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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
FORT WORTH DIVISION

IN RE: §  
§  
CELERITAS CHEMICALS, LLC § CASE NO. 16-42136-MXM  
§ (Chapter 11)  
DEBTOR §

**THIRD AMENDED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CELERITAS CHEMICALS, LLC’S PLAN OF REORGANIZATION DATED MAY 8, 2017**

THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS FILED IN SUPPORT OF THE DEBTOR’S THIRD AMENDED CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION (THE “PLAN”).

THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF MATERIAL PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN, INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE PLAN’S TREATMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST AND INTERESTS IN THE DEBTOR, THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN. THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ALSO SUMMARIZES CERTAIN FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ASSETS OF THE ESTATE AND THE CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST THE DEBTOR IN THE CHAPTER 11 CASE. WHILE THE DEBTOR BELIEVES THAT THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT CONTAINS ADEQUATE INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION SUMMARIZED, CREDITORS AND INTEREST HOLDERS SHOULD REVIEW THE ENTIRE PLAN AND EACH OF THE DOCUMENTS REFERENCED THEREIN AND HEREIN, AND SHOULD SEEK THE ADVICE OF THEIR OWN COUNSEL AND OTHER ADVISORS BEFORE CASTING THEIR BALLOTS ON THE PLAN.

EXCEPT FOR THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND THE EXHIBITS ATTACHED HERETO, NO REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE DEBTOR, THE DEBTOR’S ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, THE OPERATIONS OF THE DEBTOR, THE PLAN AND ITS TERMS, OR ALTERNATIVES TO THE PLAN ARE AUTHORIZED, NOR ARE ANY SUCH REPRESENTATIONS TO BE RELIED UPON IN ARRIVING AT A DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE PLAN. ANY INFORMATION WITH

RESPECT TO SUCH TOPIC AREAS THAT IS PROVIDED TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THE PLAN AND THAT IS NOT CONTAINED IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND THE EXHIBITS ATTACHED HERETO IS UNAUTHORIZED AND SHOULD BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE DEBTOR'S COUNSEL.

STATEMENTS AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION HEREIN CONCERNING THE ASSETS OF THE ESTATE, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, HISTORICAL INFORMATION, INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEBTOR'S ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, AND INFORMATION REGARDING CLAIMS AND INTERESTS ASSERTED OR OTHERWISE EVIDENCED IN THE DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 11 CASE, HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE DEBTOR, THE DEBTOR'S BOOKS AND RECORDS, THE DEBTOR'S SCHEDULES AND STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, AND COURT RECORDS.

UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE, THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ARE MADE AS OF MAY 8, 2017, AND NEITHER DELIVERY OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT NOR ANY EXCHANGE OF RIGHTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLAN SHALL, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, CREATE AN IMPLICATION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION SET FORTH HEREIN SINCE THE DATE THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND THE MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN THE PREPARATION OF THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT WERE COMPILED.

THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO VOTE TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE PLAN. THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT CONTAINS PROJECTED FINANCIAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE ESTATE, RECOVERIES UNDER THE PLAN, AND CERTAIN OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS, ALL OF WHICH ARE BASED UPON VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS AND ESTIMATES AS OF MAY 8, 2017, OR SUCH OTHER TIME AS IS SPECIFIED. SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT BE UPDATED TO REFLECT EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER SAID DATE(S), AND SUCH INFORMATION IS SUBJECT TO INHERENT UNCERTAINTIES AND TO A WIDE VARIETY OF SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS, ECONOMIC, AND COMPETITIVE RISKS. CONSEQUENTLY, ACTUAL EVENTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, EFFECTS, AND RESULTS MAY VARY SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THOSE INCLUDED IN OR CONTEMPLATED BY SUCH PROJECTED FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND SUCH OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS.

ON \_\_\_\_\_, AFTER NOTICE AND HEARING, THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ENTERED AN ORDER APPROVING THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AS CONTAINING INFORMATION OF THE KIND AND IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO ENABLE CREDITORS WHOSE VOTES ON THE PLAN ARE BEING SOLICITED TO MAKE AN INFORMED JUDGMENT ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE PLAN. A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORDER APPROVING THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS ATTACHED HERETO AS **EXHIBIT " E "** AND IS INCORPORATED HEREIN FOR ALL PURPOSES. THE APPROVAL OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT BY THE

BANKRUPTCY COURT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ENDORSEMENT BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT OF THE PLAN OR A GUARANTY OF THE ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.

NOTHING CONTAINED IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IS INTENDED TO GIVE RISE TO ANY COMMITMENT OR OBLIGATION OF THE DEBTOR OR ANY OTHER PARTY, NOR SHALL IT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFERRING UPON ANY PERSON ANY RIGHTS, BENEFITS, OR REMEDIES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER. THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS INFORMATIONAL ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, CREDITORS AND INTEREST HOLDERS SHOULD NOT CONSTRUE THE CONTENTS OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AS PROVIDING ANY LEGAL, BUSINESS, FINANCIAL, OR TAX ADVICE. EACH CREDITOR AND INTEREST HOLDER SHOULD CONSULT WITH ITS OWN LEGAL, BUSINESS, FINANCIAL, AND TAX ADVISORS AS TO ANY MATTER CONCERNING THE PLAN, THE EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN AND THE VOTING PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE PLAN.

All initially capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Disclosure Statement have the meanings defined in the Plan.

## I.

### **INTRODUCTION**

On June 2, 2016, (the “Petition Date”), Celeritas Chemicals, LLC (“Celeritas” or the “Debtor”) filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division (the “Bankruptcy Court”) thereby initiating this bankruptcy case (“Bankruptcy Case”).

The Debtor hereby submits this Disclosure Statement in connection with the solicitation of votes on the Plan, which is attached hereto as **Exhibit “A”** and incorporated herein for all purposes. The Disclosure Statement is being mailed to each holder of a Claim against and each holder of an Equity Interest in the Debtor. With respect to voting on the Plan, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, all Creditors holding Claims in impaired Classes 1 through 5 under the Plan are entitled to vote.

*On April 18, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing (“April 18 Hearing”) to consider approval of this Disclosure Statement and a Motion to Convert this Bankruptcy Case to Chapter 7 filed by Manidhari Gums & Chemicals (“Manidhari”). At the April 18 Hearing, the Court ordered that the Disclosure Statement would be approved but that Manidhari may submit statements to the Debtor to be included in the Disclosure Statement. The Court further held that the Debtor may make responses to the statements offered by Manidhari.*

*The additional statements provided by Manidhari to this Disclosure Statement are included, without edit, but set apart in a box so that they are easily identifiable. Below each statement from Manidhari will be the response of the Debtor, if any, also formatted in a box for ease of identification.*

**Statement of Manidhari:**

The Creditor, Manidhari Gums & Chemicals (“Manidhari”), will state its objections to the Disclosure Statement and Plan below under the sub-headings of “Manidhari Objection.”

The reference to “records” or “documents” by Manidhari includes documents that are the subject of a protective order in the district court action by Mandihari. Creditors who desire to review these documents will need to contact counsel for Manidhari to obtain a copy of the certification required under the protective order.

**Debtor’s Response:**

Manidhari argued its objections to the Disclosure Statement at the April 18 Hearing and the Court’s decision was that the Disclosure Statement would be approved with the addition of statements offered by Manidhari and the Debtor’s Response to such statements. Therefore, to be clear, although Manidhari states it still has objections, this Disclosure Statement has been approved by the Court.

It may be noted that the Debtor’s Response to many of Manidhari’s statements herein is that the statement is merely Manidhari’s expression of its opposition to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan. It is also important to note that there are essentially two different categories of requirements for a Chapter 11 Plan to be confirmed by the Court. This is explained in Article IV below but will be summarized here because it is relevant to Manidhari’s many “Objections”.

First, to be confirmed, the Chapter 11 Plan must receive the requisite number of votes in favor of confirmation from the voting creditors. Second, the Chapter 11 Plan must meet other technical requirements set forth in Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. The first category, as is clear, is up to the creditors and how they vote. The second category is determined by the Bankruptcy Court.

When deciding whether to vote in favor of the Plan, creditors should judge the treatment provided for claims in the Plan. The Debtor believes that the Chapter 11 Plan described herein and attached hereto meets the technical requirements for confirmation and that the Bankruptcy Court will agree and confirm the Plan if the requisite votes are received. Any party that wishes to file an Objection to confirmation of the Plan under Section 1129 may do so by filing their Objection with the Bankruptcy Court and appearing at the Confirmation Hearing as described in Article IV below.

**A. Overview of the Plan**

The proposed Plan provides for the continued pursuit and recovery of the primary assets of the Estate, which are claims for recovery under final judgments and insurance claims, and then distribution of the recovered funds along with funds contributed by Percy Pinto.

**Statement of Manidhari:**

Manidhari Objection:

The Disclosure Statement and Plan do not include the pursuit of all assets and fails to disclose the lack of viability of the reorganization, including Celeritas complete lack of any income or viable business opportunities since filing for bankruptcy.

Manidhari refers Creditors to its prior objections to the Disclosure Statement (Rec. Doc. 102) and its Motion to Convert to Chapter 7 (Rec. Doc. 109) for further information.

**Debtor's Response:**

A party's objection to the Disclosure Statement and an objection to a Chapter 11 Plan are two separate matters. As explained above, the Court has approved this Disclosure Statement with the inclusion of the statements offered by Manidhari.

Manidhari has not to date filed an Objection to the Debtor's Chapter 11 Plan with the Court. The Debtor will respond to Manidhari's Objection to the Plan if and when one is filed. Objections to Plan confirmation are matters for the Bankruptcy Court to decide at the Confirmation Hearing. Nonetheless, the Debtor disputes Manidhari's assertion that not all assets are pursued and that the Debtor's Plan is not viable. The assets of the Debtor and the administration of such assets for funding payment of claims is described herein at Articles II, VII, VIII, and XI. An explanation of the means for implementation of the Plan is found in Article VII.

**B. The Purpose of this Disclosure Statement**

The Bankruptcy Code generally requires the Debtor to prepare and file with the bankruptcy court a 'disclosure statement' that provides information of the kind, and in sufficient detail, that would enable a typical holder of claims or interests in a class impaired under the plan to make an informed judgment with respect to the plan. This Disclosure Statement provides such information, as well as information regarding certain deadlines with respect to confirmation of the Plan.

This Disclosure Statement is not intended to replace careful review and analysis of the Plan. Rather, it is submitted as an aid and supplement in your review of the Plan, and attempts to explain the terms and implications of the Plan. Every effort has been made to fully explain the various aspects of the Plan as it may affect Creditors and holders of Equity Interests. All Persons receiving this Disclosure Statement are urged to review all of the exhibits to this Disclosure

Statement, in addition to reviewing the text of this Disclosure Statement.

If you have any questions, you may contact counsel for the Debtor. Contact information for such counsel is set forth within this Disclosure Statement, as well as on the cover page hereof. Creditors and Equity Interest holders should read this Disclosure Statement in its entirety prior to voting on the Plan. No solicitation of votes on the Plan may be made except pursuant to this Disclosure Statement, an Order of the Bankruptcy Court approving this Disclosure Statement, and section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code. No other party has been authorized to use any information concerning the Debtor or its assets and liabilities, other than the information contained in this Disclosure Statement, to solicit votes on the Plan

**Statement of Manidhari:**

Manidhari Objection:

The Debtor's Disclosure Statement does not disclose all relevant facts for the Creditors to make an informed decision regarding the Plan. As such, Manidhari submits that this Disclosure Statement does not comply with the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code.

**Debtor's Response:**

Again, the Bankruptcy Court approved this Disclosure Statement at the April 18 Hearing with Manidhari's additions, which are included herein in their entirety.

**II.**

**BACKGROUND OF ESTATE'S ASSETS AND PLAN OVERVIEW**

Background. The Debtor is owned and managed 100% by Percy Pinto. Celeritas was organized as a Limited Liability Company in Texas in 2005 and is in the business of importing guar gum that is used in various industrial applications but primarily for the extraction of natural gas. Like many companies tied to the energy markets, the recent downturn in the oil and gas economy has had a material impact upon operations and cash flow. Celeritas has downsized its operations and overhead considerably in response to market conditions. Moreover, and not surprisingly in a severe down market, Celeritas is a party to several different lawsuits, in some cases as plaintiff attempting to recover for unpaid product, and in other cases as defendant related to disputes over product shipments.

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**Statement of Manidhari:**

Manidhari Objection:

The Debtor's description of the background omits many material facts. In 2012 and early 2013, Celeritas' business reputation was severely damaged when it refused to pay many of its Indian suppliers. This deterioration in its reputation resulted in most suppliers refusing to do business on a credit basis. Owing to Celeritas lack of cash, it formed Primena Technologies Inc. to funnel its guar orders through. Even this change did not improve Celeritas' business. Celeritas closed down most of its business in late 2014 and laid off its last worker in March 2015. In the year leading up to filing for bankruptcy, Celeritas reported substantial tax losses.

Prior to filing for protection, Celeritas was sued by multiple parties, along with Percy Pinto and related companies, Snap Holdings and Primena. Celeritas paid all of the attorney fees and costs for these non-debtors.

In June 2015, Celeritas was paid \$1,200,000 by Snap Holdings for the alleged repayment of loans. Records show that Snap Holdings was paid approximately \$1,600,000 from the sale of its building and equipment. Records also show that Celeritas loaned Snap Holdings in excess of \$2,000,000. No explanation has been provided by Debtor as to why Snap Holdings withheld over \$400,000 from its payment to Celeritas. Out of this payment, Celeritas paid Percy Pinto \$351,000, his sister \$167,000, the Stanton firm \$410,000, attorney retainers \$165,000 and taxes \$35,000.

Snap Holdings paid Percy Pinto over \$400,000 for an alleged equity payment. Records show that no equity payments were owed to Mr. Pinto.

Documents supporting these statements can be reviewed upon compliance with a protective order that is in place.

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**Debtor's Response:**

Again, the Bankruptcy Court approved this Disclosure Statement at the April 18 Hearing with Manidhari's additions. Manidhari's statements above are further articulation of its opposition to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129. Manidhari has not filed an Objection to Confirmation with the Court. If and when it does so, Celeritas will respond to such Objection.

Manidhari's statements above regarding Celeritas' business reputation are clearly the opinion of Manidhari and are disputed by Celeritas. Celeritas further disputes all factual statements of Manidhari that are not specifically admitted herein. As stated above, due to the downturn in the oil and gas market, certain customers of Celeritas failed to make payment for product. For example, the Smith Oil Judgment (defined below) was a result of Smith Oil failing to pay the purchase price for product due under contract with Celeritas. This and other occurrences like it left Celeritas unable to perform on some of its purchase contracts and litigation ensued from there, with further deteriorated Celeritas' cash position. PrimeNA Technologies was formed with the strategic intention to vertical integration of raw materials with the finished product. This vertical integration was geared in the oil and gas as well paint industry. The main emphasis in the initial stages of formation was also to get involved with blending specialized paints for the solar panel as well as the mirror glass industry. PrimeNA Technologies was not formed with an intention to buy guar in place of Celeritas.

Celeritas has not closed its business. Currently, Mr. Pinto is the owner and sole employee of Celeritas; however, Celeritas maintains its reputation and business opportunities. However, the capital needed to operate on a going forward basis will be dependent upon the confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan. In any event, the viability of Celeritas is a matter for the Court to determine at confirmation of the Plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).

Moreover, the payments to creditors under the Chapter 11 Plan described by this Disclosure Statement is not dependent upon the business success of Celeritas either before or after confirmation of the Plan. As described in Article VII, the Chapter 11 Plan is funded by the proceeds of the Debtor's litigation assets, including the \$100,000 of funds provided by Percy Pinto that will be placed in the Claims Payment Fund (defined below) and the estimated \$175,000 of additional funds provided by Mr. Pinto to fund the litigation.

