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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, January 28, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 19

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

VMZ-SOPOT: Stanishev Says Privatization to Prompt Liquidation


C Y P R U S

* CYPRUS: Bailout Requires Major Restructuring of Banking System


F I N L A N D

POHJANTAHTI: S&P Raises Financial Strength Rating to 'BBpi'


F R A N C E

* Fitch Says Securitizing Lease Receivables Limited in Insolvency


G E R M A N Y

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Frankfurter Allgemeine to Take Over
ORION ENGINEERED: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR; Rates PIK Notes (P)Caa1
SOLARWORLD AG: Management Mulls Financial Restructuring
THYSSENKRUPP AG: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'Ba1'; Outlook Negative


G R E E C E

OMEGA NAVIGATION: Has Access to Cash Collateral Until March 25


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Mortgage Bank Raises EUR500MM From Bond Issue
AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
AVOCA CLO VIII: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
TALISMAN-3 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings Three Note Classes to 'D'


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Shareholders, Bank of Italy Approve Capital Plan
CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Rating to 'Caa1'


K A Z A K H S T A N

NURBANK: S&P Raises Long-Term Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B'


L U X E M B O U R G

AXIUS EUROPEAN: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Rates US$400MM Tier 2 Debt Securities 'BB-'
FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-3 Notes to 'B+'
JUBILEE CDO V: S&P Raises Rating on Two Note Classes to 'B+'


P O L A N D

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Names Russian Alcohol Unit's R. Lee as New CFO


R O M A N I A

OLTCHIM SA: To File for Insolvency Following Losses


R U S S I A

SOVCOMFLOT JSC: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'Ba2'; Outlook Stable


S P A I N

HIPOTOTTA NO. 5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'


T U R K E Y

* TURKEY: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BYRE THEATRE: Likely to Enter Liquidation This Week
EURUS III: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Series 2012-1 Notes
GRAMPIAN CONSTRUCTION: In Administration; 34 Jobs Affected
* UK: Banks' Liquidity Reserves May Have Peaked, Fitch Says


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Says Diversification May Prop Up European Paper Cos.
* Moody's Says Nov. Overall EMEA Auto ABS Performance Improves
* Parent Debt Bail-In May Change CEE Funding Dynamics, Fitch Says
* Financial Market Turmoil in Europe Hits Banks' Credit Profiles
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 21 to January 25, 2013


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


VMZ-SOPOT: Stanishev Says Privatization to Prompt Liquidation
-------------------------------------------------------------
FOCUS News Agency reports that BSP leader Sergey Stanishev said
that the "pressing privatization of VMZ-Sopot has to be
suspended, because it will bring the company to liquidation."

Mr. Stanishev met with current and former workers of the armament
factory at their invitation on Saturday, FOCUS News relates.

"The state has to provide contracts for VMZ, as it is its
responsibility in its capacity of principal of the company and
this should happen jointly with the management of the factory,"
FOCUS News quotes Mr. Stanishev as saying.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on January 22, 2013,
SeeNews related that Mehanichen Zavod - Devin filed with a local
court an insolvency claim against VMZ Sopot.  The energy ministry
previously said VMZ Sopot should downsize its staff by some 60%
to 1,200 in order to avoid bankruptcy and find a buyer,
SeeNews disclosed.  The ministry's statement was released
following a decision by the country's privatization agency to
cancel a procedure for the sale of a 100% stake in the company
after the sole candidate buyer, local company Emko, failed to
submit a deposit guarantee of EUR3 million (US$4.0 million),
SeeNews recounted.

VMZ Sopot is a state-owned arms manufacturer.



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


* CYPRUS: Bailout Requires Major Restructuring of Banking System
----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Fidler, Gabriele Steinhauser and Matina Stevis at The Dow
Jones Newswires report that a flap over a potential bailout for
Cyprus is heightening anxieties that the tiny island's economy
could become the next flash point in the euro zone's debt crisis.

According to Dow Jones, Olli Rehn, the European Union's economics
commissioner, said in an interview Thursday at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, that a rescue program for Cyprus
will require substantially reducing government and bank debt in a
recognition that a more-conventional bailout of the latest euro-
zone country to hit financial difficulties would leave it with
too much debt.

Mr. Rehn, as cited by Dow Jones said that the rescue will also
require a major restructuring of the country's banking system
that may lead some banks to be wound down or merged.

The rescue has already been delayed by six months because of
disagreements among the Cypriot government, the International
Monetary Fund and governments in the 17-nation currency union,
Dow Jones relates.

The admission that Cyprus, which accounts for just 0.2% of the
euro zone's economy, will require debt reduction came as other
officials reported continuing divisions among prospective
contributors to the rescue program, Dow Jones notes.

"It's essential that everybody realizes that a disorderly default
of Cyprus could lead to an exit of Cyprus from the euro zone,"
Dow Jones quotes Mr. Rehn as saying.  "It would be extremely
stupid to take any risk . . . of that nature."

Officials in Washington and Brussels say one question dividing
the negotiators is what to do about the large amounts of money
held by foreigners in banks that may be wound down, Dow Jones
states.

Euro-zone finance ministers said on Jan. 21 that there wouldn't
be a bailout deal until after general elections in February, with
final agreement unlikely before March, Dow Jones recounts.

The analysts say there were EUR70 billion (US$93.2 billion) of
deposits in the banks at the end of November, of which 38% was
held by foreigners, Dow Jones discloses.

According to Dow Jones, cutting debt means the euro-zone and IMF
would lend Cyprus substantially less than the estimated EUR17
billion European officials previously said would be needed to
right the government finances and stabilize the banks, which were
hurt by Greece's debt restructurings last year.  Cypriot banks
had invested heavily in Greek government bonds as well as loans
to Greek households and companies, Dow Jones says.

Cyprus has been unable to raise money on international markets
for more than 1 1/2 years, surviving on a EUR2.5 billion loan
from close ally Russia it secured in 2011, Dow Jones discloses.
But after the Greek restructuring ate up much of the capital
cushions of Cypriot banks, Nicosia requested financial help from
the rest of the euro zone and the IMF last summer, Dow Jones
notes.



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F I N L A N D
=============


POHJANTAHTI: S&P Raises Financial Strength Rating to 'BBpi'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its insurer financial
strength rating on Pohjantahti Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio
(Pohjantahti) to 'BBpi', from 'Bpi'.

The upgrade reflects the firm's marginal, but improving financial
risk profile.  It has reduced its equity exposure and improved
its capital adequacy through retained earnings and lower asset
risks. Pohjantahti has reported good operating performance in
recent years and has a niche competitive position in the Finnish
market.  S&P continues to view its weak capitalization and
marginal financial flexibility as negative rating factors.

Pohjantahti is a mutual non-life insurer that was established in
1895 and operates mainly in the more rural areas of Finland.  It
is one of the smaller non-life insurers operating in the Finnish
market and has a market share of about 2%.  In 2011, gross
premium written remained flat at EUR84 million, of which 43%
related to motor business, 24% to fire and other damage to
property, 13% to accident and health, and 12% to workers'
compensation.  The balance mainly related to third-party
liability and legal expenses insurance.

"We consider Pohjantahti's operating performance to be good.  The
company has recorded combined ratios below 100% for the past five
years. (Lower combined ratios indicate better profitability.  A
combined ratio of greater than 100% signifies an underwriting
loss.)  The net combined ratio deteriorated to 97.7% in 2011
(2010: 95.8%), but remained stronger than that of most of its
Finnish peers.  Pohjantahti's net expense ratio of 22.1% (2010:
24.3%) is higher than most of its Finnish peer group, owing to
its high acquisition costs.  We view the company's return on
equity as impressive at 22.7% (2010: 32.8%), although this also
reflects its relatively low levels of overall capital," S&P said.

S&P views investments as supportive of the rating following a
reduction of risk in the portfolio.  According to Pohjantahti's
balance sheet, variable-yield securities formed 50% of its
investment portfolio in 2011 (2010: 58%).  However, although
these investments are listed as shares and variable-yield
securities, they actually reflect amounts held in mutual funds,
most of which invest in bonds and cash only.  Taking this onto
account brings the percentage of equity in the portfolio down to
approximately 7.5% of the portfolio (2010: 16%).  Investments in
real estate amount to approximately 22% (2010: 21%).  Investment
yield, including all capital gains and losses, fell to 3.1%
(2010: 5.8%)--a return in line with most of Pohjantahti's Finnish
peers.

Liquidity is good and provides support to reserves.  Invested
assets (excluding investment property, which S&P considers less
liquid) cover net loss reserves by 127% (2010: 126%).

Capitalization is weak, in S&P's view.  Adjusted policyholders'
funds have increased to EUR33.6 million (2010: EUR32.4 million),
but the capital base remains very small in absolute terms.  The
company has retained earnings and reduced its equity exposures,
triggering an improvement in its capital adequacy, as viewed by
Standard & Poor's capital model; nevertheless, capital adequacy
remains weak.  The result reflects the relatively small size of
the insurer and its above-average exposure to higher risk assets
(compared with its European non-life peers).  Pohjantahti's
solvency ratio (net premium written/adjusted policyholders'
funds) improved in 2011 to 230% (2010: 237%), although it remains
much weaker than that of most of its non-life peers.

This unsolicited rating(s) was initiated by Standard & Poor's.
It may be based solely on publicly available information and may
or may not involve the participation of the issuer.  Standard &
Poor's has used information from sources believed to be reliable
based on standards established in our Credit Ratings Information
and Data Policy but does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or
completeness of any information used.



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F R A N C E
===========


* Fitch Says Securitizing Lease Receivables Limited in Insolvency
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that, for French auto lease receivables
securitizations, the access to the underlying car sales proceeds
can be limited in case of seller/lessor insolvency. This is due
to the specifics of insolvency proceedings under French law and
is, in Fitch's view, making an assessment of the legal
implications of the seller/lessor insolvency essential for such
deals.

The agency's view is based on legal opinions and memos received
when examining the feasibility of rating securitizations backed
by auto leases in France. Fitch has considered, in particular,
the effect of an insolvency of the lessor and the potential
impact of the bankruptcy proceedings on the securitized lease
portfolio. Certain legal, operational or structural mechanisms
could reduce the risks from lessor insolvency. However, the
proposals seen so far do not address all the risks, some of which
might reduce the economic benefit to the seller/lessor of
securitizing French leases.

French auto lease contracts generally provide that, after the
lease expires, the lessee has the option to return the financed
car to the lessor - the registered owner of the car -- in lieu of
paying the final balloon amount. This is called the residual
value (RV) portion. A lessor will sell the car to fulfill the
final claim with no recourse to the lessee. Securitizing the RV
portion poses certain legal challenges given the nature of the
car sale receivable. Firstly, the car sale receivables are
considered future receivables which do not exist on the portfolio
transfer date. Secondly, the cars' ownership structure creates
additional complexity. The seller/lessor remains the owner of the
cars, and the issuer only benefits from the sales proceeds once
the cars are effectively sold. Both issues are not unique to
France, but make the securitization transaction particularly
exposed to the outcome of any seller/lessor bankruptcy
proceedings and the applicable insolvency regime.

