

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHRISTOPHER M. ROBERTS and
THOMAS P. FISCHER,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

No. 1:16-cv-02107

THE FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY, in its capacity as Conservator of the
Federal National Mortgage Association and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
MELVIN L. WATT, in his official capacity as
Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, and JACOB J. LEW, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury,

Defendants.

**PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION

Plaintiffs Christopher M. Roberts and Thomas P. Fischer, by and through their
undersigned counsel, hereby allege as follows:

**I.
INTRODUCTION**

1. In August 2012, at a time when the housing market was recovering from the financial crisis and the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (respectively, “Fannie” and “Freddie,” and, together, the “Companies”) had returned to stable profitability, the federal government took for itself the entire value of the rights held by Plaintiffs and Fannie’s and Freddie’s other private shareholders by forcing these private, shareholder-owned Companies to turn over all of their profits to the federal government on a quarterly basis forever—an action the government called the “Net Worth Sweep” and that

effectively expropriates private shareholders' interest in the Companies. The Net Worth Sweep also reaffirmed and exacerbated the effect of prior policy decisions that contravene the government's statutory authorities to the detriment of Fannie's and Freddie's private shareholders. Plaintiffs bring this action to put a stop to the federal government's naked, unauthorized, and ongoing expropriation of private property and contractual rights.

2. Fannie and Freddie are two of the largest privately owned *insurance* companies in the world. They are *not* banks. Unlike the big banks, Fannie and Freddie did not commit any consumer fraud in the run-up to the financial crisis. The Companies do not originate mortgages and they do not deal directly with individual homeowners. Instead, Fannie and Freddie *insure* trillions of dollars of mortgages and provide essential liquidity to America's residential mortgage market. The Companies have helped tens of millions of American families buy, rent, or refinance a home even during the toughest economic times when banks and other lenders shun mortgage risk. Fannie and Freddie operate for profit, and their debt and equity securities are privately owned and publicly traded. The Companies' shareholders include community banks, charitable foundations, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and countless individuals, including Plaintiffs.

3. During the 2008 financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie helped *save* America's home mortgage system and resuscitated our national economy by continuing to provide liquidity when credit and insurance markets froze solid. Among other things, federal regulators encouraged the Companies to initiate massive purchases of home mortgages and mortgage bonds to stem declines in those markets and alleviate pressures on the balance sheets of private firms, particularly overburdened banks. Throughout the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were capable of meeting all of their obligations to insureds and creditors and were capable of

absorbing any losses that they might reasonably incur as a result of the downturn in the financial markets. As mortgage insurers, Fannie and Freddie are designed to generate ample cash to cover their operating expenses—and indeed this was the case for the Companies throughout the financial crisis. In contrast to other market participants, the Companies took a relatively conservative approach to investing in mortgages during the national run up in home prices from 2004 to 2007. As a result, the Companies (i) experienced substantially lower mark-to-market credit losses during the financial crisis than other mortgage insurers, (ii) were never in financial distress, and (iii) remained in a comparatively strong financial condition. Indeed, the Companies’ ability to pay any outstanding claims—a fundamental principle for all insurers—was never in doubt. Despite the Companies’ relative financial health, the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) implemented a deliberate strategy to seize the Companies and operate them for the exclusive benefit of the federal government.

4. At Treasury’s urging, in July 2008, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”). HERA created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA,” and collectively with Treasury, the “Agencies”) to replace Fannie’s and Freddie’s prior regulator and authorized FHFA to appoint itself as conservator or receiver of the Companies in certain statutorily specified circumstances. As conservator, HERA charges FHFA to rehabilitate Fannie and Freddie by taking action to put the Companies in a *sound* and *solvent* condition while *preserving* and *conserving* their assets. Only as receiver does HERA authorize FHFA to wind up the affairs of Fannie and Freddie and liquidate them. HERA’s distinctions between the authorities granted to conservators and receivers are consistent with longstanding laws and practices of financial regulation.

5. HERA also granted Treasury temporary authority to invest in the Companies' stock until December 31, 2009. Congress made clear that in exercising this authority Treasury was required to consider the "need to maintain [Fannie's and Freddie's] status as . . . private shareholder-owned compan[ies]."

6. These limitations on FHFA's and Treasury's authority make clear that Congress did not intend for the Agencies to operate Fannie and Freddie in perpetuity, and certainly not for the exclusive financial benefit of the federal government.

7. On September 6, 2008—despite prior public statements assuring investors that the Companies were in sound financial shape—FHFA, at Treasury's urging, abruptly forced Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. Former Secretary Paulson has made clear that Treasury was the driving force behind the imposition of conservatorship: "FHFA had been balky all along. . . . We had to convince its people that [conservatorship] was the right thing to do, while making sure to let them feel they were still in charge." Ultimately, however, Treasury was in charge, as demonstrated by Secretary Paulson's claim that "seizing control" of Fannie and Freddie was an action "I took."

8. Under HERA, and as FHFA confirmed in its public statements beginning in September 2008, conservatorship is necessarily temporary, and FHFA must conduct the conservatorships with the objective of returning the Companies to normal business operations. At the time, neither of the Companies was experiencing a liquidity crisis, nor did they suffer from a short-term fall in operating revenue. Moreover, the Companies had access to separate credit facilities at the Federal Reserve and at the Treasury, and the Companies held hundreds of billions of dollars in unencumbered assets that could be pledged as collateral if necessary. Nevertheless, Treasury instead coerced the Companies into conservatorship to further the

government's unspoken policy objectives. Indeed, a receivership that sold all of the Companies' assets and liabilities would have had more economic value to the private shareholders than the conservatorship as it was structured and operated in practice. And in any event, Treasury had definitively concluded that the Companies would not be placed into receivership at that time.

9. Immediately after the Companies were forced into conservatorship, Treasury exercised its temporary authority under HERA to enter into agreements with FHFA to purchase securities of Fannie and Freddie ("Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements," "Purchase Agreements," or "PSPAs") in lieu of permitting the Companies to access the available credit facilities. Under these PSPAs, Treasury designed an entirely new class of securities in the Companies, known as Senior Preferred Stock ("Government Stock"), which came with very favorable terms. Treasury received \$1 billion of Government Stock (via one million shares) in each Company and warrants to acquire 79.9% of the common stock of the Companies at a nominal price in return for its commitment to acquire Government Stock in the future.

10. The PSPAs served a function similar to the credit facilities described above, but carried much more punitive terms. If Treasury acquired additional Government Stock, such purchases would not add to the one million shares held by Treasury, but would instead increase the liquidation preference of Treasury's stock—the economic equivalent of purchases of stock. The purpose and effect of this arrangement was to attempt to evade the sunset of Treasury's purchase authority in December 2009. Indeed, Secretary Paulson has admitted that the particular design of the PSPAs "turned [Treasury's] temporary authority to invest in Fannie and Freddie" into something quite different: "what effectively was a permanent guarantee on all their debt." HENRY M. PAULSON, ON THE BRINK 10–11 (2d ed. 2013).

11. The Government Stock entitled Treasury to collect dividends at an annualized rate of 10% if paid in cash or 12% if paid in kind. The Government Stock was entitled to receive cash dividends from the Companies only to the extent declared by the Board of Directors “in its sole discretion, from funds legally available therefor.” If the Companies did not wish to—or legally could not—pay a cash dividend, the unpaid dividends on the Government Stock could be capitalized (or paid “in kind”) by increasing the liquidation preference of the outstanding Government Stock—an option Treasury publicly enunciated in the fact sheet it released upon entering into the PSPAs. Therefore, the Companies were *never* required to pay cash dividends on Government Stock. There was *never* any threat that the Companies would become insolvent by virtue of making cash dividend payments, both because dividends could be paid with stock and because state law (which the Companies are subject to) prohibits the payment of dividends that would render a company insolvent. Indeed, authorizing the payment of cash dividends contravenes FHFA’s obligations as conservator. As FHFA has emphasized, “allowing capital distributions to deplete the entity’s conservatorship assets would be inconsistent with the agency’s statutory goals, as they would result in removing capital at a time when the Conservator is charged with rehabilitating the regulated entity.” Conservatorship and Receivership, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,724, 35,727 (June 20, 2011). Unlike most preferred stock that imposes temporal limits on a company’s ability to exercise a payment-in-kind option, the PSPAs specifically allowed the Companies to utilize this mechanism throughout the life of the agreement, thereby foreclosing any possibility that they would exhaust Treasury’s funding commitment because of a need to make a dividend payment to Treasury.

12. The PSPAs also granted Treasury substantial control over FHFA’s operation of Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship. Without Treasury’s consent, the PSPAs prohibited

Fannie and Freddie from (i) issuing new equity securities; (ii) paying dividends to any stockholders other than Treasury; (iii) selling, conveying, or transferring assets outside the ordinary course of business; (iv) incurring indebtedness above a specified level; (v) making certain fundamental changes to their business; or (vi) engaging in certain transactions with affiliates. Indeed, the PSPAs even purported to prohibit FHFA from terminating the conservatorships that *it* alone is charged with administering other than in connection with placing Fannie and Freddie in receivership.

13. The Government Stock diluted, but did not eliminate, the economic interests of the Companies' private shareholders. The warrants to purchase 79.9% of the Companies' common stock gave Treasury "upside" via economic participation in the Companies' profitability, but this upside would be *shared* with private preferred shareholders (who retained priority over common shareholders) and private common shareholders (who retained rights to 20.1% of the Companies' residual value). James Lockhart, the Director of FHFA, accordingly assured Congress shortly after imposition of the conservatorship that Fannie's and Freddie's "shareholders are still in place; both the preferred and common shareholders have an economic interest in the companies" and that "going forward there may be some value" in that interest.

14. Under FHFA's supervision—and, on information and belief, at the insistence and direction of Treasury—the Companies were forced to excessively write down the value of their assets, primarily due to FHFA's wildly pessimistic assumptions about potential future losses over many years. Despite the Companies' concerns, FHFA flagrantly disregarded standard insurance company accounting principles and caused the Companies to incur substantial non-cash accounting losses in the form of gargantuan loan loss provisions. To be clear, tens of billions of dollars of these provisions—processed immediately by the Companies as expenses—

were completely unnecessary since the potential loan losses never materialized into actual losses. Nonetheless, by June 2012, the Agencies had forced Fannie and Freddie to issue \$161 billion in Government Stock to make up for the balance-sheet deficits caused by the Agencies' unrealistic and overly pessimistic accounting decisions, even though there was no indication that the Companies' actual cash expenses could not be met by their cash receipts. The Companies were further forced to issue an additional \$26 billion of Government Stock so that Fannie and Freddie would be able to pay *cash* dividends to Treasury even though, as explained above, the Companies were never required to pay cash dividends. Finally, because (i) the Companies were forced to issue Government Stock to Treasury that they did not need to continue operations and (ii) the structure of Treasury's financial support did not permit the Companies to repay and redeem the Government Stock outstanding, the amount of the dividends owed on the Government Stock was artificially—and permanently—inflated.

15. As a result of these transactions, Treasury amassed a total of \$189 billion in Government Stock. But based on the Companies' performance in the second quarter of 2012, it was apparent that there was still value in the Companies' private shares. By that time, the Companies were thriving and could easily pay 10% annualized cash dividends on the Government Stock without drawing additional capital from Treasury. And based on the improving housing market and the high quality of the newer loans backed by the Companies, it was apparent that they had returned to stable profitability. The Agencies knew that this return to profitability was inevitable because the Companies were on the verge of reversing many of the unnecessary non-cash accounting losses they had incurred under FHFA's supervision, and the Agencies understood that reversal of those paper losses would result in massive profits. Given the broad-based recovery in the housing industry that had occurred by the middle of 2012 and

specific information about the Companies that the Agencies considered, it is clear that the Agencies fully understood that the Companies would be generating huge profits, far in excess of the dividends owed on the Government Stock.

16. Treasury, however, was not content to share the value of the Companies with private shareholders and was committed to ensuring that the Companies were operated for the exclusive benefit of the federal government. Indeed, unbeknownst to the public, Treasury had secretly resolved “to ensure existing common equity holders will not have access to any positive earnings from the [Companies] in the future.” By the middle of 2012, however, it was apparent that even the large amount of Government Stock outstanding—the proverbial “concrete life preserver”—would not achieve this unlawful policy goal for Treasury.

17. Therefore, on August 17, 2012, just days after the Companies announced their record-breaking quarterly earnings, the Agencies unilaterally imposed the Net Worth Sweep to expropriate for the federal government the value of Fannie and Freddie shares held by private investors. Treasury itself said that the Net Worth Sweep was intended to ensure that “every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will benefit taxpayers.” With the stroke of a pen, the Agencies had nationalized the Companies and taken all the value of the Companies for Treasury, thereby depriving the private shareholders of all their economic rights, well in excess of the authority granted to the FHFA as conservator. Indeed, under the Net Worth Sweep private shareholders are guaranteed never to receive any return *of* their investments or any return *on* their investments (i.e., in the form of dividends). The Companies received no incremental investment by Treasury or other meaningful consideration in return for the Net Worth Sweep, which restricts them to a small and diminishing maximum capital level above which any profits they generate must be paid over to Treasury. All of this was in blatant violation

of “the path laid out under HERA,” which, as even Treasury acknowledged internally, was for Fannie and Freddie to “becom[e] adequately capitalized” and “exit conservatorship as private companies.”