Litigation. Celeritas was unable to cash flow operations and litigation costs spread among multiple venues, and this bankruptcy case was a necessary step to allow Celeritas to address its operational issues and litigation matters. In 2013, Celeritas became involved in a dispute with Smith Oil Co. ("Smith Oil") over Smith Oil's nonpayment for delivered product. Celeritas obtained an arbitration award against Smith Oil in the amount of \$2,342,631.29 in September 2015 ("Smith Oil Judgment"). Celeritas has not yet collected any of the amounts from Smith Oil, but is in the process of pursuing claims on available insurance against Euler Hermes Insurance ("Insurance Claim") under an insurance policy of \$1,250,000.00 as well as unliquidated claims for

bad faith, unfair settlement practices, misrepresentation of insurance policy, delay in payment of claim, and breach of contract related to the insurance policy. In addition to the Smith Oil Judgment, Celeritas obtained a judgment against Al-Kel Alliance, Inc., Prime Pack, Inc., and Maxxum Technologies, LLC on May 13, 2016 for approximately \$350,000 on similar claims for breach of contract (“Prime Pack Judgment”), which it is in the process of pursuing as well.

**Statement of Manidhari:**

Manidhari Objection:

Since the Stanton firm’s retention to act as litigation counsel, Debtor and its counsel have not taken any steps to collect on the Prime Pack judgment or to collect on the Smith Oil judgment. The Debtor’s failure to finalize the Smith Oil judgment in court and begin collection proceedings has had a material impact on the Euler Hermes litigation. See, Manidhari’s Motion to Convert.

**Debtor’s Response:**

The Debtor has sufficiently preserved its Prime Pack judgment and Smith Oil judgment pending resolution of the various uncertainties addressed by the Plan given the relatively small budget approved over Manidhari’s objections. Since retention, the Debtor has investigated the collectability of the judgments and discussed settlement with parties. The Euler Hermes litigation has various potential impacts upon the judgment, including possible rights of subrogation. As a result, the majority of the Debtor’s efforts have been focused on the Euler Hermes litigation as described herein. There has been no negative impact upon any of the claims or judgments during this case

The Euler Hermes Insurance Claim is a substantial asset. Celeritas originally filed an insurance claim on or about October 25, 2013. Euler refused to pay on the policy until Celeritas received what Euler deemed a “final judgment” in its related suit against Smith Oil (Cause No. No. DC-15-11324 in the 95th Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas) (hereinafter referred to as the “Smith Oil Matter”). While awaiting final judgment, Euler represented that:

Euler has reviewed Celeritas’ filed claim for loss payment under the Policy and determined that if and when a final and enforceable judgment is rendered in favor of Celeritas against Smith Oil such that the invoices under Celeritas’ claim are no longer the subject of any litigation/dispute, there would be coverage under the Policy subject to all of the terms and conditions set forth in the policy (including without limitation co-insurance deductibles) in an amount not to exceed the credit limit of \$1,250,000. As discussed with Stephen Georgetti prior to Celeritas commencing litigation, Euler was and remains prepared to make a loss payment to Celeritas, subject to the terms and conditions of the Policy, once the invoices underlying the claim are no longer the subject of any litigation/dispute between Smith Oil and Celeritas.

The trial court entered its Final Judgment in the Smith Oil Matter on November 22, 2015, and an Amended Final Judgment February 18, 2016. Euler still refused to honor the policy, claiming that it would not pay until the judgment was no longer appealable. The District Court lost jurisdiction over the case and Euler still took no action to honor the policy. Because of Euler's delay in honoring the policy, Celeritas filed bankruptcy on June 2, 2016. Euler thereafter remained silent regarding whether it would honor the policy. Celeritas sought to retain its prior counsel and Manidhari objected to the engagement and funding of retainer. After Celeritas ultimately authorized to retain its prior counsel, Celeritas contacted Euler on November 16, 2016 to update the defendant on the retention and discuss payment of the claim. At that point, Euler Hermes suggested that it needed additional information on the underlying claim and loss. Even though this contradicted Euler's prior correspondence and failed to comply with Euler's duties owed under Texas law, Celeritas voluntarily produced documents to Euler Herms on November 19, 2016. Euler took no action after receiving the documents. Celeritas followed up with Euler Hermes on December 5, 2016 and was told that Euler took the new position that Celeritas' claim does not currently comply with all terms and conditions.

Euler's actions constitute a refusal to attempt in good faith to effectuate the prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of Celeritas' claim, for which Euler's liability has been reasonably clear for several years. Moreover, Euler's misrepresentation in February, 2016, that it "was and remains prepared to make a loss payment to Celeritas . . . once the invoices underlying the claim are no longer the subject of any litigation/dispute between Smith Oil and Celeritas" was made in a manner that would mislead a reasonably prudent person, and indeed did mislead Celeritas, to the false conclusion that Euler had considered all the information necessary and was prepared to make payment on Celeritas' claim. This misrepresentation led to even further delay in effectuation of settlement and payment of the claim for loss payment. As a result of these actions, on December 21, 2016, Celeritas informed Euler that it was adding claims against Euler under the Texas Insurance Code, including 'bad faith' claims and has been prosecuting these additional claim, and on January 9, 2017, Celeritas filed its First Amended Petition adding these additional claims.

The parties have been engaged in litigation on the enlarged scope of claims since that time, including new discovery on the subject claims. In March 2017, Euler requested a continuance of the prior set trial date due to the new claims asserted. A Second Amended Scheduling Order has been entered setting this case for trial the week of October 23, 2017 with various related deadlines set as soon as June 28, 2017.

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**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Debtor claims that the Smith Oil judgment is “final” and, as such, Euler Hermes owes money under the policy. Despite this claim of a “final” judgment, Debtor and its counsel have taken no steps to have this position confirmed by any court, either in the collection action in Louisiana or Texas and/or in the litigation against Euler Hermes. The simple step would be to file a motion for partial summary judgment or reset the motion in the Louisiana case for hearing.

Rather than confirm the finality of the judgment, Debtor and its counsel have expanded the litigation to include a bad faith claim based on what appear to be language in a reservation of rights letter; all of which has unnecessarily increased the costs of the litigation.

As outlined in its objections (Rec. Doc. 102) and motion to convert (Rec. Doc. 109), the issue of finality of the Smith Oil judgment is questionable.

**Debtor’s Response:**

The Smith Oil judgment is final judgment of a Texas court – no party to the judgment or related insurance policy has questioned this. The Louisiana proceeding is related to post-judgment collections in that state and is unrelated to finality of the judgment. The Debtor is pursuing additional amounts for bad faith damages, which to date has only extended the litigation by roughly six months. The fact that Manidhari stands to potentially benefit by the recovery from these additional claims, while at the same time complaining that they are being pursued, underscores Manidhari’s lack of rationality in its positions in this bankruptcy case

**Any description in this Disclosure Statement of any lawsuit, claim, action or value of the same is for informational purposes only and shall not be construed as a release, waiver, limitation, or any other modification of any claim, right or action, including the amount of damages or value. The Debtor expressly reserves all rights regarding its lawsuits, claims or actions, including all claims pending or that might be asserted against Euler Hermes.**

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

This generic description which includes a reservation of rights does not address the Disclosure Statements specific release of most of the claims.

Primary Assets. The Insurance Claim as explained above, the Prime Pack Judgment of approximately \$350,000 and the Smith Oil Judgment of approximately \$2.4MM are the primary

assets of the bankruptcy estate. In addition, Manidhari Gums and Chemicals has asserted claims against entities related to the Debtor, namely the Debtor's managing member, PrimeNA Technologies, Inc. ("PrimeNA"), and Snap Holdings, LLC ("Snap") (collectively, the "Related Entities") alleging that such entities are the alter-ego of the Debtor and that there exist avoidable, fraudulent transfers by the Debtor or by the Debtor's alter-ego to another of these entities. PrimeNA and Snap are two entities related to the Debtor and are also owned by Percy Pinto (the "Manidhari Litigation").<sup>1</sup> The claims asserted against the Related Entities are assets of the Debtor. An additional asset of the Debtor is a business income loss identified on the Debtor's 2015 federal tax return in the amount \$1,226,633 ("Tax Loss").

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

Celeritas claims that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims made by Manidhari are an asset of the estate. While Manidhari disputes this ownership claim, Celeritas does not place a value on these claims. Manidhari's proof of claim is for approximately, \$1,600,000 which Manidhari submits is the approximate value of these claims. Later in Debtor's Disclosure Statement Celeritas' Plan is to release all of these claims against Percy Pinto, and the related entities.

**Debtor's Response:**

The ownership of the alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims is another issue relevant to whether the Chapter 11 Plan should be confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court and is for the Bankruptcy Court to decide at confirmation.

Manidhari's proof of claim does not account for validity or collectability of the claims. Manidhari also does not itemize the amounts asserted in its proof of claim; however, it appears the \$1,600,000 value stated in the Manidhari proof of claim is based upon the breach of contract action Manidhari as asserted against Celeritas, which is an unsecured claim in the Bankruptcy Case and tied to the value of the subject contract.

Nonetheless, the alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims are unliquidated, contingent claims that have not been adjudicated by any court. Moreover, the practical value of the claims is limited by the collectability of a judgment on account of such claims and the cost of prosecuting the claims. Nonetheless, the value of these claims is discussed in the Liquidation Analysis section under Article XI. In Article XI, the alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims are referred to as the "Chapter 5 Claims" and the value and collectability of those claims is discussed therein.

Claims. JPMorgan Chase ("Chase") asserts a secured claim against the estate of approximately \$879,861.88, plus post-petition interest and fees incurred which are estimated to of

<sup>1</sup> *Manidhari Gums & Chemicals v. Celeritas Chemicals, et. al*, case number 2014-cv-00708.

approximately \$45,000 as of the date of this Disclosure Statement, with liens against, *inter alia*, the Euler Hermes Insurance Claim, the Smith Oil Judgment and the Prime Pack Judgment. Accordingly, Chase appears oversecured. There is also approximately \$100,000 of claims for personal property taxes asserted against the Debtor and between \$750,000 and \$2.25MM approximately in asserted General Unsecured Claims.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Celeritas does not disclose that the JP Morgan Chase loan has a personal guaranty by Percy Pinto and the Disclosure Statement does not discuss the pursuit of this guaranty.

**Debtor's Response:**

Mr. Pinto's guaranty of the Celeritas loan with Chase is identified in the Debtor's schedules filed in the Bankruptcy Case. Manidhari's suggestion that the Debtor has grounds to pursue Mr. Pinto on his guaranty to Chase is incorrect and not supported by any legal authority. The guaranty of Mr. Pinto as an obligor to Chase is not an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Under Sections 101(4)(A) and 101(9)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a guarantor is a *creditor* of the debtor because the guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the debtor. *Matter of Midwestern Companies, Inc.*, 102 B.R. 169, 171 (W.D.Mo.1989); *In re Aerco Metals, Inc.*, 60 B.R. 77, 79 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985). The Debtor is the primary obligor on the promissory note to Chase and therefore does not have a claim against Percy Pinto to compel him to pay Chase on the Debtor's obligation.

The Plan. Celeritas has engaged the James M. Stanton and Stanton LLP (formerly the Stanton Law Firm, P.C.) (the "Stanton Law Firm") to assist in recovery of the Smith Oil Judgment, Insurance Claim, and Prime Pack Judgment with the financing such litigation to come from a \$30,000 retainer provided by the Debtor and to be replenished by Percy Pinto, as needed, whenever the retainer dips below \$10,000. The Debtor currently has authority from the Court to borrow up to the \$50,000 from Percy Pinto for operations and funding of the Stanton Law Firm in the amounts above the initial retainer under the Debtor in Possession financing order ("DIP Order"). Chase will retain its lien against the Insurance Claim and the judgments with interest at the non-default contract rate to accrue until paid in full. Upon recovery of funds from the Insurance Claim, the Smith Oil Judgment and/or the Prime Pack Judgment, Chase will be paid on account of its liens with any remaining deficiency claim to be treated as a general unsecured claim.

A Claims Payment Fund (the "Claims Payment Fund") will be established with the remaining proceeds of the recovery on the Insurance Claim, the Smith Oil Judgment, the Prime Pack Judgment and a contribution of \$100,000 cash from Percy Pinto. The unencumbered proceeds of the Claims Payment Fund will be distributed in accordance with the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code: first to Allowed, unpaid Administrative Expense Claims, second to any remaining unpaid unsecured Priority Claims, third to the Allowed General Unsecured Claims, fourth to the subordinated claims of Percy Pinto arising under the DIP Order and finally with any excess proceeds of the Claims Payment Fund to be paid to Allowed Interests.

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

The Disclosure Statement does not address that Percy Pinto's contribution of \$100,000 to the Claims Payment Fund will, under the release provisions, allow him to avoid approximately \$2,700,000 in personal liability. Manidhari submits that Mr. Pinto's obligations and potential personal liability should not be released.

**Debtor's Response:**

Manidhari has not specified from where its assertion that Mr. Pinto has \$2,700,000 of personal liability comes, but the Debtor disputes this claim. It appears this sum may be the total of the face amount of Manidhari's proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Case of \$1,600,000, which again, is based upon a breach of contract claim asserted against the Debtor, and the approximate liability of Celeritas to Chase, for which Mr. Pinto has signed a personal guaranty. If that is the case, Manidhari's analysis is very simplistic and not supported by any legal authority.

As set forth Section 8.03 of the Plan, in the event all Holders of Allowed Claims consent, or are deemed to consent, to the release of claims against the Released Parties, Percy Pinto will contribute an additional \$100,000 into the Claims Payment Fund in 10 equal monthly installments of \$10,000 each ("Contingent Cash Payment") which will increase the available funds in the Claims Payment Fund.

As explained below in further detail in Article IV, all financing commitments of Percy Pinto, including the \$100,000 cash payment and the Contingent Cash Payment are subject to confirmation of the Plan and that no other party purchase the Equity Interests in the Debtor at the Auction (defined below) to be held only under the circumstances described in Article IV, C.

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Below is a summary of the treatment of classes of Allowed Claims under the Plan:

<b>SUMMARY OF TREATMENT OF CLASSES UNDER THE PLAN</b>		
<b>Class</b>	<b>Estimated Amounts</b>	<b>General Treatment Under the Plan</b>
Class 1 – Secured Claim of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.	Face Amount of Asserted Claim: \$879,861.88 plus post-petition interest and fees incurred which are estimated to of approximately \$45,000 as of the date of this Disclosure Statement	Chase to retain its lien against its collateral until payment in full as set forth herein.
Class 2 – Property Tax Claims	Face Amount of filed Claims: \$103,507.22	To be paid pro rata from the Claims Payment Fund (See Sections 5.02 C and D of the Plan) with 12% annual interest as required by 11 U.S.C. §§ 511 and 1129(a)(9)(C).
Class 3 – General Unsecured Claims	Estimated Allowable Claims: Approximately \$750K to 2.25MM <sup>2</sup>	To receive pro rata share of the remaining amounts in the Claims Payment Fund after payment of the Allowed Property Tax Claims and other Allowed, unpaid Priority Claims, if any.
Class 4 – Subordinated DIP Administrative Claim	Estimated Allowable Claims: \$50,000.00	No likely distribution
Class 5 – Equity Interests	N/A	To be retained.

### **Factors and Assumptions Applied in Arriving at Estimates**

The estimated Allowable Claims per Class in the foregoing table have been derived from the Schedules for the Debtor's Estate prepared by the Debtor and its Professionals using information from the Debtor's books and records and other information available to them, as well as proofs of Claims filed by Creditors in the Bankruptcy Case and Orders entered by the Bankruptcy Court.