French securitization legislation allows securitization of future
receivables and the latest amendments to the law, in 2008,
provide that the assignment of future receivables or the
continuation of the contract (either simple lease or leasing
agreement with purchase option) are not affected by the
commencement of insolvency proceedings against the seller/lessor.
This does not prevent a lessee from asking the judicial
administrator to terminate the contract. However, based on a
review of the process that might lead to a termination of the
contracts and considering the apparent lack of a strong economic
incentive for the lessee to ask for a termination and the
administrator to process such a request, the risk of termination
of a substantial number of the ongoing auto lease contracts is,
in Fitch's opinion, remote.

Nevertheless, where the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings results
in the transfer of the seller/lessor's lease portfolio or the
overall business activities to a third party -- which is one of
the options under the procedure -- the agency understands that
the car sale receivables could no longer be available for the
benefit of the issuer. Such receivables would be transferred to
the balance sheet of that third party and the sales proceeds
might not be credited to the issuer accounts. Furthermore, Fitch
understands that, in such cases, the purchase price of the
business or portfolio would be determined by the bankruptcy
court. This creates serious uncertainties regarding the moneys
the issuer can eventually expect to receive over the car sale
receivables.

In case the activity of the seller/lessor is maintained as a
going concern (under a safeguard proceedings or a continuation
plan), advance notification of the car purchasers to make their
payments directly to the issuer accounts could address some of
the concerns. However, with the car purchasers being unknown in
advance, it seems unlikely that this could be reliable. Should
the insolvency administrator not directly credit the sales
proceeds to the issuer's account, such moneys could potentially
be lost for the issuer.

While some uncertainties could be reduced through provisions for
pledges over the financed cars, in Fitch's view -- and based on
the legal material reviewed -- there is insufficient evidence
supporting the effectiveness of such security mechanisms in
France. Even if the security mechanisms proves effective in case
of insolvency proceedings with respect of the seller/lessor, car
sales proceeds may only be distributed to the issuer according to
a restructuring plan over a period of up to ten years. The agency
believes that this could result in a substantial delay resulting
in further strain on the securitization transaction and could
affect the ability of the securitization to make timely payments.



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G E R M A N Y
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FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Frankfurter Allgemeine to Take Over
----------------------------------------------------------
Cornelius Rahn at Bloomberg News, citing Hamburger Abendblatt,
reports that insolvent newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau may be
continued by local peer Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as an
autonomous regional newspaper for the Rhine-Main region.

According to Bloomberg, Hamburger Abendblatt said that Rundschau
is to retain about 30 journalists plus several freelancers.

FAZ is to supply national and international content, Bloomberg
discloses.

The deal has to be approved by FAZ main stakeholder Fazit
foundation and five FAZ publishers, Bloomberg notes.


ORION ENGINEERED: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR; Rates PIK Notes (P)Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating with a
negative outlook to Orion Engineered Carbons Holdings GmbH
("Orion") and withdrawn the B2 CFR of Orion Engineered Carbons
Bondco GmbH ("Kinove"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Orion. At
the same time, Moody's has changed the outlook to negative on the
existing Ba2 rating of Kinove's super senior revolving credit
facility, and the B2 rating of its senior secured guaranteed
notes. The ratings themselves have been affirmed.

The negative outlook on Orion's CFR is driven by the announced
US$390 million (c. EUR292 million) of senior secured guaranteed
PIK toggle notes, to which Moody's has assigned provisional
(P)Caa1 ratings. The PIK toggle notes are to be issued by Orion
Engineered Carbons Finance & Co SCA ("Finco"), which is a special
purpose entity owned and guaranteed by Kinove Luxembourg Holdings
1 Sarl ("Luxco1"), the ultimate parent of Orion.

Ratings Rationale

The negative outlook on Orion's CFR and the existing debt ratings
of Kinove is driven by Orion's announcement that it is looking to
raise US$390 million senior PIK toggle notes through special
purpose entity (Finco) in order to pay a special dividend to
Orion's shareholders. The negative outlook reflects higher
financial risks following the releveraging and limited
opportunities for a quick reduction in debt.

Moody's notes that the proposed transaction will add to the
company's leverage, with adjusted total debt/EBITDA expected to
rise towards 5.0x, pro-forma for the transaction, compared to the
previously expected debt/EBITDA of around 3.0x for 2012. Orion
maintained good operating momentum in 2012 and was able to reduce
its leverage, after repaying 10% of its outstanding senior
secured notes out of the strong positive free cash flow that it
recorded for the year. The proposed transaction will, however,
fully utilize the debt capacity that was built into Orion's B2
rating level, and exert pressure on the company's future
financial performance, especially given that Moody's expects the
operating environment to become more challenging in 2013,
particularly in Europe. The announced re-leveraging transaction
signals a more aggressive financial policy stance than initially
factored in Moody's rating, as does the fact that just over a
year after Orion was set up as a standalone entity, the company
will pay a large extraordinary dividend to its private equity
shareholders. A further concern for the rating agency lies in the
financial terms of the existing facilities, which offer Orion the
option to further re-leverage its balance sheet, as well as make
further payments to its shareholders.

Liquidity

Orion's liquidity position is adequate, and is supported by
EUR86.6 million of cash balances and full availability under the
US$250 million revolving credit facility at the end of December
2012. The expectation of positive operating cash flow generation
over the coming quarters and cash availability should be
sufficient to cover the company's scheduled cash outflows,
including EUR43 million to be up-streamed to prepay a portion of
the existing shareholder loan, as well as capex and an increasing
cost of debt connected with the existing and new financial debt
obligations.

What Could Change The Rating UP/DOWN

Although an upgrade is unlikely, Moody's would consider upgrading
the rating if (1) the company's Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA
ratio falls below 4.0x; (2) its retained cash flow (RCF)/debt
ratio rises above 15%; (3) the group maintains a sustained
positive free cash flow (FCF)/debt ratio; and (4) the
(FFO+interest)/interest ratio is above 3.0x.

Conversely, Moody's would consider downgrading the rating if (1)
Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio increases above 5.5x; (2) the
RCF/debt ratio falls below 5%; (3) the group generates a negative
FCF/debt ratio over a prolonged period; and (4) the
(FFO+interest)/interest ratio is below 2.0x. Furthermore, any
material deterioration in the company's liquidity position could
contribute towards a rating downgrade.

Structural Considerations

The (P)Caa1/LGD 5 (89) ratings assigned to the US$390 million
2019 PIK toggle notes reflect the subordinated position of the
new instrument relative to the existing senior secured facilities
and notes borrowed/issued by Kinove, as well as unsecured trade
obligations of the operating companies. However, the PIK toggle
notes will be secured by a first-ranking pledge on the shares of
Finco, the Issuer of the new PIK toggle notes, and on the shares
and preferred equity certificates of Kinove Luxembourg Holdings 2
Sarl ("Luxco2"), the direct parent company of the rated Orion
group and direct subsidiary of the Parent Guarantor Luxco 1.
Furthermore, the preferred equity certificates issued by the
Parent Guarantor to Finco in return for the proceeds of the new
PIK toggle notes will also be pledged.

Furthermore, the PIK toggle mechanism would mitigate the risk of
materially reducing the amount of cash at the Orion group level.
This is because it would enable the Issuer to switch a portion of
the cash interest payment on the new notes, when due, to Payment
In Kind or PIK, if (1) the distributable amounts from the Orion
group are not sufficient to entirely cover the cash interest on
the PIK toggle notes, or, even if sufficient, (2) the cash
remaining at the Orion group level, pro/forma for the cash
interest payment on the PIK notes and on the existing senior
secured notes, is less than the minimum threshold set at EUR30
million.

The B2 CFR was reassigned from Kinove to Orion, the holding
company of the restricted group for the existing senior secured
notes and credit facilities, given the expectation that the group
will continue to produce its audited consolidated financial
statements at this level. This is also a requirement in the
indenture of the new PIK toggle notes.

The provisional rating assigned to the PIK toggle notes reflect
only Moody's preliminary credit opinion regarding the new notes,
pending finalization of the issuance and confirmation of its
final terms. Furthermore, the rating is assigned based on the
commitment from Orion management to provide to the rating agency
annual audited financial statements of Finco and Luxco1. Upon
completion of the transaction and conclusive review of the final
documentation, Moody's will assign a definitive rating to the new
notes. A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Based in Frankfurt, Germany, Orion Engineered Carbons Holdings
GmbH is the third-largest global producer of rubber blacks and
the largest global producer of specialty pigment blacks. The
company has 15 plants (including joint ventures) across Europe,
North and South America, Asia and South Africa. Orion was formed
on July 29, 2011, following the leveraged buyout of the carbon
black operations from Evonik Industries. The two shareholders,
Rhone Capital and Triton Capital, each own 44.5% of the company.
In the 12 months to September 2012, Orion reported revenues of
EUR1.39 billion.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Chemical Industry published in December 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.


SOLARWORLD AG: Management Mulls Financial Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Martin at Bloomberg News reports that SolarWorld AG
said management plans financial restructuring to remain a going
concern in what it called an "anticompetitive" market.

"Management is of the opinion that serious adjustments on the
debt side are necessary, in particular with regard to the bonds
and the assignable bank loans," Bloomberg quotes the Bonn-based
company as saying in a statement on Thursday.

SolarWorld reported net debt of EUR805.2 million (US$1.08
billion) as of the end of September, raising its debt-to-equity
ratio to 218, more than double the same time a year earlier,
Bloomberg relates.

The company has EUR400 million in bonds and loans due in 2016 and
another EUR400 million due in 2017, according to data compiled by
Bloomberg.

SolarWorld led groups of manufacturers in complaints against
unfair competition from Chinese companies in the U.S and Europe,
Bloomberg discloses.

SolarWorld AG is Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.


THYSSENKRUPP AG: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'Ba1'; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded ThyssenKrupp AG's
ratings to Ba1 from Baa3. A Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) and
Ba1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) were assigned to the
company. The rated debt of ThyssenKrupp AG and ThyssenKrupp
Finance Nederland B.V. were lowered to Ba1 from Baa3, including
provisional ratings. In addition, Moody's has assigned a negative
outlook to all the ratings. This concludes the review of
ThyssenKrupp initiated by Moody's on December 13, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

"Moody's downgrade reflects the challenging market conditions for
many of ThyssenKrupp's businesses, which Moody's expects will
lead to lower profitability in 2013 than 2012, and the upward
pressure on debt due primarily to large ongoing cash losses at
its Steel Americas business area," explains Steven Oman, a
Moody's Senior Vice President and the lead analyst for
ThyssenKrupp. In 2012, the company reported adjusted EBIT from
continuing operations of EUR1.38 billion. ThyssenKrupp is
currently estimating this will be around EUR1 billion in 2013
(part of the reason for the decline is the disposal of businesses
such as Waupaca). While the disposal of Steel Americas is moving
ahead, Moody's sees a risk that the sale proceeds may be less
than Steel Americas' EUR3.9 billion book value and that the sale
may not close until the company's fourth quarter and, therefore,
the company might have to absorb the ongoing losses at Steel
Americas for the full year. As a result, ThyssenKrupp's debt
ratios at the end of fiscal year 2013 (September 30) will be
higher -- and cash flow to debt ratios lower -- than is
appropriate for an investment-grade rating. Moreover, even with
the pro forma exclusion of Steel Americas, ThyssenKrupp's
leverage and cash flow metrics fall short of Moody's targets for
a Baa3 rating. Finally, Moody's notes the considerable decrease
in ThyssenKrupp's book equity in 2012 and the potential for
equity to further decline in 2013.