18. The Net Worth Sweep has resulted in a massive and unprecedented financial windfall for the federal government. From the fourth quarter of 2012, the first fiscal quarter subject to the Net Worth Sweep, through the fourth quarter of 2015, the most recently disclosed fiscal quarter, Fannie and Freddie generated over \$184 billion in net income. But rather than using those profits to prudently build capital reserves and prepare to exit conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie instead have been forced to pay over \$190 billion in “dividends” to the federal government under the Net Worth Sweep (funded by that net income and draining prior retained earnings)—nearly \$129 billion more than the government would have received under the original PSPAs. Adding Net Worth Sweep dividends to the dividends Fannie and Freddie had already paid, Treasury has now recouped a total of \$245 billion—which is \$58 billion *more* than it invested in the Companies. Yet, according to Treasury, the amount of outstanding Government Stock remains firmly fixed at \$189 billion, and Treasury continues to insist that it has the right to all of Fannie’s and Freddie’s future earnings *in perpetuity*. At the time of the Net Worth Sweep, the Agencies knew that it would result in a massive financial windfall.

19. The timing of the Net Worth Sweep, which was announced just as the Companies began to generate substantial and sustained profits, shows that it was imposed on the Companies to expropriate private shareholders’ investments and to guarantee that the Companies would not be able to rebuild capital and emerge from conservatorship. Nevertheless, Treasury and FHFA have maintained publicly and in other litigation that they adopted the Net Worth Sweep to avert a “death spiral” in which the Companies would have otherwise exhausted Treasury’s available

funding commitment by drawing on Treasury funds to pay dividends on Treasury's senior preferred stock. This explanation makes no sense not only in light of the Net Worth Sweep's timing but also because the Companies had no obligation to declare and pay cash dividends on Treasury's senior preferred stock in the first place. To the contrary, the Companies' agreements with Treasury expressly gave the Companies the option to pay Treasury its dividends "in kind" with additional preferred stock.

20. Far from worry that the Companies would not earn enough to pay dividends on Treasury's senior preferred stock, the concern that prompted the Agencies to impose the Net Worth Sweep was that the Companies would soon become *too profitable* and that as a result they could rebuild their capital, emerge from conservatorship, and provide a return on private shareholders' investments. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21. Further supporting that [REDACTED] explanation for the Net Worth Sweep is evidence relating to a meeting that occurred on August 9, 2012, between senior Treasury officials, including Under Secretary Mary Miller, and Fannie's senior management. At

the August 9 meeting, Treasury was given specific information about Fannie's deferred tax assets: Fannie CFO Susan McFarland told Under Secretary Miller that release of the valuation allowance on her company's deferred tax assets likely would happen in mid-2013 and that it likely would generate profits in the range of \$50 billion—a prediction that proved to be correct.

[REDACTED]

22. Treasury's knowledge of Fannie's expectations for its deferred tax assets wholly discredits the declaration FHFA submitted in another district court asserting that "neither the Conservator nor Treasury envisioned at the time of the Third Amendment that Fannie Mae's valuation allowance on its deferred tax assets would be reversed in early 2013, resulting in a sudden and substantial increase in Fannie Mae's net worth, which was paid to Treasury in mid-2013 by virtue of the net worth dividend." That declaration was signed by Mario Ugoletti, who participated in the creation and implementation of the PSPAs while at Treasury, later moved to FHFA, and at the time of the Net Worth Sweep served as the principal liaison with Treasury concerning the PSPAs. But when deposed, Mr. Ugoletti expressly disclaimed any knowledge of Treasury's understanding of the deferred tax asset issue, and he also denied knowing what anyone else at FHFA thought about the issue.

23. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. The Net Worth Sweep was announced just eight days after Treasury's meeting with Fannie [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25. The Net Worth Sweep blatantly transgresses the limits Congress placed on FHFA's and Treasury's authority. As conservator of Fannie and Freddie, FHFA is charged with rehabilitating the Companies with a view to returning them to private control. The Net Worth Sweep guarantees that this can *never* be accomplished. Indeed, contrary to its statutory requirements and statements that it made when the conservatorship was initiated, FHFA has now indicated that it will operate Fannie and Freddie for the exclusive benefit of the government until Congress passes housing finance legislation. Yet holding the Companies hostage in a perpetual conservatorship while awaiting *potential* legislative action was never an option for FHFA contemplated under HERA. And Treasury's decision to exchange its existing equity stake in the

Companies for a new and different equity stake granted to it by the Net Worth Sweep years *after* its temporary authority to acquire the Companies' stock had expired is a direct affront to HERA's plain requirements. What is more, on information and belief Treasury compelled FHFA to agree to the Net Worth Sweep despite Congress's express direction that FHFA exercise its conservatorship authority independently.

26. By entering the Net Worth Sweep, FHFA violated HERA in at least six ways. First, FHFA failed to act as a "conservator"—indeed it has acted as an anti-conservator—because no conservator is allowed to brazenly confiscate billions of dollars from companies under its care and then funnel all that cash to a sister federal agency. Second, FHFA is required to put Fannie and Freddie in a *sound* and *solvent* condition, but the Net Worth Sweep perversely pushes the Companies to the edge of insolvency by stripping the capital out of the Companies on a quarterly basis. Third, FHFA is required to *preserve* and *conserve* Fannie's and Freddie's assets, but the Net Worth Sweep requires the dissipation of assets by forcing the Companies to pay their net worth to Treasury every three months. Fourth, FHFA is charged with rehabilitating Fannie and Freddie and seeking to return them to private control, but the Net Worth Sweep makes any such outcome impossible. Fifth, FHFA as conservator cannot be subject to the direction and supervision of any other government agency, but, on information and belief, FHFA entered the Net Worth Sweep at the direction and supervision of Treasury. Finally, in entering the Net Worth Sweep, FHFA also violated HERA by reaffirming the unlawful policies of making cash dividend payments during conservatorship, ceding control over Fannie and Freddie and the conservatorships to Treasury, and prohibiting Fannie and Freddie from repaying the principal of Treasury's Government Stock.

27. FHFA's duties as conservator are similar to those of a physician—to heal, rehabilitate, and always act with a view to what is best for those in its care. FHFA chose instead to slowly poison its patients; first by ordering the Companies to make accounting decisions that gratuitously ran up their dividend obligations to Treasury and later by compelling the Companies to simply turn over all of their profits to Treasury in perpetuity. These are not the actions of a conservator.

28. Treasury's violation of HERA is straightforward: the Net Worth Sweep, by changing the fundamental economic characteristics of Treasury's investment, created new securities, and HERA explicitly prohibited Treasury from acquiring Fannie and Freddie securities in 2012. Indeed, the fundamental nature of the change wrought by the Net Worth Sweep is underscored by the fact that Treasury's securities now violate state law, as state law does not contemplate the existence of "preferred" stock entitled to participate without limit in a company's earnings to the exclusion of all other stock. Furthermore, the continued existence of Treasury's commitment itself violates HERA, because Treasury's authority to invest in the Companies has expired. Even if the Net Worth Sweep did not contradict HERA's time limit on Treasury's investment authority, Treasury nonetheless acted unlawfully by imposing it in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

29. This Court must set aside the Net Worth Sweep and other aspects of the PSPAs and Treasury's securities that violate HERA and restore to Plaintiffs the property rights the federal government has unlawfully expropriated for itself.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

30. This action arises under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706, and/or HERA, PUB. L. NO. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C.

§§ 1455, 1719, 4617). The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court is authorized to issue the relief sought pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, and 706.

31. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C) because this is an action against officers and agencies of the United States, a plaintiff resides in this judicial district, and no real property is involved in the action.

III. PARTIES

32. Plaintiff Christopher M. Roberts is a citizen of the United States and a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois. Mr. Roberts resides in Cook County, Illinois.

33. Plaintiff Thomas P. Fischer is a citizen of the United States and a resident and citizen of the State of Indiana.

34. Defendant FHFA is, and was at all relevant times, an independent agency of the United States Government subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). FHFA was created on July 30, 2008, pursuant to HERA. FHFA is located at Constitution Center, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20024.

35. Defendant Melvin L. Watt is the Director of FHFA. His official address is Constitution Center, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20024. He is being sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, Director Watt has overall responsibility for the operation and management of FHFA. Director Watt, in his official capacity, is therefore responsible for the conduct of FHFA that is the subject of this Complaint and for the related acts and omissions alleged herein.

36. Defendant Department of the Treasury is, and was at all times relevant hereto, an executive agency of the United States Government subject to the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). Treasury is located at 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220.

37. Defendant Jacob J. Lew is the Secretary of the Treasury. His official address is 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220. He is being sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, Secretary Lew has overall responsibility for the operation and management of Treasury. Secretary Lew, in his official capacity, is therefore responsible for the conduct of Treasury that is the subject of this Complaint and for the related acts and omissions alleged herein.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Fannie and Freddie

38. Fannie is a for-profit, stockholder-owned corporation organized and existing under the Federal National Mortgage Act. Freddie is a for-profit, stockholder-owned corporation organized and existing under the Federal Home Loan Corporation Act. The Companies' business includes purchasing and guaranteeing mortgages originated by private banks and bundling the mortgages into mortgage-related securities that can be sold to investors.

39. Fannie and Freddie are owned by private shareholders and their securities are publicly traded. Fannie was chartered by Congress in 1938 and originally operated as an agency of the Federal Government. In 1968, Congress reorganized Fannie into a for-profit corporation owned by private shareholders. Freddie was established by Congress in 1970 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. In 1989, Congress reorganized Freddie into a for-profit corporation owned by private shareholders.

40. Before being forced into conservatorship, both Fannie and Freddie had issued common stock and several series of preferred stock. The several series of preferred stock of the Companies are in parity with each other with respect to their claims on income (i.e., dividend payments) and claims on assets (i.e., liquidation preference or redemption price), but they have

priority over the Companies' common stock for these purposes. The holders of common stock are entitled to the residual economic value of the firms. Plaintiff Fischer owns both Fannie and Freddie common stock, and he has continually owned Fannie and Freddie common stock since 2008. Plaintiff Roberts owns both Fannie and Freddie preferred stock. He first invested in Fannie and Freddie equity securities in June 2008.

41. Prior to 2007, Fannie and Freddie were consistently profitable. In fact, Fannie had not reported a full-year loss since 1985, and Freddie had never reported a full-year loss since becoming owned by private shareholders. In addition, both Companies regularly declared and paid dividends on their preferred and common stock.

Fannie and Freddie Are Forced into Conservatorship

42. The Companies were well-positioned to weather the decline in home prices and financial turmoil of 2007 and 2008. While banks and other financial institutions involved in the mortgage markets had heavily invested in increasingly risky mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie had taken a more conservative approach that meant that the mortgages that they insured (primarily 30-year fixed rate conforming mortgages) were far safer than those insured by the nation's largest banks. And although both Companies recorded losses in 2007 and the first two quarters of 2008—losses that largely reflected a temporary decline in the market value of their holdings caused by declining home prices—both Companies continued to generate enough cash to easily pay their debts and retained billions of dollars of capital that could be used to cover any future losses. Neither Company was in danger of insolvency. Indeed, during the summer of 2008, both Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Office of Federal Housing and Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) Director James Lockhart publicly stated that Fannie and Freddie were financially healthy. For example, on July 8, 2008,

Director Lockhart told CNBC that “both of these companies are adequately capitalized, which is our highest criteria.” Two days later, on July 10, Secretary Paulson testified to the House Committee on Financial Services that Fannie’s and Freddie’s “regulator has made clear that they are adequately capitalized.” And on July 13, Director Lockhart issued a statement emphasizing that “the Enterprises \$95 billion in total capital, their substantial cash and liquidity portfolios, and their experienced management serve as strong supports for the Enterprises’ continued operations.”

43. The Companies’ sound financial condition in the weeks leading up to imposition of the conservatorships is further illustrated by the decision by Fannie’s Board of Directors to declare dividends on both Fannie’s preferred and common stock in August 2008 and by FHFA’s subsequent decision as conservator to direct Fannie to pay those dividends out of cash available for distribution. It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a company may not declare dividends when it is insolvent, and dividends that a company improperly declares when insolvent may not be lawfully paid. Fannie’s Board thus could not have lawfully declared dividends in August 2008 unless the Company was solvent at that time, and the Board’s decision to declare those dividends showed its confidence that Fannie was financially healthy. Furthermore, it is evident that both FHFA and Treasury agreed that Fannie was solvent when it declared dividends in August 2008 because, rather than halting or voiding the dividends that the outgoing Fannie Board had declared, both agencies publicly took the position that Fannie was legally obligated to pay them even *after* conservatorship was imposed in early September 2008.

44. Despite (or perhaps because of) the Companies’ comparatively strong financial position amidst the crisis, Treasury initiated a long-term policy of seeking to seize control of Fannie and Freddie and operate them for the exclusive benefit of the federal government. To that

end, during the summer of 2008, Treasury officials promoted short-selling of the Companies' stock by leaking word to the press that Treasury might seek to place the Companies into conservatorship. On July 21, 2008, Treasury Secretary Paulson personally delivered a similar message to a select group of investment managers during a private meeting at Eton Park Capital Management. Although at odds with Treasury's on-the-record statements to the press, the leaks and tips had the intended effect of manipulating the market prices of the Companies' securities—driving down the Companies' stock prices and creating a misperception among investors that the Companies were in financial distress.

45. Also during the summer of 2008, Treasury pressed Congress to pass what became the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”). HERA created FHFA (which succeeded to the regulatory authority over Fannie and Freddie previously held by OFHEO) and authorized FHFA, under certain statutorily prescribed and circumscribed conditions, to place the Companies into either conservatorship or receivership.