For those Claimants listed on the Schedules who also filed proofs of Claim in the Bankruptcy Case, applicable Bankruptcy Rules provide that the proofs of Claim have superseded any amounts reflected in the Schedules. To the extent Claims scheduled by the Debtor have not

<sup>2</sup> The Debtor disputes the majority of the asserted unsecured claims. However, if all disputed claims were allowed in full then the estimated total amount of claims would be approximately \$4MM. However, the Debtor contends the ultimate Allowed amount of Unsecured Claims will be significantly less.

been superseded by proofs of Claim, the estimates in the foregoing table take into account contingent and Disputed Claims. Where duplicative or amended Claims appear to have been filed, including Scheduled Claims, the foregoing estimates assume that duplicates and superseded Claims will be Disallowed in favor of, at most, a single surviving Claim. The estimates also include application of merit-based objections known to the Debtor and its counsel as of the date of this Disclosure Statement and, therefore, constitute their best estimate, as of the date of Filing of this Disclosure Statement, of the ultimate allowable amount of Claims in each such Class.

The ultimate resolution of Claims is inherently uncertain. Moreover, the Debtor has not completed its evaluation of all Claims and cannot presume the validity of merit-based disputes or objections thereto. Any Claim which is a Disputed Claim may be Disallowed or reduced in amount if an objection has been or is timely hereafter filed and sustained by the Bankruptcy Court. Because the resolution of Disputed Claims involves many factual and legal issues which may or may not be resolved as anticipated, no assurance can be given that the anticipated amount of Allowable Claims in each Class would be achieved were these assumptions included in the foregoing estimates. The Debtor believes that the ultimate universe of Allowed Claims will be lower than the face amount of the filed proofs of Claims, and that the current estimates of Allowable Claims shown herein above in each Class are reasonably precise given the particular circumstances.

Notwithstanding, the foregoing estimates contained herein shall not be deemed as any admission on the part of the Debtor or the Estate as to the validity of any Claim. Any Claim which is not Allowed by an order of the Bankruptcy Court or pursuant to a settlement approved by an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be Disallowed or reduced in amount if an objection has been, or is timely hereafter, filed and sustained by the Bankruptcy Court. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, all objections and other defenses to Disputed Claims are preserved under the Plan.

The Debtor has disclosed on the Statement of Financial Affairs (the "SOFA") filed at Docket No. 24 in the Bankruptcy Case payments during the year prior to the Petition Date payments in the following amounts to the following parties:

Percy Pinto -	\$351,979.10 for expense reimbursement, loan repayment and equity distribution
Nancy Mathias -	\$169,283.00 for repayment of loans
Roy Chirayil -	\$23,290.11 for salary (collectively, the "Insider Payments")

The Debtor believes that none of the prepetition payments to Roy Chirayil are avoidable as either fraudulent transfers or preferences under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code because such payments were for salary that was earned in the ordinary course by Mr. Chirayil and were paid contemporaneously with the provision of his services as employee.

The Debtor believes that none of the payments to Ms. Mathias are avoidable as fraudulent transfers because they were in repayment of loans to the Debtor. However, some portion of the payments to Ms. Mathias may constitute avoidable preferences subject to the defenses set forth in Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, Ms. Mathias is a citizen of Canada and

retired school teacher such that collection would fall under Canadian law and would appear to be onerous and dubious.

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

During the course of this bankruptcy, Manidhari repeatedly requested that Celeritas fulfill its obligations as Debtor in Possession, including the pursuit of avoidable transfers or preferences and/or fraudulent transfers, each request was met with silence. See, Motion to Convert (Rec. Doc. 109).

Celeritas' claim that "collection" against Ms. Mathais under Canadian law is technically correct but the determination of whether or not the payment was a fraudulent transfer or an avoidable preference is governed by U.S. law. And, any judgment by the bankruptcy court would be recognized in Canada under applicable treaties.

Debtor claims that Ms. Mathais was paid \$169,283. Records reveal that a substantial portion of these "loans" were not to Debtor but, rather personal loans to Mr. and Mrs. Pinto; all of which may constitute avoidable preferences and/or fraudulent transfers.

**Debtor's Response:**

The Debtor disputes the above fact allegations of Manidhari. To be clear, again, the Bankruptcy Court has approved this Disclosure Statement despite the fact that Manidhari repeatedly refers to its statements as objections.

With respect to the Motion to Convert, the Debtor has filed its Response to that pleading at Docket No. 124. The avoidance claims to which Manidhari refers are discussed above and below in this section and in Article XI. The remainder of the above statement is yet another basis on which Manidhari apparently objects to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan, which is a separate matter from the Court's approval of this Disclosure Statement and which will be determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing.

The payments to Mr. Pinto were primarily in repayment of loans Mr. Pinto made to the Debtor and expense reimbursements. Nevertheless, the payments to Mr. Pinto may constitute avoidable preferences subject to the defenses set forth in Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and some portion of such payments may be avoidable under alternate legal theories. It is unknown what amount of the Insider Payments may ultimately be recoverable even if a judgment avoiding all or a portion of the transfers to Mr. Pinto could be obtained.

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

Records show that, at the time of these payments, Mr. Pinto actually owed Celeritas money that had been loaned to him by the Debtor and the amount of these loans exceeded the amount paid to Mr. Pinto; all of which demonstrates that, at a minimum, these are avoidable preferences.

The Disclosure Statement claims that a portion of these payments were for “equity distributions” but records show that, in late 2015, Mr. Pinto had a negative equity balance. Again, the records demonstrate that, at a minimum, these are avoidable preferences.

Interestingly, Debtor has not listed the monies owed by Mr. Pinto as an asset of the estate nor the Disclosure Statement address the recovery of these assets.

**Debtor’s Response:**

The Debtor disputes the above fact allegations of Manidhari. To be clear, again, the Bankruptcy Court has approved this Disclosure Statement despite the fact that Manidhari repeatedly refers to its statements as objections.

The above statement is yet another basis on which Manidhari apparently objects to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan, which is a separate matter from the Court’s approval of this Disclosure Statement and which will be determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing.

The release is provided in Section 8.02 of the Plan includes Avoidance Actions, which includes claims for return of the above detailed payments to Mr. Pinto and Ms. Mathias, and the claims of Fraudulent Transfer and Alter-Ego against the Related Entities asserted by Manidhari in the Manidhari Litigation.<sup>3</sup> Considering the costs of pursuing claims for the avoidance of such transfers and the continued participation and contribution of Mr. Pinto to the Debtor under the DIP Facility and the Plan, the Debtor believes the Release in Section 8.02 is appropriate and in the best interests of the estate.

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<sup>3</sup> In its Second Amended Complaint filed in the Manidhari Litigation, Manidhari makes generalized allegations that the Debtor is the alter ego of the Related Entities and the Related Entities are the alter ego of the Debtor and that the Related Entities received transfers of property of the Debtor prior to the filing of the Bankruptcy Case that are subject to avoidance under state fraudulent transfer law.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Celeritas argues that the “cost of pursuing claims” and Mr. Pinto’s “continued participation and contribution” are sufficient grounds for a full release of Mr. Pinto, his sister, the Stanton firm and the released entities is in the best interest of the estate.

The release of all of these claims and Avoidance Actions is certainly not in the best interest of the Creditors. And, the cost of pursuing these claims is far less than the \$521,262.10 paid to Mr. Pinto and his sister. So far, Mr. Pinto has only contributed \$30,000 as a DIP loan for attorney fees.

Additionally, to date, the cost of pursuing the alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims made by Manidhari have been borne by Manidhari and, as of this date, the Court has not yet determined whether these claims are an asset of the estate.

**Debtor’s Response:**

The ownership of the alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims asserted by Manidhari will be determined by the Bankruptcy Court at the Confirmation Hearing. The potential claims of Celeritas against Mr. Pinto and Ms. Mathias are discussed above. The contributions of Mr. Pinto to the Chapter 11 Plan and the pursuit of the Debtor’s litigation assets is discussed below, and in Articles VII and XI.

The remainder of the above statement is yet another basis on which Manidhari apparently objects to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan, which is a separate matter from the Court’s approval of this Disclosure Statement and which will be determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing.

The release of the Released Parties specified in Section 8.03 of the Plan includes a release of all Causes of Action, including Avoidance Actions, which includes all claims of misrepresentation asserted by Manidhari against the Related Entities in the Manidhari Litigation.<sup>4</sup> The Debtor has conducted a review and consideration of the misrepresentation and breach of contract claims against the Related Entities and believes they likely lack merit, although Manidhari disagrees with that assessment. Nevertheless, such claims are speculative and would be costly to pursue and therefore the Debtor believes the Release in Section 8.03 of the Plan is appropriate as provided for if all voting creditors holding general unsecured claims consent and non-voting general unsecured creditors do not opt-out in return for the \$100,000 to be paid by Mr. Pinto.

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<sup>4</sup> In the Manidhari Litigation Manidhari makes generalized allegations against the Related Entities of representations regarding the financial viability of the Debtor to Manidhari.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Celeritas argues that Manidhari's claims "likely lack merit" and would be costly to pursue. Debtor goes on to state that the \$100,000 to be paid by Mr. Pinto is more appropriate. First, Manidhari's claims have already survived a motion to dismiss and the records readily show that both the alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims will succeed at trial. As for cost, the district court case was 60 days away from trial and, as such, the cost is relatively minimal, especially if the non-debtors pay their own fees and costs.

**Debtor's Response:**

Manidhari's assertion that the value of the alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims exceeds the value which the Debtor is receiving for such claims from Mr. Pinto in the Chapter 11 Plan in return for a release of those claims is another objection to Manidhari to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan, which will be determined by the Bankruptcy Court. Furthermore, Manidhari's valuation is simplistic and ignores the costs of trial and collection of any judgment that may be obtained as well as the limited amount of funds available for payment of such judgment.

As explained in this section and in Articles VII and XI, as well as on Exhibit "B" attached hereto, Mr. Pinto has limited non-exempt assets. Mr. Pinto is contributing \$100,000 to the Claims Payment Fund and will contribute an additional \$100,000 in installments if a sufficient number of creditors' consent to the Third Party Release as described in in this Article II above. In addition, Mr. Pinto is funding the attorneys' fees and costs for the pursuit of the Debtor's litigation assets, which is estimated to be approximately \$175,000 and which will save the Bankruptcy estate an estimated \$985,000 in legal fees if the same litigation is handled by a Chapter 7 trustee on a contingency fee basis.

In addition, the Debtor has disclosed on its SOFA payments during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy to the Stanton Law Firm PC in the amount of \$132,168.08. The Debtor has reviewed the circumstances surrounding these payments and does not believe they are avoidable preferences under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code because the payments were made to the Stanton Law Firm PC on account of legal services provided contemporaneously with the payments made and/or the payments were further made within the terms of the parties and within what appears to be standard within the industry for such services and such payments. As is evident from the table summary below and the IOLTA account statements and correspondence from the Stanton Law Firm to Percy Pinto attached hereto as Exhibit "C", payments made during the preference period for on account of invoices dated either the same day as payment or within days of the payment and services continued to be provided up to the date before the Petition Date.

**Manidhari's Statement:****Manidhari Objection:**

Celeritas argues that the payments to the Stanton firm “appear to be standard within the industry.” The standard billing practice in the “industry” is that, unless specifically instructed by the clients, to bill each client separately, not a consolidated bill. Since Celeritas consulted with bankruptcy counsel in 2014, the Stanton firm and Debtor should have been well aware that separate billing should have been issued to each non-debtor.

**Debtor's Response:**

It is not unusual for a law firm to represent a group of related defendants to a single lawsuit of various claims based upon a common, overlapping set of facts. In those instances, the vast majority of tasks are related to all, or at least multiple, defendants. It is virtually impossible, or at least highly impractical, for the attorney to separately record all time entries on separate invoices for each task and party. In these instances, standard industry practices would include single, joint time recording and billing

Below is further detail regarding the invoices from the Stanton Law Firm PC related to the preference period payments.

<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Arlington ISD v. PrimeNA/347	PrimeNA, Celeritas in separate lawsuit	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$1,601.96	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Arlington ISD v. PrimeNA/375	PrimeNA, Celeritas in separate lawsuit	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$2,150.70	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Arlington ISD v. PrimeNA/398	PrimeNA, Celeritas in separate lawsuit	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$49.63	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Arlington ISD v. PrimeNA/443	PrimeNA, Celeritas in separate lawsuit	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$5,887.50	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 9,689.79</b>		
<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>

Manidhari Gums & Chemicals/351	PrimeNA, Celeritas, Snap Holdings, Percy Pinto	Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Transfer, Alter Ego	\$ 7,419.80	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Manidhari/379	PrimeNA, Celeritas, Snap Holdings, Percy Pinto	Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Transfer, Alter Ego	\$ 9,373.67	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Manidhari/401	PrimeNA, Celeritas, Snap Holdings, Percy Pinto	Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Transfer, Alter Ego	\$3,193.52	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Manidhari/445	PrimeNA, Celeritas, Snap Holdings, Percy Pinto	Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Transfer, Alter Ego	\$ 18,389.80	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 38,376.79</b>		
<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Ruchi Soya/353	PrimeNA, Celeritas	Breach of Contract	\$487.50	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Ruchi Soya/381	PrimeNA, Celeritas	Breach of Contract	\$ 5,711.50	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Ruchi Soya/403	PrimeNA, Celeritas	Breach of Contract	\$6,599.60	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Ruchi Soya/447	PrimeNA, Celeritas	Breach of Contract	\$ 6,266.84	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$19,065.44</b>		
<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Chase Bank/348	Celeritas, Percy Pinto	Suit on Note, Guaranty	\$ 4,137.57	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Chase Bank/376	Celeritas, Percy Pinto	Suit on Note, Guaranty	\$352.00	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Chase Bank/399	Celeritas, Percy Pinto	Suit on Note, Guaranty	\$ 2,470.25	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$ 6,959.82</b>		

<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
La Porte/350	Celeritas	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$1,952.05	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
La Porte/378	Celeritas	Property Tax Lawsuit	\$122.90	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$2,074.95</b>		
<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Euler Hermes/349	Euler Hermes - Celeritas is the plaintiff	Suit on insurance policy	\$ 3,859.41	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Euler Hermes/377	Euler Hermes - Celeritas is the plaintiff	Suit on insurance policy	\$5,538.85	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Euler Hermes/400	Euler Hermes - Celeritas is the plaintiff	Suit on insurance policy	\$ 801.50	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Euler Hermes/444	Euler Hermes - Celeritas is the plaintiff	Suit on insurance policy	\$3,096.50	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$13,296.26</b>		
<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Prime Pack/352	Prime Pack/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Breach of Contract	\$2,398.55	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Prime Pack/380	Prime Pack/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Breach of Contract	\$ 11,312.41	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Prime Pack/402	Prime Pack/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Breach of Contract	\$2,295.97	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Prime Pack/402	Prime Pack/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Breach of Contract	\$8,654.53	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$24,661.46</b>		

<b>Matter Description/Invoice Number</b>	<b>Defendants</b>	<b>Summary of Lawsuit</b>	<b>Amount Invoiced</b>	<b>Invoice Date</b>	<b>Date Paid</b>
Smith Oil/354	Smith Oil/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Confirm Arbitration Award in favor of Celeritas	\$ 1,039.98	2/15/2016	2/16/2016
Smith Oil/382	Smith Oil/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Confirm Arbitration Award in favor of Celeritas	\$ 6,815.73	3/15/2016	3/15/2016
Smith Oil/404	Smith Oil/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Confirm Arbitration Award in favor of Celeritas	\$ 6,182.25	4/15/2016	4/15/2016
Smith Oil/448	Smith Oil/Celeritas is the Plaintiff	Confirm Arbitration Award in favor of Celeritas	\$5,353.00	6/1/2016	6/1/2016
		<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$19,390.96</b>		
		<b>Grand Total of Invoices</b>	<b>\$ 133,515.47</b>		

**Manidhari Statement:**

## Manidhari Objection:

This table does not provide a complete breakdown of the \$410,000 in fees and costs paid to the Stanton firm. See. Exhibit "D"

In addition to potential claims under Section 547 of the Code against the Stanton Law Firm, the Debtor has considered possible claims for fraudulent transfer relating to the payments the Stanton Law Firm received from the Debtor prior to the petition date. A fraudulent transfer claim requires that the Debtor have not received reasonably equivalent value in return for the payments it provided to the Stanton Law Firm. Multiple courts that have considered whether payments made by a debtor to its law firm could be avoidable as fraudulent transfers have concluded that, so long as the debtor received a benefit from the services provided, the payments made could not be avoided as fraudulent transfers. *See, Friedman v. Grossman (In re Trauger)*, 105 B.R. 120, 123 (Bankr. S.D. Fla., 1989); *Lawrence v. Bonadio, Insero & Co. (In re Interco Systems, Inc.)*, 202 B.R. 188, 193 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y., 1996); *Alexander v. Delong, Caldwell, Novotny & Bridgers, L.L.C (In re Terry Mfg. Co., Inc.)*, 2008 WL 4493240, at \*12 (M.D. Ala., 2008).