However, the rating positively reflects the benefits of
ThyssenKrupp's portfolio optimization program, through which the
company has aggressively pruned assets representing about one-
fourth of its sales and re-focused the group on more profitable
and stable businesses. The December 2012 disposal of Inoxum was
the latest step in this process and led to a EUR1.1 billion
decrease in net financial debt. Moreover, the company's
concurrent push for efficiency gains (more than EUR2 billion is
targeted over three years) and its emphasis on a performance-
based culture and improved transparency are positive trends. In
Moody's opinion, the cumulative effect of these actions will be
to end a long period of losses and negative cash flow, although
this will not be the case in 2013. Nevertheless, the order books
at ThyssenKrupp's capital goods businesses are holding up
relatively well. And, sale proceeds from Inoxum and Steel
Americas will help lower total debt by the end of 2013. Asset
sale proceeds will also supplement the company's liquidity.

Outlook

The negative rating outlook indicates the challenges posed over
the next 12 months by the soft European economy and, in
particular, lackluster steel and automotive markets. The outlook
also reflects uncertainty surrounding the sale of Steel Americas,
further asset impairments and possible shareholder and rail
price-fixing lawsuits.

What Could Change The Rating Down/Up

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if (1) market conditions for
the company's business areas deteriorate further, (2) cash
proceeds from the disposal of Steel Americas are less than
Moody's expects and a substantial part of the sale proceeds are
not used to reduce debt, (3) there are indications that the
company could fail to comply with its debt covenants, (4)
leverage as measured by Moody's adjusted debt/LTM EBITDA is
expected to be greater than 4.5x, and (5) free cash flow
excluding Steel Americas is, or Moody's expects it to be,
negative over multiple quarters.

The rating outlook could be changed to stable by a combination of
improved market conditions and the successful conclusion of the
disposal of Steel Americas and subsequent debt reduction, which
together indicate the potential for debt/EBITDA to fall below
3.5x and achievement of positive free cash flow. The rating could
be raised if there is an appreciable improvement in the outlook
for the company's businesses, the company maintains strong
liquidity, its debt/EBITDA approaches 3.0x and its retained cash
flow to debt is greater than 16%.

Downgrades:

  Issuer: ThyssenKrupp AG

    Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Downgraded to NP from P-3

    Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
    (P)NP from (P)P-3

    Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
    (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Mar 18, 2015,
    Downgraded to Ba1 (LGD4, 50%) from Baa3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Jun 18, 2014,
    Downgraded to Ba1 (LGD4, 50%) from Baa3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 28, 2017,
    Downgraded to Ba1 (LGD4, 50%) from Baa3

  Issuer: ThyssenKrupp Finance Nederland B.V.

    Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Downgraded to NP from P-3

    Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
    (P)NP from (P)P-3

    Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
    (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 25, 2016,
    Downgraded to Ba1 (LGD4, 50%) from Baa3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 25, 2013,
    Downgraded to Ba1 (LGD4, 50%) from Baa3

Assignments:

  Issuer: ThyssenKrupp AG

    Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba1-PD

    Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: ThyssenKrupp AG

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

  Issuer: ThyssenKrupp Finance Nederland B.V.

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Steel Industry published in October 2012. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

ThyssenKrupp is a diversified industrial conglomerate operating
in about 80 countries. In the fiscal year ended September 30,
2012, ThyssenKrupp generated sales from continuing operations of
EUR40 billion.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


OMEGA NAVIGATION: Has Access to Cash Collateral Until March 25
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas
continued until March 25, 2013, at 2 p.m., the hearing to
consider Baytown Navigation Inc., et al.'s motion for cash
collateral use.

The Court also ordered that the Debtors are authorized to use
cash collateral until March 25.  A copy of the budget is
available for free at:

http://bankrupt.com/misc/OMEGANAVIGATION_cashcoll_budget.pdf

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Jan. 8, 2013, HSH
Nordbank AG, as agent, asserts that pursuant to the senior
facilities agreement and the other senior facilities documents,
the Debtors are indebted to the senior facilities lenders in the
principal amount of US$242,720,000, plus accrued and accruing
interest and all other amounts.   The junior lenders assert a
lien on inter alia, the ships, all cash collateral and all
prepetition collateral pursuant to a US$42,500,000 loan dated
March 27, 2008.

As adequate protection from diminution in value of the lenders'
collateral, the Debtors will:

   -- make adequate protection payments;

   -- grant the lenders adequate protection liens in all of their
      rights, title and interest in their property, and a
      superpriority administrative expense claim status, subject
      to carve out.

   -- provide continued maintenance of, and insurance on, the
      ships and all of their other assets and property,
      consistent with the Debtors' prepetition practices.

                      About Omega Navigation

Athens, Greece-based Omega Navigation Enterprises Inc. and
affiliates, owner and operator of tankers carrying refined
petroleum products, filed for Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Lead Case No. 11-35926) on July 8, 2011, in Houston, Texas
in the United States.

Omega is an international provider of marine transportation
services focusing on seaborne transportation of refined petroleum
products.  The Debtors disclosed assets of US$527.6 million and
debt totaling US$359.5 million.  Together, the Debtors wholly own
a fleet of eight high-specification product tankers, with each
vessel owned by a separate debtor entity.

HSH Nordbank AG, as the senior lenders' agent, has first liens on
vessels to secure a US$242.7 million loan.  The lenders include
Bank of Scotland and Dresdner Bank AG.  The ships are encumbered
with US$36.2 million in second mortgages with NIBC Bank NV as
agent.  Before bankruptcy, Omega sued the senior bank lenders in
Greece contending they violated an agreement to grant a three
year extension on a loan that otherwise matured in April 2011.

An affiliate of Omega that manages the vessels didn't file, nor
did affiliates with partial ownership interests in other vessels.

Judge Karen K. Brown presides over the case.  Bracewell &
Giuliani LLP serves as counsel to the Debtors.  Jefferies &
Company, Inc., is the financial advisor and investment banker.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has tapped Winston
& Strawn as local counsel; Jager Smith as lead counsel; and First
International as financial advisor.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: Mortgage Bank Raises EUR500MM From Bond Issue
-----------------------------------------------------------
AIB Mortgage Bank agreed a EUR500 million 3.5-year secured ACS
bond issue under its EUR20 billion Mortgage Covered Securities
Programme.  AIBMB is a wholly owned subsidiary of AIB.  This is
AIBMB's second successful recent return to the ACS market
following the EUR500 million 3-year issuance in November 2012.
ACS bonds are not guaranteed by the Irish State.  This 3.5-year
deal was priced at a spread over mid-swaps of 185 basis points
and was oversubscribed more than four times.

The total order book was c. EUR2.2 billion with in excess of 160
international investors reflecting a well placed and diversified
profile.  Demand came from 20 countries with 99% placed outside
Ireland.

This transaction demonstrates the continued progress of AIB's
strategy of engaging with the market in a balanced and measured
manner.

                      About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

The Company reported a loss of EUR2.29 billion in 2011, a loss of
EUR10.16 billion in 2010, and a loss of EUR2.33 billion in 2009.

Allied Irish's consolidated statement of financial position for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, showed EUR136.65 billion in total
assets, EUR122.18 billion in total liabilities and EUR14.46
billion in shareholders' equity.

Allied Irish's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed EUR129.85
billion in total assets, EUR116.59 billion in total liabilities
and EUR13.26 billion in total shareholders' equity.


AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Avoca CLO IV PLC's class B Def, C1 Def, C2 Def, D Def, N Combo, P
Combo, and Q Combo notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on the class A1a, A1b, A2, and E Def notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance.  S&P has conducted a credit and cash flow analysis,
and has applied its relevant criteria for transactions of this
type.

Following S&P's analysis, it has observed that the portfolio's
overall credit quality has deteriorated since its April 25, 2012
review.

Since S&P's previous review, the proportion of assets rated in
the 'CCC' category (rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has decreased
to 5.58% from 7.76%, and the level of defaulted assets (assets
from obligors rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or 'D')
has increased to 5.53% from 0.42%.

Credit enhancement has decreased for all rated classes of notes
due to the reduction in the aggregate collateral balance (to
EUR373 million from EUR393 million).  This decrease is explained
by the losses in the underlying portfolio as well as by partial
amortization of the class A1a and A1b notes.  The class B Def
coverage test is currently failing, and the class D Def and E Def
notes have further deferred their interest payments.  The
transaction now benefits from a higher weighted-average spread of
3.60% compared with 3.34% as of S&P's previous review.

"We have subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rates (BDRs)
for each rated class at each rating level.  We have incorporated
a series of cash flow stress scenarios using various default
patterns and levels for each liability rating category, in
conjunction with different interest stress scenarios," S&P said

In our opinion, the credit enhancement available to the class
A1a, A1b, and A2 notes is commensurate with their current
ratings.  We have therefore affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' rating on the
class A1a notes, and have affirmed our 'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the
class A1b and A2 notes," S&P added.

S&P's ratings on the class B Def, C1 Def, C2 Def, D Def, and E
Def notes are constrained by the application of the largest
obligor test, a supplemental stress test that it introduced in
its 2009 cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.
This test addresses event and model risk that might be present in
the transaction.  Although the BDRs generated by S&P's cash flow
model indicated higher ratings, the largest obligor test
effectively constrained the ratings on the class B Def at 'A+
(sf)', C1 Def and C2 Def at 'BB+ (sf)', D Def at 'CCC+ (sf)', and
E Def notes at 'CCC- (sf)'.  S&P has therefore lowered its
ratings on the class B Def, C1 Def, C2 Def, and D Def notes, and
has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class E Def notes.

Today's downgrades of the class N, P, and Q combination notes
reflect the downgrades of their rated components.  In addition,
the class N and P Combo notes now rely more on the cash flows
from their rated class E Def component and are negatively
affected by its performance.  The class E Def notes are currently
rated 'CCC-' (sf), which makes them vulnerable to nonpayment.

Deutsche Bank AG (A+/Negative/A-1) acts as the account bank and
custodian in the transaction.  In S&P's view, the counterparty is
appropriately rated to support the ratings on the notes (see
"Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And Assumptions,"
published on Nov. 29, 2012).

At closing, Avoca CLO IV entered into a number of derivative
agreements to mitigate currency risks in the transaction.  S&P
considers that the documentation for these derivative agreements
does not comply with their 2012 counterparty criteria.
Therefore, S&P has applied additional foreign exchange stresses
to the notional amount of non-euro denominated assets in the
portfolio, for stress scenarios of 'AA-' and above.

Avoca CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in January 2006. Avoca Capital Holdings
manages the portfolio.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

                Rating
Class        To         From

Avoca CLO IV PLC
EUR494.1 Million Floating- and Fixed-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

B Def        A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)
C1 Def       BB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
C2 Def       BB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
D Def        CCC+ (sf)  B+ (sf)
N Combo      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)
P Combo      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)
Q Combo      BB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A1a          AAA (sf)
A1b          AA+ (sf)
A2           AA+ (sf)
E Def        CCC- (sf)


AVOCA CLO VIII: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all classes of notes in Avoca CLO VIII Ltd.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- raised its ratings on the class A2, B def, and C def notes;

   -- lowered its ratings on the class A1 and D def notes; and

   -- affirmed its rating on the class E def notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance based on the Oct. 31, 2012 trustee report, S&P's
credit and cash flow analysis, and recent transaction
developments.  S&P has applied its 2012 counterparty criteria,
2009 cash flow criteria update for corporate collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and its non-sovereign ratings criteria.

