

1 Jeffrey J. Goodrich (SBN 107577)
2 Goodrich & Associates
3 336 Bon Air Center, #335
4 Greenbrae, CA 94904
5 (415) 925-8630 VOICE
6 (415) 925-9242 FAX

7
8 Attorneys for First Priority
9 Lenders¹

10 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 In re:
13
14 SR REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,
15 Debtor

CHAPTER 11

Case No. 13-09784-PB11

REPLY OF FIRST PRIORITY LENDERS TO
DEBTOR'S OMNIBUS OPPOSITION TO
DACA 2010L L.P.'S MOTION TO DISMISS,
TO FIND THAT DEBTOR IS A SINGLE
ASSET REAL ESTATE DEBTOR AGAIN
AND, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR RELIEF
FROM STAY

Date: November 4, 2013

Time: 2:30 p.m.

Dept: 4, Room 328

Judge: Hon. Peter W. Bowie

24
25
26 ¹ First Priority Sargent Ranch Lenders is comprised of the following unconflicted lenders who hold fractional interests
27 in only the First Loan and First Deed of Trust and in no junior loans or liens: Debra Gewertz, Jim Schreader, Gunilla M.
28 Rittenhouse, Los Amigos V, Louis E. Rittenhouse, Trustee, Michael E. Pegler, Janice L. Pegler, Richard Ehrenberger,
Ronald P. Elvidge, and Penelope Kuykendall.

1 First Priority Lenders hereby reply to the Debtor's Omnibus Opposition to the motion of
2 DACA 2010L, L.P. ("DACA") to dismiss this Chapter 11 case with prejudice, find the debtor is a
3 single asset real estate debtor (again) or, alternatively, for relief from the automatic stay ("Motion").
4

5
6 **A. CORRECTIONS TO DEBTOR'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

7 1. No Majority of Record First Loan Holders Ever Agreed to the Debtor's
8 Proposed Global Compromise.
9

10 The Debtor alleges that on August 14, 2012, "a majority of 1st TD Holders recorded a
11 Majority Action Affidavit documenting a global compromise that would have ended that tortured
12 history." Although the Debtor is correct that such a document was recorded, the Debtor leaves out a
13 key fact: the so-called majority of lenders who signed the document did not, in fact, hold a majority
14 of record interest in the First Loan and none of them even signed the document under penalty of
15 perjury.
16

17 This is a critical omission because Cal. Civ. Code §2941.9 expressly states that "any
18 action taken pursuant to the authority granted in this section is not effective" unless the Majority
19 Action Affidavit is signed under penalty of perjury and includes, among other things, a statement
20 that it is signed by "more than 50 percent of the record . . . undivided interests" in the subject note."
21 (emphasis supplied) In other words, for a "majority vote" to authorize the majority to act on behalf
22 of the entire group of fractional noteholders, that majority must sign under penalty of perjury a
23 statement that they actually hold a simple majority of record beneficial interests in the note.
24

25 A cursory inspection of the Majority Action Affidavit#1 ("MAA #1) upon which the
26 Debtor relies proves conclusively that it conferred no such authority at all. See, Debtor's Request
27 for Judicial Notice, Docket #84, Ex. 1, p. 6-7. Instead of asserting that the signatories hold more
28

1 than 50% of the record beneficial note interests, as the statute requires, the MAA #1 merely asserts
2 that the signatories hold “more than 50% of the principal amount of the first-priority deed of trust”.