46. In authorizing FHFA to act as conservator under specified circumstances, Congress took FHFA's conservatorship mission verbatim from the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), *see* 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D), which itself incorporated a long history of financial supervision and rehabilitation of troubled entities under common law. HERA and the FDIA, as well as the common law concept on which both statutes draw, treat conservatorship as a process designed to stabilize a troubled institution with the objective of returning it to normal business operations. Like any conservator, when FHFA acts as a conservator under HERA it has a fiduciary duty to safeguard the interests of the Companies and *all* their shareholders.

47. According to HERA, FHFA “may, as conservator, take such action as may be—
(i) necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition, and (ii) appropriate to

carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D).

48. FHFA’s powers and duties as conservator must be read in harmony with its regulatory duties, one of the most important of which is “to ensure that [the Companies] operate[] in a safe and sound manner, *including maintenance of adequate capital*.” 12 U.S.C. 4513(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, whether acting as conservator or regulator, FHFA is obligated to seek to ensure that the Companies are in a sound financial condition, and soundness includes maintaining adequate capital.

49. Consistent with HERA’s statutory mandates, FHFA has repeatedly acknowledged that “[t]he purpose of conservatorship is to preserve and conserve each company’s assets and property and to put the companies in a sound and solvent condition” and “[t]o fulfill the statutory mandate of conservator, FHFA must follow governance and risk management practices associated with private-sector disciplines.” FHFA, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2009 at i, 99 (May 25, 2010); *see also* FHFA 2009 Annual Report to Congress at 99 (May 25, 2010), <http://goo.gl/DqVE2w> (“The statutory role of FHFA as conservator requires FHFA to take actions to preserve and conserve the assets of the Enterprises and restore them to safety and soundness.”); FHFA Strategic Plan at 7 (Feb. 21, 2012), <http://goo.gl/kket7D> (acknowledging HERA’s “ ‘preserve and conserve’ mandate”). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

50. Under HERA, conservatorship is a status distinct from receivership, with very different purposes, responsibilities, and restrictions. When acting as a receiver, but *not* when acting as a conservator, FHFA is authorized and obliged to “place the regulated entity in liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of the regulated entity.” *Id.* § 4617(b)(2)(E).

The only “post-conservatorship outcome[] . . . that FHFA may implement today under existing law,” by contrast, “is to reconstitute [Fannie and Freddie] under their current charters.” Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA, to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and to the House Committee on Financial Services 7 (Feb. 2, 2010). In other words, receivership is aimed at winding down a company’s affairs and liquidating its assets, while conservatorship aims to rehabilitate it and return it to normal operation. This distinction between the purposes and authorities of a receiver and a conservator is a well-established tenet of financial regulation and common law. In our Nation’s history, there has *never* been an example of a regulator forcing a healthy, profitable company to remain captive in a perpetual conservatorship (in this instance, for over seven years) while facilitating the looting and plundering of the company’s assets by another federal agency *and* simultaneously avoiding the organized claims process of a receivership.

51. In promulgating regulations governing its operations as conservator versus receiver of the Companies, FHFA specifically acknowledged the distinctions in its statutory responsibilities as conservator and as receiver: “A conservator’s goal is to continue the operations of a regulated entity, rehabilitate it and return it to a safe, sound and solvent condition.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 35,730. In contrast, when FHFA acts as a receiver, the regulation specifically provides that “[t]he Agency, as receiver, *shall* place the regulated entity in liquidation” 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(b) (emphasis added). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

52. On September 6, 2008, FHFA—at the instruction of Treasury—directed the Companies’ boards to consent to conservatorship. Given that the Companies were not in financial distress and were in no danger of defaulting on their debts, the Companies’ directors were given a Hobson’s choice: face intense scrutiny from federal agencies for rejecting conservatorship or submit to the demands of Treasury and FHFA. The Agencies ultimately obtained the Companies’ consent by threatening to seize them if they did not acquiesce and by informing them that the Agencies had already selected new CEOs and had teams ready to move in and take control.

53. In publicly announcing the conservatorship, FHFA committed itself to operate Fannie and Freddie as a fiduciary until they are stabilized. As FHFA acknowledged, the Companies’ stock remains outstanding during conservatorship and “continue[s] to trade,” *FHFA Fact Sheet, Questions and Answers on Conservatorship* 3, and Fannie’s and Freddie’s stockholders “continue to retain all rights in the stock’s financial worth,” *id.* Director Lockhart testified before Congress that Fannie’s and Freddie’s “shareholders are still in place; both the preferred and common shareholders have an economic interest in the companies” and that “going forward there may be some value” in that interest. Sept. 25, 2008, Hearing, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Servs, H.R. Hrg. 110-142 at 29-30, 34.

54. FHFA also emphasized that the conservatorship was temporary: “Upon the Director’s determination that the Conservator’s plan to restore the [Companies] to a safe and solvent condition has been completed successfully, the Director will issue an order terminating the conservatorship.” *FHFA Fact Sheet, Questions and Answers on Conservatorship* 2. Investors

were entitled to rely on these official statements of the purposes of the conservatorship, and public trading in Fannie's and Freddie's stock was permitted to, and did, continue.

55. In short, the Companies were not in financial distress when they were forced into conservatorship. The Companies' boards acquiesced to conservatorship based on the understanding that FHFA, like any other conservator, would operate the Companies as a fiduciary with the goal of preserving and conserving their assets and managing them in a safe and solvent manner. And in publicly announcing the conservatorships, FHFA confirmed that the Companies' private shareholders continued to hold an economic interest that would have value, particularly as the Companies generated profits in the future.

FHFA and Treasury Enter into the Purchase Agreements

56. On September 7, 2008, Treasury and FHFA, acting in its capacity as conservator of Fannie and Freddie, entered into the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements.

57. In entering into the Purchase Agreements, Treasury exercised its temporary authority under HERA to purchase securities issued by the Companies. *See* 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l), 1719(g). To exercise that authority, the Secretary of the Treasury ("Secretary") was required to determine that purchasing the Companies' securities was "necessary . . . to provide stability to the financial markets; . . . prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and . . . protect the taxpayer." 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1)(B), 1719(g)(1)(B). In making those determinations, the Secretary was required to consider six factors:

- (i) The need for preferences or priorities regarding payments to the Government.
- (ii) Limits on maturity or disposition of obligations or securities to be purchased.
- (iii) *The [Companies'] plan[s] for the orderly resumption of private market funding or capital market access.*
- (iv) The probability of the [Companies] fulfilling the terms of any such obligation or other security, including repayment.

(v) *The need to maintain the [Companies'] status as . . . private shareholder-owned compan[ies].*

(vi) Restrictions on the use of [the Companies'] resources, including limitations on the payment of dividends and executive compensation and any such other terms and conditions as appropriate for those purposes.

Id. §§ 1455(l)(1)(C), 1719(g)(1)(C) (emphasis added).

58. HERA's legislative history underscores the temporary nature of Treasury's authority to purchase Fannie and Freddie securities. Secretary Paulson testified to Congress that HERA would give "Treasury an 18-month *temporary* authority to purchase—only if necessary—equity in either of these two [Companies]." *Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses to Them: Hearing before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Dev.*, 100th Cong. (2008) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Secretary, Dep't of the Treasury) at 5 (emphasis added). In response to questioning from Senator Shelby, Secretary Paulson reiterated that Treasury's authority to purchase Fannie and Freddie stock was intended to be a "short-term" solution that would expire at "the end of 2009." *Id.* at 11-12.

59. In analyzing HERA, the Congressional Budget Office emphasized that only "before the temporary authority expired" could Treasury "provide funds to the [Companies]." CBO's Estimate of Cost of the Administration's Proposal to Authorize Federal Financial Assistance for the Government-Sponsored Enterprises for Housing at 2-3 (July 22, 2008) *available at* <https://goo.gl/xGZBqp>. "Consequently, if the Treasury purchased equity in Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, that purchase cost would also be recorded on the budget as budget authority and outlays in 2009 or during the first few months of fiscal year 2010, before the temporary financial assistance authority expired." *Id.* at 7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

60. Treasury's authority under HERA to purchase the Companies' securities expired on December 31, 2009. *See* 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(4), 1719(g)(4). After that date, HERA authorized Treasury only "to hold, exercise any rights received in connection with, or sell" previously purchased securities." *Id.* §§ 1455(l)(2)(D), 1719(g)(2)(D).

61. Treasury's PSPAs with Fannie and Freddie are materially identical. Under the original unamended agreements, Treasury committed to provide up to \$100 billion to each Company to ensure that it maintained a positive net worth. In particular, for quarters in which either Company's liabilities exceed its assets under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the PSPAs authorize Fannie and Freddie to draw upon Treasury's commitment in an amount equal to the difference between its liabilities and assets.

62. In return for its funding commitment, Treasury received one million shares of Government Stock in each Company and warrants to purchase 79.9% of the common stock of each Company at a nominal price. Exercising these warrants would entitle Treasury to up to 79.9% of all future profits of the Companies, subject to the Companies' obligation to satisfy their dividend obligations with respect to the preferred stock and to share the remaining 20.1% of those profits with private common shareholders. As Treasury noted in entering the PSPAs, the warrants "provide potential future upside to the taxpayers." Action Memorandum for Secretary Paulson (Sept. 7, 2008).

63. Treasury's Government Stock in each Company had an initial liquidation preference of \$1 billion. This liquidation preference increases by one dollar for each dollar the Companies receive from Treasury pursuant to the PSPAs. In the event the Companies liquidate, Treasury is entitled to recover the full liquidation value of its shares before any other shareholder may recover anything.

64. Upon entering the PSPAs, Treasury did not disburse any funds to the Companies. It is only when Fannie and Freddie draw upon the funding commitment that funds are disbursed, and Treasury's liquidation preference is increased accordingly. Thus, when Treasury disburses funds to Fannie and Freddie under the funding commitment it effectively purchases additional Government Stock. Secretary Paulson has admitted that when Treasury provides money to Fannie and Freddie under the PSPAs, it is "purchasing preferred shares." PAULSON, ON THE BRINK 168. *See also* Action Memorandum for Secretary Paulson (Sept. 7, 2008) ("Treasury's [PSPA] provides for the purchase of up to \$100 billion in [Government Stock] from each [Company] to help ensure that they each maintain a positive net worth."). Indeed, Secretary Paulson has stated that the PSPAs "turned [Treasury's] temporary authority to invest in Fannie and Freddie, which would expire at year-end 2009, into what effectively was a permanent guarantee on all their debt." PAULSON, ON THE BRINK 10–11.

65. In addition to the liquidation preference, the original unamended PSPAs provided for Treasury to receive either a cumulative cash dividend equal to 10% of the value of the outstanding liquidation preference or a stock dividend. If the Companies decided not to pay the dividend in cash, the value of the dividend would be added to the liquidation preference—effectively amounting to an in-kind dividend payment of additional Government Stock. After an in-kind dividend payment, the dividend rate would increase to 12% until such time as full cumulative dividends were paid in cash, at which point the rate would return to 10%. The plain terms of the PSPAs thus make clear that Fannie and Freddie never were required to pay a cash dividend to Treasury but rather had the discretion to pay dividends in kind.

66. Despite the Agencies' arguments to the contrary in related litigation, a large volume of materials from the Agencies and the Companies show that the PSPAs were long

understood to permit the Companies to elect to pay the dividends on Treasury's senior preferred stock in kind rather than in cash. Shortly after announcing the PSPAs, Treasury issued a fact sheet stating that "[t]he senior preferred stock shall accrue dividends at 10% per year. The rate shall increase to 12% if, in any quarter, the dividends are not paid in cash" U.S. TREASURY DEP'T OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: TREASURY SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (Sept. 7, 2008), <https://goo.gl/ieXBex>. And in a June 2012 presentation to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Treasury publicly filed in litigation in another case, Treasury stated that the dividend rate of the PSPAs would be 12% "if elected to be paid in kind." Treasury Presentation to SEC, GSE Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPA), Overview and Key Considerations at 9, June 13, 2012.

67. When asked during his deposition, Jeff Foster, a Treasury official intimately involved in the development of the Net Worth Sweep, could not identify any "problems of the circularity [in dividend payments that] would have remained had the [payment-in-kind] option been adopted." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In an October 2008 email to Mr. Ugoletti, another Treasury official indicated that Treasury's consultant Grant Thornton wanted to know "whether we expect [Fannie and Freddie] to pay the preferred stock dividends in cash or to just accrue the payments." [REDACTED]

68. Mr. Ugoletti subsequently left Treasury and went to work for FHFA. During his May 2015 deposition, he described the "payment-in-kind" option as part of the dividend structure for Treasury's senior preferred stock that existed prior to the Net Worth Sweep. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

69. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

70. Even setting aside the payment in kind option, there was never any risk that payment of dividends would render the Companies insolvent since it would have been illegal under state law for either Company to pay a dividend that would render it insolvent. Furthermore, paying cash dividends during conservatorship violates FHFA's statutory responsibilities to preserve and conserve Fannie's and Freddie's assets and to put them in sound financial condition.

71. An in-kind dividend payment would not decrease Treasury's funding commitment because only when the Companies receive "funding under the Commitment" does its size decrease. Fannie and Freddie Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements ("PSPA") § 1. Thus, as the Congressional Research Service has acknowledged, under the PSPAs' original terms the Companies could "pay a 12% annual senior preferred stock dividend indefinitely." N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34661, FANNIE MAE'S AND

FREDDIE MAC'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS (Aug. 10, 2012). In other words, because of the payment-in-kind option, there was no risk—*none whatsoever*—that the PSPAs would force Fannie and Freddie to exhaust Treasury's funding commitment to facilitate the payment of dividends.