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Nov. 16, 2011,
it has observed an increase in the weighted-average spread earned
on the collateral pool to 3.69% from 3.01%.  S&P has also
observed that the transaction's weighted-average life has reduced
to 4.58 years from 5.14 years.

The proportion of assets that S&P considers to be rated in the
'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has decreased (in
notional and percentage terms).  However, assets that S&P
considers to be defaulted (assets rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective
default], and 'D') has increased since its previous review, when
there were no defaulted assets.  This has resulted in decreasing
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes.

S&P also notes that obligor concentration in this well-
diversified pool has increased.  Additionally, the par value
tests for the class D and E notes do not comply with the required
trigger under the transaction documents, but the par value tests
for all other classes of notes comply with the required triggers.
In S&P's previous review, all of the par value tests exceeded the
required levels.

Avoca CLO VIII is currently in its reinvestment period, which
ends in October 2014.  S&P has subjected the capital structure to
its cash flow analysis, based on its 2009 cash flow CDO criteria,
to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) at each rating
level.  S&P used the reported portfolio balance that it
considered to be performing, the principal cash balance, the
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that S&P considered to be appropriate.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.  To help assess the collateral pool's credit
risk, S&P used CDO Evaluator 6.0.1 to generate scenario default
rates (SDRs) at each rating level.  S&P then compared these SDRs
with their respective BDRs.

Taking into account the observations outlined above, S&P
considers that the level of credit enhancement available to the
class A2, B def, and C def notes now supports higher ratings than
previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on
these classes of notes.

Although the results of our cash flow analysis suggest higher
ratings for the class D def and E def notes, S&P has lowered its
rating on the class D def notes to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and
has affirmed its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on the class E def notes
based on the maximum ratings achievable under the largest obligor
test.  The largest obligor test is a supplemental stress test
that S&P introduced in its 2009 cash flow CDO criteria.  This
test addresses event and model risk that might be present in the
transaction and assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (not counting excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets, with a flat recovery of 5%.

"Under our non-sovereign ratings criteria, S&P also take into
account the transaction's exposure to assets in certain lower
rated European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone)
jurisdictions that cannot support higher ratings.  Therefore, for
'AAA'-rated tranches, S&P establishes a maximum ratings
differential of up to a maximum of six notches above the rating
on the jurisdiction in which the securitized assets are located,
unless the credit enhancement available to a class of notes is
sufficient to support a higher rating differential after
adjusting down the pool balance.

Avoca CLO VIII is exposed to assets located in Spain (BBB-
/Negative/A-3), Italy (Unsolicited; BBB+/Negative/A-2), and
Ireland (BBB+/Negative/A-2).  S&P has considered this exposure in
its review, and has made adjustments to the aggregate pool
balance in its analysis.  In S&P's previous review, it did not
make these adjustments as these sovereigns had higher ratings.

"Based on our counterparty analysis, we have concluded that the
transaction documents for the derivative counterparties -- Credit
Suisse International (A+/Negative/A-1), Citibank N.A.
(A/Negative/A-1), and JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (A+/Negative/A-1)
do not comply with our 2012 counterparty criteria (see
"Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And Assumptions,"
published on Nov. 29, 2012).  We have analyzed the transaction's
exposure to the derivative counterparties based on the maximum
potential rating that each derivative counterparty can support
under our criteria.  The maximum potential rating can be no
higher than one notch above the rating on the counterparty unless
the credit enhancement available to a class of notes is
sufficient to support higher ratings after adjusting the pool
balance (i.e., adjustments made to the foreign currency in our
cash flow analysis)," S&P said.

Taking into account the application of S&P's non-sovereign
ratings criteria and 2012 counterparty criteria, S&P considers
the level of credit enhancement available to the class A1 notes
to be commensurate with a lower rating.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)' its rating on the class A1
notes.

Avoca CLO VIII is a cash flow corporate loan collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                        Rating
                 To                       From

Avoca CLO VIII Ltd.
EUR508 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2               AA (sf)                 AA- (sf)
B def            A+ (sf)                 A (sf)
C def            BBB+ (sf)               BBB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

A1               AA+ (sf)                AAA (sf)
D def            B+ (sf)                 BB+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E def            CCC+ (sf)


TALISMAN-3 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings Three Note Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Talisman-3 Finance p.l.c.'s class D
to F notes and withdrawn the ratings, as follows:

  -- EUR0m class D (XS0256115865) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     assigns Recovery Estimate (RE) 0%, withdrawn

  -- EUR0m class E (XS0256116327) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     RE 0%, withdrawn

  -- EUR0m class F (XS0256116673) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     RE 0%, withdrawn

The downgrade reflects a write off following a EUR20.7 million
loss allocation from the sale of assets backing the
Berlin/Dresden loan. The recoveries were applied to the notes
sequentially in October 2012, redeeming the class B notes
(EUR13.7 million) and C notes (EUR19.6 million) in full and the
class D notes in part (by EUR9.8 million). Following the full
repayment of the last remaining loan, Waterloo (EUR27.2 million),
in January 2013 the class D notes suffered a EUR5.7 million loss
leading to a recovery of 80% of then outstanding note balance.
The class E and F notes were entirely written off.

Recovery Estimates RE0% have been assigned to all notes as no
further recoveries are expected. The ratings for the class D to F
notes have been withdrawn as there is no outstanding principal.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Shareholders, Bank of Italy Approve Capital Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Davis and Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News report that the
Bank of Italy approved EUR3.9 billion (US$5.3 billion) in
emergency loans for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (BMPS),
meaning Prime Minister Mario Monti may have to push ahead with
the unpopular bailout before elections next month.

The decision comes amid a political firestorm over rescuing the
world's oldest bank after revelations the lender's former
management hid details of structured-finance transactions from
regulators that may produce hundreds of millions of euros in
losses, Bloomberg relates.  The Bank of Italy made its
announcement late on Saturday, a day after Monte Paschi
shareholders approved EUR6.5 billion in capital increases needed
to secure the loans, Bloomberg notes.

Separately, Bloomberg News' Ms. Sirletti and Elisa Martinuzzi
report that the capital-raising plan is a required step to
receive a second bailout from the Italian government.

Shareholders approved two capital transactions at a meeting in
Siena on Friday, allowing Monte Paschi to qualify for EUR3.9
billion of state aid, a week after Bloomberg News revealed the
bank used derivatives to mask losses.

Mr. Monti, who is trying to limit the political fallout from
Monte Paschi on his campaign for a second term, on Thursday asked
the Bank of Italy to review the lender's accounts before
releasing the aid, Bloobmerg discloses.  According to Bloomberg,
Monte Paschi Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola said on
Friday that under the bailout, Monte Paschi will sell securities
dubbed "Monti bonds" to the government with a 9% coupon that may
rise to as much as 15%.

The world's oldest bank, which was bailed out in 2009, is seeking
EUR500 million more from taxpayers to cover potential losses
linked to derivatives, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg News' Chiara Vasarri reports that Bank of Italy
Governor Ignazio Visco said the Bank of Italy's role isn't to
"police" Monte Paschi and the central bank wasn't informed of
newly emerged transactions producing losses.

The central bank "is a supervisor, not the police of the banks,"
Bloobmerg quotes Mr. Visco as saying on Friday in an interview
with Bloomberg Television's Francine Lacqua in Davos,
Switzerland.

The central bank will review Paschi's books after the company
disclosed last week it may face more than EUR700 million (US$941
million) of losses related to structured finance transactions
hidden from regulators, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Visco, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the Siena, Italy-
based bank's difficult liquidity situation, which is also due to
"risky" deals, has been known for a long time.  He said that new
derivatives transactions linked to earlier deals have emerged and
the central bank wasn't informed of losses connected to them,
Bloomberg notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on December
18, 2012, Bloomberg News related that Banca Monte dei Paschi di
Siena SpA won temporary European Union approval for a EUR3.9
billion (US$5.1 billion) recapitalization from the Italian
government to help it meet minimum capital requirements.  The
European Commission said in an e-mailed statement that Monte
Paschi must submit a restructuring plan within six months before
regulators can make a final decision on the state aid, Bloomberg
disclosed.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Rating to 'Caa1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
rating of Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara SpA (CR Ferrara) to Caa1,
from Ba3. Concurrently, the standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) was downgraded to E, mapping to a standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ca (formerly D-/ba3). The
outlook on the long-term deposit rating is stable. The standalone
BCA of ca has no outlook assigned. CR Ferrara's Non-Prime short-
term deposit rating is unaffected by this rating action.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of CR Ferrara's ratings reflects Moody's
expectation that the bank will require external support to remain
a going concern at some point over the rating horizon, which is
expressed in the standalone BCA of ca. Additionally, Moody's
believes that the likelihood of support forthcoming from the
Italian government is high, resulting in a now three-notch uplift
for its deposit ratings to Caa1, with a stable outlook.

This assessment is based on the bank's very weak asset quality
and low capacity to generate capital through profits to offset
the balance sheet risks. The lack of access to the wholesale
funding markets and very high reliance on European Central Bank
(ECB) funding is a reflection of these ongoing challenges. The
downgrade of the long-term-deposit rating was triggered by the
downgrade of the standalone BCA. It incorporates Moody's
assessment that it is highly probable that CR Ferrara would
receive systemic support in case of need, though there remains an
element of uncertainty over the amount and timeliness of such
support.

The downgrade of CR Ferrara's ratings concludes the review for
downgrade initiated on November 16, 2012.

Standalone Credit Profile

The downgrade of CR Ferrara's standalone BCA to E/ca reflects
Moody's expectation that the bank will require external support
to remain a going concern at some point over next few years. The
high risks associated with the bank's past expansionary strategy
outside its home market and the weakness of many of its assets
and its underwriting have been exposed by the challenging
domestic operating environment. The bank has experienced
significant increases in non-performing loans each year since
2008, well over 20% of its loan portfolio is already classified
as problem loans, and the weak economic outlook suggests that
asset quality will continue to deteriorate in the coming years.
Notwithstanding its reported Tier 1 ratio of 8.1% and recent
increases in provisions, Moody's believes that further asset
impairments are very likely to result in a significant erosion of
capital, exceeding the bank's capacity to absorb losses out of
earnings and the capacity of its majority owners' (a charitable
foundation) to inject additional capital. As at December 2011,
the bank's Tier 1 capital stood at EUR389 million, loan loss
reserves at EUR530 million, against non-performing ('sofferenze')
loans of EUR883 million, and 'watchlist' plus other problem loan
items ('incagli', 'ristrutturati', 'scaduti') of EUR564 million.
It is therefore Moody's expectation that the bank will require
external support to remain a going concern.

Moody's notes that CR Ferrara's internal core capital generation
capacity is very weak. Moody's expects net profit in 2012 and
2013 to be largely influenced by the positive carry from its
investment in Italian government bonds funded largely by ECB
funding. CR Ferrara reported a loss of EUR22 million in 2011,
following two consecutive years of losses (i.e., YE2010: EUR58
million, YE2009: EUR79 million). Accordingly, and notwithstanding
the positive impact of this position on otherwise negative future
earnings, the agency believes that the bank's earnings capacity
will be insufficient to offset losses on impaired assets.
Moreover, Moody's highlights the risk concentration of the
sizeable Italian government bond portfolio held by the
institution.

