltd.         D-R   55818KAU5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XIII Ltd.       C-R2  55818MBE6   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XIII Ltd.       D-R2  55818MBG1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XIII Ltd.       B-R2  55818MBC0   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XLI Ltd.        D-R   04965CAQ1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XLI Ltd.        F-R   04964YAL5   B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XLI Ltd.        B-R   04965CAL2   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XLI Ltd.        C-R   04965CAN8   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Madison
  Park Funding
  XLI Ltd.        E-R   04964YAJ0   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO V Ltd.     A-2-R  56576QAQ1   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO V Ltd.      B-R   56576QAS7   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO VI Ltd.   A-2-R2  56576VAY3   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO VI Ltd.     B-R2  56576VBA4   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Marathon  
  CLO VI Ltd.     C-R2  56576VBC0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO VI Ltd.     D-R2  56576WAG0   B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Marathon   
  CLO X Ltd.      B     56578JAG7   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

  Marathon
  CLO X Ltd.      A2    56578JAE2   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  MidOcean
  Credit CLO II   C     59863KAE7   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

  MidOcean
  Credit CLO II   E-R   59802TAE2   B (sf)/Watch Neg      B (sf)

  MidOcean
  Credit CLO II   B-R   59863KAU1   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Mountain
  View CLO
  2014-1 Ltd.     D-R   62431XBA3   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

  Nassau
  2017-I Ltd.     B     631707AE6   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Nassau
  2017-I Ltd.     D     631706AA6   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  Nassau
  2017-I Ltd.     A-2   631707AC0   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Newfleet CLO
  2016-1 Ltd.     C-R   65130PAS9   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Newfleet CLO
  2016-1 Ltd.     D-R   65130PAU4   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  OFSI BSL
  VIII Ltd.       E     67111JAA1   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  OFSI BSL
  VIII Ltd.       C-R   67111CAQ1   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  OFSI BSL
  VIII Ltd.       B-R   67111CAN8   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Ocean Trails
  CLO VII         E     67515VAA6   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  Regatta II
  Funding L.P.  A-2F-R3 75885WBJ9   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Regatta II  
  Funding L.P.  A-2L-R3 75885WBC4   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Sequoia
  Infrastructure
  Funding I Ltd.  E     81742MAA2   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 2 LLC       D-R2  56844XBN8   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB- (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 2 LLC       C-R2  56844XBL2   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 2 LLC       B-R2  56844XBJ7   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 3 Ltd.      B-R2  56845AAW8   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 3 Ltd.      D-R2  56845ABA5   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)

  Signal Peak
  CLO 3 Ltd.      C-R2  56845AAY4   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Trinitas
  CLO V Ltd.      D-R   89641AAU9   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)

  Trinitas
  CLO V Ltd.      C-RR  89641AAY1   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Venture XXI
  CLO Ltd.        E     92330LAA9   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

  Venture XXI
  CLO Ltd.        D-R   92330MAS8   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Venture XXI
  CLO Ltd.        C-R   92330MAQ2   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  Wind River
  2013-1
  CLO Ltd.        D-R   87244FAG4   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  Wind River
  2013-1
  CLO Ltd.      A-2RR   97316FAC5   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

  ZAIS CLO
  8 Ltd.          E     98885HAA4   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

  ZAIS CLO
  8 Ltd.          B     98885GAC2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., USA.
Randy Antoni, Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante,
Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Psyche A. Castillon,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***