72. Finally, the PSPAs provided for the Companies to pay Treasury a quarterly periodic commitment fee “intended to fully compensate [Treasury] for the support provided by the ongoing Commitment.” PSPA § 3.2(a). Like dividends on Treasury's Senior Preferred Stock, the PSPAs authorize the Companies to pay the periodic commitment fee in cash or in kind. *Id.* § 3.2(c) (“At the election of Seller, the Periodic Commitment Fee may be paid in cash or by adding the amount thereof ratably to the liquidation preference of each outstanding share of Senior Preferred Stock . . .”). The periodic commitment fee was to be set for five-year periods by agreement of the Companies and Treasury, but Treasury had the option to waive it for up to a year at a time. Treasury has exercised this option and has never received a periodic commitment fee under the PSPAs. The PSPAs and the Government Stock Certificates explicitly contemplate that the Companies could pay down the liquidation preference and that when it is paid down “in full, such [Government Stock] shares shall be deemed to have been redeemed.” Certificate §§ 3(c), 4(c). Indeed, the PSPAs were “structure[d]” to “enhance the probability of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ultimately repaying amounts owed.” Action Memorandum for Secretary Paulson (Sept. 7, 2008). Nevertheless, while Treasury's commitment remains outstanding, Fannie and Freddie generally are prohibited from paying down amounts added to the liquidation preference due to draws from Treasury's commitment. *See* Fannie and Freddie Government Stock Certificates § 3(a).

73. The PSPAs prohibit Fannie and Freddie from declaring and paying dividends on any securities junior to Treasury's Government Stock unless full cumulative dividends have been paid to Treasury on its Government Stock for the then-current and all past dividend periods.

74. The PSPAs also grant Treasury substantial control over FHFA's operation of Fannie and Freddie and the conservatorships. In particular, the unamended PSPAs provided as follows:

From the Effective Date until such time as the Senior Preferred Stock shall have been repaid or redeemed in full in accordance with its terms:

5.1. *Restricted Payments.* Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, declare or pay any dividend (preferred or otherwise) or make any other distribution (by reduction of capital or otherwise), whether in cash, property, securities or a combination thereof, with respect to any of Seller's Equity Interests (other than with respect to the Senior Preferred Stock or the Warrant) or directly or indirectly redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise acquire for value any of Seller's Equity Interests (other than the Senior Preferred Stock or the Warrant), or set aside any amount for any such purpose.

5.2. *Issuance of Capital Stock.* Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, sell or issue Equity Interests of Seller or any of its subsidiaries of any kind or nature, in any amount, other than the sale and issuance of the Senior Preferred Stock and Warrant on the Effective Date and the common stock subject to the Warrant upon exercise thereof, and other than as required by (and pursuant to) the terms of any binding agreement as in effect on the date hereof.

5.3. *Conservatorship.* Seller shall not (and Conservator, by its signature below, agrees that it shall not), without the prior written consent of Purchaser, terminate, seek termination of or permit to be terminated the conservatorship of Seller pursuant to Section 1367 of the FHE Act, other than in connection with a receivership pursuant to Section 1367 of the FHE Act.

5.4. *Transfer of Assets.* Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, sell, transfer, lease or otherwise dispose of (in one transaction or a series of related transactions) all or any portion of its assets (including Equity Interests in other persons, including subsidiaries), whether now owned or hereafter acquired (any such sale, transfer, lease or disposition, a "Disposition"), other than Dispositions for fair market value:

(a) to a limited life regulated entity (“LLRE”) pursuant to Section 1367(i) of the FHE Act;

(b) of assets and properties in the ordinary course of business, consistent with past practice;

(c) in connection with a liquidation of Seller by a receiver appointed pursuant to Section 1367(a) of the FHE Act;

(d) of cash or cash equivalents for cash or cash equivalents; or

(e) to the extent necessary to comply with the covenant set forth in Section 5.7 below.

5.5. Indebtedness. Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, incur, assume or otherwise become liable for (a) any indebtedness if, after giving effect to the incurrence thereof, the aggregate Indebtedness of Seller and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis would exceed 110.0% of the aggregate Indebtedness of Seller and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis as of June 30, 2008 or (b) any Indebtedness if such Indebtedness is subordinated by its terms to any other Indebtedness of Seller or the applicable subsidiary. For purposes of this covenant the acquisition of a subsidiary with Indebtedness will be deemed to be the incurrence of such Indebtedness at the time of such acquisition.

5.6. Fundamental Changes. Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, (i) merge into or consolidate or amalgamate with any other Person, or permit any other Person to merge into or consolidate or amalgamate with it, (ii) effect a reorganization or recapitalization involving the common stock of Seller, a reclassification of the common stock of Seller or similar corporate transaction or event or (iii) purchase, lease or otherwise acquire (in one transaction or a series of transactions) all or substantially all of the assets of any other Person or any division, unit or business of any Person.

5.8. Transactions with Affiliates. Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, without the prior written consent of Purchaser, engage in any transaction of any kind or nature with an Affiliate of Seller unless such transaction is (i) Pursuant to this Agreement, the Senior Preferred Stock or the Warrant, (ii) upon terms no less favorable to Seller than would be obtained in a comparable arm’s-length transaction with a Person that is not an Affiliate of Seller or (iii) a transaction undertaken in the ordinary course or pursuant to a

contractual obligation or customary employment arrangement in existence as of the date hereof.

PSPAs at 8–10.

75. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yet nowhere in HERA did Congress grant FHFA the authority to contract away its authority to manage Fannie and Freddie or the conservatorships. Indeed, the statute expressly *forbids* FHFA from doing so when the counterparty is another government agency, as it provides that “[w]hen acting as conservator or receiver, the Agency shall not be subject to the direction or supervision of any other agency of the United States or any State in the exercise of the rights, powers, and privileges of the Agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7).

76. In approving the exercise of Treasury’s temporary authority under HERA to purchase securities of the Companies, Treasury Secretary Paulson determined (1) “[u]nder conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will continue to operate as going concerns”; (2) “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may emerge from conservatorship to resume independent operations”; and (3) “[c]onservatorship preserves the status and claims of the preferred and common shareholders.” Action Memorandum for Secretary Paulson (Sept. 7, 2008).

**Treasury and FHFA Amend the Purchase Agreements
To Increase Treasury’s Funding Commitment**

77. On May 6, 2009, the Agencies amended the terms of the Purchase Agreements to increase Treasury’s funding commitment to both Fannie and Freddie. In particular, under the amendment Treasury’s total commitment to each Company increased from \$100 billion to \$200 billion.

78. Also on May 6, 2009 the Agencies amended Section 5.5 of the PSPAs, relating to indebtedness, to read as follows:

5.5. *Indebtedness.* Seller shall not, and shall not permit any of its subsidiaries to, in each case without the prior written consent of Purchaser, incur, assume or otherwise become liable for (a) any Indebtedness if, after giving effect to the incurrence thereof, the aggregate Indebtedness of Seller and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis would exceed (i) through and including December 30, 2010, 120.0% of the amount of Mortgage Assets Seller is permitted by Section 5.7 to own on December 31, 2009; and (ii) beginning on December 31, 2010, and through and including December 30, 2011, and each year thereafter, 120.0% of the amount of Mortgage Assets Seller is permitted by Section 5.7 to own on December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year, or (b) any Indebtedness if such Indebtedness is subordinated by its terms to any other Indebtedness of Seller or the applicable subsidiary. For purposes of this covenant the acquisition of a subsidiary with indebtedness will be deemed to be the incurrence of such Indebtedness at the time of such acquisition.

Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement at 3 (May 6, 2009).

79. On December 24, 2009—one week before Treasury’s temporary authority under HERA expired—the Agencies again amended the terms of Treasury’s funding commitment. Instead of setting that commitment at a specific dollar amount, the second amendment established a formula to allow Treasury’s total commitment to each Company to exceed (but not fall below) \$200 billion depending upon any deficiencies experienced in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and any surplus existing as of December 31, 2012.

80. Treasury’s authority under HERA then expired on December 31, 2009. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As

Treasury also acknowledged, expiration of this authority meant that its “ability to make further changes to the PSPAs . . . [was] constrained.” Action Memorandum for Secretary Geithner at 3 (Dec. 22, 2009).


**The Agencies Force Accounting Changes to Increase
the Companies' Draws From Treasury**

81. Beginning in the third quarter of 2008—when FHFA took control of the Companies as conservator—the conservator began to make wildly pessimistic and unrealistic assumptions about the Companies' future financial prospects. Those assumptions triggered adjustments to the Companies' balance sheets, most notably write-downs of significant tax assets and the establishment of large loan loss reserves, which caused the Companies to report non-cash losses. Although reflecting nothing more than faulty accounting assumptions about the Companies' future prospects and having no effect on the cash flow the Companies were generating, these non-cash losses temporarily decreased the Companies' reported net worth by hundreds of billions of dollars. For example, in the first year and a half after imposition of the conservatorship, Fannie reported \$127 billion in losses, but only \$16 billion of that amount reflected actual credit-related losses. Upon information and belief, FHFA directed Fannie and Freddie to record these excessive non-cash losses at the insistence of Treasury, which resulted in excessive purchases of Government Stock by Treasury.


82. By the end of 2011, the Companies' reported net worth had fallen by \$100 billion as a result of the decision made shortly after imposition of the conservatorship to write down the value of their deferred tax assets. A deferred tax asset is an asset that may be used to offset future tax liability. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, if a company determines that it is unlikely that some or all of a deferred tax asset will be used, the company must establish a "valuation allowance" in the amount that is unlikely to be used. In other words, a company must write down a deferred tax asset if it is unlikely to be used to offset future taxable profits. Shortly after FHFA took control of the Companies, FHFA made the rather astounding assumption that the Companies would *never again* generate taxable income and that their deferred tax assets

were therefore worthless. That incomprehensibly flawed decision dramatically reduced the Companies' reported net worth.

83. The decision to designate excessive loan loss reserves was another important factor in the artificial decline in the Companies' reported net worth during the early years of conservatorship. Loan loss reserves are an entry on the Companies' balance sheets that reduces their reported net worth to reflect anticipated losses on the mortgages they own. Beginning when FHFA took control of the Companies in the third quarter of 2008 and continuing through 2009, the Companies adopted the practice of designating additional loan loss reserves far in excess of the credit losses they were actually experiencing. The extent to which excess loan loss reserve provisioning reduced the Companies' net worth is dramatically illustrated by the following chart, which compares Fannie's loan loss reserve provisioning to its actual credit losses for 2006 through 2014. As this chart shows, FHFA caused Fannie to make grossly excessive loan loss reserve provisions in 2008 and 2009, thereby allowing it to make far smaller provisions beginning in 2012. It was clear by 2012 that these loan loss provisions were grossly excessive, and reversal of these provisions would inevitably lead to corresponding profits:




84. Despite the fact that the Companies' mortgage portfolios were safer than the similar portfolios held by banks involved in the mortgage business, banks were much more accurate—and, with the consent of their regulators, far less aggressive—in reducing their reported net worth to reflect expected loan losses. The following chart illustrates this fact:



85. To date, the Companies have drawn a total of \$187 billion from Treasury, in large part to fill the holes in the Companies' balance sheets created by these non-cash losses imposed under conservatorship. Including Treasury's initial \$1 billion liquidation preference in each Company, Treasury's liquidation preference for its Government Stock amounts to approximately \$117 billion for Fannie and approximately \$72 billion for Freddie. Approximately \$26 billion of these combined amounts were drawn simply to pay the 10% dividend payments owed to Treasury. (In other words, FHFA requested draws to pay Treasury this \$26 billion in cash that was not otherwise available rather than electing to pay the dividends in kind. Had the dividends been paid in kind, FHFA would not have had to draw from—and, consequently, reduce the remaining size of—Treasury's commitment to pay them.) Thus, Treasury actually disbursed approximately \$161 billion to the Companies, a sum that primarily reflected temporary changes in the valuation estimates of assets and liabilities.

The Companies Return to Profitability and Stability

86. By 2012, the Companies were well-positioned to continue generating profits for the foreseeable future. Fannie's and Freddie's financial results are strongly influenced by home prices. And as FHFA's own Home Price Index shows, the market reached its bottom in 2011:



87. The improving housing market was coupled with stricter underwriting standards at Fannie and Freddie. As a result—and as the Agencies recognized—Fannie- and Freddie-backed loans issued after 2008 had dramatically lower serious delinquency rates than loans issued between 2005 and 2008. The strong quality of these newer loans boded well for Fannie's and Freddie's future financial prospects. Together, the Companies' return to profitability and the stable recovery of the housing market showed in early 2012 that the Companies could in time redeem Treasury's Government Stock and that value remained in their preferred and common stock.