Moody's also expects the considerable pressure on CR Ferrara's
funding to persist and to remain a strong source of vulnerability
in the coming years. The bank is mainly retail funded, with most
of its non-retail funding being sourced from the ECB (about 23%
as of December 2011). It is likely that the bank's market access
will remain restricted and costly for an extended period, and
need to repay maturing LTRO funds will pose an increasing threat
to the institution as the maturity date approaches. As a result,
the uncertainty regarding the bank's future ability to secure
market funding on a regular basis and the possibility that
further support may be needed to repay ECB funding is an
additional negative rating driver.

The assessment of these pressure points led Moody's to downgrade
the bank's standalone BFSR to E and lower the standalone credit
assessment to ca, reflecting the rating agency's view of a high
likelihood that the bank may require external support.

Long-Term Deposit Ratings

The downgrade of CR Ferrara's deposit rating to Caa1 was
triggered by the lowering of the standalone credit assessment.
Given the high likelihood of external support being required,
Moody's believes there is a high likelihood of systemic support
from the Italian government being forthcoming in case of need,
notwithstanding the banks' small size and very limited systemic
importance, especially in view of the institution being largely
retail-funded. However, there remains a material margin of
uncertainty over the availability, amount and timing of support.

What Could Move The Ratings UP/DOWN

At the current level of the standalone ratings of ca, Moody's
does not expect any further downwards pressure. Most likely, any
upwards pressure would stem from capital injections or other
forms of external support (such as transfer of bad assets out of
the bank) which could bolster the bank's capital, asset quality
and/or profitability and improve its standalone strength. The
extent to which it would be appropriate to reflect such support
in a higher BCA would depend on Moody's judgment as to the
likelihood of the bank being be able to ensure its viability from
that point, and the impact on its debt rating would additionally
depend on the likelihood of further support being forthcoming.

Downwards pressure on CR Ferrara's debt ratings could be
triggered by rising uncertainty around the likelihood of systemic
support.

Methodology Used

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology, published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Ferrara, Italy, CR Ferrara had total assets of
EUR7.3 billion as at December 2011.

1) Unless noted otherwise, data in this report is sourced from
company reports and Moody's Financial Metrics.

2) Problem loans include: non-performing loans ('sofferenze'),
watchlist ('incagli' -- including only an estimated portion of
those over 90 days overdue), restructured ('ristrutturati') and
past due loans ('scaduti').



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


NURBANK: S&P Raises Long-Term Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long- and short-
term counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based financial
institution, Nurbank, to 'B/B' from 'B-/C' and its Kazakhstan
national scale rating to 'kzBB+' from 'kzBB-'.  The outlook is
stable.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that Nurbank's capital position
has strengthened following the November 2012 sale of Kazakhstani
tenge (KZT) 47.3 billion of problem loans to third-party
collection companies in a true sale without recourse.  S&P views
this transaction--the aggregated profit and loss impact of which
was marginal--as similar to a capital increase.

S&P understands that the bank is planning another KZT24.2 billion
sale in the first quarter of 2013.  S&P expects the two sales
combined--which represented about one-quarter of Nurbank's total
loan portfolio at Sept. 30, 2012--will materially reduce
Nurbank's large stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and problem
loans.  In S&P's view, NPLs will likely reduce to around 25% of
the bank's total loan portfolio at year-end 2013 from 36% at
Sept. 30, 2012.  Apart from the two sales, the more-dynamic
generation of new business than seen in the previous three years
will also likely improve the bank's profitability and asset
quality.

"Before both sales were announced, we had expected Nurbank's
Standard & Poor's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio would weaken
because of the bank's need to create significant additional
provisions on its problem loans.  The sale of problem loans has
enabled Nurbank to significantly reduce its risk-weighted assets,
which we calculate using our RAC framework methodology, and to
maintain its capital base.  Therefore, we now expect that
Nurbank's RAC ratio before diversification will have strengthened
significantly year-on-year at end-2012 and will stay comfortably
above 10% in the next 24 months.  Our forecast assumes that
Nurbank's main shareholder will remain fully committed to the
bank and would either inject fresh capital or initiate further
sales of problem assets, if required, to maintain capitalization
at current levels," S&P said.

S&P has raised the short-term rating to 'B' from 'C' to reflect
its view of reduced pressure on Nurbank's funding and liquidity
position and the bank's ability to maintain stable deposit-based
funding, with no significant wholesale repayments, over the
forecast horizon.

S&P's ratings on Nurbank reflect S&P's assessment of its 'bb-'
anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit rating,
as well as its "moderate" business position, "strong" capital and
earnings, "weak" risk position, "average" funding and "adequate"
liquidity, as S&P's criteria define these terms.  Positive rating
factors are its strengthened capitalization and stable deposit-
based funding.  Ratings weaknesses are its exposure to the risky
construction and real estate sectors in Kazakhstan and its still-
high share of NPLs and restructured loans, which is higher than
the Kazakh banking sector average, excluding restructured banks.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the bank will
maintain strong capitalization in the next 24 months and that its
profitability and asset quality will gradually recover as new
business is generated.

"We are unlikely to raise the ratings again over the outlook
horizon.  To revise the bank's risk position to "moderate" from
"weak" we would need to see that its loan underwriting had
strengthened and that loans generated over the past two years
were performing better than the old stock of NPLs.  We would also
need to see a significant reduction in the proportion of loans to
the high-risk real estate and construction sectors," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if, contrary to our expectations, the
bank's capitalization weakens such that our projected RAC ratio
before adjustments for diversification declines below 10%.  This
could happen because of higher-than-expected planned loan
expansion, the creation of significant additional provisions, or
other material negative one-off items.  An increase in NPLs--
against our current expectation that asset quality will improve--
could also lead us to lower the ratings," S&P added.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


AXIUS EUROPEAN: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Axius European CLO S.A.'s class A, B-1, B-2, and C notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class
D and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance.  Since its last review in November 2011, S&P has
observed a reduction of the aggregate collateral balance to
EUR324.6 million from EUR330.5 million, while none of the notes
have amortized.  This has led to a decrease in available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes and a general drop in the
results of the class A, B, C, D, and E par value tests, compared
with when S&P last took rating action.

"We have observed a relatively mixed credit performance of the
underlying assets, with a slight increase in the balance of
assets that we consider to be defaulted in our analysis (i.e.,
assets rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective default], or 'D') to 1.66%
from 0.70%.  However, at the same time, assets rated in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') have significantly decreased
to 4.14% from 11.73%.  We have also noted decreasing weighted-
average recovery rates for the underlying portfolio across all
rating levels," S&P noted.

Nevertheless, S&P has noted several key positive factors in its
credit analysis.  The weighted-average spread generated by the
portfolio has increased to 3.86% from 3.42%, and the
transaction's weighted-average life has fallen to 3.9 years from
5.1 years.  The latter has led to a significant decrease in the
scenario default rates that S&P assumes across all rating levels
in its default analysis of the underlying portfolio.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class.  In
our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
consider to be performing, the current weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using alternative default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Overall, positive factors have more than offset the negative
ones and our credit and cash flow analysis indicated that the
credit enhancement available to the class A, B-1, B-2 and C notes
is consistent with higher ratings than previously assigned.  We
have therefore raised our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P
added.

The credit support for the class D and E notes is commensurate
with S&P's current ratings on these classes of notes.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on these notes.

S&P notes that its rating on the class E notes is constrained at
its current rating level by the application of the largest
obligor default test, a supplemental stress test that S&P
introduced as part of our 2009 collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) criteria update.

S&P has applied its 2012 counterparty criteria and, in its view,
the transaction participants are appropriately rated to support
the ratings on all classes of notes.

Axius European CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
October 2007 and has been managed by 3i Debt Management since
September 2012.

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
           To             From

Axius European CLO S.A.
EUR350 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A          AA (sf)        AA- (sf)
B-1        A+ (sf)        A- (sf)
B-2        A+ (sf)        A- (sf)
C          BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

D          BB+ (sf)
E          B+ (sf)



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Rates US$400MM Tier 2 Debt Securities 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s USD400
million subordinated Tier 2 debt securities a 'BB-' rating. The
rating is in line with the expected rating.

The rating reflects Fitch's criteria 'Assessing and Rating Bank
Subordinated and Hybrid Securities'. The securities are
subordinated but have no coupon flexibility. Their rating is one
notch below CEB's Viability Rating (VR) reflecting one notch for
loss severity, but no notches for incremental non-performance
risk relative to the bank's VR. The securities' rating is
sensitive to any change in CEB's VR.

The securities have a 10-year maturity, with a maturity date of
Jan. 24, 2023, and have a call option exercisable once at the
call date on Jan. 24, 2018. The final amount is USD400 million.
The notes' ISIN is XS0878492791.

The transaction features statutory loss absorption language in
the 'Risk Factors' section of the bond documentation, which is
cross-referenced in the terms and conditions of the notes, and
the notes are expected to be Basel III compliant. The securities
do not have contractual language for loss absorption at the point
of non-viability. However, the notes would, under the Dutch
jurisdiction, be statutorily subject to some form of loss
absorption in a resolution situation in the context of the
expected implementation of the Crisis Management Directive, i.e.
if the bank reaches the point of non-viability.


FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-3 Notes to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
FAXTOR ABS 2005-1 B.V.'s class A-1, A-2E, A-2F, and A-3 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance.  S&P performed a credit and cash flow analysis and
assessed the support that each participant provides to the
transaction by applying its 2012 counterparty criteria.  In S&P's
analysis, it used data from the latest available trustee report
dated Nov. 30, 2012.

FAXTOR ABS 2005-1 has been amortizing since the end of its
reinvestment period in February 2011.  Since the last rating
action S&P took in the transaction on May 3, 2012, the aggregate
collateral balance has decreased by 18.24% to EUR185.7 million
from EUR227.3 million.

S&P has subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rates for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considered to be performing
(EUR182,251,056), the current weighted-average spread (1.45%),
and the weighted-average recovery rates that calculated in
accordance with S&P's 2012 Structured Finance criteria.  S&P
applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using nine different
default patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

From S&P's analysis, it has observed that EUR43.8 million of the
class A-1 notes have paid down since its May 2012 rating action.
In S&P's view, this has increased the credit enhancement
available to the class A-1, A-2E, A-2F, and A-3 notes.  S&P has
also observed an increase in the weighted-average spread to 145
basis points (bps) from 143 bps and an increase in the recovery
rates across all rating levels over the same period.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the class A-1, A-2E, A-2F,
and A-3 notes indicated that the level of credit enhancement is
commensurate with a higher rating than previously assigned.  S&P
has therefore raised to its ratings on these classes of notes.
The application of its 2012 counterparty criteria has not
constrained its updated ratings on these notes because the
ratings are lower than the ratings on the counterparties in the
transaction.