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

Of interest, both the Friedman and Lawrence cases found the payments to be avoidable preferences but the trustees did not prove fraudulent transfers.

None of these cases analyze Texas law on fraudulent transfers. That is the standard to be applied to this determination. See, *S.E.C. v. Rer. Dev. Int'l. LLC*, 487 F.3d 295, 301 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007).

**Debtor's Response:**

The legal standard for recovery of payments as preferences versus fraudulent transfers is completely different. There is clearly no basis to assert that the payments to the Stanton Law Firm are avoidable preferences since all of the payments made to the Stanton Law Firm were from a retainer and were made within a day or two of the invoice. Since the payments were made from a retainer that means they were paid using funds that were already in the possession of the Stanton Law Firm and payment within days of the invoice means the payments were substantially contemporaneous with the provision of the services. Both of these facts preclude recovery of any of the payments on a preference theory. Therefore, it is completely irrelevant that the Friedman and Lawrence cases found payments were avoidable as preferences under the facts of those cases.

The cases cited above considered the avoidability of the payments in question as potential fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548, which is the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code and is applicable to the payments to the Stanton Law Firm that were made within 2 years prior to the Petition Date. Texas law on fraudulent transfers follows the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which parallels Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, *Levit v. Spatz (In re Spatz)*, 222 B.R. 157, 164 (N.D.Ill.1998).

Copies of the invoices for work provided by the Stanton Law Firm to Celeritas and its Related Entities are attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Applying this analysis to the payments to the Stanton Law Firm, it is helpful to view the above referenced matters in separate categories. First, there are four of the above matters, which include the Smith Oil, Prime Pack, Euler Hermes, and La Porte matters, in which the Debtor is the only party represented by the Stanton Law Firm. As such, in all of these matters there is no basis upon which the payments to the Stanton Law Firm might be avoidable as fraudulent transfers because the Debtor received a direct benefit and the payments to the Stanton Law Firm could not have possibly been on account of any other party, as the invoices reflect.

A second category of matters would include the matters where the Debtor is a party to the lawsuit, but there are other non-debtor, co-parties as well that were represented by the Stanton Law Firm. These are the Manidhari, Ruchi Soya, and Chase Bank matters. In the Chase Bank matter, the Debtor is the borrower of a note to Chase Bank. Percy Pinto, the only co-defendant, is the guarantor such that Percy Pinto's liability is directly related to Celeritas' liability under the note.

In the Ruchi Soya matter, PrimeNA is alleged to have breached a contract to Ruchi Soya, Celeritas guaranteed payment for that breach of contract, and Celeritas is sued on account of its guaranty. In the Manidhari matter, Manidhari alleges breach of contract and misrepresentation against the Debtor and also alleges that the other, non-debtor co-defendants received property of the Debtor and/or are the alter ego of the Debtor. The defense of each of these matters necessarily benefitted the Debtor as it was a defendant. The claims all arise out of the same set of facts, with respect to each individual matter, such that a unity of defense was appropriate and would benefit the Debtor's ultimate liability. Because the Debtor received a direct benefit, under the cases cited above there does not appear to be a viable claim for fraudulent transfer for funds expended by the Debtor for the common defense of all co-defendants.

#### **Manidhari Statement:**

##### **Manidhari Objection:**

Note, Celeritas cites no cases to support this argument. However, both the Friedman and Lawrence cases cited above found such transfers to be voidable preferences.

#### **Debtor's Response:**

Manidhari is incorrect. As explained above, multiple courts that have considered whether payments made by a debtor to its law firm could be avoidable as fraudulent transfers have concluded that, so long as the debtor received a benefit from the services provided, the payments made could not be avoided as fraudulent transfers. *See, Friedman v. Grossman (In re Trauger)*, 105 B.R. 120, 123 (Bankr. S.D. Fla., 1989); *Lawrence v. Bonadio, Insero & Co. (In re Interco Systems, Inc.)*, 202 B.R. 188, 193 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y., 1996); *Alexander v. Delong, Caldwell, Novotny & Bridgers, L.L.C (In re Terry Mfg. Co., Inc.)*, 2008 WL 4493240, at \*12 (M.D. Ala., 2008).

The above paragraph to which Manidhari refers is an application of the principles of law decided by the above cited cases to the facts present in this case with respect to the payments to the Stanton Law Firm. The above argument is supported by all of the cases cited above. As stated, it is completely irrelevant that these courts found payments to be avoidable preferences with respect to the fraudulent transfer liability because the two claims are completely different.

The final remaining matter is a set of two property tax lawsuits filed by Arlington ISD with one of the lawsuits being against PrimeNA and the other against Celeritas. Although there are two separate lawsuits, they were still defended by the Stanton Law Firm conjunctively and the Debtor paid the Stanton Law Firm's services. It appears in this case that the Debtor clearly did also receive a benefit from the Stanton Law Firm's services. A question may arise as to whether the Debtor received a benefit for the work done on the separate PrimeNA lawsuit. However, because the defense work was done simultaneously for the Debtor and PrimeNA in the same fashion as if there were only one lawsuit, the Debtor benefited from all of the work done as with the other matters explained above. Nevertheless, the total amount paid to the Stanton Law Firm during the entire

representation is \$11,794.62. This relatively de minimis claim against the Stanton Law Firm is resolved by the Release contained in Section 8.02 of the Plan in return for the concessions provided by the Stanton Law Firm for the continued representation of the Debtor.

The Debtor believes that the Plan provides affected Creditors and holders of Equity Interests with Distribution rights on account of their Claims and Equity Interests which are at least equal to, if not greater than, what they would obtain if the Chapter 11 Case was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation case, and the Debtor's assets were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor further believes that the Plan is fair and equitable to all Classes of Claims and Interests under the Plan.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:  
Manidhari submits that the Disclosure Statements' stated plan to release all of the fraudulent transfer and avoidable preferences, sums which exceeds \$2,700,000, is neither fair or equitable to the Creditors.

**Debtor's Response:**

The above is yet another objection to confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan. Nevertheless, Manidhari has no factual or legal basis to support its statement.

**III.**  
**VOTING PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS**

**A. Ballots and Voting Deadlines**

Each holder of a Claim in an impaired Class is entitled to vote on the Plan and will be provided a Ballot along with this Disclosure Statement. If a Creditor holds Claims in more than one impaired Class, such Creditor will be provided a separate Ballot for each such Class. The Ballot is to be used by the Creditor to accept or reject the Plan. To ensure that their Ballot is deemed timely and considered by the Balloting Agent, each Creditor must (a) carefully review the Ballot and the instructions set forth thereon, (b) provide all of the information requested on the Ballot, (c) sign the Ballot and (d) return the completed and signed Ballot to the Balloting Agent by the Voting Deadline. By Order of the Bankruptcy Court, the Voting Deadline is \_\_\_\_\_. Therefore, in order for a Ballot to be counted for voting purposes, the completed and signed Ballot must be **received** at the address specified below by not later than such Voting Deadline:

**QUILLING SELANDER LOWNDS WINSLETT & MOSER, P.C.**  
**ATTN: HUDSON M. JOBE**  
**2001 BRYAN STREET, SUITE 1800**  
**DALLAS, TEXAS 75201**

## **B. Creditors Solicited to Vote**

Each Creditor holding a Claim in an impaired Class under the Plan is being solicited to vote on the Plan. However, unless otherwise provided in the Plan, as to any Claim for which a proof of Claim was filed and as to which an objection has been lodged, if such objection is still pending as of the Voting Deadline, the Creditor's vote associated with such Claim will not be counted to the extent of the objection to the Claim, unless the Creditor properly files and serves a motion and obtains an order of the Bankruptcy Court temporarily allowing the Claim in an amount that the Bankruptcy Court deems proper for the purpose of voting on the Plan. In addition, a Creditor's vote may be disregarded if the Bankruptcy Court determines that the Creditor's acceptance or rejection of the Plan was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, or that the Creditor is an insider of a Debtor within the meaning of section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code.

## **C. Definition of Impairment**

Pursuant to section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code, except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim or equity interest within a class agrees to less favorable treatment of the holder's claim or equity interest, a class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan does at least one of the following two (2) things:

1. The plan leaves unaltered the legal, equitable and contractual rights to which such claim or equity interest entitles the holder of such claim or equity interest; or
2. Notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles the holder of such claim or equity interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or equity interest after the occurrence of a default, the plan:
  - (i) cures any such default that occurred before or after the commencement of the case under the Bankruptcy Code, other than a default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code or of a kind that section 365(b)(2) expressly does not require to be cured;
  - (ii) reinstates the maturity of such claim or equity interest as such maturity existed before such default;
  - (iii) compensates the holder of such claim or equity interest for any damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law;
  - (iii) if such claim or such equity interest arises from any failure to perform a nonmonetary obligation, other than a default arising from failure to operate a nonresidential real property lease subject to section 365(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, compensates the holder of such claim or equity interest

(other than the debtor or an insider) for any actual pecuniary loss incurred by such holder as a result of such failure; and

- (iv) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable or contractual rights to which such claim or equity interest entitles the holder of such claim or equity interest.

#### **D. Classes Impaired Under the Plan**

Classes 1 through 5 are impaired Classes under the Plan. All holders of Allowed Claims or Allowed Equity Interests in Classes 1 through 5 are scheduled to receive on account of such Claims or Equity Interests at least some property interest having potential value under the Plan. Accordingly, holders of Claims within Classes 1 through 5 are being solicited to vote on the Plan.

#### **E. Vote Required for Class Acceptance**

Under section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a Class of Claims under the Plan shall be deemed to have accepted the Plan if the Plan is accepted by Creditors holding at least two-thirds (2/3) in amount and more than one-half (1/2) in number of the Allowed Claims within such Class held by Creditors that have accepted or rejected the Plan.

Under section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, on request of a party in interest in the Bankruptcy Case, and after notice and a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court may designate the vote of any Creditor whose acceptance or rejection of the Plan was not (a) in good faith, (b) solicited or procured in good faith, or (c) made in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

### **IV.** **CONFIRMATION OF THE PLAN**

#### **A. Confirmation Hearing**

Section 1128(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the Bankruptcy Court, after notice, to hold a hearing on confirmation of the Plan. Section 1128(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that any party in interest may object to confirmation of the Plan. The Confirmation Hearing has been scheduled to commence on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_. (prevailing Central Time), before the Honorable Mark X. Mullin, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Texas, Eldon B. Mahon U.S. Courthouse 501 W. 10th St. Fort Worth, TX 76102-3643. Any objection to confirmation of the Plan must be made in writing, and such written objection must be filed with the Bankruptcy Court and served on the following parties by not later than \_\_\_\_\_:

Debtor's Counsel:

Hudson M. Jobe  
Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett &  
Moser, PC  
2001 Bryan Street, Suite 1800  
Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 871-2100 – Telephone  
214) 871-2111 – Facsimile

United States Trustee:  
Office of the United States Trustee  
1100 Commerce Street, Room 976  
Dallas, Texas 75242

**UNLESS AN OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION IS TIMELY FILED AND SERVED, IT WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.**

**B. Requirements for Confirmation of the Plan**

At the Confirmation Hearing, the Bankruptcy Court will determine whether the confirmation requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code have been satisfied. Only in the event that all of these requirements have been satisfied, and that all other conditions to confirmation set forth in the Plan have been met, will the Bankruptcy Court enter an order confirming the Plan under section 1129(a). The requirements of section 1129(a) applicable to corporate debtors are as follows:

1. The plan complies with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. The Debtor complies with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.
4. Any payment made or to be made by the Debtor, or by a person issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs and expenses in or in connection with the case, or in connection with the plan and incident to the case, has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the court as reasonable.
5. The Debtor has disclosed:
  - (a) the identity and affiliations of any individual proposed to serve, after confirmation of the plan, as a director, officer or voting trustee of the debtor, an affiliate of the debtor participating in a joint plan with the debtor, or a successor to the debtor under the plan, and the appointment to, or continuance in, such office of such individual, is consistent with the interests of creditors and equity interest holders and with public policy; and
  - (b) the identity of any insider that will be employed or retained by the reorganized debtor, and the nature of any compensation for such insider.
6. Any governmental regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval.

7. With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests:
  - (a) each holder of a claim or equity interest of such class has accepted the plan or will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or equity interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on such date; or
  - (b) if section 1111(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to the claims of such class, each holder of a claim of such class will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property that secures such claims.
8. With respect to each class of claims or interests, such class has accepted the plan or such class is not impaired under the plan.
9. Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that:
  - (a) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
  - (b) with respect to a class of claims of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1), 507(a)(4), 507(a)(5), 507(a)(6), or 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, each holder of a claim of such class will receive (i) if such class has accepted the plan, deferred cash payments of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim, or (ii) if such class has not accepted the plan, cash on the effective date of the plan equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
  - (c) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim regular installment payments in cash (i) of a total value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim, (ii) over a period ending not later than 5 years after the date of the order for relief under section 301, 302, or 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (iii) in a manner not less favorable than the most favored nonpriority unsecured claim provided for by the plan (other than cash payments made to a class of creditors under section 1122(b) of the Bankruptcy Code); and
  - (d) with respect to a secured claim which would otherwise meet the description of an unsecured claim of a governmental unit under section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, but for the secured status of that claim, the holder of that claim will receive on account of that claim, cash payments, in the same manner and over the same period, as prescribed in paragraph 9(c) above.

10. If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.
11. Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
12. All fees payable under section 1930 of Title 28, as determined by the court at the hearing on confirmation of the plan, have been paid or the plan provides for the payment of all such fees on the effective date of the plan.
13. The plan provides for the continuation after its effective date of payment of all retiree benefits, as that term is defined in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, at the level established pursuant to subsection (e)(1)(B) or (g) of section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, at any time prior to confirmation of the plan, for the duration of the period the debtor has obligated itself to provide such benefits.
14. All transfers of property under the plan shall be made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, or trust.

If a sufficient number of Creditors and amounts of Claims in impaired Classes under the Plan vote to accept the Plan, the Debtor believes that the Plan will satisfy all of the applicable statutory requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed below, however, the Debtor believes that the Plan may be confirmed under the "cramdown" provisions of section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

### **C. Cramdown**

Pursuant to section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court may confirm the Plan at the request of the Debtor if: (a) all of the requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, with the exception of section 1129(a)(8) (set out in paragraph 8 above), are met with respect to the Plan; (b) at least one Class of Claims that is impaired under the Plan has accepted the Plan (excluding the votes of insiders); and (c) with respect to each impaired Class that has not accepted the Plan, the Plan does not "discriminate unfairly" and is "fair and equitable."

A plan does not "discriminate unfairly" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code if the classification of claims under the plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code and no particular class will receive more than it is legally entitled to receive for its claims or interests.

"Fair and equitable," on the other hand, has a different meaning for classes of secured claims, classes of unsecured claims and classes of equity interests, as described below:

With respect to a class of secured claims that rejects the plan, to be "fair and equitable" the plan must, among other things, provide:

(a) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims, and that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;

(b) for the realization of such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims; or

(c) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, of any property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under (a) or (b) above.

With respect to a class of unsecured claims that rejects the plan, to be "fair and equitable" the plan must, among other things, provide:

(a) that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or

(b) that the holder of any claim or equity interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or equity interest any property.

With respect to a class of equity interests that rejects the plan, to be "fair and equitable" the plan must, among other things, provide:

(a) that each holder of an equity interest of such class receive or retain on account of such equity interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is entitled, or the value of such equity interest; or

(b) that the holder of any equity interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior equity interest any property.

In the event that at least one impaired Class of Claims under the Plan accepts the Plan, the Debtor requests the Bankruptcy Court confirm the Plan in accordance with the cramdown provisions of section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor believes that all of the requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (with the exception of section 1129(a)(8)) will be satisfied, that at least one Class of impaired Claims will accept the Plan (excluding the votes of insiders), and that the Plan does not unfairly discriminate against and is fair and equitable

in relation to each of the Classes that may vote to reject the Plan.

Percy Pinto is contributing new value to the Debtor under the Plan in the form of the litigation funding under the DIP Facility and for the recovery of the Smith Oil Judgment, Insurance Claim, and Prime Pack Judgment (the “Litigation Funding”) as well as a \$100,000 cash payment to the Claims Payment Fund to retain his Equity Interests in the Debtor as required under Section 1129(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “New Value”). In the event the Debtor proceeds under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor asserts that New Value satisfies the Absolute Priority Rule. A creditor of the Debtor in this case may assert that the Plan violates the Absolute Priority Rule and that the litigation funding and payment of \$100,000 by Percy Pinto does not constitute new value. This determination is reserved for the Bankruptcy Court.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Manidhari submits that Debtor’s Disclosure Statement and Plan do not meet the requirements of section 1129(b) of the bankruptcy code and is far from “fair and equitable.”

Celeritas argues that the \$100,000 cash payment is “New Value” and satisfies the Absolute Priority Rule. Manidhari submits that Mr. Pinto’s payment of \$100,000 does not comply with the Absolute Priority Rule. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)

**Debtor’s Response.**

Clearly, the above statement is Manidhari making an objection to confirmation of the Plan under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, which will be decided by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing. The Debtor contends the Plan is confirmable. If and when Manidhari files an Objection to Confirmation with the Court, the Debtor will respond to such Objection. However, The Debtor contends that, when deciding whether to vote in favor of the Plan or not, creditors can assume the Plan will be confirmed. Any creditor that wishes to object to confirmation may do so as explained in Article IV above.

In the event the Plan is not accepted by each Class of Claims, an auction will be held for the Equity Interests in the Reorganized Debtor one (1) business day prior to the Confirmation Hearing on the Plan at the offices of counsel for the Debtor at Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett & Moser, P.C. 2001 Bryan Street, Suite 1800 Dallas, Texas 75201 at 2 p.m. Central Time (the “Auction”). Bidders must qualify on or before seven (7) calendar days prior to the Auction by submitting a plan for recovery of the Euler Hermes Insurance Claim, Smith Oil Judgment and Prime Pack Judgment as well as a financial commitment and proof of financial ability to make a minimum bid that is all cash, non-contingent and in excess of the obligations in this Plan as further set forth below.. Bids over the initial qualifying amount must be in \$25,000 increments. All financing commitments of Percy Pinto, including the \$100,000 cash payment and the contingency cash payments in the event of the required consent or deemed consent to the Section 8.03 Release

in the Plan, are subject to confirmation of the Plan and that no other party purchase the Equity Interests in the Debtor at the Auction. Any qualified bid is subject to overbid by Percy Pinto or another party at the Auction. In the event a qualified bidder is successful it takes the Debtor subject to all obligations of the Plan with the following modifications: (1) the successful bidder must contribute \$100,000 to the Claims Payment Fund (defined above) on the Effective Date; (2) Percy Pinto has no obligation to pay the initial \$100,000 or the additional \$100,000 into the Claims Payment Fund as described above; (3) Percy Pinto's obligations to contribute any other funds to the Debtor, including the obligations set forth in Docket No. 43-1 are terminated, except for any past due amounts owed to the Stanton Law Firm; (4) the claim of Percy Pinto under the DIP Facility and DIP Order is no longer subordinated; (5) the Stanton Law Firm's services are immediately terminated and the Stanton Law Firm is permitted to withdraw as counsel to the Debtor in all pending matters; and (6) the releases granted to the Released Parties in sections 8.02 and 8.03 will be of no effect.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

In the event the Plan is not accepted, no auction should be held. Rather, the Court should rule on the pending motion to convert this matter to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Further proceedings would be governed by Chapter 7, the Trustee and the Court.

**Debtor's Response:**

The auction described above is triggered if any class of claims does not accept the Plan and the auction will be held prior to the Confirmation Hearing. The Court has already determined that the Motion to Convert will be heard at the Confirmation Hearing, in the event confirmation of the Plan is denied.

**V.**

**SIGNIFICANT PLEADINGS FILED IN THE BANKRUPTCY CASE**

**A. Schedules and Statements**

On July 5, 2016, the Debtor filed its schedules and statement of financial affairs which are available at Docket Nos. 23 and 24 in the Bankruptcy Case.

**B. Debtor in Possession Financing**

On August 18, 2016, the Debtor filed its *Motion for Interim and Final Order Authorizing (A) Borrowing in Return for Administrative Expense Claim Pursuant to Section 364(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, (B) Additional Lending Procedures and (C) Setting A Final Hearing* [Docket No. 42], pursuant to which the Debtor sought authority to borrow up to \$50,000 from Percy Pinto in return for an administrative expense claim for purposes of payment of operational expenses and legal fees associated with the pursuit of estate assets. This motion was approved by order of the

Bankruptcy Court [Docket No. 63] entered on October 11, 2016.

**C. Employment of Professionals**

**(a) Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett & Moser**

On June 23, 2016, the Debtor filed its *Application for Approval of Employment of Quilling, Selander, Lownds Winslett & Moser, PC. as Counsel for the Debtor* [Docket No. 17], pursuant to which the Debtor sought authority to employ Quilling, Selander, Lownds Winslett & Moser, P.C. (“QSLWM”) as general counsel. This application was approved by order of the Bankruptcy Court [Docket No. 66] entered on October 13, 2016.

**(b) Anderson Tobin, PLLC**

On June 23, 2016, the Debtor filed its *Application for Approval of Employment of Anderson Tobin, PLLC. as Special Conflicts Counsel for the Debtor* [Docket No. 18], pursuant to which the Debtor sought authority to employ Anderson Tobin, PLLC (“Anderson Tobin”) as the conflicts counsel. This application was approved by order of the Bankruptcy Court [Docket No. 67] entered on October 13, 2016.

**(c) Sheldon E. Levy**

On July 15, 2016, the Debtor filed its *Application for Approval of Employment of Sheldon E. Levy as Accountant* [Docket No. 35], pursuant to which the Debtor sought authority to employ Sheldon Levy as the Debtor’s accountant and tax professional. This application was approved by order of the Bankruptcy Court [Docket No. 49] entered on August 24, 2016.

**(d) Stanton Law Firm, PC**

On August 18, 2016, the Debtor filed its *Application for Approval of Employment of Stanton Law Firm, PC as Special Counsel for the Debtor* [Docket No. 43] ], pursuant to which the Debtor sought authority to employ the Stanton Law Firm, PC (“Stanton Law Firm”) as the special counsel. This application was approved by order of the Bankruptcy Court [Docket No. 65] entered on October 11, 2016.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Should this matter be converted to a Chapter 7 proceedings, all employment of any professional vests with the Trustee and prior orders should be revoked and retainers returned unless approved by the Trustee or the Court.

**Debtor's Response:**

Under Sections 327, 330, and 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, professionals employed by the Debtor hold administrative claims against the Bankruptcy Estate that are subject to Court approval prior to allowance and payment, as is explained in Article VI below.

**D. Bar Date**

On June 3, 2016, the Court set the bar date of October 13, 2016 (the "Bar Date") as the last day for Creditors and Governmental Entities to file proofs of claim.

**VI.**

**SUMMARY OF THE CLAIMS, CLASSIFICATIONS, AND INTERESTS**

**A. Introduction**

A summary of the principal provisions of the Plan relating to the treatment of Classes of Claims and Equity Interests is set out herein. The summary is qualified in its entirety by the Plan itself, which is controlling in the event of any conflict. Additionally, the estimated amount of allowable Claims in the various Classes are estimates only and are not intended to be exact determinations. While the Debtor has made every effort to reasonably estimate such amounts, there is no guarantee that such estimates shall constitute an admission on the part of the Debtor to the validity of any Disputed Claims. Any Claim which is not Allowed by an order of the Bankruptcy Court or pursuant to a settlement approved by an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be Disallowed or reduced in amount if an objection has been, or is timely hereafter, filed and sustained by the Bankruptcy Court.

**B. Classification of Claims and Interests**

The Plan provides for the division of Claims against and Equity Interests in the Debtor (except Administrative Claims) into Classes. A Claim is classified within a particular Class only to the extent that the Claim qualifies under the description of that Class. A proof of Claim asserting a Claim which is properly includable in more than one Class is only entitled to inclusion within a particular Class to the extent that it qualifies under the description of such Class, and shall be included within a different Class(es) to the extent that it qualifies under the description of such different Class(es). The Plan classifies Claims and Equity Interests as follows:

Unclassified Claims:

Allowed Administrative Claims

Classified Claims and Equity Interests:

Class 1 – JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Class 2 – Property Tax Claims

Class 3 – Unsecured Claims

Class 4 – Subordinated DIP Administrative Claim

## Class 5 – Equity Interests

**C. Unclassified Claims Under the Plan****Allowed Administrative Claims**

The holder of an Administrative Claim that is incurred, accrued, or in existence prior to the Effective Date must file with the Bankruptcy Court and serve on all parties required to receive such notice a request for the allowance of such Administrative Claim on or before the Administrative Claim Bar Date. Such notice must include, at a minimum, (a) the name of the holder of the Claim, (b) the amount of the Claim, and (c) the basis for the Claim. *Failure to timely and properly file and serve the application required under this subsection shall result in the Administrative Claim being forever barred and discharged.* Any party-in-interest with standing to object to a request for allowance of an Administrative Claim may file such an objection thereto. The United States Trustee is not required to file an application for the allowance of an Administrative Claim with regards to fees due in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6).

An Administrative Claim shall become an Allowed Administrative Claim only to the extent Allowed by a Final Order. Unless previously paid, each holder of an Allowed Administrative Claim shall receive in full satisfaction, release and discharge of, and in exchange for, such Allowed Administrative Claim: (i) the amount of such Allowed Administrative Claim, in cash, and without interest, attorney’s fees (except as Allowed by the Bankruptcy Court), or costs, on the earlier of: (a) the Effective Date; or (b) the date that is ten (10) Business Days after such Administrative Claim becomes an Allowed Administrative Claim; or (ii) such other treatment as may be agreed upon in writing by the holder of such Claim.

QSLWM currently holds retainer funds in the amount of \$104,903.00 (“QSLWM Retainer”) for payment of its incurred, allowed fees and expenses as counsel to the Debtor. Anderson Tobin currently holds retainer funds in the amount of \$20,000.00 (“Anderson Tobin Retainer” and collectively the “Retainers”) for payment of its incurred, allowed fees and expenses as conflicts counsel to the Debtor. QSLWM’s fees and expenses to date are approximately the same amount as the QSLWM Retainer. Anderson Tobin has not incurred any material fees in this case and does not expect to in the event the Plan is confirmed without other significant proceedings being required. In the event the Plan is confirmed without substantial other proceedings being required, QSLWM and Anderson Tobin’s fees through confirmation will be limited to the available Retainers, and post-confirmation fees will be paid by the reorganized entity.

**Manidhari Statement:****Manidhari Objection:**

Debtor argues that QSLWM’s fees to date are approximately the same amount as the retainer, \$104,903.00. Manidhari disputes this claim and demands strict proof.

Prior to this Disclosure Statement QSLWM, it filed a motion for payment of fees but, after objection to the motion based on the heavy redaction of the firm statements, the motion was never heard. The determination of the appropriate fees for QSLWM rests with the court.

The Professional Fee Claims of Sheldon Levy will be paid out of the DIP Facility on the later of the Effective Date or the date Sheldon Levy's Professional Fee Claims are allowed by Court order. The total estimated amounts owed to Sheldon Levy for his work on behalf of the bankruptcy estate totals approximately \$6,623.75 as of the date of this Disclosure Statement.

On October 11, 2016, the Court entered an Order authorizing the Debtor to pay \$30,000 as a retainer to the Stanton Law Firm for payment of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in conjunction with the Stanton Law Firm's engagement to pursue the Euler Hermes Insurance Claim and collection of the Smith Oil Judgment and Prime Pack Judgment ("Stanton Retainer"). In the engagement agreement with the Stanton Law Firm at Docket No. 43-1, Percy Pinto further agreed to replenish the Stanton Retainer once it falls below \$10,000 and to personally guarantee payment of attorneys' fees incurred under the engagement agreement in excess of the Stanton Retainer, as more fully set forth in the applicable agreement and subject to the conditions therein. Also on October 11, 2016, the Court entered the DIP Order authorizing Percy Pinto to advance up to \$50,000.00 for the funding of the Debtor's ordinary course business operations and expenses and to allow for the replenishment of the Stanton Retainer. The DIP Order also provides a procedure for additional amounts to be advanced pre-confirmation. Any amounts advanced by Percy Pinto after the Confirmation Date will be a new and separate debt of the Debtor repayable in the ordinary course of the Debtor's business post-confirmation. The Stanton Law Firm shall have no claim or right to payment from the Claims Payment Fund.

#### **D. Classified Claims and Equity Interests Under the Plan**

##### **CLASS 1 – Allowed Secured Claims of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.**

Class 1 Claims consist of the Allowed Secured Claims of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., including its predecessors in interest, successors, and/or assigns, in the Debtor's Bankruptcy Case, including those under the Promissory Note in the original principal amount of \$2,000,000.000, as amended and/or modified by the Business Loan Agreement dated May 30, 2012 (the "Business Loan Agreement") and the Promissory Note dated August 28, 2013 in the original amount of \$2,000,000.00 (the "Renewal contract"), all guaranty agreements and any related documents (collectively, the "Loan Documents"). The holders of Claims in Class 1 are impaired and entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.

**Treatment** – Chase asserts a lien against the proceeds of the insurance with Euler Hermes as well as the proceeds of the Smith Oil Judgment and Prime Pack Judgment ("Chase Collateral"). Chase shall retain its liens in its collateral until its Allowed Claim is paid in full in the amount of \$879,861.88 plus any postpetition accrued interest and fees as provided in the Loan Documents and as reflected by the proof of Claim Number 14-1 filed by JPMorgan Chase estimated to be approximately \$45,000.00. To the extent Chase is entitled to post-petition and post-confirmation interest under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and non-bankruptcy law, interest shall accrue to Chase under this Plan at the non-default rate of interest specified by the Loan Documents until Chase is paid in full.

Within 30 days of the recovery of funds from the Chase Collateral, Chase will be paid up to the allowed amount if its claim from such recovery on account of its liens. Any unsecured

deficiency claim of Chase shall be treated as a Class 3 unsecured claim entitled to payment on a pro rata basis. The payment to Chase under the Plan will be in full satisfaction and discharge of all of Chase's claims against the Estate, all of Chase's claims under the Loan Documents, and all claims asserted or that could have been asserted in the Chase Litigation against all parties. Any and all guaranty agreements executed in connection with the Chase loan agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the Chase claim is paid in full.

### **CLASS 2 – Property Tax Claims**

Class 2 Claims consist of the Allowed Claims of property taxing authorities. The following proofs of claim have been filed against the Debtor on behalf of property taxing authorities:

Claimant	Face Amount of Claim	Proof of Claim No.	Disputed
Arlington ISD	\$5,708.08	3	N
La Porte Tax Office	\$67,922.31	6	N
San Jacinto CCD	\$5,836.34	8	N
Harris County	\$19,998.70	7	N
Tarrant County	\$1,976.84	1	N
Dallas County	\$2,064.95	11-2	N

Total Face Amount      \$103,507.22

Class 2 Claims are impaired and entitled to vote. The Property Tax Claims asserted against the Debtor have been filed as secured claims. However, the Debtor currently maintains no inventory against which a security could attach. ).

### **Treatment.**

Any remaining Allowed, unpaid Property Tax Claims will be paid from the Claims Payment Fund (defined in Sections 5.02 C and D) with the statutory rate interest of 12% per annum in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 511 and 1129(a)(9)(C).

### **CLASS 3 – Unsecured Claims**

Class 3 consists of the Allowed, General Unsecured Claims against the Debtor. Below is a table of the General Unsecured Claims either scheduled by the Debtor or for which proofs of claim have been filed in the Bankruptcy Case.

Creditor	Scheduled Amount	Disputed	Claim No.	Claim Amount	Claim Type
Apex Resources Inc.	\$625,000.00		13	680,890.80	General Unsecured
AT&T Mobility	\$105.77				General Unsecured
Bank Direct	\$1,427.65		10	\$1,793.16	General Unsecured
BYK Additives	\$663.00				General Unsecured

Hangzhou Jingyi Chemical Co., Ltd	\$36,520.00				General Unsecured
Landrum & Evans, PC	\$1,616.00				General Unsecured
Leaf Capital Funding, LLC	\$918.33	Y	9	\$5,108.85	Secured <sup>5</sup>
Manidhari Gums & Chemicals	\$1,181,886.59	Y	4	\$1,600,000.00	General Unsecured
National Telesystems, Inc.	\$188.36				General Unsecured
Pennington Hill, LLP	\$90,350.07	Y		\$55,521.66	Unsecured <sup>6</sup>
Pruitt's Frac Tanks South Texas LLC	\$20,875.00				General Unsecured
Ruchi Soya Industries, Ltd.	\$1,430,000.00	Y	15	\$1,430,000.00	General Unsecured
Shannon Gracey	\$47,550.52				General Unsecured
Stim Teq, LLC	\$7,250.00				General Unsecured
Smith Oil Co., Inc.	\$0.00	Y			General Unsecured
Zeno Imaging	\$777.60				General Unsecured
Law Offices of Paul C. Miniclier	Not Scheduled	Y	5	\$240,021.24 <sup>7</sup>	General Unsecured

Based upon the above table, the Debtor estimates the allowable General Unsecured Claims against the Estate to be in the range of \$750,000 to \$2.25MM. This wide range is due to the large amount of the asserted claims being disputed by the Debtor.

**Manidhari Statement:**

<b>Manidhari Objection:</b>
Ruchi Soya's proof of claim is identified in the table above. Pennington did not file a proof of claim and an Order allowing a reduced, unsecured claim is at Docket No. 135
<del>or these proofs of claims exceed \$4,000,000.</del>

**Debtor's Response:**

**Treatment.** Allowed, General Unsecured Claims will receive their pro rata share of the funds in the Claims Payment Fund as defined in Sections 5.02 C and D of the Plan after payment of the Allowed Property Tax Claims, and any Allowed, unpaid, Administrative Claims other than ordinary course Administrative Claims and the Subordinated DIP Administrative Claim.

<sup>5</sup> The Debtor disputes the secured status of Leaf Capital's claim as it is based upon a lease agreement and leased property that Leaf Capital has already repossessed.

<sup>6</sup> Pennington Hill, LLP filed a UCC-1 against the Debtor that the Debtor disputed. This was resolved by Agreed Order allowing Pennington an unsecured claim in the amount of \$55,521.66 at Docket No. 135.

<sup>7</sup> This claim is for attorneys' fees and expenses relating to the prosecution of the claims of Manidhari against the Debtor and the Related Entities and thus is contingent upon the claim of Manidhari.

#### **CLASS 4 – Subordinated DIP Administrative Claim**

Class 4 consists of the subordinated DIP Administrative Claim under the Final DIP Order currently. The holders of Claims in Class 4 are impaired but not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.

**Treatment.** Per the agreement between the Debtor and Percy Pinto, Mr. Pinto's claims under the Final DIP Order relating to the DIP Facility, including all amounts advanced by Mr. Pinto under the same terms as the DIP Order after the Confirmation Date, will be voluntarily subordinated to all Allowed Claims in the Bankruptcy Case.

#### **CLASS 5 – Equity Interests in the Debtor**

Class 5 consists of the Interests in the Debtor and are to be retained and not entitled to vote.

**Treatment.** The Equity Interests in the Reorganized Debtor shall remain as previously owned with Percy Pinto owning 100% of the interests in the Reorganized Debtor.

### **VII.**

#### **MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN**

The Reorganized Debtor shall be organized and managed by Percy Pinto. The following are the means of funding the operations and payment of claims in the Plan.

A. Financing of Operations/Litigation. On October 11, 2016, the Court entered an Order authorizing the Debtor to pay \$30,000 as a retainer to the Stanton Law Firm for payment of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in conjunction with the Stanton Law Firm's engagement to pursue the Euler Hermes Insurance Claim and collection of the Smith Oil Judgment and Prime Pack Judgment ("Stanton Retainer"). In the engagement agreement with the Stanton Law Firm at Docket No. 43-1, Percy Pinto further agreed to replenish the Stanton Retainer once it falls below \$10,000 and to personally guarantee payment of attorneys' fees incurred under the engagement agreement in excess of the Stanton Retainer, as more fully set forth in the applicable agreement and subject to the conditions therein. Also on October 11, 2016, the Court entered the DIP Order authorizing Percy Pinto to advance the Debtor up to \$50,000.00 for the funding of the Debtor's ordinary course business operations and expenses and to allow for the replenishment of the Stanton Retainer. The Stanton Law Firm shall have no claim or right to payment from the Claims Payment Fund. The DIP Order also provides a procedure for additional amounts to be advanced pre-confirmation. Any amounts advanced by Percy Pinto after the Confirmation Date will be a new and separate debt of the Debtor repayable in the ordinary course of the Debtor's business post-confirmation.

B. Source of Payment of Professional Fee Claims. QSLWM currently holds retainer funds in the amount of \$104,903.00 ("QSLWM Retainer") for payment of its incurred, allowed fees and expenses as counsel to the Debtor. Anderson Tobin currently holds retainer funds in the amount of \$20,000.00 ("Anderson Tobin Retainer" and collectively the "Retainers") for payment

of its incurred, allowed fees and expenses as conflicts counsel to the Debtor. QSLWM's fees and expenses to date are approximately the same amount as the QSLWM Retainer. Anderson Tobin has not incurred any material fees in this case and does not expect to in the event the Plan is confirmed without other significant proceedings being required. In the event the Plan is confirmed without substantial other proceedings being required, QSLWM and Anderson Tobin's fees through confirmation will be limited to the available Retainers, and post-confirmation fees will be paid by the reorganized entity. The Professional Fee Claims of Sheldon Levy will be paid out of the DIP Facility on the later of the Effective Date or the date Sheldon Levy's Professional Fee Claims are allowed by Court order. The total estimated amounts owed to Sheldon Levy for his work on behalf of the bankruptcy estate totals approximately \$6,623.75 as of the date of this Disclosure Statement. The Professional Fee Claims of Sheldon Levy will be paid out of the DIP Facility on the later of the Effective Date or the date Sheldon Levy's Professional Fee Claims are allowed by Court order.

C. Claims Payment Fund. On or before the Effective Date, Mr. Pinto shall establish a fund for payment of Allowed Claims ("Claims Payment Fund"). Into the Claims Payment Fund Mr. Pinto will pay \$100,000 within 30 days of the Effective Date. In addition, all remaining proceeds of the recovery under the Insurance Claim against Euler Hermes, the Smith Oil Judgment, and the Prime Pack Judgment after satisfaction of Chase's liens against such assets will also be paid into the Claims Payment Fund.

D. Third Party Release Funds. In the event all of the Holders of Claims consent, or are deemed to consent, to the Release contained in Section 8.03 herein, Mr. Pinto will pay an additional \$100,000 into the Claims Payment Fund in 10 monthly installments of \$10,000 each beginning on the first day of the month following the Effective Date.

E. Priority of Payment from the Claims Payment Fund. For the avoidance of doubt, the unencumbered proceeds of the Claims Payment Fund will be paid to each class of claims in accordance with the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code as further described below:

- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| First Priority –  | All Allowed unpaid Administrative Expense Claims               |
| Second Priority – | Any allowed, unsecured priority claims                         |
| Third Priority -  | All Allowed General Unsecured Claims                           |
| Fourth Priority – | Subordinated claims of Percy Pinto arising under the DIP Order |
| Fifth Priority -  | Equity Interests.  |

## VIII. PRESERVED CAUSES OF ACTION

The Plan preserves all Causes of Action, unless expressly provided otherwise. The Plan contains definitions for "Causes of Action," and "Avoidance Actions," and all parties are strongly encouraged to review those definitions in the Plan and, if appropriate, seek advice of counsel to determine whether they may be a defendant in a preserved Causes of Action or Avoidance Actions.

Except as expressly otherwise provided in the Plan, after the Effective Date, the Debtor shall have authority and standing to prosecute, enforce, pursue, sue on, settle, or compromise (or

decline to do any of the foregoing) such Causes of Action and Avoidance Actions.

Under section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody or control, during the case, of property of the bankruptcy estate can be compelled to turn over to the trustee (or debtor in possession pursuant to section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code) such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. Under sections 544, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee (or debtor in possession pursuant to section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code) may avoid fraudulent transfers of a debtor's interests in property and recover, for the benefit of estate, any such transfer from immediate or subsequent transferees. Under sections 547 and 550, a trustee (or debtor in possession pursuant to section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code) may avoid preferential payments made within ninety (90) days immediately preceding the commencement of a Bankruptcy Case.

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION THAT ARE EXPRESSLY RELEASED OR WAIVED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PLAN OR FINALLY ADJUDICATED BY ORDER OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT, ALL CAUSES OF ACTION OF THE DEBTOR OR THE ESTATE (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, AVOIDANCE ACTIONS), WHETHER OR NOT SPECIFIED HEREIN, WILL BE PRESERVED AND TRANSFERRED TO THE REORGANIZED DEBTOR UNDER THE PLAN FOR ASSERTION BY THE REORGANIZED DEBTOR. THE REORGANIZED DEBTOR SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY AND STANDING TO PROSECUTE, ENFORCE, PURSUE, SUE ON, SETTLE, OR COMPROMISE (OR DECLINE TO DO ANY OF THE FOREGOING) CAUSES OF ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1123(b)(3) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE.**

#### **IX.**

### **OTHER SIGNIFICANT PLAN PROVISIONS**

#### **A. Distributions Under the Plan**

##### **1. Allowed Claims**

Distributions under the Plan will only be made to Creditors holding Allowed Claims. A Claim or Equity Interest is "Allowed" under the Plan: (a) to the extent that it is listed in the Schedules in a liquidated, non-contingent, and undisputed amount, but only if no proof of Claim or proof of Equity Interest is filed with the Bankruptcy Court to evidence such Claim or Equity Interest on or before the Bar Date and no objection thereto has been timely filed; (b) as evidenced by a proof of Claim or proof of Equity Interest filed on or before the Bar Date, but only to the extent asserted in a liquidated amount, and only if no objection to the allowance of the Claim or Equity Interest or no motion to expunge the proof of Claim or Equity Interest has been timely filed; or (c) to the extent allowed by a final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

##### **2. Delivery of Distributions**

The Plan provides that, subject to Bankruptcy Rule 9010, Distributions to holders of

Allowed Claims will be made by mail at (a) the address of each such holder as set forth on the proofs of Claim filed by such holders, (b) the address set forth in any written notice of address change delivered to the Debtor after the date of any related proof of Claim, or (c) the address reflected in the Schedules if no proof of Claim is filed and the Debtor has not received a written notice or address change. If any Distribution is returned as undeliverable, no further Distributions to such holder will be made unless and until the Debtor is notified in writing of such Creditor's then current address. Such Distributions shall be placed in the Reserve until such time as all other funds in the Claims Payment Fund have been distributed.

### **3. Unclaimed Distributions and Uncashed Checks**

Unclaimed Distributions shall be held in the Reserve for the benefit of the potential Claimants. All claims for undeliverable Distributions must be made within sixty days after the date on which delivery the Distribution was initially mailed. The Claim upon which an undelivered or unclaimed Distribution was made shall be treated as a Disputed Claim until such period has passed, and after that shall be treated as Disallowed in full by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court. After such date, all unclaimed Distributions will revert to the Reserve for deposit into the Claims Payment Fund to be reallocated and distributed to the holders of Allowed Claims and the Claim of any holder with respect to such Distribution will be discharged and forever barred. Checks issued in respect of Allowed Claims will be null and void if not negotiated within ninety days after the date of issuance thereof, and such holder will forfeit its right to such Distribution. In no event shall any funds escheat to the State of Texas.

### **4. Due Authorization by Claimants**

Under the Plan, each and every Claimant who elects to participate in the Distributions provided for herein warrants that the Creditor is authorized to accept in consideration of its Claim against the Debtor the Distributions provided for in this Plan and that there are no outstanding commitments, agreements or understandings, express or implied, that may or can in any way defeat or modify the rights conveyed or obligations undertaken by the Creditor under the Plan.

### **5. Setoffs**

The Plan also generally allows the Debtor, pursuant to sections 502(d) or 553 of the Bankruptcy Code or any applicable non-bankruptcy law, to setoff against any Distribution to be on account of an Allowed Claim any claims, rights, or Causes of Action held by the Estate against the holder of the Allowed Claim or in relation to the Allowed Claim, and further provides that neither the failure to effect such a setoff nor the allowance of any Claim shall constitute a waiver or release by the Debtor or the Debtor of any such claims, rights or Causes of Action. If the Debtor fails to setoff against a Claim and seeks to collect from the holder of such Claim after Distribution to that holder pursuant to the Plan, the Debtor shall be entitled to full recovery on the claims of the Debtor, or the Estate, if any, against the holder of such Claim.

### **6. Additional Charges**

Under the terms of the Plan, no interest, penalty, attorney's fee, or late charges shall be

allowed or paid with respect to any Claim, except as may be expressly provided in the Plan or allowed by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

#### **7. Compliance with Tax Requirements**

In connection with the Plan, the Debtor shall comply with all withholding and reporting requirements imposed on it by any Governmental Unit, and all Distributions pursuant to the Plan shall be subject to such withholding and reporting requirements.

#### **8. De Minimis Distributions and Rounding**

The Plan provides that ratable Distributions to holders of Allowed Claims will not be made if such Distribution will result in a Distribution amount of less than \$25.00, unless the affected Claimant makes a written request for such amount to the Debtor.

#### **C. Means for Resolving Disputed Claims**

Under the terms of the Plan, until a Contingent Claim becomes an Allowed Claim or is Disallowed, the Claim will be treated as a Disputed Claim for all purposes under the Plan. The holder of a Contingent Claim will be entitled to a Distribution under the Plan only when the Contingent Claim becomes an Allowed Claim. Any Contingent Claim for reimbursement or contribution held by a Person that may be liable with the Debtor on a Claim of a Creditor is Disallowed as of the Effective Date if: (a) that Creditor's Claim is Disallowed; (b) the Claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the Effective Date; or (c) that Person asserts a right of subrogation to the rights of the Creditor under section 509 of the Bankruptcy Code. To facilitate the timely and effective administration of Claims, the Plan further provides that, except as otherwise expressly contemplated by the Plan, following the later of the Effective Date of the Plan or the applicable Bar Date, no original or amended proof of Claim may be filed in the Bankruptcy Case to assert a Claim against the Estate without prior authorization of the Bankruptcy Court, and any such proof of Claim which is filed without such authorization will be deemed null, void and of no force or effect; *provided, however*, that the holder of a Claim that has been evidenced in the Bankruptcy Case by the filing of a proof of Claim on or before the Bar Date shall be permitted to file an amended proof of Claim in relation to such Claim at any time if the sole purpose of the amendment is to reduce the amount of the Claim asserted.