88. The Agencies shared this understanding of the Companies' financial prospects in 2012. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Companies' financial performance and outlook only further improved in the months that followed. [REDACTED]

89. On August 9, 2012—eight days before the Net Worth Sweep was announced—Under Secretary Miller and other senior Treasury officials involved with the Net Worth Sweep met with the senior executives of [REDACTED] Fannie [REDACTED]. During Treasury's meeting with Fannie's management, Treasury was presented with projections showing the Company earning an average of more than \$11 billion per year from 2012 through 2022 and having over \$116 billion left of Treasury's funding commitment at the end of that time period. Those projections, which are reproduced below, show that the most up-to-date information that was before Treasury in August 2012 showed that even if the Companies continued to pay dividends on Treasury's stock in cash, there was no threat to Treasury's funding commitment under the PSPAs:

Annual Detail of Cumulative Dividends and SPSPA Draws

	(In Billions)											
	2008-2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Fannie Mae Comprehensive Income		11.6	7.5	11.0	12.5	13.9	13.2	12.2	11.4	10.9	10.5	10.5
Preferred Dividend Payment	19.8	11.6	11.8	12.1	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.3	12.5
Residual Equity	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8	2.8	2.7	1.9	0.5	0.0	0.0
Cumulative Dividends	19.8	31.4	43.2	55.3	67.6	79.8	92.1	104.3	116.6	128.8	141.1	153.6
Cumulative SPSPA Draws	(116.1)	(116.1)	(119.0)	(121.2)	(121.5)	(121.5)	(121.5)	(121.5)	(121.5)	(121.5)	(122.9)	(124.3)
Cumulative Dividends Less Draws	(96.3)	(84.7)	(75.8)	(65.9)	(53.9)	(41.7)	(29.4)	(17.2)	(4.9)	7.3	18.3	28.8
SPSPA Funding Cap	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9	240.9
Remaining Funding under SPSPA	124.8	124.8	122.0	119.7	119.5	119.5	119.5	119.5	119.5	119.5	118.1	116.1

Note: 2012-2016 figures from Fannie Mae July BOD corporate forecast. 2017-2022 figures are based on simplifying assumptions derived from trends observed within the 2012-2016 horizon.

	(In Billions)											
	2008-2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Freddie Mac Comprehensive Income		11.6	7.5	8.2	8.6	9.0	8.7	8.3	7.7	7.1	6.7	6.5
Preferred Dividend Payment	16.3	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4
Residual Equity	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.7	3.5	5.6	6.9	7.9	8.1	7.9	7.2	6.3
Cumulative Dividends	16.3	23.7	31.1	38.4	45.8	53.2	60.6	68.0	75.4	82.8	90.2	97.6
Cumulative SPSPA Draws	(72.2)	(116.1)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.0)	(73.1)
Cumulative Dividends Less Draws	(55.9)	(92.4)	(41.9)	(34.5)	(27.1)	(19.7)	(12.3)	(4.9)	2.5	9.9	17.3	24.7
SPSPA Funding Cap	220.5	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3	221.3
Remaining Funding under SPSPA	148.3	105.2	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3	148.3

Note: 2012-2022 figures are based on simplifying assumptions derived from Fannie Mae forecast trends and observed relationships between key Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac performance metrics. Reported 2011 results re-aligned as necessary to correspond to Fannie Mae management reporting.

Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding.

7

Confidential Commercial Information - Confidential Treatment and FOIA Exemption Requested



90.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] But by the time that the Net Worth

Sweep was announced in August 2012, it was apparent that those projections were outdated and

drastically underestimated Fannie's and Freddie's earning capacity. [REDACTED]



91. As previously explained, the paper losses Fannie and Freddie reported during the early years of conservatorship were the result of temporary and unrealistic accounting decisions, and the Companies were always able to generate enough revenue to cover their expenses. As the chart below illustrates, the Companies' annual net operating revenue has exceeded their net operating expenses in all but one year. Furthermore, the Companies' losses were never so severe that they would have had a negative net worth absent their excessively pessimistic treatment of deferred tax assets and loan loss reserves:



92. By 2012, Fannie and Freddie began generating consistent profits notwithstanding their overstated loss reserves and the write-down of their deferred tax assets. Fannie has not drawn on Treasury's commitment since the fourth quarter of 2011, and Freddie has not drawn on Treasury's commitment since the first quarter of 2012. In fact, in the first two quarters of 2012, the Companies posted sizable profits totaling more than \$11 billion.

93. As a result of Fannie's and Freddie's return to sustained profitability, it was clear that the overly pessimistic accounting decisions weighing down the Companies' balance sheets would have to be reversed. Indeed, by early August 2012, the Agencies knew that Fannie and Freddie were poised to generate massive profits well in excess of the Companies' dividend obligations to Treasury.

94. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These excess loss reserves artificially depressed the Companies' net worth, and reversing them would cause a corresponding increase in their

reported net worth. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

95. Another key driver of the massive profits that the Agencies anticipated that the Companies would soon generate when they announced the Net Worth Sweep was the release of the Companies' deferred tax assets valuation allowances. Established principles of financial accounting specified that these valuation allowances would have to be released if the Companies concluded that it was more likely than not that they would generate taxable income and therefore be able to use their deferred tax assets. The Treasury Department was intimately familiar with this accounting principle, having made a massive investment in AIG and seen a similar reversal of AIG's deferred tax asset valuation allowance in February 2012. By mid-2012, Fannie and Freddie had combined deferred tax asset valuation allowances of nearly \$100 billion—enough to pay the dividends on Treasury's senior preferred stock for multiple years even if the Companies did not generate any other profits. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

96. By the time the Net Worth Sweep was announced, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

97. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And if Fannie was to use its deferred tax assets, it would inevitably be required under basic principles of financial accounting to release the offsetting valuation allowance. FHFA knew this. Ms. McFarland testified that in July 2012 she would have mentioned the potential release of the valuation allowance at a Fannie executive committee meeting attended by FHFA, and she also testified that FHFA knew about a statement she made to Under Secretary Miller on August 9, 2012 regarding the potential release of the valuation allowance before the Agencies entered the third amendment to the PSPAs on August 17, 2012. Moreover, accountants from FHFA were monitoring the Companies' treatment of their deferred tax assets, and FHFA knew that the Companies' audit committees were assessing the status of the valuation allowances on a quarterly basis.

98. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And hand-written notes on a Grant Thornton document produced by Treasury displaying Freddie's results through the first quarter of 2012 say that Freddie could release its valuation allowance "probably [in] 2013, 2014." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

99. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the August 9 meeting, Fannie CFO Susan McFarland informed Treasury that the criteria for reversing the deferred tax assets valuation allowance could be met in the not-so-distant future. When asked for more specifics by Under Secretary Miller, Ms. McFarland stated that the reversal would be probably in the 50-billion-dollar range and probably sometime mid-2013, an assessment that proved remarkably accurate.

100. Although Mr. Ugoletti stated in a declaration in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that “neither the Conservator nor Treasury envisioned at the time of the Third Amendment that Fannie Mae’s valuation allowance on its deferred tax assets would be reversed in early 2013,” his subsequent deposition testimony shows that he had no basis for making that statement: “I don’t know who else in FHFA or what they knew about the potential for that [i.e., that the deferred tax assets might be written back up in 2013], but . . . our accountants were monitoring this situation, they were monitoring . . . whether to revalue, they had to do it all the time, revalue or not revalue, and I do not recall knowing about that this was going to be an issue until really ’13 when it became imminent that, oh, this has to happen now, and I don’t know what anybody else thought about it.” And when asked whether he knew “what Treasury thought about it,” he answered, “I do not.”

101. In addition to the release of loan loss reserves and deferred tax assets valuation allowances, Fannie and Freddie also had sizeable assets in the form of claims and suits brought by FHFA as conservator relating to securities law violations and fraud in the sale of private-label securities to Fannie and Freddie between 2005 and 2007. In 2013 and 2014, the Companies

recovered over \$18 billion from financial institutions via settlements of such claims and suits. The Companies, FHFA, and Treasury knew in August 2012 that the Companies would reap substantial profits from such settlements.

**FHFA and Treasury Amend the PSPAs
To Expropriate Private Shareholders' Investment**

102. On August 17, 2012, a few days after the Companies had announced their return to profitability and just as it was becoming clear that they had regained the earnings power to redeem Treasury's Government Stock and exit conservatorship, the Agencies unilaterally amended the PSPAs for a third time. Again, at the time that this third amendment was under consideration, the Agencies knew that Fannie and Freddie were experiencing a dramatic turnaround in their profitability and would soon generate massive profits from the reversal of unduly pessimistic accounting decisions that they had previously made at FHFA's direction. Due to rising house prices and reductions in credit losses, in early August 2012 the Companies reported significant income for the second quarter 2012 and neither required a draw from Treasury under the PSPAs. But rather than fulfilling its statutory responsibility as conservator to return the Companies to sound and solvent business operations and, ultimately, to private control, FHFA entered into the Net Worth Sweep with Treasury, which transfers all of the Companies' substantial profits to Treasury, prevents them from ever exiting government control, and deprives private shareholders of any residual value in the Companies.

103. Far from imposing the Net Worth Sweep because the Companies were at risk of depleting Treasury's funding commitment, the Agencies adopted the Net Worth Sweep when they did because they knew that the Companies had returned to sustained profitability. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

104. Notwithstanding their statutory duties, FHFA and Treasury had decided that Fannie and Freddie would *not* be allowed to exit conservatorship in their current form. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

105. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

106. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Pollock, Wallison, and Pinto had written a policy paper for the American Enterprise Institute in 2011 recommending that “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be eliminated as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) over time.” Also on August 17, Mr. Wallison was quoted in Bloomberg saying the following: “The most significant issue here is whether Fannie and Freddie will come back to life because their profits will enable them to re-capitalize themselves and then it will look as though it is feasible for them to return as private companies backed by the government. . . . What the Treasury Department seems to be doing here, and I think it’s a really good idea, is to deprive them of all their capital so that doesn’t happen.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

107. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

108. Mr. Parrott has since left the Administration and is now with the Urban Institute, and he recently told the Economist that “[i]n the aftermath of the crisis there was widespread agreement that [Fannie and Freddie] needed to be replaced or overhauled.” *A Funny Form of Conservation*, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 2015, available at <http://goo.gl/4ieC0u>. The Net Worth Sweep ensured that the Companies’ return to profitability did not threaten this goal.

109. This understanding of the purpose and effect of the Net Worth Sweep is further supported by the deposition testimony of Ms. McFarland. She testified that she believed that the Agencies imposed the Net Worth Sweep in response to what she had told Treasury on August 9, and she thought the Net Worth Sweep’s purpose “was probably a desire not to allow capital to build up within the enterprises and not to allow the enterprises to recapitalize themselves.”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

110. As Treasury stated when the Net Worth Sweep was announced, the dividend sweep of all of the Companies’ net worth requires that “every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be used to benefit taxpayers.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug. 17, 2012). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Net Worth Sweep, in short, effectively nationalized the Companies and confiscated the existing and potential value of all privately held equity interests, including the stock held by Plaintiffs.

111. As a Staff Report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recently acknowledged, the Net Worth Sweep “effectively narrows the difference between conservatorship and nationalization, by transferring essentially all profits and losses from the firms to the Treasury.” W. Scott Frame, et al., *The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac* at 21, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, no. 719 (Mar. 2015). The Economist stated the obvious in reporting that the Net Worth Sweep “squashe[d] hopes that [Fannie and Freddie] may ever be private again” and, as a result, “the companies’ status as public utilities . . . appear[ed] crystal clear.” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, *Back to Black*, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 2012, available at <http://goo.gl/JgUVV6>.

112. As a result of the Net Worth Sweep, it is clear that FHFA will not allow Fannie and Freddie to exit conservatorship but rather will continue to operate them essentially as tools of the government, unless Congress takes action. Indeed, FHFA’s website states that “FHFA will continue to carry out its responsibilities as Conservator” until “Congress determines the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the housing finance market.” FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, <http://goo.gl/ZihFZb>.

113. The Net Worth Sweep fundamentally changed the nature of Treasury’s investment in the Companies. Instead of quarterly dividend payments at an annual rate of 10% (if paid in cash) or 12% (if paid in kind) of the total amount of Treasury’s liquidation preference, the Net Worth Sweep entitles Treasury to quarterly payments of *all—100%*—of the Companies’ existing net worth and future profits. Beginning January 1, 2013, the Companies have been required to pay Treasury a quarterly dividend equal to their *entire net worth*, minus a capital reserve amount that starts at \$3 billion and decreases to \$0 by January 1, 2018.

114. While the Net Worth Sweep fundamentally changed the nature of Treasury's securities, the Net Worth Sweep transaction reaffirmed and enhanced the significance of other unlawful provisions of those securities, such as Treasury's open-ended commitment to invest in the Companies despite the expiration of its investment authority, the prohibition on Fannie and Freddie paying down the principal of Treasury's stock, and the ceding of a substantial amount of FHFA's management of the conservatorships to Treasury.¹

115. Forcing the Companies to operate in this inherently unsafe and unsound condition also increases their borrowing costs, which is a major expense for both Companies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


116. The Net Worth Sweep is particularly egregious because it makes the Companies unique in financial regulation. All other financial institutions are required to retain minimum levels of capital that ensure that they can withstand the vicissitudes of the economic cycle and are prohibited from paying dividends when they are not adequately capitalized. The Companies, in contrast, are not allowed to retain capital but instead must pay their entire net worth over to Treasury as a quarterly dividend. In other words, whereas other financial institutions are subject to *minimum* capital standards, the Net Worth Sweep makes the Companies subject to a capital *maximum*—any amount of retained capital that they hold in excess of a small and diminishing capital buffer is swept to Treasury on a quarterly basis. The effect of the Net Worth Sweep is

¹ The third amendment did alter the restrictions on Fannie and Freddie disposing of assets in one respect, by amending Section 5.4 of the PSPAs to permit the Companies to unilaterally make dispositions for fair market value "of assets and properties having fair market value individually or in aggregate less than \$250,000,000 in one transaction or a series of related transactions."


thus to force the Companies to operate in perpetuity on the brink of insolvency and to immediately nullify the rights of private shareholders to any return *of* their principal or any return *on* their principal (i.e., in the form of dividends). In other contexts, federal regulators understand such an arrangement to be fundamentally unsafe and unsound, if not altogether unlawful. And indeed, HERA itself recognizes that a fundamental aspect of the Companies' soundness is the "maintenance of adequate capital." 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(i). Director Watt recently expressed the same view, describing the Companies' inability to build capital reserves under the Net Worth Sweep as a "serious risk" that erodes investor confidence in the Companies because they have "no ability to weather quarterly losses."