3 And instead of making their claim under penalty of perjury, they signed no oath at all.
4

5 Moreover, these were not inadvertent omissions or typographical errors. As we now
6 know, at the time MMA#1 was recorded, the 12.6% interest that Tena Collins, one of the signatories,
7 claimed to hold was, in fact, held by Shazara, Ltd., not Ms. Collins. In other words, MAA#1 was
8 fatally defective not just because it failed to contain the proper recitation and oath, but also because
9 an actual majority of record interests had never agreed, and would never agree, to the Debtor’s
10 proposed “global compromise”.
11

12 2. The Ehrenberger Notice of Default Was Not Defective

13 The Debtor alleges that the Notice of Default recorded by Mr. Ehrenberger was
14 “defective” because it was not authorized by a majority vote. This is false. The Servicing
15 Agreement, signed by one hundred percent of the First Lenders, expressly authorizes the recording
16 of a Notice of Default in the event the note is in default. See, Debtor’s Request for Judicial Notice,
17 Docket #84, p. 44, Section 1.G. Also, the Debtor fails to disclose that the Notice of Default was
18 expressly recorded under the authority of Perkins v. Chad Development Corp. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d
19 645, 651 [157 Cal.Rptr. 201] (“We hold that where there is more than one beneficiary under a single
20 note and trust deed, in the event of a default, any one of the beneficiaries is empowered to give
21 notice of default and election to sell.”). Moreover, a Majority Action Affidavit, signed under oath by
22 a majority of record beneficial interests in the First Loan, ratifying and authorizing the recording of
23 that Notice of Default has since been served and recorded.
24
25

26 In sum, there is not, and never was, anything “defective” about the First Lenders’
27 Notice of Default.
28

1 3. There Was Never a Majority to “Thwart”

2 The Debtor repeatedly claims that a “majority” of First Lenders wanted to proceed
3 with the Debtor’s “global compromise” and that they would have had DACA not “thwarted” their
4 plans. However, the only evidence supplied to support this allegation is the MAA#1. As noted
5 above, under Cal. Civil Code §2941.9, the MMA#1 is merely a piece of paper that had absolutely no
6 meaning or effect when it was recorded. On the other hand, there is now a properly executed (under
7 oath), served and recorded Majority Action Affidavit in which 57% of record beneficial interests in
8 the First Loan opposes any such settlement and directs the immediate foreclosure of the property
9 under the First Deed of Trust. This is simply not in dispute.
10

11 In short, if anybody is attempting to “thwart” the will of a legal majority of First
12 Lenders, it is the Debtor, not DACA.
13

14 4. The First Priority Lenders Only Filed Suit to Resolve The Impasse

15 The Debtor glosses over the fact that the First Lenders’ original suit was for
16 declaratory relief. Instead, they try to focus on a subsequent complaint for damages that was only
17 filed in response to the minority defendants’ cross-complaint for damages and which is now moot as
18 a result of the formation of an actual, legal majority voting to foreclose.
19

20 Briefly, when they filed their first suit against all interest holders, the First Lenders
21 knew that regardless of whether there was a foreclosure or settlement, there would be disgruntled
22 beneficiaries and, therefore, any title insurance company would need a court judgment binding all
23 beneficial interests.
24

25 The filing First Lenders originally argued that in conducting any vote, holders of
26 “conflicted” interests, i.e., those who also held junior interests that would be wiped out by any
27 foreclosure, should be required to abstain from voting on the issue of foreclosure. But after DACA
28

1 purchased the Shazara interest, those voting for foreclosure exceeded 57%, thereby making the need
2 for such declaratory relief moot.

3
4 Unfortunately (and not disclosed by the Debtor in its statement of facts), the losing
5 minority of First Lenders filed a cross-complaint against the First Priority Lenders alleging that their
6 “informal” fake majority entitled them to recover damages and attorneys fees. Despite demand, they
7 refuse, and continue to refuse, to dismiss the action, even after the Superior Court has ruled that a
8 simple majority vote governs the actions of all.

9
10 5. The Debtor Has Shown No Good Faith Toward First Priority Lenders

11 The Debtor suggests that it has “cooperated” with DACA and, therefore, evidenced
12 its good faith postpetition. At the same time, however, the Debtor has moved to strike all of the First
13 Priority Lenders’ opposition on the ground that such lenders’ counsel has not filed a 2019 Statement.