The Reorganized Debtor shall have standing to object to Claims. The Plan also provides that the after the Effective Date of the Plan, the Reorganized Debtor will have the right, power, and authority to settle any Disputed Claim without the need for approval or Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Manidhari Objection:**

Since Debtor is disputing all of the unsecured claims, under this Disclosure Statement and Plan, none of them will be allowed any distribution until they become “Allowed Claims”; all of which will require litigation of each claim to judgment or settlement which would be barred by the Plan’s approval. Accordingly, the plan is premature and does not properly address the resolution of the disputed claims.

**Debtor’s Response:**

Manidhari’s statement that the Debtor is disputing all unsecured claims is incorrect. As the tables above indicate, the Debtor has identified 23 unsecured claims and is disputing 6 of them. One of the claim disputes has already been resolved by Agreed Order at Docket No. 135.

Manidhari is further incorrect that the Plan does not address resolution of disputed claims. First, the Plan establishes a deadline for the Debtor to file objections to claims. Second, the Plan establishes a finite pot of funds for payment of all Allowed Claims. Third, the Plan makes clear that the Bankruptcy Court will retain jurisdiction to resolve objections to claims.

The above process for handling disputed claims in a Chapter 11 Plan is standard. Moreover, Manidhari’s objection to this process is another objection to confirmation of the Plan under Section 1129 that will be taken up by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing.

**D. Conditions to Confirmation and Effectiveness of the Plan**

In addition to meeting the requirements of section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, in order for the Plan to be confirmed, the Bankruptcy Court shall have entered the Confirmation Order in a form and substance satisfactory to the Debtor, which shall include, among other things, findings of fact and/or conclusions of law that: (a) enjoin and restrain all Creditors and Equity Interest holders of and in the Debtor from asserting any lien, security interest, Claim, interest, or encumbrance against the Debtor, or the Estate unless such lien, security interest, Claim, interest, or encumbrance is expressly preserved hereunder; (b) preserve jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to implement and enforce the Plan; (c) provide, pursuant to section 1125(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, that Persons who have solicited acceptances or rejections of the Plan have acted in good faith and in compliance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and are not liable on account of such solicitation or participation for violation of any applicable law, rule, or regulation governing the solicitation of acceptances or rejections of the Plan; and (d) find that the Plan and the payments required hereunder are feasible.

Following confirmation of the Plan, the following conditions precedent must be met before the Plan will become effective: (a) the Confirmation Order shall have become a Final Order; (b) execution of definitive documentation, if any, required to consummate the transactions contemplated in the Plan and satisfaction of the conditions precedent, if any, set forth therein in

accordance with the terms thereof; (c) Entry of a final, non-appealable order of the bankruptcy court finding that the Debtor has the exclusive power and authority to execute the Release of the Related Entities and that such release is effective as to bar all parties-in-interest in the Debtor's bankruptcy case, including specifically Manidhari, from asserting any Released claim and (d) any actions, documents, and agreements necessary to implement the Plan shall have been effected or executed.

## **E. Effects of Confirmation of the Plan; Injunction and Exculpation**

### **1. Legally Binding Effect of Plan**

Upon the Effective Date of the Plan, the Plan and each of its provisions will be binding on all holders of Claims and/or Equity Interests, and all other parties in interest, whether or not they accept this Plan. On and after the Effective Date, all holders of Claims and Equity Interests shall be precluded and enjoined from asserting any Claim against the Debtor or the Estate based on any transaction or other activity of any kind that occurred prior to the Confirmation Date except as permitted under the Plan.

### **2. Preservation of Avoided Transfers and Liens**

The Estate shall retain and preserve as Estate property transfers and liens avoided with respect to property of the Estate in accordance with section 551 of the Bankruptcy Code.

### **3. Protection of Certain Parties-In-Interest**

Provided the respective officers, directors, shareholders, members, representatives, attorneys, financial advisors, and agents of the Debtor act in good faith, and subject to any limitations expressly stated in the "Exculpation" section below, they will not be liable, other than for fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence, to any holder of a Claim or Equity Interest or other party with respect to any action, forbearance from action, decision, or exercise of discretion in connection with: (a) the operation of the Debtor after the Petition Date; (b) the proposal or implementation of any of the transactions provided for, or contemplated in, the Plan; or (c) the administration of the Plan or the assets and property to be distributed pursuant to the Plan. The Debtor, and its affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, members, employees, representatives, attorneys, advisors, agents, and contractors may rely upon the opinions of counsel, certified public accountants, and other experts or professionals employed by the Debtor or the Trustee, and such reliance will conclusively establish good faith. In any action, suit, or proceeding by any holder of a Claim or Equity Interest or other party-in-interest contesting any action by or non-action of, the Debtor or its affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, members, employees, representatives, attorneys, advisors, agents, or contractors as not being in good faith, the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the prevailing party will be paid by the losing party and as a condition to going forward with such action, suit, or proceeding at the outset thereof, all parties thereto will be required to provide appropriate proof and assurances of their capacity to make such payments of reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the event they fail to prevail.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

This provision does not address the pending alter ego to TUFTA claims against Mr. Pinto and the related entities.

**4. Exculpation**

On the Effective Date, and without the need for further order, document, or action, the Plan and Confirmation Order shall constitute a release and discharge of all actions, causes of action, claims, suits, debts, damages, judgments, liabilities, and demands whatsoever, whether matured or unmatured, whether at law or in equity, whether before a local, state, or federal court, state or federal administrative agency or commission, regardless of location and whether now known or unknown, liquidated or unliquidated, that any Person may have or be able to assert against the following solely for any actions or inactions taken by the following in, or arising against the following as a result of, the Bankruptcy Case, the Disclosure Statement, and the Plan: (i) the Debtor; and (ii) Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett & Moser, PC; (iii) Anderson Tobin, PLLC, (iv) the Stanton Law Firm, PC, and their respective attorneys, employees, officers, agents, and shareholders; *provided, however*, that nothing contained in this Plan or the Confirmation Order shall relieve any of the foregoing from the normal requirements applicable to the allowance of an Administrative Claim if approval from the Bankruptcy Court for such allowance is required, and no defenses to said allowance are waived or released.

**Mandhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

This provision does not address the avoidable preference and/or fraudulent transfer claims pending against the Stanton firm.

**5. Injunction**

Except and otherwise provided in the Plan, all Persons are enjoined from (a) threatening, commencing or continuing any lawsuit or other legal or equitable action against the Debtor, the Debtor's property or the Estate to recover on any Claim or Equity Interest, (b) committing any act to obtain possession of or exercise control over any property of the Debtor or the Estate, including the Claims Payment Fund or any Reserve, (c) committing any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien, security interest, Claim, or other interest against any property or assets of the Debtor or its Estate, (d) committing any act to collect, assess, or recover on a Claim that arose prior to the Effective Date, and (e) setting off any debt owing to the Debtor that arose prior to the Petition Date against any Claim against the Debtor.

**6. Releases**

a. **Releases by the Debtor.** Pursuant to Section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,

and except as otherwise specifically provided in the Plan or any Plan Supplement, for good and valuable consideration, on and after the Effective Date, all Released Parties are released and discharged by the Debtor and the Estate from any and all claims, obligations, rights, suits, successor liability, damages, Causes of Action, including but not limited to the all Avoidance Actions, claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, claims asserted in the Manidhari Lawsuit for Alter Ego and Fraudulent Transfer, and any remedies, and liabilities whatsoever and any other successor liability of the Debtor, including any derivative Causes of Action that may be asserted on behalf of the Debtor, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereinafter arising, in law, equity, or otherwise that the Debtor, the Estate, or its affiliates, and any party who has standing to assert claims on behalf of the foregoing parties, would have been legally entitled to assert in their own right (whether individually or collectively) or on behalf of the Holder of any Claim or Interest or other Entity, based on or relating to, or in any manner arising from, in whole or in part, the Debtor, the Chapter 11 Case, the subject matter of, or the transactions or events giving rise to, any Claim or Interest that is treated in the Plan, the business or contractual arrangements between the Debtor and any Released Party, the restructuring of Claims and Interests prior to or in the Chapter 11 Case, the negotiation, formulation or preparation of the Plan and Disclosure Statement, or related agreements, instruments, or other documents, upon any other act or omission, transaction, agreement, event, or other occurrence taking place on or before the Effective Date.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

See Revised definition of “Released Parties” which is now expanded to include Mr. Pinto, his sister, the Stanton firm and all related entities.

This expanded release includes the alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims made by Manidhari; all of which is counter to Debtor’s argument that these claims are assets of the bankruptcy estate. Since the value of Manidhari’s claims exceed \$1,600,000, should the estate be held to be the owner of these claims, Celeritas’ release of these claims is neither fair or equitable and does not comply this the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Disclosure Statement’s and Plan’s release attempts to release the fraud based claims which is not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.

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**Debtor's Response:**

The definition of "Released Parties" is found in Section 1.02 of the Chapter 11 Plan. Manidhari's statements here are again objections to confirmation under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. The alter-ego and fraudulent transfer claims against Mr. Pinto and the Related Entities are released in return for the value provided by Mr. Pinto described in Article II above. As previously discussed, Manidhari's \$1,600,000 valuation is the face value of its proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Case, which is based on a breach of contract claim against the Debtor, is unsecured, unliquidated, contingent, and disputed.

Manidhari's reference to a release of fraud claims not being allowed under the Bankruptcy Code is an incorrect statement. The claims released in Section 6a above are claims *of the Debtor*. The Debtor, with Court approval may release any type of claim it may have. Manidhari seems to repeatedly forget, or simply does not understand, that confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan is determined by the Bankruptcy Court and the Court will hear the objection of any party in interest that files an Objection and appears at the Confirmation Hearing.

**b. Releases by Holders of Class 3 Claims. Holders of Class 3 Claims (a) voting to accept the Plan and consenting to this Section 8.03 Release or (b) abstaining from voting on the Plan and electing not to opt out of the release contained in this paragraph (which by definition, does not include Holders of Claims and Interests who are not entitled to vote in favor of or against the Plan), shall be deemed to have conclusively, absolutely, unconditionally, irrevocably, and forever, released and discharged the Debtor and any Released Party from any and all claims, interests, obligations, rights, suits, damages, Causes of Action, remedies, and liabilities whatsoever, including any derivative Causes of Action that may be asserted on behalf of the Debtor, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, in law, equity or otherwise. For the avoidance of doubt and notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, this Section 8.03 Release by Holders of Class 3 Claims shall not apply to the Class 1 Claim of Chase or an unsecured, Class 3 Claim of Chase, if any.**

**F. Modification of the Plan**

In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor reserves the right to amend or modify the Plan at any time prior to the Confirmation Date. After the Effective Date, the Debtor may, upon Order of the Bankruptcy Court, amend or modify the Plan in accordance with section 1127(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or remedy any defect or omission or reconcile any inconsistency in the

Plan in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and intent of the Plan.

**G. Retention of Jurisdiction**

Pursuant to the Plan, from and after the Effective Date of the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court will retain jurisdiction, to the fullest extent legally permitted, over the Bankruptcy Case, all proceedings arising under, arising in or related to the Bankruptcy Case, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and the administration thereof. The specific types of disputes and proceedings that the Bankruptcy Court will retain jurisdiction over are identified in Article X of the Plan.

**XI  
COMPARISON OF PLAN TO ALTERNATIVES**

**A. Chapter 7 Liquidation**

The most realistic alternative to the Plan is conversion of the Bankruptcy Case from a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. If the Bankruptcy Case is converted to Chapter 7 a Chapter 7 Trustee will be appointed to administer the assets of the Estate. As set forth at length above, the primary assets of the Estate are claims against third parties that must be litigated to be administered.

**Below is an estimated analysis and comparison of the recovery and costs of recovery of the assets of the estate through this Chapter 11 Plan versus a Chapter 7 Liquidation using example figures for recoveries and expenses. The below is only an estimate for information purposes. The Debtor reserves all rights, claims, and actions related to the litigation summarized below and the below summary should not be construed as a waiver of any rights or an admission that would in any way limit the actual amount the Debtor may recover on such claims.**

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

The estimated analysis and comparison of recovery and costs of recovery is both incomplete and inaccurate. For example, the estimate does not include any recovery of any portion of the avoidable preferences and/or fraudulent transfers to Mr. Pinto and his sister of over \$531,000, or the Stanton firm of a portion of \$410,000 or the alter ego/fraudulent transfer claims be Manidhari of approximately \$1,600,000. These claims exceed approx.. \$2,500,000.

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**Debtor's Response:**

The liquidation analysis below does not omit these claims. The above claims are categorized as Chapter 5 Claims. The value attributed to these claims in the Chapter 11 Plan is included in the table below into the contributions from Percy Pinto. As previously stated, Percy Pinto's contribution of paying the legal fees for pursuing the litigation assets is estimated be \$175,000. However, the cost savings to the estate resulting from this contribution is the \$985,625 of fees and costs estimated below to be incurred by the trustee if the case is converted to Chapter 7.

The liquidation analysis below is an estimate that includes the face value of the claims, discounted for their legal viability, collectability, and the costs of prosecution and collection. Manidhari's estimation is incomplete because it omits all of these factors except for face value.

Below are example recoveries of the assets of the estate under the Chapter 11 Plan versus under a Chapter 7 liquidation.

<b>Description</b>	<b>Chp 11 Plan Estimates</b>	<b>Chp 7 Estimates</b>
Smith Oil Judgment	\$400,000 <sup>8</sup>	\$400,000
Euler Hermes Claims	\$1,600,000 <sup>9</sup>	\$1,300,000

<sup>8</sup> This estimated recovery under the Smith Oil Judgment is reduced by the recovery under the Euler Hermes insurance policy as Euler Hermes would presumably assert subrogation rights to the Debtor's rights against Smith Oil after payment under the insurance policy.

**Manidhari Objection:** Debtor's estimate incorrectly assumes that Euler Hermes is entitled to a priority subrogation claim against any Smith Oil recovery after payment of the insurance proceeds. Since the Smith Oil and Euler Hermes cases are listed as assets of the estate, any recoveries would have to be considered assets of the estate and subject to the terms of the Plan. Any subrogation claim be Euler Hermes would be an unsecured claim subject to this Court's orders, including deadline for filing a proof of claim. The correct number for Smith Oil under both recoveries is \$2,342,631.29

**Debtor's Response:** Manidhari misstates bankruptcy law and insurance law. First, it is of course the case that Euler Hermes' subrogation claim is contingent upon Euler Hermes making payment under the policy. Upon making such a payment, which would be payment of Smith Oil's liability, Euler Hermes would arguably hold certain subrogation rights. However, in as much as Euler Hermes' claim was still contingent on the Petition Date, and will likely still be contingent on the Confirmation Date, the claim is not an Allowed Claim under the Plan. Moreover, such a claim that only arises after confirmation, would not be impaired by the Plan.

<sup>9</sup> The Debtor estimates it can recover a greater amount on the Euler Hermes claim under the Chapter 11 Plan because the Debtor has the benefit of the personal knowledge of Percy Pinto to aid in pursuit of the claim, which the Trustee would not have and the incentives for a Trustee in Chapter 7 slant toward a settlement of the claim in a fashion that may reduce the ultimate recovery.

**Manidhari Objection:** Debtor's statement is inaccurate. Mr. Pinto would be obliged to provide his "personal knowledge" to the Trustee as well. Moreover, Mr. Pinto's "personal knowledge" has little or no impact on this insurance dispute. The correct number for Euler Hermes under both recoveries is \$1,250,000.

**Debtor's Response:** The Debtor disputes this unsupported claim of Manidhari for the reasons outlined above.

Prime Pack Judgment	\$175,000	\$175,000
Atty Fees/Costs of Recovery	(\$0.00) (Net) <sup>10</sup>	(\$985,625) <sup>11</sup>
Percy Pinto Cash Settlement	\$100,000	\$0
Percy Pinto Contingent Cash Contribution	\$100,000 (contingent)	\$0
Chapter 5 Claims	\$0	\$200,000
Trustee Commission	N/A	(\$62,250)
<b>Total Net Recovered</b>	<b><u>\$2,375,000</u></b>	<b><u>\$1,027,125</u></b>
Est. Claim of JPMC	(\$925,000)	(\$925,000)
<b>Remaining Funds for Unsecured Creditors</b>	<b><u>\$1,450,000</u></b>	<b><u>\$102,125</u></b>

The above table demonstrates, under the estimated and example analysis, that the funds remaining to pay to unsecured creditors under the Chapter 11 Plan would be \$1,450,000 compared to \$102,125 in a Chapter 7 liquidation. As noted, the additional \$100,000 contribution from Percy Pinto is contingent upon certain conditions being met in the Plan, however, even without that additional contribution the amount remaining for unsecured creditors is significantly more than under a Chapter 7 liquidation. As is also evident, the key difference between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 is the commission of the Chapter 7 Trustee and the attorneys' fees that would be incurred by the Chapter 7 Trustee on litigation claims of the type present here, which are typically pursued on a contingency fee basis.

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<sup>10</sup> As explained elsewhere herein, Percy Pinto has agreed to fund the attorneys' fees and costs of collection of the litigation assets of the Debtor. The estimated, example cost for this is \$175,000.00.

**Manidhari Objection:** These fees and costs are readily paid from the recovery of the avoidable preferences and/or fraudulent transfers.

**Debtor's Response:** Payment of fees and costs out of the recovery from the avoidable preferences would reduce the funds available to pay to unsecured creditors. This is the Debtor's point and the reason the Chapter 11 Plan provides a much higher recovery to unsecured creditors.

<sup>11</sup> This estimated cost of recovery includes 40% contingency fee for the attorney pursuing the action plus costs estimated at 7.5% of the total recovery.

**Manidhari Objection:** In bankruptcy, contingency fees are normally 33 1/3 %. Moreover the fee calculation for the three cases is incorrect, at 40% the fees are \$750,000 not \$985,625. Fees at a 33 1/3 % would be \$624,937.50. The estimate also ignores the fact that, except for Euler Hermes, the collection of these judgments under Texas law allows for the recovery of attorney fees to be added to the judgment. So, for Euler Hermes the contingency fee would be approx.. \$420,000.

**Debtor's Response:** The estimated recovery total is \$400,000 + 1,300,000 + \$175,000 + \$200,00 = \$2,075,000 x .475 (40.75% attorneys' fees and costs) = \$985,625.

**Manidhari Statement:**

**Mandihari Objection:**

If you revise the contingency fees to the appropriate levels, see objection to note 12, an additional \$525,000 needs to be added to recovery under Chapter 7. Assuming a recovery of only 50% of the avoidable preferences, an additional \$1,200,000 would also be added. Per objection in note

**Debtor's Response:**

The estimated recovery total is  $\$400,000 + 1,300,000 + \$175,000 + \$200,000 = \$2,075,000 \times .475$  (40.75% attorneys' fees and costs) = \$985,625. A 40% contingency fee in bankruptcy matters is standard. Manidhari's number assumes that attorneys' fees are recoverable from the target defendants. Manidhari ignores that attorneys' fees are not recoverable from the defendants in cases under Sections 547, 548, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Manidhari also ignores that the above estimates are examples of the settlement value of the claims, or an example of the value that could be collected following judgment by the Court. Manidhari appears to conflate an award of judgment for collection of money under a judgment. The numbers estimated for recovery on each matter are the total amount recovered. Attorneys' fees would necessarily be subtracted from the total amount recovered when considering claims pursued by a Chapter 7 Trustee because the claims themselves are the only source of payment of the fees and costs incurred.

However, under the Chapter 11 Plan, Percy Pinto is funding the litigation fees and costs such that the total amounts recovered will not be reduced as they will be under the Chapter 7 scenario. Manidhari's estimates are therefore wildly inaccurate.

As explained in Article VII above, there is an agreement at Docket No. 43-1 in the Bankruptcy Case whereby Percy Pinto has an obligation to replenish the retainer of the Stanton Law Firm when it dips below \$10,000. The DIP Order entered by the Court allows these advances for retainer replenishment and other advances for other expenses of the Debtor to be added to the DIP Facility up to \$50,000 and further provides additional procedures whereby additional advances can be made by Percy Pinto. Furthermore, as also explained in Article VII above, Percy Pinto's administrative expense claim for advances under the DIP Order is being subordinated to general unsecured claims. In other words, the costs of pursuing the Smith Oil Judgment, Prime Pack Judgment, and Insurance Claim will not be borne by the Class 3 general unsecured claims under the Chapter 11 Plan. As such, all of the assets of the Chapter 11 estate, subject to the lien of Chase and the priorities of the Bankruptcy Code, will be available for distribution without costs of collection of such assets as compared to the realities of Chapter 7 outlined by the table above.

If the Bankruptcy Case is converted to Chapter 7 where a Trustee will be appointed, the

costs of the pursuit of the litigation assets will be subtracted out of the recovery from those assets first to pay the Trustee's costs of such administration as well as the Trustee's commission. The Trustee would have to expend funds to first familiarize himself and his professionals with the Euler Hermes Insurance Claim and the Smith Oil and Prime Pack Judgments and hire counsel to pursue recoveries of such assets. In addition, the Trustee would be required to litigate the Estate's claims against the Related Entities if any recovery is to be obtained for the Estate on such claims. Furthermore, as indicated by the financial statement of Percy Pinto attached hereto as Exhibit "B", it is not estimable that the recovery on the Chapter 5 Claims would be greater than the \$100,000 Percy Pinto Cash Contribution that is made under the Plan, if confirmed. The financial statement of Percy Pinto indicates Mr. Pinto holds approximately \$370,000 of apparently non-exempt property in the form of securities, which would be used to fund his defense of the actions against him that remain if the Plan is not confirmed. The remaining amount of such non-exempt property would be the total recovered that would then be netted against the contingency fee of the Trustee's counsel and costs and the Trustee's commission and this has been estimated above at a total recovery of \$200,000 from Mr. Pinto before costs are subtracted.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:  
Mr. Pinto has attached his financial statement as Exhibit "B" and suggests he holds approximately \$370,000 in "non-exempt" property.

Records will show this financial statement is inaccurate, especially as to exempt v. non-exempt property. For example, Mr. Pinto claims a homestead exemption of \$667,800. And yet, prior records show a substantial mortgage in 2015 before he paid himself monies from the Debtor; all of which calls into question the source of the monies used to pay off the mortgage and the validity of the claimed homestead exemption under section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code.

**Debtor's Response:**

Mr. Pinto is not a debtor in bankruptcy and therefore Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code is irrelevant to his homestead exemption.

The Trustee's counsel will not have the familiarity and background with the Debtor, the Related Entities, or the Insurance Claim and the judgments described herein and will be required to expend significantly more in fees and time to possibly effectuate a similar recovery to that proposed by the Plan. As such, the administrative costs of such endeavor would be significantly greater than those described in the Plan and would significantly reduce the ultimate recovery for all other creditors of the Estate.

As a commission, in addition to payment of incurred fees and costs, the Trustee will be entitled to a reasonable payment in relation to the level of disbursements made to creditors, as follows: (a) up to 25% of the first \$5,000 disbursed; (b) up to 10% of the amount disbursed in

excess of \$5,000 but not in excess of \$50,000; (c) up to 5% of any amount disbursed in excess of \$50,000 but not in excess of \$1,000,000; and (d) up to 3% of any amount disbursed in excess of \$1,000,000. Perhaps most significantly, in a Chapter 7 there will be no financing for the litigation costs provided by a third party as is the case under this Plan and the financing from Percy Pinto. Moreover, in Chapter 7 there will be no additional funding of up to \$200,000 by Mr. Pinto for payment of Allowed Claims. Furthermore, the Debtor's Tax Loss will likely not be a recoverable or beneficial asset to a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:  
The amount of any commission, if any, owed to the Trustee under Chapter 7 is within the purview of the Court.

**Debtor's Response:**

Manidhari's apparent suggestion that the Court may reduce or disallow the Chapter 7 Trustee a commission after successfully administering disputed, unliquidated claims, and/or collecting on money judgments is highly unlikely to be accurate.

The cash realized from liquidation is subject to distribution to creditors in accordance with section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code. Whether a bankruptcy case is one under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, allowed secured claims, allowed administrative claims, and allowed priority claims, unless subordinated pursuant to section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code, are entitled to be paid in cash, in full, before unsecured creditors and Equity Interest holders receive anything. Thus, in a Chapter 7 case, the recovery, if any, to creditors holding non-priority unsecured claims will depend upon the net proceeds left in the estate after all of the debtor's assets have been reduced to cash and all claims of higher priority have been satisfied in full. Nonetheless, the priority of distribution in Chapter 7 would be similar to that proposed in the Plan.

It is difficult to estimate what recovery may be realized from the Smith Oil Judgment and Prime Pack Judgment. However, it is clear that whatever recovery there can be from those judgments will be less in Chapter 7 because of the administrative costs that will be borne by the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate that are otherwise to be borne by Percy Pinto and the Reorganized Debtor through this Plan which will allow more of the recovered funds to be paid to Allowed Unsecured Claims.

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**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari Objection:

Celeritas' plan to abandon and release any claims against Mr. Pinto, his sister, the Stanton firm and the related entities only benefits Mr. Pinto and shields him from potential liabilities which exceed \$2,500,000.

Considering that the Debtor's counsel suggests that it has incurred fees and costs over \$104,000 to date, the rejection of this Disclosure Statement and Plan would allow the Trustee the opportunity to take steps to benefit the creditors and not Mr. Pinto.

**Debtor's Response:**

Manidhari yet again raises objection to confirmation under Section 1129. All of the releases in the Chapter 11 Plan are subject to Court approval. Manidhari is incorrect in its assertion that claims against Mr. Pinto are to be abandoned. The Debtor's evaluation of the claims of the estate against the Stanton Law Firm and Ms. Mathias are discussed extensively in Article II above.

Accordingly, with respect to the "best interest of creditors" test of section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor does not believe that holders of Allowed Claims or Allowed Equity Interests would achieve a greater recovery under Chapter 7 than under the Plan. Inasmuch as the Plan is a plan of liquidation, any comparison of likely distributions to holders of Allowed Claims under the Plan to likely distributions to holders of Allowed Claims in a Chapter 7 proceeding is similar.

**B. Alternative Plans**

To date, no other proposed Chapter 11 plans have been filed in the Bankruptcy Case, and the Debtor does not anticipate that any other Chapter 11 plan will be filed.

**XI  
MATERIAL UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS**

In considering whether to vote to accept or reject the Plan, Creditors entitled to vote should consider the following risks associated with the Plan: (a) that all of the conditions to confirmation of the Plan are not satisfied or waived (as applicable); (b) that all of the conditions to the effectiveness of the Plan are not satisfied or waived (as applicable) or that such conditions are delayed by a significant period of time; (c) that estimations and projections may ultimately prove to be materially inaccurate; and (d) that the prosecution of Causes of Action does not result in significant recoveries.

There can also be no assurance that the Plan will not be modified up to and through the Confirmation Date, and the Debtor reserves the right to modify the Plan, subject to compliance

with the Bankruptcy Code, in the event the modification becomes warranted or necessary in furtherance of confirmation, effectiveness, or administration of the Plan.

## **XII CERTAIN FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLAN**

### **A. Introduction**

Implementation of the Plan might have federal, state, and local tax consequences to the Debtor and its Estate, as well as to Creditors and Equity Interest holders of the Debtor. No tax opinion has been sought or will be obtained with respect to any tax consequences of the Plan, and the following disclosure does not constitute and is not intended to constitute either a tax opinion or tax advice to any Person.

This disclosure is provided for informational purposes only. Moreover, this disclosure summarizes only certain of the federal income tax consequences associated with the Plan's confirmation and implementation and does not attempt to comment on all such aspects. Similarly, this disclosure does not attempt to consider any facts or limitations applicable to any particular Creditor or Equity Interest holder that may modify or alter the consequences described below. This disclosure does not address state, local, or foreign tax consequences or the consequences of any federal tax other than the federal income tax.

This disclosure is based upon the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Tax Code"), the regulations promulgated thereunder, existing judicial decisions, and administrative rulings. In light of the expansiveness of such authorities, no assurance can be given that legislative, judicial, or administrative changes will not be forthcoming that would affect the accuracy of the discussion below. Any such changes could be material and could be retroactive with respect to the transactions entered into or completed prior to the enactment or promulgation thereof. Finally, the tax consequences of certain aspects of the Plan are uncertain due to a lack of applicable legal authority and may be subject to judicial or administrative interpretations that differ from the discussion below.

**CREDITORS AND EQUITY INTEREST HOLDERS, THEREFORE, ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT WITH THEIR OWN TAX ADVISORS REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES TO THEM AND TO THE DEBTOR OF THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLAN, INCLUDING FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN TAX CONSEQUENCES.**

### **B. Federal Income Tax Consequences to the Creditors**

In general, a holder of a Claim should recognize gain or loss equal to the amount realized under the Plan in respect to its Claim less the amount of such holder's basis in its Claim. Any gain or loss recognized in the exchange may be long-term or short-term capital gain or loss, or ordinary income or loss, depending upon the nature of the Claim and the holder, the length of time the holder held the Claim and whether the Claim was acquired at a discount. If the holder realizes a capital loss, its deduction of the loss may be subject to limitations under the Tax Code. The holder's

aggregate tax basis for any Distribution received under the Plan generally will equal the amount realized. The amount realized by a holder generally will equal the sum of the Distributions the holder received less the amount (if any) allocable to interest.

### **C. Tax Withholding**

The Plan provides for the Debtor to comply with all tax withholding and reporting requirements imposed upon him by any governmental authority. Accordingly, it provides that Distributions made under the Plan will be subject to all applicable withholding and reporting requirements and authorizes the Debtor to take all actions necessary or appropriate to comply with such withholding and reporting requirements, including, without limitation, payment of applicable withholding taxes from a Claimant's Distribution and conditioning Distributions upon receipt of necessary tax reporting information from a Claimant.

### **D. Disclaimers**

**PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLAN SHOULD CONSULT THEIR OWN ACCOUNTANTS, ATTORNEYS, AND/OR ADVISORS. THE DEBTOR MAKES THE ABOVE-NOTED DISCLOSURE OF POSSIBLE TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ALERTING READERS TO TAX ISSUES THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER. THE DEBTOR CANNOT, AND DOES NOT, REPRESENT THAT THE TAX CONSEQUENCES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE COMPLETELY ACCURATE BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE TAX LAW EMBODIES MANY COMPLICATED RULES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO STATE ACCURATELY WHAT THE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF ANY ACTION MIGHT BE.**

**IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, THE DEBTOR INFORMS ALL RECIPIENTS OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT THAT ANY U.S. TAX INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (INCLUDING THE EXHIBITS HERETO) IS NOT INTENDED OR WRITTEN TO BE USED, AND CANNOT BE USED, FOR THE PURPOSE OF (A) AVOIDING PENALTIES UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, OR (B) PROMOTING, MARKETING, OR RECOMMENDING TO ANOTHER PARTY ANY TRANSACTION OR MATTER ADDRESSED HEREIN.**

## **XIV CONCLUSION**

The Debtor believes that the Plan complies with section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code and is fair and equitable and in the best interests of the Debtor, the Estate, Creditors, and Equity Interests holders. Accordingly, the Debtor urges Creditors and Equity Interests holders receiving Ballots to vote to accept the Plan.

**Manidhari Statement:**

Manidhari submits that the Plan does not comply with section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code and is not fair and equitable to the Estate, Creditors and Equity Holders. Manidhari urges the Creditors vote to reject the Plan.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Timothy A. York

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