FAXTOR ABS 2005-1 is a cash flow mezzanine structured finance CDO
of a portfolio that consists predominantly of residential
mortgage-backed securities and, to a lesser extent, CDOs of
corporates, CDOs of asset-backed securities, and commercial
mortgage-backed securities.  The transaction closed in December
2005 and is managed by IMC Asset Management.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
             To                   From

FAXTOR ABS 2005-1 B.V.
EUR 308.4 Million Asset-Backed Floating and Fixed-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1          A- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
A-2E         BBB- (sf)            BB+ (sf)
A-2F         BBB- (sf)            BB+ (sf)
A-3          B+ (sf)              B- (sf)


JUBILEE CDO V: S&P Raises Rating on Two Note Classes to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Jubilee CDO V B.V.'s class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, D-1, and D-2 senior
secured notes.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class B and C senior secured floating-rate notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis to
assess the transaction's performance since S&P's previous review
on March 16, 2012.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

                                  Notional
                         Current     as of
       Rating   Rating  notional  Mar.2012
Class      to     from (mil.EUR) (mil.EUR)        Interest PIK

A-1A  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)    146.05    160.97 6mEURIBOR+0.22%  No
A-1B  AA+(sf)   AA(sf)     28.90     28.90 6mEURIBOR+0.35%  No
A-2   AA+(sf)   AA(sf)    127.50    138.36 6mEURIBOR+0.24%  No
B      A+(sf)   A+(sf)     45.80     45.80 6mEURIBOR+0.36%  No
C     BB+(sf)  BB+(sf)     46.80     46.80 6mEURIBOR+0.60% Yes
D-1    B+(sf) CCC+(sf)      8.48      8.48 6mEURIBOR+1.40% Yes
D-2    B+(sf) CCC+(sf)     12.73     12.73          5.005% Yes
E          NR       NR     72.20     72.20 6mEURIBOR+8.00% N/A

6mEURIBOR--Six-month EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate).
PIK--Deferrable.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.

The senior notes have continued to amortize since our March 2012
review.  The class A-1A and A-2 notes have amortized to 79% and
82% of their original sizes, respectively.

At the same time, in S&P's opinion, the transaction has benefited
from:

   -- decreased time-to-maturity to 3.74 from 4.18 years; and

   -- an increase in the loan portfolio's weighted-average spread
      to 4.06% from 3.41%.

This positive performance was somewhat mitigated by:

A deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral.  Assets
rated in the 'CCC' category now represent 10.71% of the total
collateral, as opposed to 10.57% in March 2012.  At the same
time, the proportion of defaulted assets in the total collateral
has increased to 2.08% from 1.48% in March 2012; and Lower
weighted-average recovery rates for each rating category.

S&P subjected the notes to various cash flow scenarios
incorporating different default patterns and interest rate
curves, to determine each tranche's break-even default rate at
each rating level.

KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

                               Current   As of March 2012
Collateral balance (mil. EUR)   455.51             486.56
Number of obligors                  62                 67
Weighted-average spread (%)       4.06               3.41
AAA WARR (%)                     36.25              39.25
AA WARR (%)                      41.25              44.00
A WARR (%)                       45.50              48.00
BBB WARR (%)                     49.75              52.25
BB WARR (%)                      57.75              60.75
B/CCC WARR (%)                   61.50              64.50
Portfolio WAL (years)             3.74               4.18
Class A/B par value ratio (%)   126.27             123.56

WARR--Weighted-average recovery rate.
WAL--Weighted-average life.

JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (A+/Negative/A-1), Credit Suisse
International (A+/Negative/A-1), and Citibank N.A. (A/Negative/
A-1) currently provide currency hedges on an aggregate
EUR71.17 million of non euro-denominated assets.  S&P has
reviewed each counterparty's downgrade provisions.  In S&P's
opinion, they do not fully comply with S&P's 2012 counterparty
criteria.   However, S&P considers that the transaction's
exposure to the counterparties is sufficiently limited to the
extent that their failure to perform would not materially affect
its analysis.

S&P has also applied the largest obligor default test and the
largest industry default test, two supplemental stress tests that
S&P introduced as part of its September 2009 criteria update.
The application of the largest obligor default test constrained
S&P's ratings on the class D-1 and D-2 notes at 'B+ (sf)'.  The
largest industry default test did not affect any of S&P's ratings
in this transaction.

As a result of these developments, and following S&P's credit and
cash flow analysis, S&P believes that the credit enhancement
available to class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, D-1, and D-2 notes is
commensurate with higher ratings.  Therefore, S&P's has raised
its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, D-1, and D-2 notes.  At
the same time, S&P believes that the credit enhancement available
to the class B and C notes is commensurate with the assigned
rating levels.  Therefore S&P has affirmed its ratings on the
class B and C notes.

Jubilee CDO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade corporate
firms.  The transaction, managed by Alcentra Ltd., closed in
June 2005 and has been in its amortization period since August
2011.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

                 Rating
Class       To            From

Jubilee CDO V B.V.
EUR555 Million secured Floating- and Fixed-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1A        AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
A-1B        AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-2         AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
D-1         B+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
D-2         B+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B          A+ (sf)
C          BB+ (sf)



===========
P O L A N D
===========


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Names Russian Alcohol Unit's R. Lee as New CFO
----------------------------------------------------------------
Central European Distribution Corporation announced that Ryan
Lee, age 44, was appointed Chief Financial Officer of CEDC by the
CEDC Board of Directors.  Prior to his appointment, Mr. Lee
served as Chief Financial Officer of Russian Alcohol Group, a
CEDC subsidiary, from April 2012.  Mr. Lee has over 23 years of
international work experience including 13 years in Russia, 5
years in Switzerland, and 2 years in each of the UK and the
Netherlands.  From November 2008 to March 2012, Mr. Lee worked
for Eldorado as Vice President Finance.  From November 1999 to
November 2008, Mr. Lee worked for Japan Tobacco International,
Geneva, as Vice President Finance, Business Service Centres &
Integration, Vice President Finance, Financial Planning &
Analysis, and Vice President Corporate Tax, and for Japan Tobacco
International, Russia as Chief Financial Officer, Vice President
Finance and Financial Controller.  From August 1989 to October
1999, Mr. Lee held accounting, finance and commercial positions
at Unilever PLC and its group subsidiaries.  Mr. Lee graduated in
1990 from the University of Wales Cardiff with a BA joint honors
in Law and Italian, and has been a Chartered Accountant since
1992.

CEDC also announced on Jan. 22, 2013, that Bartosz Kolacinski
agreed to resume his position as Deputy Chief Financial Officer
of CEDC.  Mr. Kolacinski had been serving as Interim Chief
Financial Officer of CEDC since September 2012.

                            About CEDC

Mt. Laurel, New Jersey-based Central European Distribution
Corporation is one of the world's largest vodka producers and
Central and Eastern Europe's largest integrated spirit beverages
business with its primary operations in Poland, Russia and
Hungary.

Ernst & Young Audit sp. z.o.o., in Warsaw, Poland, expressed
substantial doubt about Central European's ability to continue as
a going concern, following the Company's results for the fiscal
year ended Dec. 31, 2011.  The independent auditors noted that
certain of the Company's credit and factoring facilities are
coming due in 2012 and will need to be renewed to manage its
working capital needs.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2012, showed
US$1.98 billion in total assets, US$1.73 billion in total
liabilities, US$29.44 million in temporary equity, and US$210.78
million in total stockholders' equity.

                             Liquidity

The Company's Convertible Senior Notes are due on March 15, 2013.
The Company has said its current cash on hand, estimated cash
from operations and available credit facilities will not be
sufficient to make the repayment of principal on the Convertible
Notes and, unless the transaction with Russian Standard
Corporation is completed the Company may default on them.  The
Company's cash flow forecasts include the assumption that certain
credit and factoring facilities coming due in 2012 would be
renewed to manage working capital needs.  Moreover, the Company
had a net loss and significant impairment charges in 2011 and
current liabilities exceed current assets at June 30, 2012.
These conditions, the Company said, raise substantial doubt about
its ability to continue as a going concern.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the TCR on Aug. 10, 2012, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services kept on CreditWatch with negative implications
its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating on U.S.-based
Central European Distribution Corp. (CEDC), the parent company of
Poland-based vodka manufacturer CEDC International sp. z o.o.

"The CreditWatch status reflects our view that uncertainties
remain related to CEDC's ongoing accounting review and that
CEDC's liquidity could further and substantially weaken if there
was a breach of covenants which could lead to the acceleration of
the payment of the 2016 notes, upon receipt of a written notice
of 25% or more of the noteholders," S&P said.

As reported by the TCR on Jan. 16, 2013, Moody's Investors
Service has downgraded the corporate family rating (CFR) and
probability of default rating (PDR) of Central European
Distribution Corporation (CEDC) to Caa3 from Caa2.

"The downgrade follows CEDC announcement on the 28 of December
that it had agreed with Russian Standard a revised transaction to
repay its $310 million of convertible notes due March 2013 which,
in Moody's view, has increased the risk of potential loss for
existing bondholders", says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CEDC.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


OLTCHIM SA: To File for Insolvency Following Losses
---------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the board of directors of Oltchim SA on
Thursday decided to file a insolvency request.

SeeNews relates latest financial data available from Oltchim show
that the company's net loss jumped to RON308.5 million (US$94
million/EUR70.6 million) in the first nine months of 2012 from
RON180 million a year earlier.

In 2011, Oltchim reported a net loss of RON278 million on a
turnover of RON1.53 billion, SeeNews recounts.

According to SeeNews, financial news daily Ziarul Financiar
reported that the board of directors proposed as judicial
administrators a consortium of Rominsolv and BDO Business
Restructuring.

The board has appointed Nicolae Turdean as a new interim
president and Mihai Obadescu as an interim administrator,
replacing Rodin Traicu and Radu Adrian, respectively, SeeNews
discloses.  Their interim terms will end with the appointment of
new administrators at the general shareholders' meeting of the
company, SeeNews says.

Romania tried unsuccessfully to sell its 54.80% stake in Oltchim
in October, SeeNews recounts.

Oltchim SA is a state-owned chemical company.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SOVCOMFLOT JSC: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'Ba2'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and to Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD the
probability of default rating (PDR) of Sovcomflot JSC (SCF).
Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded SCF's issuer rating to
Ba3 from Ba2 and the senior unsecured rating assigned to the $800
million Eurobond issued by SCF Capital Limited, which is a 100%
indirect subsidiary of SCF (SCF guarantees the Eurobond), to Ba3
with a loss given default assessment of 5 (LGD5/85%) from Ba2.
The outlook on all ratings is stable.

As SCF is a 100% state-owned company, Moody's applies its
Government-Related Issuer (GRI) rating methodology in determining
the company's CFR. According to this methodology, the rating is
driven by a combination of (1) SCF's baseline credit assessment
(BCA), a measure of standalone financial strength, of b2; (2) the
Baa1 local currency rating of the Russian government; (3) the low
default dependence between SCF and the government; and (4) the
strong probability of provision of state support to the company
in the event of financial distress.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade was triggered by Moody's decision to lower SFC's
BCA to b2 from ba3. This decision reflects the fact that the
company's financial metrics remain weak and do not demonstrate an
improvement trend, which would be required for a higher BCA. In
particular, SCF's leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA, stood at
6.4x as of September 2012 and is likely to rise above 6.5x as of
year-end 2012, compared with the threshold of 5.5x that Moody's
has set for a BCA of ba3. Moody's does not expect SCF to reduce
its leverage below 6.0x over the next 12-18 months, as a result
of the continuing difficult global tanker market environment, as
well as the company's ongoing debt-financed investment in the
expansion of its fleet.

At the same time, Moody's continues to acknowledge SCF's solid
business profile thanks to its (1) strong customer base; (2)
diversification into the gas transportation and offshore
businesses, which complements its conventional tanker business;
(3) specialized ice-class fleet (including Arctic shuttle
tankers), which provides the company with a competitive advantage
for servicing projects and operations in harsh weather
conditions; and (4) conservative fleet management, with only
limited exposure to the spot tanker market. In addition, Moody's
notes that SCF's liquidity remains adequate and covers its debt
maturities over the next 12-15 months.