14 First Priority Lenders is simply a name given to several, individual fractional
15 noteholders who for three years have appeared before this court through their counsel, Goodrich &
16 Associates. Since 2010, the First Priority Lenders’ counsel has represented their interests in three
17 different bankruptcy cases. In its pleadings in each case, counsel has identified these clients by
18 name and the percentage interest they hold. Notably, the Debtor’s counsel has also been involved in
19 those cases over the same three years. There is no mystery about who Goodrich & Associates
20 represents. While Goodrich & Associates will submit a 2019 Statement, it does not believe that
21 demanding one in this case is an act of “cooperation”.
22

23
24 6. There Exists No Collective Enterprise for the Benefit of All Original Holders

25 Perhaps the most remarkable misstatement by the Debtor is that the First, Second and
26 Third Lenders are part of a “collective enterprise for the benefit of all Original Holders.”
27
28 Opposition, p. 4:20-21.

1 The First Loan carries an interest of 15%. The Second Loan carries an interest of
2 31%, as does the Third. The First Loan was made in June 2000. The Second Loan was made in
3 November 2000 and funded over the following couple of years. The Third Loan was not made until
4 2003. The holders of the Second Loan signed an express subordination agreement in favor of the
5 First Lenders irrevocably and permanently subordinating the lien of the Second Loan to the lien of
6 the First Loan.
7

8 These facts are not in dispute. The Debtor does not explain how notes of different
9 priorities, interest rates and, most importantly, different funding dates, can possibly be part of a
10 “collective enterprise”. Did the Seconds or Thirds ever pay any of their 31% interest to the Firsts?
11 Did the Seconds or Thirds advance a single dime to cure the \$1,800,000 tax default and save the
12 property from an imminent tax sale in June of this year? Have the Seconds or Thirds ever offered to
13 buyout the First Lenders’ interests, as DACA has done?
14

15 Obviously, there is no “collective enterprise”. Rather, the Debtor actually sees its
16 relationship with the First Lenders as a one-way street: give up some of the value of the First
17 Lenders’ collateral or the Debtor will continue to do everything within its power --- whether or not it
18 is in good faith --- to delay the First Lenders’ rightful foreclosure sale.
19

20 **B. ARGUMENT**

21 1. The Debtor Has Admitted Its Bad Faith

22 In his declaration in opposition to DACA’s motion to dismiss, Norman Adams admits:
23

24 “Under the Consensual Agreement, the 1st TD Holders were to receive the first
25 \$37.5 million in proceeds, sharing of additional proceeds until the 2nd TD Holders
26 and 3rd TD Holders received a return of their principal (\$18 million)

27

28 The Debtor commenced this case to pursue a similar compromise which the
Debtor believes is supported by 42% in amount and well more than half in
number (based on DACA’s own calculation) of 1st TD Holders and the vast
majority (likely all except for DACA) of the 2nd TD Holders.”

1
2 Declaration of Norman I. Adams in Support of SR Real Estate Holdings Omnibus
3 Opposition, P¶33 and 53.

4 In other words, the Debtor is admitting that because it could not get an actual, legal majority to agree
5 with its so-called “Consensual Agreement”, it filed Chapter 11 to force such an agreement over the
6 objections of the real majority of interests. Moreover, the Debtor is not just admitting that it is using
7 Chapter 11 solely to change the outcome of a prepetition dispute it lost. Rather, the Debtor is
8 claiming that the very remedy it unsuccessfully attempt to use against the First Priority Lenders --- a
9 majority vote --- cannot be used by the prevailing First Priority Lenders!
10

11 Such facts leave no doubt. The Debtor is not claiming it has equity in any property to
12 protect nor employees or vendors to pay. Rather, the Debtor is just a few wealthy investors who are
13 trying to escape not only the consequences of their bad investment decisions but also the outcome of
14 the vote they demanded occur. Using a federal court to manipulate the rules of an investment game,
15 or to tilt the game board in favor of the losing party, is the essence of bad faith. DACA’s motion
16 should be granted.
17

18
19 DATED: October 31, 2013

GOODRICH & ASSOCIATES

20 /s/Jeffrey J. Goodrich

21 Jeffrey J. Goodrich

22 Attorneys for First Priority Sargent Ranch Lenders
23
24
25
26
27
28