117. This dramatic departure from accepted practices is demonstrated by the following charts, which compare the equity to assets ratio of Fannie and Freddie to that maintained by large banks and insurers:

Capital Strength: Equity to Assets of Fannie and Freddie vs. Large Banks



**Capital Strength: Equity to Assets
of Fannie and Freddie vs. Large Insurers**



118.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Net Worth Sweep, by

contrast, has *reduced* the capital available to Fannie by a much larger amount—nearly \$130 billion, to date.

119. The Net Worth Sweep’s departure from sound and solvent operation has not gone unnoticed by Congress. Representatives Stephen Lee Fincher and Mick Mulvaney recently wrote Secretary Lew and Director Watt to “express [their] concerns about [Fannie] and [Freddie] and the effect that the non-enforcement of statutory capital reserve requirements will have on the risk they pose to taxpayers.” HERA, the Representatives wrote, “specifically tasked the newly-created Federal Housing Finance Agency with establishing and enforcing more stringent capital standards for Fannie and Freddie. Inexplicably, and in violation of that statute, Fannie and Freddie currently hold far less capital than required, and according to Treasury’s [PSPAs], are required to reduce their capital reserves by \$600 million a year until they reach zero on January

1, 2018.” “It is extremely troubling,” the Congressmen continued, that Fannie and Freddie “are being specifically directed to deplete their capital reserves. . . . In a post-Dodd-Frank world, Fannie and Freddie will be the only significant financial institutions not voluntarily or mandatorily raising their capital; instead, they are being told to lower their capital—to zero. This does not make sense.”

120. The Companies did not receive any meaningful consideration for agreeing to the Net Worth Sweep. Because the Companies always had the option to pay dividends “in kind” at a 12% interest rate, the Net Worth Sweep did not provide the Companies with any additional flexibility or benefit. Rather than accruing a dividend at 12% (which never had to be paid in cash), FHFA unlawfully agreed to make a payment of substantially all the Companies’ net worth each quarter.

121. The Third Amendment also provides that the Companies will not have to pay a periodic commitment fee under the PSPAs while the Net Worth Sweep is in effect. But Treasury had consistently waived the periodic commitment fee before the Net Worth Sweep, and it could only set the amount of such a fee with the agreement of the Companies and at a market rate. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] standard industry practice, which is to set such fees as a small percentage of the lender’s financial exposure. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

122. Moreover, the PSPAs say that the purpose of the periodic commitment fee was to compensate Treasury for its ongoing support in the form of the commitment to invest in the Companies' Government Stock. By the time of the Net Worth Sweep, the 10 percent return on the Government Stock and the warrants for 79.9 percent of the common stock provided a more than adequate return on the government's stand-by commitment, and thus any additional fee would have been inappropriate. In August 2012, the Companies had returned to stable profitability and were no longer drawing from Treasury's commitment. Given the Companies' return to profitability, the market rate for the periodic commitment fee in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 would have been zero. And, of course, by the time of the Net Worth Sweep, Treasury's temporary authority to purchase the Companies' securities had already expired, making any further purchases contrary to law. Finally, even if a market-rate fee had been agreed between Treasury and FHFA and imposed pursuant to the PSPAs, the Companies had sufficient market power to pass the entire amount of this fee through to their customers—as the Companies do for other operating and financing costs—without affecting profitability or the value of the Companies' equity securities.

123. For these reasons, Mr. Ugoletti's statement, in his declaration to the District Court for the District of Columbia, that the value of the periodic commitment fee was "incalculably large" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And Mr. Ugoletti subsequently testified that he did not know whether anyone at Treasury or FHFA shared his view that the fee was incalculably large and could not recall

discussing his view with anyone at either agency. Mr. Ugoletti also testified that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

he did not know whether anyone at FHFA or Treasury ever tried to calculate the value of the periodic commitment fee.

124. As the Agencies anticipated, Fannie and Freddie have been extraordinarily profitable since the imposition of the Net Worth Sweep. From the third quarter of 2012 through the fourth quarter of 2015, Fannie and Freddie have reported total net income of over \$116 billion and \$67 billion, respectively.

125. As the Agencies also anticipated, Fannie's 2013 net income included the release of over \$50 billion of the company's deferred tax assets valuation allowance. The release of this valuation allowance underscores Fannie's financial strength, as it demonstrates Fannie's expectation that it will generate sizable taxable income moving forward. Fannie relied on the following evidence of future profitability in support of the release of its valuation allowance:

- Its profitability in 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 and expectations regarding the sustainability of these profits;
- Its three-year cumulative income position as of March 31, 2013;
- The strong credit profile of the loans it had acquired since 2009;
- The significant size of its guaranty book of business and its contractual rights for future revenue from this book of business;
- Its taxable income for 2012 and its expectations regarding the likelihood of future taxable income; and
- That its net operating loss carryforwards will not expire until 2030 through 2031 and its expectation that it would utilize all of these carryforwards within the next few years.

126. Freddie's 2013 earnings also reflect the Company's decision to release a sizeable (in excess of \$20 billion) deferred tax assets valuation allowance. Freddie relied on the following evidence in support of its release of its valuation allowance:

- Its three-year cumulative income position as of September 30, 2013;


- The strong positive trend in its financial performance over the preceding six quarters, including the quarter ended September 30, 2013;
- The 2012 taxable income reported in its federal tax return which was filed in the quarter ended September 30, 2013;
- Its forecasted 2013 and future period taxable income;
- Its net operating loss carryforwards do not begin to expire until 2030; and
- The continuing positive trend in the housing market.

127. The Net Worth Sweep has proven to be immensely profitable for the federal government. The table below lists only the dividends Fannie and Freddie have paid under the Net Worth Sweep, and it does not include dividends paid before that time

**Dividend Payments Under the Net Worth Sweep
(in billions)**

		Fannie	Freddie	Combined
2013	Q1	\$4.2	\$5.8	\$10.0
	Q2	\$59.4	\$7.0	\$66.4
	Q3	\$10.2	\$4.4	\$14.6
	Q4	\$8.6	\$30.4	\$39.0
2014	Q1	\$7.2	\$10.4	\$17.6
	Q2	\$5.7	\$4.5	\$10.2
	Q3	\$3.7	\$1.9	\$5.6
	Q4	\$4.0	\$2.8	\$6.8
2015	Q1	\$1.9	\$0.9	\$2.8
	Q2	\$1.8	\$0.7	\$2.5
	Q3	\$4.4	\$3.9	\$8.3
	Q4	\$2.2	\$0.0	\$2.2
2016	Q1	\$2.9	\$1.7	\$4.6
Total		\$116.2	\$74.4	\$190.6

128. As the above chart shows, the Companies have paid Treasury over \$190 billion in “dividends” under the Net Worth Sweep. Had they instead been paying 10% cash dividends, they would have paid Treasury approximately \$62 billion. The following chart shows how imposition of the Net Worth Sweep dramatically increased the size of the Companies’ dividend payments to Treasury:



129. The Net Worth Sweep has thus enabled the federal government to usurp nearly \$129 billion more than it was entitled to under the prior arrangement. Had the Companies instead been allowed to use those excess funds to pay down the liquidation preference on Treasury’s senior preferred stock, the remaining combined liquidation preference would today be less than \$24 billion. As explained above, the Agencies knew that the Net Worth Sweep would result in a massive financial windfall for the federal government, enabling the White House to

tout reduced budget deficit figures while avoiding earnest negotiations with Congressional Republicans over the debt ceiling.

130. The Net Worth Sweep is squarely contrary to FHFA's statutory responsibilities as conservator of Fannie and Freddie. As conservator FHFA is obligated to "take such action as may be—(i) necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D). As FHFA itself has acknowledged, the agency "has a statutory charge to work to restore a regulated entity in conservatorship to a sound and solvent condition" 76 Fed. Reg. at 35,727. Accordingly, "allowing capital distributions to deplete the entity's conservatorship assets would be inconsistent with the agency's statutory goals, as they would result in removing capital at a time when the Conservator is charged with rehabilitating the regulated entity." *Id.* Thus, FHFA's own regulations generally prohibit Fannie and Freddie from making a "capital distribution while in conservatorship," subject to certain exceptions. 12 C.F.R. § 1237.12(a). Indeed, rather than putting Fannie and Freddie in sound and solvent condition, the Net Worth Sweep's reduction and eventual elimination of the Companies' capital reserves *increases* the likelihood of additional Treasury investment in the Companies while eliminating the economic interests of private shareholders.

131. But for the Net Worth Sweep, Fannie and Freddie would have nearly \$130 billion of additional capital to cushion them from any future downturn in the housing market, reassure debtholders of the soundness of their investments, and eventually resume dividend payments to preferred and common stockholders, among other things. Instead, because of the Net Worth Sweep, the Companies are required to operate at the edge of insolvency with no prospect of ever

generating value for private shareholders, rendering the Companies fundamentally unsafe and unsound and more likely to require an additional—albeit entirely avoidable—government bailout in the future.

132. The Net Worth Sweep’s quarterly sweep of all net profits thus plainly harms the Companies’ private shareholders by effectively prohibiting the Companies from rebuilding their capital. Nor can distributing the entire net worth of the Companies to Treasury be reconciled with FHFA’s statutory obligation to preserve and conserve their assets and property.

133. Furthermore, on information and belief, FHFA agreed to the Net Worth Sweep only at the insistence and under the direction and supervision of Treasury. The Net Worth Sweep was a Treasury initiative and reflected the culmination of Treasury’s long-term plan to seize the Companies and see that they were operated for the exclusive benefit of the federal government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was Treasury that informed the Companies just days before the Net Worth Sweep that it was forthcoming, and a meeting addressing the Net Worth Sweep was held at Treasury during which a senior Treasury official announced the changes. Secretary Geithner apparently believed that even before the Net Worth Sweep was imposed, “we had already effectively nationalized the GSEs . . . , and could decide how to carve up, dismember, sell or restructure those institutions.” Plaintiff’s Corrected Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact 26.2.1(a), *Starr Int’l Co. v. United States*, No. 1:11-cv-779-TCW (Fed. Cl. March 2, 2015), ECF No. 430.

134. The Net Worth Sweep is just one example of the significant influence Treasury has exerted over FHFA from the beginning of the conservatorship. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Indeed, Secretary Paulson has written that “seizing control” of Fannie and Freddie, an action that

is statutorily reserved to FHFA, was an action “I took.” HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK xiv (2d ed. 2013). Congressional Budget Office Assistant Director for Financial Analysis Deborah Lucas told Congress that the Companies are subject to “ownership and control by the Treasury.” *Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac & FHA: Taxpayer Exposure in the Housing Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget*, 112th Cong. 15 (2011). And Secretary Geithner, who was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York the original PSPAs were signed, understood the federal takeover of Fannie and Freddie to be a “Treasury operation.”

135. In 2009, Treasury used the conservatorship powers that the PSPAs transfer from FHFA to Treasury to prohibit Fannie and Freddie from selling certain low income housing tax credits. FHFA supported the sale of these credits as in the Companies’ best interest and consistent with its mission to “conserve Enterprise assets,” but Treasury barred the sale, preferring that the credits should expire unused rather than being transferred to buyers who could exercise them to offset their tax liabilities.

136. The Net Worth Sweep is an element of Treasury’s broader plan to eliminate the Companies and transform the housing finance market. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FHFA has made the

development of such a utility a key initiative of the conservatorships, providing further evidence that FHFA is operating according to Treasury’s playbook.

137. Treasury, however, lacks the authority to impose such direction and supervision, and FHFA lacks the authority to submit to it. HERA expressly provides that “[w]hen acting as conservator, . . . [FHFA] shall not be subject to the direction or supervision of any other agency of the United States” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

138. Contrary to statutory authority, both Treasury and FHFA understood the Net Worth Sweep to be a step toward the liquidation, not the rehabilitation, of the Companies.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mr. Ugoletti also said during his deposition that FHFA’s objective “was not for Fannie and Freddie Mac to emerge from conservatorship.” HERA does not contemplate that FHFA will operate a perpetual conservatorship that is entirely contingent on the hope of unspecified legislative action at some point in the future. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All this was in stark contrast to FHFA’s then-Acting Director’s statement two years prior to the Net Worth Sweep that, absent legislative action, “the only [post-conservatorship option] that FHFA may implement today under existing law is to reconstitute [Fannie and Freddie] under their current charters.” February 2, 2010 Letter of Acting Director DeMarco to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services.

139. Statements by both FHFA and Treasury provide further confirmation that the Net Worth Sweep violates FHFA's statutory duties as conservator. Treasury, for example, said the Net Worth Sweep would "expedite the wind down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," and it emphasized that the "quarterly sweep of every dollar of profit that each firm earns going forward" would make "sure that every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be used to benefit taxpayers." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug. 17, 2012). Indeed, Treasury emphasized that the Net Worth Sweep would ensure that the Companies "will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form." *Id.*

140. Unbeknownst to the public, as early as December 2010, an internal Treasury memorandum acknowledged the "Administration's commitment to ensure existing common equity holders will not have access to any positive earnings from the [Companies] in the future." Action Memorandum for Secretary Geithner (Dec. 20, 2010). Just weeks later, however, in another internal document the author of this memorandum acknowledged that "the path laid out under HERA and the Paulson Treasury when [the Companies] were put into conservatorship in September 2008" was for Fannie and Freddie to "becom[e] adequately capitalized" and "exit conservatorship as private companies" with "existing common shareholders" being "substantially diluted"—but not eliminated. Information Memorandum for Secretary Geithner (Jan. 4, 2011). The memorandum also acknowledged that any threat to Treasury's funding commitment from dividend payments potentially could be addressed by "converting [Treasury's] preferred stock into common or cutting or deferring payment of the dividend (under legal review)." *Id.* In other words, the problem Treasury was purportedly trying to solve with the Net

Worth Sweep, a cash dividend too high to be serviced by earnings, could be addressed by other means already known to Treasury, such as cutting or deferring payment of the dividend.

141. Furthermore, as explained above, because of the payment-in-kind option available to FHFA and the Companies, the purported problem was entirely illusory. Nevertheless, in 2012 the Agencies implemented the Administration's secret and unauthorized commitment to wipe out private shareholders by imposing the Net Worth Sweep on the Companies.

142. FHFA Acting Director Edward DeMarco informed a Senate Committee that the "recent changes to the PSPAs, replacing the 10 percent dividend with a net worth sweep, reinforce the notion that the [Companies] will not be building capital as a potential step to regaining their former corporate status." Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA, Statement Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking & Urban Affairs 3 (Apr. 18, 2013). In its 2012 report to Congress, FHFA explained that it had begun "prioritizing [its] actions to move the housing industry to a new state, one without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." FHFA, 2012 REP. at 13. Thus, according to FHFA, the Net Worth Sweep "ensures all the [Companies'] earnings are used to benefit taxpayers" and "reinforces the fact that the [Companies] will not be building capital." *Id.* at 1, 13. In short, the Net Worth Sweep plainly is central to the FHFA's new plan to "wind[] up the affairs of Fannie and Freddie," Remarks of Edward J. DeMarco, Getting Our House in Order at 6 (Wash., D.C., Oct. 24, 2013), and thus cannot be reconciled with the agency's statutory obligations as conservator of Fannie and Freddie.

143. While waiting for Congress to take action on Fannie and Freddie, FHFA has resolved to operate the Companies for the benefit of the federal government rather than for the benefit of the Companies themselves and their private stakeholders. The Net Worth Sweep is only the most blatant manifestation of this decision, which is reflected in numerous additional

FHFA statements and actions. In short, while HERA directs FHFA to operate the Companies with a view toward rebuilding their capital and returning them to private control, FHFA has resolved to operate Fannie and Freddie with a view toward “minimiz[ing] losses on behalf of taxpayers.” FHFA, A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ENTERPRISE CONSERVATORSHIPS: THE NEXT CHAPTER IN A STORY THAT NEEDS AN ENDING 7 (Feb. 21, 2012)—a goal that ignores a simple reality: no such losses have been incurred, as Treasury has currently realized a profit of approximately \$58 billion (and counting). Indeed, FHFA has made clear that its “overriding objectives” are to operate Fannie and Freddie to serve the federal government’s policy goals of “[g]etting the most value for taxpayers and bringing stability and liquidity to housing finance” *Id.* at 21. Director Watt summed up the situation succinctly when stating that he does not “lay awake at night worrying about what’s fair to the shareholders” but rather focuses on “what is responsible for the taxpayers.” Nick Timiraos, *FHFA’s Watt ‘Comfortable’ with U.S. Sweep of Fannie, Freddie Profits*, WALL STREET JOURNAL MONEY BEAT BLOG (May 16, 2014, 3:40 PM), <http://goo.gl/xolQDC>.

144. Following FHFA’s lead, Fannie’s management has publicly acknowledged that it does not routinely consider the interests of private shareholders when operating the company. Timothy Mayopoulos, Fannie’s CEO, recently said that his company’s management is “not looking to maximize profits for investors” and that he is “less interested in what happens to Fannie Mae as a legal entity.” Fannie has also expressly disavowed any fiduciary duty to its private shareholders in its SEC filings. *See* Fannie Mae 2014 Annual Report at 1 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2015), <http://goo.gl/36p2j6> (“Our directors do not have any fiduciary duties to any person or entity except to the conservator and, accordingly, are not obligated to consider the

interests of the company, [or] the holders of our equity or debt securities . . . unless specifically directed to do so by the conservator.”).

145. The dramatically negative impact of the Net Worth Sweep on the Companies’ private shareholders is demonstrated by Fannie’s results in the first quarter of 2013. At the end of the first quarter Fannie’s net worth stood at \$62.4 billion. Under the prior versions of the PSPAs, if Fannie chose to declare a cash dividend it would have been obligated to pay Treasury a dividend of only \$2.9 billion, and the balance—\$59.5 billion—would have been credited to its capital. Private shareholders would have been entitled to a pro rata share of any additional amount of that residual capital paid out to Treasury in dividends. The Net Worth Sweep, however, required Fannie to pay Treasury \$59.4 billion, while private shareholders received nothing. Treasury and FHFA knew upon entry into the Net Worth Sweep that Treasury would obtain such a windfall. Indeed, FHFA recognized that, as a result of the Net Worth Sweep, reversal of the Companies’ deferred tax assets valuation allowances could result in an extraordinary payment to Treasury. And internal Fannie records reveal that one expected effect of the Net Worth Sweep was that the Company would be able to “repay” the federal government faster than under the prior arrangement. That, of course, could only be true if Fannie expected to out-earn the prior 10% dividend.

146. Contrary to FHFA’s statutory authority, FHFA has ensured that the Companies cannot operate independently and must remain wards of the federal government. FHFA has announced that, during the conservatorship, existing statutory and FHFA-directed regulatory capital requirements will not be binding on the Companies. And at the end of 2012, Fannie had a deficit of core capital in relation to statutory minimum capital of \$141.2 billion. This deficit decreased to \$88.3 billion by the end of the first quarter of 2013. When adjusted for the \$59.4

billion dividend payment to Treasury, however, Fannie's core capital deficit jumped back up to \$147.7 billion. Thus, because of the Net Worth Sweep, Fannie was in a *worse* position with respect to its core capital—and thus further from safety, soundness, and rehabilitation—than it was before the record-breaking profitability it achieved in the first quarter of 2013.

147. Furthermore, under FHFA's conservatorship Fannie and Freddie have elected to pay Treasury its dividend in cash, even though their net worth includes changes in both cash and non-cash assets. In the first quarter of 2013, for example, over \$50 billion of Fannie's profitability resulted from the release of the Company's deferred tax assets valuation allowance—the same non-cash asset that previously created massive paper losses for the Company. As a result, Fannie was required to “fund [its] second quarter dividend payment of \$59.4 billion primarily through the issuance of debt securities.” Fannie, 2013 First Quarter Report, at 42.

148. Borrowing money to pay an enormous dividend on a non-cash profit (due to an accounting reversal) is without precedent in a conservatorship. It also is clearly contrary to FHFA's statutory obligations as conservator, as FHFA is operating the Companies in an inherently unsafe and unsound manner and hindering the ability of the Companies to restore their financial health so that they can be returned to normal business operations.

149. FHFA's decision to direct the Companies to declare and pay Treasury's dividends in cash is a particularly egregious violation of its duties as conservator because that decision not only forced the Companies to pay out vast sums of cash to Treasury but also compelled them to make interest payments on subordinated debt that they could have otherwise deferred. When the Companies were forced into conservatorship, both had significant amounts of outstanding subordinated debt. Under the terms of their agreements with subordinated debt holders, the

Companies were entitled to defer paying interest on that debt when their retained capital fell below a specified threshold. If the Companies chose to exercise this option, however, they were contractually obliged not to pay cash dividends on any stock—including Treasury’s Senior Preferred Stock. Despite announcing during the early days of conservatorship that its capital reserves had fallen below levels that entitled it to withhold subordinated debt payments, FHFA directed Fannie to continue making these interest payments, citing the fact that deferring subordinated debt payments would have required Fannie to stop paying cash dividends on its stock. Similarly, Freddie disclosed that FHFA directed it to continue paying interest on its subordinated debt and not to exercise its contractual right to defer those payments. FHFA’s decision to direct the Companies to make unnecessary subordinated debt payments that could have been used to build up their capital reserves shows that it is operating the Companies with the aim of maximizing dividend payments to Treasury and with no concern for the soundness and safety of the Companies, the preservation of their assets, or the interests of private shareholders. If FHFA had been genuinely concerned about preserving the Companies’ assets and avoiding a purported “death spiral” in which the Companies exhausted Treasury’s funding commitment, it would not have ordered them to make gratuitous payments on their subordinated debt. Instead, it directed the Companies to make payments to subordinated debtholders so that they could also pay cash dividends to Treasury.

150. The Net Worth Sweep has become a major revenue source for the United States Government at the expense of Plaintiffs and other private shareholders. For example, the federal government’s record-breaking \$53.2 billion surplus for the month of December 2013 was driven in large part by the \$39 billion swept from Fannie and Freddie. Fannie’s and Freddie’s outsize

dividend payments in 2013 also extended Treasury's ability to meet federal obligations during the debt ceiling crisis.

151. As previously noted, Treasury's temporary statutory authority to purchase the securities of the Companies was conditioned on its consideration of certain statutory factors, including "the need to maintain the [Companies'] status as . . . private shareholder-owned compan[ies]" and the Companies' plans "for the orderly resumption of private market funding or capital market access." *See* 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1)(C), 1719(g)(1)(C). There is no public record that Treasury considered these factors before executing the Net Worth Sweep, and Treasury has asserted that it did not need to consider them. Indeed, the terms of the Net Worth Sweep requiring the quarterly payment of all profits and the winding down of the Companies' operations are wholly inconsistent with these factors. There is also no evidence that Treasury adequately considered alternatives to the Net Worth Sweep that would have been consistent with its statutory obligations, less harmful to Plaintiffs and other private shareholders, and more likely to ensure the Companies' future solvency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Finally, there is no evidence that Treasury fulfilled the statutory requirement to report exercises of its temporary purchase authority to Congress upon entering the Net Worth Sweep. *See* 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1)(D); 1719(g)(1)(D).

152. FHFA made no public record of its contemporaneous decision-making processes in agreeing to the Net Worth Sweep. There is no public record that FHFA adequately considered whether the Net Worth Sweep is consistent with its statutory obligations as conservator of the Companies. Treasury's stated purpose of winding down the Companies, which necessarily

involves liquidating their assets and property, is incompatible on its face with FHFA's charge to put the Companies back into "a sound and solvent condition" and to "conserve [their] assets and property." There is also no evidence that FHFA adequately considered alternatives to the Net Worth Sweep that would have been both consistent with its statutory obligations and less harmful to private shareholders. Instead, there are statements by FHFA—including in its own Strategic Plan for the Companies—that the role of the conservator was to "minimize taxpayer losses" rather than protect and conserve the Companies.

153. Finally, there is no public record that either government agency—Treasury or FHFA—considered whether the Net Worth Sweep is consistent with the contractual and fiduciary duties to private shareholders. And the Net Worth Sweep is wholly inconsistent with those duties.

Dividend Payments Under the Purchase Agreements

154. Treasury has disbursed \$116.1 billion to Fannie under the PSPAs, and Treasury has recouped a total of \$147.6 billion from Fannie in the form of purported "dividends." Treasury has disbursed \$71.3 billion to Freddie under the PSPAs, and Treasury has recouped a total of \$98.2 billion from Freddie in the form of purported "dividends." Combined, Fannie and Freddie have paid Treasury approximately \$58 billion more than they have received.

155. Yet, under the Net Worth Sweep, these purported dividend payments do not operate to pay down the liquidation preference or otherwise redeem any of Treasury's Government Stock. The liquidation preference of Treasury's Government Stock in the Companies purportedly remains at approximately \$189 billion (due to the Companies' draws and the \$1 billion initial valuation of Treasury's Government Stock in each) and will remain at that

amount regardless of how many billions of dollars the Companies pay to Treasury in dividends going forward. The Government's rate of return is infinite, like that of a common equity holder.

156. Indeed, the fundamental nature of the change in Treasury's investment resulting from the Net Worth Sweep is illustrated by the facts that Treasury is now effectively Fannie's and Freddie's *sole* equity shareholder and that Treasury's securities in the Companies are now effectively equivalent to 100% of the Companies' common stock. After giving effect to the Net Worth Sweep, Treasury has both the right to receive all profits of the Companies as well as control over the manner in which the Companies conduct business. Accordingly, following the Net Worth Sweep, Treasury's Government Stock should be characterized in a manner consistent with its economic fundamentals as 100% of the Companies' common stock. Indeed, the Government Stock must be deemed as common or voided altogether because, by definition, preferred stock must have preferences over other classes of stock. *See* 8 Del. Code tit.8, § 151(c); Va. Code § 13.1-638(C)(4). After the Net Worth Sweep, of course, the economic rights of other classes of Fannie and Freddie stock have been effectively eliminated, leaving nothing for the Government Stock to have preference over. The Government Stock simply takes *everything*.

157. That FHFA and Treasury continue to label the Government Stock as a preferred equity security—or the imposition of the Net Worth Sweep as a mere “amendment”—is not controlling or persuasive, particularly in light of the fact that the Net Worth Sweep was not an arms-length business transaction. Rather it was a self-dealing arrangement between two agencies of the federal government for the benefit of the federal government and, upon information and belief, one of those agencies (FHFA) was acting at the direction of the other (Treasury). Moreover, as explained above, statements by Treasury and FHFA make clear that the Net Worth Sweep was designed with the intent to grant the federal government the right to all of Fannie's

and Freddie's future profits and to ensure that the Companies will remain under the control of the federal government and never return to the control of their private shareholders.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

FHFA's Conduct Exceeded Its Statutory Authority As Conservator

158. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.

159. The APA requires the Court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations" or that are "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), (D). In addition to the limitations established under the APA, FHFA's authority as conservator of the Companies is strictly limited by statute. *See* 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D).

160. The Net Worth Sweep is inimical to the very definition of what it means to be a conservator, which is a term with a well-established meaning in financial regulation. A conservator is charged with seeking to rehabilitate the company under its control, not to operate the company for its own benefit while stripping it of its assets.

161. The Net Worth Sweep is in direct contravention of the statutory command that FHFA as conservator must undertake those actions "necessary to put the [Companies] in a sound and solvent condition" and "appropriate to carry on the business of the [Companies] and preserve and conserve [their] assets and property." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D). Indeed, rather than seeking to put the Companies in a "sound and solvent" condition and to preserve and conserve the Companies' assets and property, FHFA has expropriated the Companies' entire net worth for the benefit of the federal government, to the detriment of private shareholders such as Plaintiffs.

162. Furthermore, FHFA's purpose as conservator is to seek to rehabilitate Fannie and Freddie, but the Net Worth Sweep makes such rehabilitation impossible. Rather, the Net Worth

Sweep makes clear that FHFA and Treasury intend to keep Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship indefinitely, operating them for the sole benefit of the federal government, unless Congress passes legislation resolving the situation.

163. On information and belief, FHFA agreed to the Net Worth Sweep only at the insistence and under the direction and supervision of Treasury. But because HERA mandates that FHFA perform its duties as conservator independent of the “direction or supervision of any other agency,” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7), FHFA was not authorized to subject itself to Treasury’s will.

164. While the Net Worth Sweep fundamentally altered the nature of Treasury’s securities in Fannie and Freddie, the Net-Worth-Sweep transaction also reaffirmed and gave new significance to other features of the PSPAs and Treasury’s securities that are inimical to FHFA’s conservatorship responsibilities.

165. First, the Net Worth Sweep continued (and indeed, exacerbated) the problem of Fannie and Freddie paying cash dividends while in conservatorship. As FHFA itself has emphasized, “allowing capital distributions to deplete the entity’s conservatorship assets would be inconsistent with the agency’s statutory goals, as they would result in removing capital at a time when the Conservator is charged with rehabilitating the regulated entity.”

166. Second, the terms of the Government Stock continue to prohibit Fannie and Freddie from paying down amounts drawn from Treasury’s funding commitment. This does not promote Fannie’s and Freddie’s soundness and solvency or the preservation and conservation of their assets, and it is particularly indefensible in light of the fact that Fannie’s and Freddie’s draws were primarily the result of overly pessimistic accounting decisions made during conservatorship. Those decisions resulted in an artificial increase in the amount of Government Stock outstanding, but under the terms of the Government Stock the reversal of those accounting

decisions cannot result in a corresponding decrease in the amount of Government Stock outstanding. The harm caused by this one-way ratchet provision is heightened by the fact that the Net Worth Sweep prohibits the Companies from building a capital cushion. After the Net Worth Sweep the Companies are more likely to require an unrepayable draw in the event that either has a down quarter.

167. Third, the PSPAs (sections 5.1–5.6 and 5.8) continue to cede substantial control over the operation of Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship to Treasury, going so far as to prohibit FHFA from allowing Fannie and Freddie to exit conservatorship without Treasury’s consent. Nothing in HERA authorizes FHFA to contract away its statutory authorities, and HERA expressly forbids FHFA to cede to the direction and supervision of another agency of the federal government. The Net Worth Sweep eliminated any doubt about the Agencies’ intention to prohibit the Companies from exiting conservatorship under their existing charters.

168. FHFA also acted beyond its authority by re-interpreting its statutory duty as a conservator under HERA to be a duty to taxpayers only and by resolving to hold Fannie and Freddie in a perpetual conservatorship to be operated for the benefit of the federal government.

169. FHFA’s conduct was therefore outside of FHFA’s authority under HERA and “in excess of statutory . . . authority” and “without observance of procedure required by law,” and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to relief against FHFA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(C), (D).

COUNT II

Treasury’s Conduct Exceeded Its Statutory Authority

170. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.

171. The APA requires the Court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”

or that are “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), (D). Treasury’s statutory authority to purchase securities issued by the Companies expired on December 31, 2009. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(*l*)(4), 1719(g)(4). The Net Worth Sweep, which was executed on August 17, 2012, contravenes this unambiguous limit on Treasury’s authority.

172. The Net Worth Sweep created an entirely new security. Under the original Purchase Agreements, Treasury purchased Government Stock that entitled it to a 10% cash or 12% in-kind quarterly dividend on an amount equal to the aggregate liquidation preference of the Government Stock. The Government Stock was a fixed return security not otherwise entitled to participate in the unlimited upside of the Companies’ earnings. By contrast, the Net Worth Sweep entitles Treasury to a quarterly distribution of *all* of the Companies’ earnings for as long as they remain in operation. The Net Worth Sweep thus effected a wholesale change to the nature of Treasury’s securities after its statutory authority to purchase new securities had expired, and it converted Treasury’s Government Stock into new securities that nationalize the Companies and entitle Treasury to 100% of their net worth as if Treasury were the outright owner of all common stock in the Companies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Accordingly, Treasury cannot evade this clear statutory restriction on its authority to purchase securities of the Companies by the simple expedient of calling these new securities an “amendment” to the old securities.

173. In addition, before exercising its temporary authority to purchase securities, Treasury is required to “determine that such actions are necessary to . . . (i) provide stability to the financial markets; (ii) prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and (iii) protect the taxpayer.” 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(1)(B). In making the statutorily required

determinations, Treasury must consider such factors as “the [Companies’] plan[s] for the orderly resumption of private market funding or capital market access” and “the need to maintain the [Companies’] status as . . . private shareholder-owned Company[ies],” among other factors. *Id.* § 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v).

174. These statutory criteria must apply to any and all “amendments” to the Purchase Agreements. Were it otherwise, Treasury could fundamentally alter its investments in the Companies at any time, including after its investment authority has expired and effectively turn Treasury’s limited, temporary grant of authority to purchase the Companies’ securities under certain conditions, into an unconstrained and permanent authority and subvert the statutory limitations imposed by Congress.

175. As far as the public record discloses, Treasury did not make any of the required determinations or consider any of the necessary factors before imposing the Net Worth Sweep. It therefore exceeded its statutory authority.

176. The Net Worth Sweep is beyond Treasury’s authority because it is not compatible with due consideration of factors that Treasury must consider before purchasing the Companies’ securities or amending its agreements to purchase such securities. The Net Worth Sweep destroys the value of the Companies’ private stock. The Net Worth Sweep is therefore wholly incompatible with “the need to maintain the [Companies’] status as . . . private shareholder-owned Company[ies]” and with the “orderly resumption of private market funding or capital market access.”

177. On information and belief, FHFA agreed to the Net Worth Sweep only at the insistence and under the direction and supervision of Treasury. But because HERA mandates that FHFA “shall not be subject to the direction or supervision of any other agency” when performing

its duties as conservator for the Companies, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7), Treasury acted in excess of its authority in imposing its will on FHFA. The provisions of the PSPAs granting Treasury substantial control over FHFA's operation of the conservatorships (sections 5.1–5.6 and 5.8) likewise violates this provision.

178. Finally, the Net-Worth-Sweep transaction perpetuated the unlawful provision for Treasury to continue to invest in Fannie and Freddie after the expiration of Treasury's statutory authority to purchase their securities. Indeed, the Net Worth Sweep increased the probability of future Treasury disbursements by preventing the Companies from rebuilding their capital levels. Secretary Paulson has admitted that disbursements pursuant to Treasury's funding commitment amount to purchases of additional Government Stock. But Treasury's authority to make such purchases expired after December 31, 2009.

179. Treasury's conduct was therefore outside of Treasury's authority under HERA and "in excess of statutory . . . authority" and "without observance of procedure required by law," and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to relief against Treasury pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(C), (D).

COUNT III

Treasury's Conduct Was Arbitrary and Capricious

180. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.

181. The APA requires the Court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This means, among other things, that agency action is unlawful unless it is the product of "reasoned decisionmaking" that considers every responsible alternative. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n*, 463 U.S. at 52. Decisionmaking that relies on

inadequate evidence or that results in inconsistent or contradictory conclusions cannot satisfy that standard.

182. Before Treasury exercises its temporary authority to purchase the Companies' securities, it is required to determine that the financial support is necessary to "provide stability to the financial markets," "prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance," and "protect the taxpayer." 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1)(B), 1719(g)(1)(B). In making these determinations, Treasury is further required to "take into consideration" several factors, including the "plan for the orderly resumption of private market funding or capital market access," and the "need to maintain [the] status [of Fannie and Freddie] as . . . private shareholder-owned compan[ies]." *Id.* §§ 1455(l)(1)(C); 1719(g)(1)(C).

183. These statutory criteria plainly apply to any and all "amendments" of the Purchase Agreements. Were it otherwise, Treasury could fundamentally alter its investments in the Companies at any time, including after its investment authority has expired and effectively turn Treasury's limited, temporary grant of authority to purchase the Companies' securities under certain conditions, into an unconstrained and permanent authority and subvert the statutory limitations imposed by Congress.

184. There is no evidence in the public record that Treasury made the required determinations or considered the necessary factors before imposing the Net Worth Sweep. Indeed, the available evidence reveals that none of the necessary conditions was satisfied. Further, Treasury also has not explained whether it considered alternatives to the Net Worth Sweep that would have been both consistent with its statutory obligations and less harmful to Plaintiffs and other private shareholders. Treasury has thus arbitrarily and capriciously failed to

provide a reasoned explanation for its conduct, which results in the Government's expropriation of all private shareholder value in the Companies' stock.

185. Treasury also acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on outdated and demonstrably inaccurate projections of Fannie's and Freddie's future financial performance while ignoring or failing adequately to account for more timely and accurate information on that subject.

186. Treasury also arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider alternatives to the Net Worth Sweep that would have better promoted stability in the mortgage markets by leaving the Companies on a sound financial footing. There is no evidence in the public record that Treasury considered alternatives to the Net Worth Sweep that would have provided greater assurance to investors that the Companies will be able to service their debts in the future.

187. Treasury also acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by failing to consider whether the Net Worth Sweep is consistent with its fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as the Companies' dominant shareholder.

188. Under applicable state law governing shareholders' relationship with Fannie and with Freddie, a corporation's dominant shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.

189. Treasury is the dominant shareholder and de facto controlling entity of the Companies. For example, Treasury serves as the Companies' only permitted source of capital, and Treasury must give permission to the Companies before they can issue other equity securities and before they can sell assets valued above \$250 million. Treasury also is able to influence or control the actions of FHFA as conservator and the length and nature of the conservatorship.

190. The Net Worth Sweep effectively transfers the value of other classes of Fannie and Freddie stock from Plaintiffs and other private holders to the Companies' dominant shareholder. And as Treasury admits, the Net Worth Sweep's express purpose is to wind down the Companies' operations. Treasury's actions in preventing Plaintiffs and other minority shareholders from receiving any dividends or value from their stock, combined with Treasury's intent to wind down the Companies, render the private stock devoid of any value or prospect of return.

191. Treasury's conduct was therefore arbitrary and capricious, and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to relief under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

192. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for an order and judgment:

a. Declaring that the Net Worth Sweep, and its adoption, are not in accordance with and violate HERA within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), and that Treasury acted arbitrarily and capriciously within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) by executing the Net Worth Sweep;

b. Enjoining Treasury and its officers, employees, and agents to return to Fannie and Freddie all dividend payments made pursuant to the Net Worth Sweep or, alternatively, recharacterizing such payments as a pay down of the liquidation preference and a corresponding redemption of Treasury's Government Stock rather than mere dividends;

c. Vacating and setting aside the Net Worth Sweep, including its provision sweeping all of the Companies' net worth to Treasury every quarter;

d. Enjoining FHFA and its officers, employees, and agents from implementing, applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant to the Net Worth Sweep;

e. Enjoining Treasury and its officers, employees, and agents from implementing, applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant to the Net Worth Sweep;

f. Declaring that the following additional provisions of the PSPAs and Treasury's securities are not in accordance with and violate HERA within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C): any provision for the payment of cash dividends during conservatorship; the prohibition on Fannie and Freddie paying down amounts added to Treasury's liquidation preference based on disbursements pursuant to Treasury's commitment; the provisions of the PSPAs ceding control over Fannie and Freddie and the conservatorships to Treasury (sections 5.1–5.6 and 5.8); and the provision for additional disbursements to Fannie and Freddie pursuant to Treasury's funding commitment;

g. Vacating and setting aside the provisions of the PSPAs and Treasury's securities declared invalid;

h. Enjoining FHFA and its officers, employees, and agents from implementing, applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant to provisions of the PSPAs and Treasury's securities declared invalid;

i. Enjoining Treasury and its officers, employees, and agents from implementing, applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant to provisions of the PSPAs and Treasury's securities declared invalid;

j. Enjoining FHFA and its officers, employees, and agents from acting at the instruction of Treasury or any other agency of the government and from re-interpreting the duties of FHFA as conservator under HERA;

k. Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in bringing this action; and

l. Granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Christian D. Ambler

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of April, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be filed electronically using the Court's CM/ECF system, causing a true and correct copy to be served on all counsel of record.

/s/ Christian D. Ambler
Christian D Ambler