The stable outlook on SCF's ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the company's leverage will be below 6.5x debt/EBITDA and
(funds from operations (FFO) + interest expense)/interest expense
ratio above 3.0x on a sustainable basis. A recovery of SCF's
financial metrics will be subject to an improvement in trading
conditions in the tanker market, as well as the company's
successful completion of its long-discussed IPO, which should
provide it with the funds to repay part of its debt.

As stated above, there is a one-notch difference between the CFR
and both SCF's issuer rating and the senior unsecured rating
assigned to SCF Capital's Eurobond issuance. This differential
continues to reflect the structural and contractual subordination
of the bond to secured debt and unsecured debt located at the
level of operating companies, which comprises a major portion of
the SCF group's total debt. Moody's notes that the differential
could increase to two notches if the company's positioning in its
current rating were to weaken.

What Could Change The Rating UP/DOWN

Moody's could upgrade SCF's rating by one notch if the company
were to reduce its debt/EBITDA to 5.5x or below and increase its
FFO interest coverage to 3.5x on a sustainable basis, while
maintaining its adequate liquidity. That said, Moody's considers
it unlikely that any upward pressure could be exerted on the
rating over the next 12-18 months.

Moody's could downgrade SCF's rating if (1) it expected the
company's debt/EBITDA to remain above 6.5x as of year-end 2014
and beyond; (2) the company's FFO interest coverage were to
decline below 3.0x on a sustainable basis; or (3) its liquidity
were to weaken materially. Moody's would not expect a one-notch
change in the sovereign rating to affect SCF's ratings provided
that all the other GRI inputs remain unchanged.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Shipping Industry published in December 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009 and the Government-Related Issuers: Methodology Update
published in July 2010.

SCF is the leading Russian energy shipping group, servicing
approximately 25% of all seaborne hydrocarbons exports from
Russia. The company is 100% state-owned. As of September 2012,
SCF's last-12-months revenues were US$1.5 billion. The company
ranks among the world's top five energy shipping players by
deadweight tonnage (DWT), with a fleet of 147 own vessels for a
total of 11.7 million DWT as of year-end 2012. In addition, 12
ordered buildings, totaling 1.3 million DWT, are to be delivered
in 2013-14.



=========
S P A I N
=========


HIPOTOTTA NO. 5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on HipoTotta No. 5 PLC's
class A2, B, and C notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its
ratings on the class D and E notes, and has affirmed its rating
on the class F notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's credit and cash flow analysis,
and the application of its Portuguese residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) criteria, 2012 couCriteria For Rating
Portuguese Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities," published on
Aug. 6, 2002; "Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And
Assumptions," published on Nov. 29, 2012; and "Nonsovereign
Ratings That Exceed EMU Sovereign Ratings: Methodology And
Assumptions," published on June 14, 2011).

In accordance with S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria, the
maximum rating differential between Portuguese issuers or
transactions and the related sovereign rating on the Republic of
Portugal is five notches.  Given that S&P's long-term sovereign
credit rating on the Republic of Portugal is 'BB', under S&P's
criteria, the ratings on the notes in structured finance
transactions backed by Portuguese assets should be no higher than
'A-'.

"In our opinion, the increased country risk in Portugal, which
has resulted from the economic recession and rising unemployment,
has negatively affected both the ability and willingness of
obligors to repay their debts.  To absorb this increased credit
risk, we believe that structured finance notes should be able to
withstand losses that would be at least 1.3 times the initial
loss expectations for each rating level and we have adjusted our
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) results accordingly to reflect this
risk," S&P said.

In addition, S&P has applied haircuts to the valuations based on
observed declines in the Portuguese house price index since the
weighted-average origination date.  This has contributed to an
increased WAFF and WALS in the transaction, although it has seen
a larger relative increase (than in earlier HipoTotta
transactions) given the decline in property prices observed since
the weighted-average origination date.

In HipoTotta No. 5, all borrowers pay into a proceeds account
held with Banco Santander Totta S.A. (BB/Negative/B).  Although
losses on this account should not occur and are protected by
Portuguese securitization law, S&P has applied a liquidity stress
of one month's principal and interest collections.

On Oct. 19, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on HipoTotta No. 5's
class A2, B, and C notes on CreditWatch negative following its
Oct. 15 downgrade of the swap provider, Banco Santander S.A.
(BBB/Negative/A-2).  As the swap documentation does not comply
with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, S&P has conducted its
analysis both with and without giving benefit to the swap.

Although arrears remain relatively low, given the process of
writing off loans more than 18 months in arrears, S&P's WAFF and
WALS have increased since its previous review.  This increase is
largely due to house price declines.

Rating      WAFF     WALS      CE
level        (%)      (%)     (%)

AAA        23.35    23.43    5.47
AA         15.95    18.61    2.97
A          12.89    14.29    1.84
BBB         9.92    10.47    1.04
BB          6.86     7.21    0.49

WAFF--Weighted-average foreclosure frequency.
WALS--Weighted-average loss severity.
CE--Credit enhancement.

The increase in WAFF and WALS levels have not been met by a
corresponding increase in credit enhancement.  Therefore, when
S&P considers HipoTotta No. 5 without the benefit of the interest
rate swap, the current ratings on the notes cannot be maintained.
Given that the swap agreement does not comply with S&P's 2012
counterparty criteria and no collateral is being posted, S&P has
capped its ratings on the notes at 'BBB' (the long-term issuer
credit rating on Banco Santander).  As such, and based on the
outcome of S&P's cash flow analysis, it has lowered to 'BBB (sf)'
from 'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
on HipoTotta No. 5's class A2 notes.  S&P has also lowered to
'BBB- (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative
its ratings on the class B and C notes.

The more junior classes of notes (class D and E) cannot maintain
their current ratings either, as the transaction's structural
features do not sufficiently mitigate the increased WAFF and
WALS. S&P has therefore lowered its ratings on the class D notes
to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and on the class E notes to 'BB-
(sf)' from 'BB (sf)'.

The class F notes, which were used at closing to fund the cash
reserve, are paid through excess spread at the bottom of the
priority of payments.  S&P has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on
the class F notes.

HipoTotta No. 5 is an RMBS transaction backed by Portuguese
residential mortgages originated by Banco Santander Totta.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To                 From

HipoTotta No. 5 PLC
EUR2.01 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          BBB (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BBB- (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BBB- (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

D           BB (sf)            BBB (sf)
E           BB- (sf)           BB (sf)

Rating Affirmed

F           CCC- (sf)



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


* TURKEY: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook on the Turkish banking system remains stable, says
Moody's Investors Service in a new Banking System Outlook
published on Jan. 24. The key drivers of the outlook are (1) the
rating agency's view that moderate economic growth and improving
sovereign financial strength will create supportive operating
conditions for banks, despite downside risks from the euro area
crisis, volatile markets and investor risk aversion; and (2)
banks' sufficient resources to absorb an expected gradual
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs). These factors are
partially offset by Moody's expectations that (1) banks' net
profit margins will likely decline further amid low interest
rates and rising competition; and (2) bank funding profiles,
while still sound, are becoming less robust with loan growth
outpacing deposit growth.

The new report is entitled "Banking System Outlook: Turkey".

Moody's expects sustained growth in Turkey's GDP of 3.8% in 2013,
up from an estimated 3.0% in full-year 2012, but below the recent
boom prior to the 2009 recession. This relatively moderate growth
will create supportive conditions for banks, which also benefit
from the improving financial strength of the Turkish government
(Ba1 positive). Following years of a surge in lending, Moody's
expects credit expansion to moderate to around 12-15% in 2013
underpinned by increasing banking penetration, particularly in
under-banked regions in Turkey. Downside risks include a renewed
acceleration of the euro area crisis and a sudden increase in
global investor risk aversion.

Asset quality will likely normalize gradually, with NPLs
increasing moderately from very low current levels. After lending
rose by a rapid 101% in the three years to 30 September 2012,
delinquencies will increase as loan books season. Unsecured
consumer loans and loans to small and mid-sized enterprises are
most at risk and NPLs will rise only gradually, because economic
growth still supports borrowers' payment ability. Importantly,
banks have sufficient resources to cope with even worse-than-
expected losses, given a system-average 14.5% Tier 1 ratio (Basel
II) and Moody's-adjusted Tier 1 ratio (which reflects sovereign
exposures in local-currency) at 12.0% as of 30 September 2012.
Capital ratios have, however, decreased as asset growth outpaced
capital growth.

Moody's expects net profit margins to weaken over the next 12-18
months, as banks confront an environment of moderating growth,
heightened competition, and rising provisioning costs. Pre-
provision margins are likely to stay flat, at best, as moderate
economic growth limits revenue opportunities and competition for
deposits dampen any positive impact from lower central bank rates
on funding costs. A critical longer-term challenge for the system
will be to preserve risk discipline despite intensifying
competition and profitability pressures.

With loans having grown faster than deposits for many years,
banks increasingly turn to wholesale markets or shift from liquid
securities into loans. As a result, they are becoming more
vulnerable to funding market volatility, although most banks
still benefit from robust retail deposit franchises.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BYRE THEATRE: Likely to Enter Liquidation This Week
---------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Byre Theatre in St Andrews is likely to go
into liquidation this week.

According to BBC, recent funding cuts left the theater unable to
produce its own shows.

It has been in demand as a touring venue, and was due to host
several concerts for the forthcoming Fife Jazz Festival, BBC
discloses.

These will now be held in St Andrews town hall instead, while a
booking for a charity event in the theater this week will also be
honored, BBC notes.

Byre Theatre has played host to drama productions since the
1930s.


EURUS III: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Series 2012-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'BB-
(sf)' ratings on the series 2012-1 class A principal-at-risk
variable-rate notes issued by Eurus III Ltd.

The affirmation followed notification by the administrator that,
due to an administrative error in the payment process, an event
of default under the terms and conditions of the notes had
occurred on Jan. 10, 2013.  The notes were due to make a
quarterly interest payment on Jan. 2, 2013, but the payment was
not made until Jan. 10, 2013.  The administrator notified
Standard & Poor's that noteholders would receive additional
interest payments as compensation for the eight-day delay on the
next payment date.

In affirming the notes, S&P took into account:

   -- That the event of default was cured on the day it occurred;

   -- S&P's forward-looking opinion that the obligor's capacity
      and willingness to meet its financial commitments as they
      come due remains unchanged; and

   -- Administrative measures that the parties plan to implement
      to avoid a repetition of the error.

The notes were issued under an insurance-linked securitization
sponsored by Hannover Rueckversicherung AG, E+S Rueckversicherung
AG, and Hannover Re Bermuda Ltd. (collectively Hannover Re).
Eurus III covers losses due to windstorm in the following
countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
U.K. between Sept. 30, 2012, and March 31, 2016 (four full
windstorm seasons).


GRAMPIAN CONSTRUCTION: In Administration; 34 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------------------
Keith Findlay at The Press and Journal reports that Grampian
Construction has collapsed into administration, with the loss of
34 jobs.

According to the Press and Journal, professional services firm
KPMG said on Friday that four employees have been kept on at the
company to help joint administrators assess its financial
position.

Grampian Construction employed 38 people and used 47
subcontractors on commercial and private projects carried out
independently or jointly with other companies, the Press and
Journal discloses.

Grampian Construction is based in Huntly.


* UK: Banks' Liquidity Reserves May Have Peaked, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
In order to expand lending and improve earnings, UK banks are
likely to reduce their liquidity reserves during 2013, Fitch
Ratings says in a newly-published report on the UK banking
sector.

The major UK banks are among those with the highest liquidity
buffers in Europe. Fitch estimates that on average around 13% of
the UK's funded bank balance sheets are in the form of prime
liquid assets, on top of which banks hold varying buffers of
secondary liquidity.

"Peak liquidity may have been reached and we are beginning to see
UK banks make more active use of liquidity management, for
example the buying back of debt, as well as allocating more
assets to lending," said Claudia Nelson, Senior Director in
Fitch's Financial Institutions group. However the reduction is
unlikely to be a negative rating driver in Fitch's view as bank
liquidity reserves are likely to remain high.

Fitch has Stable Outlooks on most major UK banks' Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs), reflecting the measures these banks have taken
over the past three years to improve their fundamental credit
risk profile (strengthening liquidity, improving asset quality
and higher capitalization) or Fitch's expectations of support
should the banks get into difficulty.

Fitch's main concern is continued pressure on profitability
deriving from lower revenue generation, tougher regulatory
demands, stricter overview over conduct and, in some cases,
continued restructuring costs/losses. Fines and customer
recompense have featured largely in 2012 and are likely to
continue to do so into 2013.

Low demand for credit, high capital requirements, prolonged low
base rates, tougher conduct, and misselling measures, have all
dampened medium-term earning prospects for the major UK banks.
Fitch expects profitability targets to remain notably lower than
in the past for the medium- to long-term.

Overreliance on short-term debt is no longer a rating concern.
Access to the capital markets has been available recently for the
UK major banks (although it remains more expensive than in the
past) but like for all banks, it is subject to overall market
conditions. The need of the two banks most affected by the crisis
(Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group) to access the
wholesale debt markets has reduced due to their de-leveraging and
structurally strong liquidity. Conversely, asset encumbrance,
although low, is likely to rise modestly as a result of the
government's Funding for Lending Scheme.

The major UK banks are generally soundly capitalized and on
target to meet Basel III requirements. However, achieving this
implies continuing deleveraging and restructuring by the part-
nationalized banks and possibly additional issuance of loss
absorbing capital, in line with regulatory requirements. Fitch
has some concerns over the very low risk weightings assigned to
loans backed by real estate (residential and commercial
mortgages), which are being reviewed by the UK regulator.

There is a wide divergence in asset quality. UK residential
mortgage loans are performing well thanks to the high
affordability allowed by low base rates. Fitch's main concerns
are interest-only loans (46% of all mortgage loans) and any
unexpected sharp rise in unemployment. There has been some
deterioration in the performance of SME lending but overall asset
quality remains sound. The main vulnerability is legacy exposure
to commercial real estate (CRE), a large portion of which
continues to face renegotiation, refinancing or sale while the
value of the underlying assets remains under pressure, as well as
the part-nationalized banks' (especially RBS) exposure to
Ireland.

The longer-term trend for UK and other EU bank Support Rating
Floors (SRF) is likely to be downward as resolution and bail-in
agendas along with other associated practical and legal measures
proceed. It is also a product of the ability of the UK
('AAA'/Negative) to support its major banks. Fitch has previously
stated that, there is a degree of tolerance at the current
sovereign rating level for the SRF of the UK major banks to
remain at 'A' should the UK sovereign be downgraded in the
future.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Says Diversification May Prop Up European Paper Cos.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Amidst declining paper volumes, European paper and forest product
companies could restore their long-term profitability, and in
doing so strengthen their credit profiles, by diversifying away
from the paper market, says Moody's Investors Service in a
Special Comment report published on Jan. 24.

The new report is entitled "European Paper and Forest Product
Companies: Diversification Away from European Paper Market Is Key
to Growth".

"Most rated companies have headroom within their respective
ratings category to accommodate some deterioration in their
credit metrics due to weakening demand for paper in Europe," says
Anke Rindermann, an Assistant Vice President - Analyst in Moody's
Corporate Finance Group and author of the report. "Nevertheless,
non-paper operations and emerging markets will remain key long-
term growth drivers for European paper companies."

"In the face of a deteriorating profitability, some operators,
such as Stora Enso Oyj (Ba2 negative), Metsa Board Corporation
(B3 positive) and Sappi Limited (Ba3 positive), are diversifying
their operations away from the mature European paper market by
moving into related product areas with higher margins ," explains
Ms. Rindermann. "Meanwhile, other companies, such as UPM-Kymmene,
rated Ba1 stable, are seeking to expand their geographical reach
by investing in markets with better growth prospects,
particularly in Asia." Moody's would expect these trends to
continue in 2013.

This diversification comes against the backdrop of persistent
macroeconomic weakness in the euro area and the structural
decline in demand for paper, owing to the ongoing shift to
digital media. These factors are creating a widening supply-
demand gap at a time when producers are facing elevated input
costs and have limited pricing power. In such an environment,
pure paper players with high exposure to the European paper
market, such as Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Caa1 stable) and Lecta
S.A. (B1 stable), are the most vulnerable.

While unlikely to be sufficient to safeguard long-term
profitability, most if not all producers have made substantial
efforts to cut costs by closing excess capacity and improving
internal efficiencies. In the case of Mets„ Board, this could
lead Moody's to upgrade the company's rating if its cost-cutting
efforts result in an improvement in operating performance over
the next couple of quarters, hence the positive outlook assigned
to the rating. Moody's would expect producers to take further
steps to rationalize their cost bases, although the associated
costs could dent their short-term profitability.

Input costs are likely to remain high, although pulp prices may
ease in 2013 due to additional production capacity coming on
stream in South America. As the pricing power of paper producers
in Europe remains weak, rated companies with a high degree of
vertical integration into low-cost fiber and energy, such as
Mondi Plc (Baa3 stable) and UPM, are likely to fare better.

Stora Enso's rating is under pressure because its operating
profitability has weakened in Europe at a time when it is
investing heavily overseas. But, if these projects are executed
on time and within budget, Moody's would expect them to enhance
Stora Enso's credit profile from 2015 onwards.


* Moody's Says Nov. Overall EMEA Auto ABS Performance Improves
--------------------------------------------------------------
The overall performance of the EMEA auto loan and lease asset-
backed securities (ABS) market improved in the three-month period
leading up to November 30, 2012, according to the latest indices
published by Moody's Investors Service.

In November 2012, 60+ days delinquencies for the EMEA auto market
decreased to 0.69%, from 0.82% in November 2011 and the Constant
Prepayment Rate (CPR) increased to 13.26% from 10.70% a year ago,
both primarily a result of the German auto market, which
represents 44% of the total EMEA auto market's current pool
balance. However cumulative defaults continued to increase in
Italy, Portugal and Spain, affected by the economic difficulties
in these countries. Portugal is showing the highest defaults
across the market, increasing to 7.40% in November 2012 from
6.69% in November 2011.

Moody's outlook for German auto ABS collateral is stable. The
rating agency expects that the unemployment rate in Germany will
remain stable at 5.5%, as previously announced in "European ABS
and RMBS: 2013 Outlook" (December 2012), which is expected to
keep German auto delinquencies stable. In the same outlook
Moody's outlined its forecast that Portugal, Spain and Italy will
remain in economic recession in 2013. As a result Moody's expects
that delinquencies and defaults will continue to increase in
these countries.

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF315035


* Parent Debt Bail-In May Change CEE Funding Dynamics, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The level of foreign funding for central and eastern European
banks could change if debt that can be bailed in becomes
compulsory and funding from a parent bank is made eligible for
bail-in, Fitch Ratings says. Depending on the extent of parent
funding, intragroup facilities could increase or remain stable
for some foreign-owned banks in the region against the more
general trend for parent banks to decrease their funding of
subsidiaries.

The draft European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
suggests that debt that can be bailed in should be equal to at
least 10% of liabilities (excluding regulatory capital). The
Vienna 2.0 Initiative proposes parent funding bail-in and higher
capital requirements as alternatives to issuing bail-in debt for
banks in the region.

"Given other options to meet the suggested 10% requirement, we
believe that CEE banks would favor parent funding bail-in. Where
parental funding is limited, this could lead to an increase in
intragroup loans for CEE banks. Where parent funding is
substantial, there would be an incentive not to reduce it below
the proposed minimum level of debt eligible for bail-in. We think
it would be difficult for many CEE banks to issue debt that can
be bailed in due to their sometimes weak (sub-investment grade)
stand-alone profiles, often active management of their balance
sheets by parent banks, and mostly small and undeveloped local
debt markets," Fitch says.

"If there is a requirement to maintain a minimum level of such
debt and parent funding would qualify, this could create a floor
for the withdrawal of foreign funding. At end-Q312, foreign
funding as a proportion of liabilities in Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia,
ranged from 10%-25% according to our calculations. We expect
parent funding to remain a feature for banks in the region.

"The self-sufficiency of many foreign-owned CEE banks has
increased since the onset of the global financial crisis. Parent
funding has decreased, but at a moderate pace. Our survey of 43
banks in the region last year indicated the withdrawal of parent
funding had been significant but for the most part orderly.

"With higher pricing and reduced availability of intragroup
funding, competition for domestic deposits is likely to remain in
many CEE markets in 2013, mitigated by weak prospects for growth
in 2013. We expect to see CEE banks gradually increase funding
from capital markets in the medium term, partly encouraged by the
Basel III push to reduce asset-liability maturity and currency
mismatches.

"On balance, we believe foreign ownership has been, and remains,
positive for financial and macroeconomic stability in CEE. Most
foreign banks with a large CEE presence have remained committed
to the region, and have recapitalized subsidiaries where needed.
Most CEE banks' Long-Term IDRs reflect potential support from
parent institutions, with Outlooks aligned accordingly. They are
typically notched once from the parent's Long-Term IDR. If parent
banks provide funding for debt that can be bailed in to CEE
subsidiaries, this would likely be neutral for the IDRs of the
latter, confirming our view of the high probability of parent
support and the limited risk of losses for third-party creditors.

"The Vienna 2.0 Initiative's report on cross-border bank
resolution highlighted the challenges for banks in the region,
where many foreign-owned subsidiaries have dominant domestic
franchises, but often rely to a significant degree on the parent
for funding and strategic decisions."


* Financial Market Turmoil in Europe Hits Banks' Credit Profiles
----------------------------------------------------------------
Recent financial market turmoil and subsequent sovereign crises
across Europe took a heavy toll on many banks' credit profiles
resulting in a substantial number of downgrades in 2012, but bank
ratings are expected to be relatively stable during 2013, says
Moody's Investors Service in its report, "Global Banking Outlook
-- 2013."

"While there has been strengthening in many banks' financial
performance, there are a number of interconnected themes with
material implications for bank credit that we will closely follow
in 2013," said Moody's Global Banking Managing Director Greg
Bauer.

Moody's will monitor key themes in 2013 that include:

1. Continued weak global recovery and still-elevated sovereign
risk for many European banking systems

2. Unprecedented low interest rates that dampen profitability and
can encourage excessive risk-taking

3. Still-fragile investor confidence deriving from uncertainty
over banks' risk profiles

4. Nascent regulatory reforms that impact risk-taking, capital,
liquidity and the resolution of troubled banks

The report also provides regional overviews of the key issues
facing banks operating in Europe, North America, Asia, Emerging
Europe and Latin America.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 21 to January 25, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *