TCREUR_Public/170810.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, August 10, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 158


                            Headlines


B E L A R U S

BELARUSBANK: Fitch Corrects June 29 Rating Release
BPS-SBERBANK: Fitch Corrects July 4 Rating Release


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR: Government Challenges Court's Recognition of Insolvency


G E R M A N Y

DECO 9-PAN EUROPE 3: S&P Cuts Ratings on Five Note Classes to D
SOLARWORLD AG: Founder Teams Up with Qatar to Buy Factories


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO XIII: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F-R Notes


I T A L Y

WIND TRE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


K A Z A K H S T A N

ATFBANK JSC: S&P Puts B Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch Neg.


N E T H E R L A N D S

JUBILEE CLO 2014-XIV: Fitch Corrects July 17 Rating Release
PENTA CLO 2: Moody's Assigns B1(sf) Rating to Class F Notes


R U S S I A

INTECHBANK PJSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
VLADPROMBANK LLC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR: EU Competition Regulators OK Santander Takeover
HIPOCAT 10: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB+ (sf)'
HIPOCAT 11: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on Three Note Classes


U K R A I N E

CB GEFEST: NBU Declares Bank Insolvent
* UKRAINE: UAH644MM Insolvent Banks Assets Sold Via ProZorro


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ECO-RESOURCES FUND: Liquidation Not Matter for FSA
ESP STRATEGIES: Two Directors Face Disqualification
GELPACK INDUSTRIAL: Goes Into Administration
GFI CONSULTANTS: Chapter 15 Case Summary
GFI CONSULTANTS: Liquidator Seeks U.S. Recognition of UK Case

ICICI BANK: Moody's Lowers Sub. Rating to Ba1, Outlook Stable
SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Notes
STRATFORD TOWN FC: Council Agrees on Repayment Plan
TVCATCHUP LIMITED: High Court Bans Director for 9 Years


                            *********



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B E L A R U S
=============


BELARUSBANK: Fitch Corrects June 29 Rating Release
--------------------------------------------------
This commentary replaces the version published on June 29, 2017.
It corrects the level of Belinvestbank's (BIB) direct exposure to
the sovereign relative to Fitch Core Capital at end-2016.
Subsequent to the original announcement Fitch revised the Outlook
on the banks to Positive from Stable on July 31.

Fitch Ratings has affirmed Belarusbank's (BBK), BIB's and
Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus' (DBRB) Long-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) 'B-' with Stable Outlooks. A full
list of rating actions is at the end of this commentary.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS
The three banks' Long-Term IDRs, Support Rating and Support
Ratings Floors are underpinned by potential state support, in
case of need, and are aligned with the sovereign rating
(B-/Stable). In assessing support, Fitch considers the banks'
state ownership, government control through supervisory board
representation at each of the banks and the track-record of
support to date.

We also factor in the policy roles of BBK and DBRB as the
country's largest providers of government programme lending
backed by dedicated government funding, the systemic importance
of BBK (market share of 41% by assets and 45% of retail deposits)
and the government's subsidiary liability on DBRB's bond
obligations, which, however, is as yet untested.

The authorities' ability to provide support in foreign currency
is limited, in Fitch's view, given the three banks' significant
external funding (a combined USD2.2 billion at end-2016,
including USD1.2 billion short-term debt maturing over the 12
months starting from March 1, 2017) and high dollarisation of
domestic liabilities (USD7.3 billion at end-2016), largely in the
form of customer deposits (bonds at DBRB). These FX liabilities
are large relative to the country's international reserves of
USD5.2 billion, while FX liquidity at all three banks is largely
invested in the FX bonds issued by the government (long-term
debt) and central bank (short-term debt).

We expect the authorities to make this FX liquidity available to
banks, in case of need, to avoid defaults on external borrowings.
Positively, around 40% of the latter comprise facilities from
Russian creditors and so are more likely to be rolled over, in
Fitch views. Liquidity shortages in local currency, if any, are
likely to be covered by the central bank (BBK, BIB) or the
authorities (DBRB).

There were no new capital contributions from the government at
the three banks in 2016 (although government-held subordinated
debt at BIB was converted into equity) and none are expected in
the near term. The original plan to partially privatise BBK
announced in 2016 has now been postponed and the bank will focus
on structural reforms, as Fitch understands from management. The
privatisation of BIB (100% stake) is also unlikely in the near
term in Fitch's view given this bank's similar need for
structural reforms and uncertainty over the country's economic
prospects. Fitch believes the authorities' propensity to support
will remain unchanged for both BBK and BIB as long as the
government holds a controlling stake.

VRs - BBK, BIB
The banks' standalone credit profiles are closely linked to that
of the sovereign due to large direct exposure to the government
and, more generally, the public sector. This makes the banks'
asset quality dependent on the state of government finances and
the ability of the authorities to support macroeconomic stability
and the public sector. At end-2016, direct exposure to the
sovereign (including claims on the government and the central
bank) relative to FCC was 3x at BBK, and 2.4x at BIB. Loans
issued to public sector corporates (including those issued under
government programmes) contributed a further 3.8x FCC at BBK and
2x at BIB.

Credit risks remain high as the economy is sluggish and borrower
performance remains constrained by generally significant leverage
in the corporate sector and loan dollarisation (BBK: 60%; BIB:
70% of loans), while the share of hedged borrowers is limited.
Asset quality metrics have weakened across the board during 2015-
2016. Fitch expects this trend to continue through 2017 as
operating conditions remain challenging.

BBK's individually impaired loans (as per IFRS accounts) grew to
a high at 37% of end-2016 gross loans from 30% at end-2015,
reflecting deterioration in borrowers' financial standing and/or
collateral value. At the same time, loans over 90 days overdue
remained low, at 1.6% of loans, helped by loan
restructuring/roll-overs but also reflecting the high share of
borrowers benefitting from government support (in the form of
subsidies on interest payments or loan repayments under state
guarantees). BIB's individually impaired loans were also high at
30% of loans at end-2016, down from 34% at end-2015, and loans
over 90 days overdue were 11.6%.

Asset quality ratios have benefitted from moderate balance sheet
clean-ups arranged by the authorities in 2015-2016 through
exchange of selected problem loans for long-term bonds issued by
the Ministry of Finance, DBRB or local governments. Fitch expects
that clean-up will continue although this is likely to be a
gradual process given the government's limited financial capacity
for significant support.

Fitch views capitalisation as modest given the banks' credit
exposures and levels of impaired loans. The unreserved portion of
the latter was equal to a high 1.7x FCC at BBK and 1x FCC at BIB.
At end-5M17, the regulatory Tier 1 and Total capital adequacy
ratios were 16.2% and 18.6%, respectively, at BBK and 10.5% and
15.2%, respectively, at BIB. These capital cushions allowed
limited loss absorption capacity equal to 9% of loans at BBK and
5% at BIB, without breaching regulatory minimum levels (including
buffers).

Pre-impairment profit (net of accrued interest not received in
cash) was a solid 5.8% of average gross loans (BBK) and 8% (BIB).
However, in Fitch's view there is uncertainty about the ability
of some borrowers to service loans out of their own cash flows
rather than through receipt of new credit. Large loan impairment
charges (equal to 65% of pre-impairment operating profit at BBK
in 2016 and 98% at BIB) constrained returns on equity (ROAE) at
8.9% at BBK and 0% at BIB.

Core funding is from customers (over 70% of liabilities), but
with a high proportion of foreign currency accounts (67% at BBK,
62% at BIB). Deposit trends have been stable recently, limiting
immediate liquidity pressure. However, liquidity management
remains highly dependent on the confidence of depositors and
support from the authorities.

Fitch has not assigned a VR to DBRB due to the bank's special
status as a development institution and its close association
with the authorities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

Changes to the banks' IDRs are likely to be linked to changes in
the sovereign credit profile, and the Stable Outlooks reflect
that on the sovereign ratings.

The banks' ratings could also be downgraded, and hence notched
down from the sovereign, in case timely support is not made
available, when needed, or if increased pressure on the country's
external finances heightens the risk of capital or exchange
controls being introduced prior to a sovereign default.

VR - BBK, BIB

Downgrades of VRs could result from capital erosion due to a
further marked deterioration in asset quality or a significant
tightening of FX liquidity positions. Upgrades of VRs above the
sovereign rating are extremely unlikely given the close linkages
between sovereign and bank credit profiles.

The rating actions are as follows:

BBK and BIB

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

DBRB

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'


BPS-SBERBANK: Fitch Corrects July 4 Rating Release
--------------------------------------------------
This commentary replaces the version published on July 4, 2017.
It corrects BPS-Sberbank's (BPS) share of high-risk loans
transferred to the parent bank in 2Q17 and Belgazprombank's
(BGPB) individually impaired loan ratios at end-2016 and at end-
2015 and net individually impaired loans/Fitch Core Capital ratio
at end-2016. Subsequent to the original announcement Fitch
revised the Outlook on the banks to Positive from Stable on July
31.

Fitch Ratings has affirmed BPS's, Bank BelVEB's and BGPB's Long-
Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) 'B-' with Stable Outlooks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS

The IDRs and Support Ratings factor in the likelihood of support
the three banks may receive from their Russian shareholders. BPS
is 98.4%-owned by Sberbank of Russia (Sberbank; BBB-/Stable),
BelVEB 97.5%-owned by Vnesheconombank, (VEB; BBB-/Stable), and
BGPB is jointly owned by PJSC Gazprom (BBB-/Stable) and JSC
Gazprombank (BB+/Stable), with a 49.7% stake each.

Fitch's view of potential support is based on the majority
ownership, continued strong commitment of the Russian owners to
the Belarus market, common branding (implying high reputational
risks in case of a subsidiary default), parent-subsidiary
integration (including board representation and operational
controls), the track record of support to date and the low cost
of any support required (given that each subsidiary accounts for
a small part of parent entities' consolidated assets).

BPS's and BGPB's regulatory capitalisation was supported in 2015-
1Q16 by the provision of subordinated debt, while BPS also
benefitted from risk-sharing arrangements with the parent group
since 2014, resulting in significant capital relief (transferred
risky exposures were equal to 2.8x of the bank's end-1Q17 FCC).
While there are no plans for equity injections in the near term,
Fitch believes that parental capital support will be available
for all three banks, in case of need. Funding support, mostly in
foreign currency, is available for the banks, with the parents
contributing 33%-38% of subsidiary liabilities at end-2016.

The banks' 'B-' Long-Term IDRs reflect the constraint of
Belarus's 'B-' Country Ceiling, which captures transfer and
convertibility risks and limits the extent to which support from
the foreign shareholders of these banks can be factored into the
ratings. The Stable Outlooks on the banks' Long-Term IDRs are in
line with that on Belarus's.

Viability Ratings (VRs)
The banks' VRs of 'b-' factor in risks from a challenging
operating environment, and the linkage between the banks' credit
profiles and that of the Belarusian sovereign due to the large
direct exposure of the banks to the authorities and, more
generally, the public sector. This makes the banks' asset quality
dependent on the state of government finances and the ability of
the authorities to support macroeconomic stability and the public
sector.

At end-2016, direct exposure to the sovereign (including claims
on the government and the central bank) relative to FCC was 2.4x
at BPS, 1.5x at BGPB and 2.1x at BelVEB. Loans issued to public
sector corporates contributed a further 0.8x at BPS, 1x at BGPB
and 2.8x at BelVEB. In contrast with Belarusian state-owned
banks, these banks are not involved in new government programme
lending, although BPS has a residual exposure at below 10% of
gross loans.

More broadly credit risks remain high as the economy is sluggish
and borrower performance remains constrained by generally
significant leverage in the corporate sector and high loan
dollarisation (BPS: 70%; BGPB: 75%; BelVEB: 84% of loans), while
the share of hedged borrowers is limited. Asset quality metrics
have weakened across the board during 2015-2016. Fitch expects
this trend to continue through 2017 as operating conditions
remain challenging.

BPS's asset quality is somewhat worse than peers'. Its
individually impaired loans (as per IFRS accounts) grew to a high
57% of end-1Q17 loans (36% at end-2015), reflecting deterioration
in borrowers' financial performance and/or collateral value. The
bank's own assessment suggests that about 38% of loans are of
higher-risk, on top of non-performing loans (NPLs, loans over 90
days overdue) of 21% of loans at end-1Q17 (end-2015: 10%), of
which many are in the construction and real estate segment (CRE).
BPS's asset quality ratios were helped by the transfer of high-
risk loans in 2Q17 (3% of total loans at end-1Q17) to the parent
bank, which also guaranteed some of the high-risk exposures (a
further 40% of loans at end-1Q17).

BGPB's and BelVEB's individually impaired loans were also high at
respectively, 35% and 32% of gross loans at end-2016 (end-2015:
32% and 34%). At the same time, reported NPLs were small at 1.6%
at BGPB and 0.3% at BelVEB, helped by loan
restructuring/rollovers and also reflecting both banks' more
limited exposure to the troubled CRE segment. However, judging by
the high volume of impaired loans, Fitch believes, that asset
quality is vulnerable.

Fitch views capitalisation as modest given the banks' risk
profiles and high levels of individually impaired loans, which
net of reserves, stood at 1.7x FCC at BPS, 1.4x at BGPB and 1.5x
at BelVEB. At end-5M17, all three banks' regulatory Tier 1 and
Total capital adequacy ratios were above the required minimums of
7.25% and 11.25% (including buffers): BPS at 12.8% and 21%, BGPB
at 9.7% and 17.4%, and BelVEB at 8.3% and 15.5%. These capital
cushions allowed only limited loss absorption capacity equal to
6% of loans at BPS, 5% at BGPB and 1.7% at BelVEB, without
breaching regulatory minimum levels (including buffers).

Pre-impairment profitability (net of accrued interest not
received in cash) was solid at 6.8% of average gross loans at
BPS, 7.9% at BGPB and more moderate at 4.9% at BelVEB in 2016.
However, in Fitch's view there is some uncertainty about the
ability of some borrowers to service loans out of their own cash
flows rather than through receipt of new credit. Provisioning
requirements remained high at all three banks in 1Q17, wiping out
61%-79% of their annualised pre-impairment profits.

The majority of funding is from domestic customers, but is highly
dollarised (over 65% of customer accounts at the three banks).
Deposits have been stable recently, limiting immediate liquidity
pressure and banks' liquidity is also supported by limited third-
party wholesale repayments and availability of undrawn committed
liquidity lines from the parent institutions. At end-5M17,
liquidity cushions (cash and equivalents, net of short third-
party interbank exposures, securities eligible for refinancing
with the central bank and unused credit lines from parents)
accounted for over 100% of customer funding at BPS, 62% at BGPB
and 20% at BelVEB.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

The IDRs could be upgraded or downgraded if a change in Belarus's
sovereign ratings results in a change in the Country Ceiling,
although this is currently unlikely given the Stable Outlook on
the sovereign rating.

VRs
Downgrades of VRs could result from capital erosion due to
further marked deterioration in asset quality without sufficient
and timely support being made available by parents. Upgrades of
VRs above the sovereign rating are extremely unlikely given the
high sovereign exposure/dependence of many borrowers on some form
of sovereign support.

The rating actions are as follows:

BPS, BGPB, BelVEB
Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'


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C R O A T I A
=============


AGROKOR: Government Challenges Court's Recognition of Insolvency
----------------------------------------------------------------
The STA reports that the government has decided to mount a legal
challenge against a decision by the Ljubljana District Court that
recognises the insolvency procedure of retailer Mercator's parent
company, the Croatian conglomerate Agrokor.

The news agency relates that the government argues the procedure
could jeopardise Mercator and Slovenia's economic, financial and
social stability.

Zagreb-based Agrokor is the biggest food producer and retailer in
the Balkans, employing almost 60,000 people across the region
with annual revenue of some HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

                            *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on June 7, 2017,
that Moody's Investors Service downgraded Croatian retailer and
food manufacturer Agrokor D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to
Ca from Caa2 and the probability of default rating (PDR) to D-PD
from Ca-PD. The outlook on the company's ratings remains
negative.  Moody's also downgraded the senior unsecured rating
assigned to the notes issued by Agrokor due in 2019 and 2020 to C
from Caa2.  The rating actions reflect Agrokor's decision not to
pay the coupon scheduled on May 1, 2017 on its EUR300 million
notes due May 2019 at the end of the 30 day grace period. It also
factors in Moody's understanding that the company is not paying
interest on any of the debt in place prior to Agrokor's decision
in April 2017 to file for restructuring under Croatia's law for
the Extraordinary Administration for Companies with Systemic
Importance.

The TCR-Europe on April 17, 2017, reported that Moody's Investors
Service downgraded Agrokor D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR)
to Caa2 from Caa1 and its probability of default rating (PDR) to
Ca-PD from Caa1-PD. "Our decision to downgrade Agrokor's rating
reflects its filing for restructuring under Croatian law, which
in Moody's views makes a default highly likely," Vincent Gusdorf,
a Vice President -- Senior Analyst at Moody's, said. "It also
takes into account uncertainties around the restructuring
process, as creditors' ability to get their money back hinges on
numerous factors that will become apparent over time."


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G E R M A N Y
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DECO 9-PAN EUROPE 3: S&P Cuts Ratings on Five Note Classes to D
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its
credit ratings on DECO 9 - Pan Europe 3 PLC's class C, D, E, F,
and G notes. At the same time, we have affirmed our 'D (sf)'
ratings on the class H and J notes. S&P said, "We have
subsequently withdrawn, effective in 30 days' time, our ratings
on these seven classes of notes.

"Our ratings in DECO 9 - Pan Europe 3 address the timely payment
of interest (payable quarterly in arrears) and the payment of
principal no later than the legal final maturity date on July 27,
2017. The issuer failed to repay the notes on the legal final
maturity date. We have therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' our ratings on the class C to G notes, in line with our
criteria (see "Methodology: Timeliness Of Payments: Grace
Periods, Guarantees, And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published
on Oct. 24, 2013).

"At the same time, we have affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the
class H and J notes.

"We have subsequently withdrawn, effective in 30 days' time, our
ratings on all remaining classes of notes."

DECO 9 - Pan Europe 3 closed in August 2006, with notes totaling
EUR1.154 billion. The original 11 loans were secured on
commercial properties located in Germany and Switzerland.

RATINGS LIST

  DECO 9 - Pan Europe 3 PLC
  EUR1.154 bil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                                         Rating
  Class         Identifier           To               From
  C             24358RAE8            D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
  D             24358RAF5            D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
  E             24358RAG3            D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
  F             24358RAH1            D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
  G             24358RAJ7            D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
  H             24358RAK4            D (sf)           D (sf)
  J             24358RAL2            D (sf)           D (sf)


SOLARWORLD AG: Founder Teams Up with Qatar to Buy Factories
-----------------------------------------------------------
Anneli Palmen and Alexander Huebner at Reuters report that
Frank Asbeck, founder and former CEO of SolarWorld, has teamed up
with Qatar to buy two of the insolvent panel maker's factories.

Qatar was a shareholder in SolarWorld with a stake of 29% before
its collapse, while Asbeck held 21%, Reuters discloses.

Sources familiar with the matter told Reuters on Aug. 8 the
plants, located in the German states of Saxony and Thuringia,
will be taken over by a new investment vehicle called SolarWorld
Industries GmbH, which counts Asbeck and the Qatar Foundation as
its owners.

SolarWorld's insolvency administrator Horst Piepenburg confirmed
that Asbeck was one of the entity's shareholders, but declined to
give more details about other parties, saying that the planned
purchase would save 475 of the group's 1,800 jobs, Reuters
relates.

Mr. Piepenburg is also still looking for buyers for SolarWorld's
solar parks as well as the group's assets in the United States,
Reuters notes.

SolarWorld AG is based in Bonn, Germany.


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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO XIII: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
nine classes of notes (the "Refinancing Notes") to be issued by
Avoca CLO XIII Designated Activity Company ("Avoca CLO XIII" or
the "Issuer"):

-- EUR2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR240,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR14,000,000 Class B-1R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Class B-2R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR15,000,000 Class B-3R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR22,000,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR22,000,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR23,000,000 Class E-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR11,500,000 Class F-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying
assets.

The Issuer will issue the Refinancing Notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A Notes,
Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and
Class F Notes due 2027 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued
on December 16, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its
respective Original Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the
Issuer also issued one class of subordinated notes, which will
remain outstanding.

Avoca CLO XIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, senior secured bonds and
eligible investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds.

KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland) Unlimited Company (the "Manager")
manages the CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer. After the
reinvestment period, which ends in October 2021, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales
of credit risk and credit improved obligations, subject to
certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints, up to 10% of the pool can be domiciled
in countries with local currency government bond rating below Aa3
with a further constraint of 5% to exposures with local currency
government bond rating below A3. However, the eligibility
criteria require that an obligor be domiciled in a Qualifying
Country. At present, all qualifying countries have a local
currency government bond rating of at least A3. Therefore at
present, it is not possible to have exposures to countries with a
local currency government rating of below A3. Given this
portfolio composition, there were no adjustments to the target
par amount, as further described in the methodology.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-1R Notes: -2

Class B-2R Notes: -2

Class B-3R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: 0

Class F-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-1R Notes: -3

Class B-2R Notes: -3

Class B-3R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -4

Class D-R Notes: -3

Class E-R Notes: -1

Class F-R Notes: 0


=========
I T A L Y
=========


WIND TRE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
rating to Italy-based mobile operator Wind Tre SpA. The outlook
is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Wind Tre's wholly owned funding
subsidiary, Wind Acquisition Finance S.A. The outlook is stable.
We also affirmed our 'B' issue rating on Wind Acquisition
Finance's EUR1.75 billion and $2.80 billion senior unsecured
notes. The recovery rating on these notes remains '6', indicating
our expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%; rounded estimate
0%) in the event of a default.

"In addition, we assigned our 'BB' issue rating to Wind Tre's
senior secured debt, and affirmed our 'BB' issue rating on Wind
Acquisition Finance's senior secured debt. The recovery rating on
both issues is '2', reflecting our expectations of substantial
recovery (70%-90%; rounded estimate 85%) in the event of a
payment default.

"We also withdrew our long-term corporate credit rating on Wind
Telecomunicazioni SpA, as the company no longer exists following
the merger."

The rating actions follow the recent completion of the merger of
Wind Telecomunicazioni into H3G SpA, with a simultaneous name
change to Wind Tre SpA, an indirect fully owned subsidiary of a
50-50 joint venture between VEON Ltd. (BB/Stable/--) and CK
Hutchison Holdings Ltd. (A-/Positive/--).

S&P said, "We consider Wind Tre's business risk profile to be
equivalent to that of the former entity Wind Telecomunicazioni.
While we see some advantage stemming from its greater scale and
increased mobile market share, Wind Tre's competitive advantage
remains constrained by being predominantly a mobile-based network
operator, with some lag in investments compared with its
competitors Telecom Italia and Vodafone. Additionally, it has
significant exposure to price-sensitive mobile customers, which
may be particularly sensitive to churn, given the prospects of
increased competition in the market in the near term.

"After integration costs of the merger in the first half of 2017,
the Wind Tre's EBITDA margin contracted to 29%, which is
significantly weaker than in the past at Wind Telecomunicazioni
level, stemming from the lower profitability of the operator with
which it was merged. That said, we anticipate that reported
EBITDA margins after integration costs should gradually improve
toward 35%, as the merged entity will likely reap meaningful
synergies.

"In our view, the renewed pricing pressure in the consumer mobile
segment this year is negative for the company, which still
derives the bulk of its revenues and EBITDA from mobile
operations. Despite the consolidation from four to three
operators after the merger, and following signs of price
stabilization in 2016, mobile price competition has rekindled,
and likely reflects the anticipated arrival of a new player,
Paris-based Iliad S.A. This translates overall into a still-
unpredictable, but likely fiercely competitive, mobile market in
the short to medium term. In our view, Wind Tre is more sensitive
to negative repercussions than the market leader Telecom Italia,
given Wind Tre's significantly weaker position in the fixed-line
segment and, consequently, lower capacity to market higher-end
convergent services, which are typically more resilient than
mobile-only products.

"Wind Tre is planning to make massive capital outlays to execute
the merger of its networks, increase 4G coverage, and expand and
upgrade its fixed broadband network, which should help it to
compete with its larger, more-integrated peers. We foresee that
this level of spending will significantly constrain Wind's free
operating cash flow (FOCF) generation in 2017 and 2018.

"We foresee that our adjusted ratio of debt to EBTIDA will remain
high and significantly above 5x in the foreseeable future,
including reported shareholder loans. Although we understand that
these loans are subordinated to and mature after outstanding
debt, we note that prepayments are allowed, which make these
instruments debt-like, in our view. That said, in our
understanding, any prepayments would have to be within the limits
set by the senior debt's documentation. While we acknowledge the
company's financial parameters target a reduction of senior
leverage toward 3x, we think that visibility regarding these
loans in the long run is reduced after the three-year deadlock
agreement between the shareholders has ended.

"We assess Wind Tre as a moderately strategic subsidiary for its
ultimate shareholders, VEON and Hutchison. That said, we consider
that support from any one shareholder would be provided in
conjunction with, and not independently from the other
shareholder.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Wind Tre will
leverage its larger scale and aggressively reduce costs in order
to increase its absolute EBITDA, despite renewed and likely
enduring competitive headwinds in the consumer mobile segment. It
also reflects our anticipation of smooth execution of its
networks integration and upgrade. We also anticipate positive
FOCF, diminishing senior leverage, and EBITDA interest coverage
of above 3x, which we think is commensurate with the rating."

Rating pressure could come from weaker-than-expected operating
performances, which could stem in particular from possible
complications in the integration process or the planned
synergies. Weaker operating performance could also result from
steadily negative effects of renewed pricing pressures in the
mobile market, potentially leading to higher customer churn or
lower average revenue per subscriber.

S&P said, "Weaker-than-anticipated EBITDA, resulting in only
breakeven FOCF, could lead us to lower the rating, as could
EBITDA interest coverage deteriorating to less than 2.5x or
senior leverage failing to diminish. If Wind Tre were to adopt a
more aggressive financial policy than is currently the case, we
could also lower the rating."

Rating upside seems remote at this stage, as this would likely
require an upgrade of VEON, together with Wind Tre's S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted ratio of debt to EBITDA dropping sustainably
below 5x and FOCF to debt increasing to above 5%.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ATFBANK JSC: S&P Puts B Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long-term counterparty credit
rating and 'kzBB' Kazakhstan national scale rating on ATFBank JSC
on CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P said, "At the same
time, we have affirmed our 'B' short-term credit rating on the
bank.

"The CreditWatch placement follows our observation that ATFBank's
asset quality indicators did not improve as much as we previously
expected despite the bank management's ongoing efforts to recover
legacy problem loans. The bank's estimated nonperforming loans
(NPLs; loans overdue by 90 days or more) and foreclosed assets,
together accounting for about 29% of total loans under
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), appear worse
compared with those of local peers and peers operating in
countries with similar economic risks. In addition, the
provisioning coverage ratio has decreased to about 47% as of end-
2016, which we consider very low for an environment such as the
one in Kazakhstan. We do not rule out that the bank may have to
create material additional new loan loss provisions in 2017-2018.

"We are aware that the government recently announced a plan to
introduce a recapitalization program to support some large and
midsize banks in Kazakhstan. We understand that government
support will be provided to banks that meet the minimum capital
requirement of Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 45 billion (US$134
million) and possibly some other criteria in the form of Tier 2
long-term subordinated loans. We also understand that
shareholders will be obliged to provide capital support to banks
through a new capital injection or retention of profits in case
they request government support. Furthermore, we understand that
the amount of potential support will be defined based on the
results of the asset quality review recently performed by the
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). At this stage, little clarity
is available on the terms of this program, including the total
amount, the banks to receive support, and the support breakdown
between banks, among other terms. In addition, the NBK has not
released the results of its asset quality review.

"Consequently, we currently do not have an official confirmation
that ATFBank is included in the list of banks to receive capital
support or of the potential amount and terms of such support.
Also, we currently do not have sufficient clarity on the amount
of additional provisions the NBK might require the bank to create
following the asset quality review. We will reassess the bank's
capitalization and risk positon once we have more information on
these issues.

"We think that recovery of problem assets will remain a challenge
for ATFBank's management given the current difficult operating
environment for Kazakh banks. In the absence of additional
support from the government and the controlling shareholder, the
bank's recent asset quality performance was worse than we
previously expected, and that of peers. The bank's NPLs under
IFRS amounted to 22.2% of gross total loans on Dec. 31, 2016, and
were covered by provisions by only 66.6%, which is low compared
to peers. In addition, the bank's foreclosed assets amounted to a
sizable 6.5% of total loans on the same date. The bank did not
have as much success in problem loans restructuring as we
previously expected for 2017.

"Furthermore, we see as a risk that single-name concentrations of
ATFBank's loan book are quite high with the top-20 borrowers
accounting for 41.4% of gross total loans and 3.8x total adjusted
capital net of provisions as of March 31, 2017. Loan
concentration in the risky construction and real estate sectors
is also high, with about 27% of total loans on the same date,
which is higher than that of local or international peers.

"Positively, ATFBank enjoys healthy liquidity and funding
profiles. The bank's funding is dominated by customer deposits
and we expect these to remain sticky in the next 12-18 months.
The bank has a sizable liquidity cushion, with liquid assets
accounting for around 35% of total assets as of April 1, 2017.
The bank acts as a net lender in the interbank market, in
particular in U.S. dollars.

"We continue to incorporate one notch of extraordinary government
support into the rating on ATFBank because we consider that the
bank has moderate systemic importance in Kazakhstan due to its
sizeable market share (5.0% in total loans and 6.8% in total
deposits on July 1, 2017) and importance for the Kazakhstan's
banking sector and the economy. We also factor in our assessment
of the Kazakh government as supportive toward the banking sector.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch on ATFBank within the next
three months. This is when we expect to have more clarity on the
developments of the bank's asset quality following the NBK's
review, the terms of the government recapitalization program, as
well as potential capital support from the government and the
controlling shareholder, enabling us to assess the impact of such
capital support on the bank's asset quality and capitalization.

"We could lower the rating on ATFBank if we considered that the
bank is unlikely to reduce the level of its NPLs below 15% of
total loans or if we consider the loan loss provisioning coverage
is less than adequate within the next 12-18 months. We would also
take a negative rating action if the bank's capitalization, as
measured by our risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio, fell below 3%
due to the need to create material new provisions, faster-than-
currently-expected loan growth, or other negative developments of
risk-adjusted capitalization not adequately compensated by
capital inflows from the shareholder and/or the government. We
could also downgrade the bank if we think that it is less likely
to receive the extraordinary support from the government than we
currently envision.

"We could affirm the ratings on ATFBank if we considered that the
government and shareholder support helped the bank stabilize its
asset quality and capitalization with the share of NPLs
decreasing to below 15%, while its capitalization measured by our
RAC ratio remained sustainably above 3%."


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


JUBILEE CLO 2014-XIV: Fitch Corrects July 17 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------------------
This commentary corrects the version published on July 17, 2017
to include more information on data adequacy.

Fitch Ratings has assigned Jubilee CLO 2014-XIV B.V.'s
refinancing notes final ratings and affirmed the others, as
follows:

EUR319.5 million Class A1-R: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR5.0 million Class A2-R: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR51.2 million Class B1-R: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR12.8 million Class B2-R: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR34.4 million Class C-R: assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR28.4 million Class D-R: assigned 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR38.5 million Class E: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR18.9 million Class F: affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Jubilee CLO 2014-XIV is a cash flow collateralised loan
obligation securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged
loans and bonds. The transaction closed in October 2014 and is
still in its reinvestment period, which is set to expire in
January 2019. The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Ltd.

The issuer has issued new notes to refinance part of the original
liabilities. The refinancing notes bear interest at a lower
margin over EURIBOR than the notes being refinanced. The original
notes have been redeemed in full as a consequence of the
refinancing.

In addition, the issuer will extend the weighted average life
(WAL) covenant to 6.25 years (rounded to the nearest quarter)
from 5.25 years and update the Fitch test matrices. The remaining
terms and conditions of the refinancing notes, including
seniority, will be the same as the refinanced notes. Fitch has
analysed the transaction in line with the new WAL covenant and
the ratings assigned to the non-refinanced notes will not be
impacted by this amendment.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Reduced Weighted Average Life
The maximum weighted average life of the portfolio is now 6.25
years compared with the WAL covenant of eight years assumed at
closing and as a result Fitch's default assumptions, at each
rating stress, have fallen. In combination with the key rating
drivers below this has led to lower breakeven recovery rates in
the Fitch Test Matrix.

Reduced Cost of Funding
The lower liability spreads have resulted in a lower weighted
average cost of funding and as a result the transaction benefits
from higher excess spread.

Significant Par Building
Based on the most recent June trustee report received by Fitch,
the transaction is EUR3.3 million above target par and so the
agency has given benefit to the positive par building since
closing.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors in the
underlying portfolio to be in the 'B'/'B-' range. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor of the current portfolio is 33.97,
below the maximum covenant of 34.

High Recovery Expectations
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured loans and
senior secured bonds. Recovery prospects for these assets are
typically more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured, and
mezzanine assets. Fitch weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of
the current portfolio is 65%, above the revised minimum WARR
covenant of 53.1%.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If, in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers a confirmation to be
given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to five notches for the rated notes.


PENTA CLO 2: Moody's Assigns B1(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to four classes of notes issued by
Penta CLO 2 B.V. (the "Issuer"):

-- EUR234,000,000 Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR49,000,000 Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR25,250,000 Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2
    (sf)

-- EUR20,000,000 Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
    (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has taken the following rating actions on
the existing junior notes issued by Penta CLO 2 B.V.:

-- EUR26,750,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2028, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR13,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2028, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 16,
    2015 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the refinancing notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal maturity of the
notes in 2028. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on
the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Class A Notes, the
Refinancing Class B Notes, the Refinancing Class C Notes and the
Refinancing Class D Notes (the "Refinancing Notes") in connection
with the refinancing of the Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2028, the Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2028, the Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 and the Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2028 ("the Original Notes") respectively,
previously issued on June 16, 2015 (the "Original Closing Date").
The Issuer uses the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes to redeem in full the Original Notes that are refinanced.
On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued the Class E
and Class F Notes and one class of subordinated notes, which will
remain outstanding.

Other than the changes to the spreads of the notes, the material
changes to the terms and conditions involve increasing the
Weighted Average Life Test by 15 months to approximately 7.1
years from the refinancing date. The length of the reinvestment
period remains unchanged and will expire on August 04, 2019.
Furthermore, the manager will be able to choose from a new set of
collateral quality test covenants (the "Matrix"). No other
material modifications to the CLO are occurring in connection to
the refinancing.

Moody's rating actions on the Class E Notes and Class F Notes are
primarily a result of the amendments to the transaction documents
and the issuance of the Refinancing Notes.

Penta CLO 2 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured bonds and
up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans,
second lien loans, mezzanine obligations and/or, high yield
bonds. The underlying portfolio is expected to be 100% ramped as
of the refinancing date.

Partners Group (UK) Management Ltd (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer. After the reinvestment
period, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit improved and credit risk
obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Refinancing Notes as well as the existing
notes which are not subject to refinancing is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par, recoveries and principal proceeds balance:
EUR400,000,000

Defaulted par: EUR0

Diversity Score: 34

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3025

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.20%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.1 years

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. Given the portfolio
constraints and the current sovereign ratings in Europe, such
exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio with exposures
to countries with local currency country risk ceiling rating of
Baa1 to Baa3 further limited to 5%. As a worst case scenario, a
maximum 5% of the pool would be domiciled in countries with A3
and a maximum of 5% of the pool would be domiciled in countries
with Baa3 local currency country ceiling each. The remainder of
the pool will be domiciled in countries which currently have a
local currency country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3. Given this
portfolio composition, the model was run with different target
par amounts depending on the target rating of each class as
further described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are
a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the
target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the
Refinancing Class A Notes, 0.50% for the Refinancing Class B
Notes, 0.38% for the Refinancing Class C Notes and 0% for
Refinancing Class D Notes as well as the not refinanced Class E
Notes and Class F Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing
Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on the Refinancing Notes as well as the existing
notes which are not subject to refinancing (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3025 to 3479)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3025 to 3933)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -3

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction
may be found in the related pre-sale report, published around the
Original Closing Date in June 2015 and available on Moodys.com.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Actions:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


INTECHBANK PJSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of PJSC IntechBank, appointed by
Bank of Russia Order No. OD-548, dated March 3, 2017, due to the
revocation of its banking license, revealed operations which bear
signs of transactions aimed at diverting assets through lending
to borrowers with dubious creditworthiness and not engaged in
real business activity, as well as through transfer of claims on
loans to legal entities, according to the press service of the
Central Bank of Russia.

The provisional administration also revealed operations to
replace the bank's assets (corporate loans and their equivalents,
investments in investment-grade securities, corporate
receivables) with claims to companies not engaged in real
business activity, overestimated real property and other
non-liquid assets.

According to the estimate by the provisional administration, the
assets of PJSC IntechBank do not exceed RUR10.9 billion, whereas
the bank's liabilities to its creditors amount to RUR25.7 billion
rubles.

On April 12, 2017, the Arbitration Court of the Republic of
Tatarstan recognised PJSC IntechBank as insolvent (bankrupt).
The State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was appointed as a
receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and owners of PJSC IntechBank
to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.


VLADPROMBANK LLC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
-------------------------------------------------------------
During the examination of financial standing of the credit
institution, the provisional administration appointed by Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-1141, dated April 28, 2017, from April 28,
2017, due to the revocation of the banking license of
Vladprombank LLC, revealed operations, conducted by the credit
institution's former management, bearing the evidence of
siphoning off of assets by, among other things, extending
intentionally bad loans to borrowers with dubious solvency and
corporate borrowers bearing the marks of shell companies.

The provisional administration estimates the value of the Bank
assets to total under RUR1.8 billion, versus RUR5.0 billion of
its liabilities to creditors.

On June 29, 2017, the Court of Arbitration of the Vladimir Region
ruled to recognize the Bank as insolvent (bankrupt) and initiate
bankruptcy proceedings.  The State Corporation Deposit Insurance
Agency was appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on the operations
performed by former management and owners of Vladprombank LLC
which bear the evidence of criminal offence to the Prosecutor
General's Office of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO POPULAR: EU Competition Regulators OK Santander Takeover
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that European Union competition
regulators are approving the landmark takeover of Spain's
troubled Banco Popular by Banco Santander.

The European Commission, which oversees competition issues, said
on Aug. 8 that investigators concluded "the transaction would not
raise competition concerns" in Europe's economic area, the AP
relates.

It said their combined market share would be limited, and that
strong competitors remain in all markets affected by the move,
the AP notes.

According to the AP, Banco Santander said on June 7 that it would
pay 1 euro to take over its rival in a deal that showcases
Europe's new system to rescue failing banks without burdening
taxpayers or markets.

The takeover was conducted in an auction sanctioned by European
authorities after Europe's main banking regulator, the European
Central Bank, said it believed Popular was "failing or likely to
fail", the AP relays.

Banco Popular Espanol SA is a Spain-based commercial bank.  The
Bank divides its business into four segments: Commercial Banking,
Corporate and Markets; Insurance Activity, and Asset Management.
The Bank's services and products include saving and current
accounts, fixed-term deposits, investment funds, commercial and
consumer loans, mortgages, cash management, financial assessment
and other banking operations aimed at individuals and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs).  The Bank is a parent company of Grupo
Banco Popular, a group which comprises a number of controlled
entities, such as Targobank SA, GAT FTGENCAT 2005 FTA, Inverlur
Aguilas I SL, Platja Amplaries SL, and Targoinmuebles SA, among
others.  In January 2014, the Company sold its entire 4.6% stake
in Inmobiliaria Colonial SA during a restructuring of the
property firm's capital.


HIPOCAT 10: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB+ (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has raised its credit ratings on Hipocat 10,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A2 and A3 notes. At the
same time, we have affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B,
C, and D notes.

S&P said "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the most recent transaction information that we have
received and the July 2017 investor report. Our analysis reflects
the application of our European residential loans criteria and
our current counterparty criteria (see "Methodology And
Assumptions: Assessing Pools Of European Residential Loans,"
published on Dec. 23, 2016, and "Counterparty Risk Framework
Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 25, 2013)."

The transaction features an interest deferral trigger for the
class B and C notes. If triggered, the interest payments are
subordinated below principal in the priority of payments. These
triggers are based on cumulative gross defaults in the
transaction. Both interest deferral terms have been triggered and
interest on the class B and C notes is subordinated to senior
principal payment. Given the insufficiency of available
resources, neither class of notes paid interest in a timely
manner.

As the class A2 and A3 notes have amortized since our previous
review, the credit enhancement available to them has increased.
At the same time, the credit enhancement available to the class B
and C notes has decreased due to the increase in defaults and the
fact that the reserve fund is fully depleted.

  Class      Available credit enhancement,
             excluding defaulted credits (%)

  A2         7.87
  A3         7.87
  B          (7.78)
  C          (22.58)

Hipocat 10 features a reserve fund, which can amortize to a
target amount. It has been used to provision for defaulted assets
in the past and is now fully depleted. The reserve fund was fully
funded at closing from the proceeds of the issuance of the class
D notes.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, excluding defaults,
are 1.87%, which is below our Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) index, although they have been above the index
in the past (see "Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2017," published
on June 1, 2017).

Mortgage credits in arrears for more than 18 months are
classified as defaulted in this transaction and, consequently,
artificially written off. S&P said, "In this transaction, the
outstanding balance of defaulted assets is significantly higher
than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that we rate, at about
19%, because severe delinquencies have rolled into defaults in
the past. Due to the lack of available resources, as of April
2017, the balance of defaulted collateral that the transaction
was not able to provision for in advance totaled EUR79.22
million. Prepayment levels remain low and we believe that the
transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the near
term."

About 72% of the collateral pool is concentrated in Catalonia,
which was the home region of the originator. Specifically, about
61% of the pool is in the province of Barcelona and 5% in Girona.
S&P said, "We have considered this high concentration limit in
our analysis. Since the pool exceeds both the threshold province
and region concentration limits, we have applied the higher
province adjustment.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, our credit analysis results show a decrease in the
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and a decrease in
the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for all rating levels.

"Based on recent information received from the trustee on the low
use of the payment holiday flexibility by borrowers on this pool
and our analysis of the performance of credits that used this
flexibility in the past once the payment holiday period had
elapsed, we have reassessed our view of the risks in relation to
payment holidays. We have concluded that the use of the payment
holiday flexibility feature in Hipocat transactions does not
imply a potential payment shock. At the same time, we have
reflected the recent performance data, in combination with
improved macroeconomic conditions, and more specifically the
decrease in the unemployment rate, by not projecting arrears in
addition to the existing arrears in the pool in our credit
analysis. The combination of these two variables has had a
positive effect on our credit analysis. In addition, the current
WAFF level reflects the benefit from the increased seasoning. The
WALS decrease factors in the decrease in the current loan-to-
value ratio due to the amortization of the pool, coupled with the
application of our revised market value decline assumptions. The
overall effect is a decrease in the required credit coverage for
each rating level."

  Rating level     WAFF     WALS       CC
                    (%)      (%)      (%)
  AAA             32.14    34.68    11.15
  AA              24.13    30.95     7.47
  A               19.49    24.05     4.69
  BBB             14.36    20.35     2.92
  BB               9.11    17.79     0.50
  B                7.49    15.51     1.16

  CC--Credit coverage.

S&P said, "Our cash flow analysis includes consideration of
credits that have the option to take a payment holiday (that is,
temporarily suspend periodic payments) in line with our European
residential credits criteria. We account for these by delaying a
proportion of scheduled interest and principal receipts. The
proportion is based on historical data on borrowers that have
exercised such an option.

"The collection account is held with Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA; BBB+/Positive/A-2) in the name of the
servicer, BBVA. As a consequence, the transaction is exposed to
commingling risk. However, since our ratings in this transaction
are at or below the rating on the servicer, we have not stressed
commingling loss in our cash flow analysis, in line with our
current counterparty criteria. Consequently, our ratings on the
notes are constrained by our long-term issuer credit rating on
BBVA.

"BBVA is the swap counterparty. The replacement language in the
swap agreement is in line with our current counterparty criteria.
The hedge agreement mitigates basis risk arising from the
different indexes used by the securitized assets and the notes,
based on a notional. Under this agreement, the swap counterparty
pays the coupon on the notes and includes an additional margin of
65 basis points. If the balance of credits taking a payment
holiday exceeds 35% of the outstanding collateral balance, the
swap notional (which is the performing balance up to 90 day in
arrears) will include the balance of credits in payment holiday.
The swap also pays the servicer fees in case of substitution.

"Our credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the class A2
and A3 notes now have sufficient credit enhancement to pass our
stresses at the 'BB+' rating level. We have therefore raised to
'BB+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' our ratings on the class A2 and A3
notes.

"The class B, C, and D notes continue to experience ongoing
interest shortfalls because of interest deferral trigger breaches
and lack of excess spread in the transaction. Our ratings in
Hipocat 10 address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
principal during the transaction's life (see "General Criteria:
Methodology: Timeliness Of Payments: Grace Periods, Guarantees,
And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published on Oct. 24, 2013). We
have therefore affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B, C,
and D notes.

"Our European residential loans criteria set the minimum
projected losses at 0.35% at the 'B' rating level. The projected
losses that we compare with these credit coverage floors include
the negative carry resulting from interest due on the rated
liabilities during the foreclosure period. Projected losses with
interest meet the minimum floor level at the 'B' rating level.

"In our opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential mortgage
and real estate market is not benign and we have therefore
increased our expected 'B' foreclosure frequency assumption to
3.33% from 2.00%, when we apply our European residential loans
criteria, to reflect this view (see "Outlook Assumptions For the
Spanish Residential Mortgage Market," published on June 24,
2016). We base these assumptions on our expectation of modest
economic growth, continuing high unemployment, and house prices
stabilization during 2017."

Hipocat 10 is a Spanish RMBS transaction that closed in July 2006
and securitizes first-ranking mortgage credits. Catalunya Banc,
which was formerly named Caixa Catalunya and is now part of BBVA,
originated the pool. The pool comprises credits secured over
owner-occupied properties, mainly in Catalonia.

RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
              To              From

  Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR1.526 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised

  A2          BB+ (sf)        B- (sf)
  A3          BB+ (sf)        B- (sf)

  Ratings Affirmed

  B           D (sf)
  C           D (sf)
  D           D (sf)


HIPOCAT 11: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on Three Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Hipocat 11,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A2, A3, B, C, and D
notes.

S&P said, "Today's affirmations follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the most recent transaction information that we have
received and the July 2017 investor report. Our analysis reflects
the application of our European residential loans criteria and
our current counterparty criteria (see "Methodology And
Assumptions: Assessing Pools Of European Residential Loans,"
published on Dec. 23, 2016, and "Counterparty Risk Framework
Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 25, 2013)."

The transaction features an interest deferral trigger for the
class B and C notes. If triggered, the interest payments are
subordinated below principal in the priority of payments. These
triggers are based on cumulative gross defaults balance and once
triggered they are irreversible. Both interest deferral terms
have been triggered, so interest on the class B and C notes is
subordinated to senior principal payment. Given the insufficiency
of available resources, both classes of notes have missed their
timely interest payment.

Available credit enhancement for all classes of notes is
negative, as the performing collateral balance is less than their
outstanding amounts. This is a deterioration compared with S&P's
previous review, in which the difference between nondefaulted
principal balance and the class A2 and A3 notes was lower, though
already negative at -4.59% (see "Various Rating Actions Taken In
Spanish RMBS Transaction Hipocat 11 Following Application Of
Updated Criteria," published on Nov. 18, 2014).

  Class        Available credit
         enhancement, excluding
          defaulted credits (%)
  A2                     (6.02)
  A3                     (6.02)
  B                     (21.40)
  C                     (40.03)

Hipocat 11 features a reserve fund, which was fully funded at
closing with the proceeds of the issuance of the class D notes
and which can amortize to a target amount. It is fully depleted
because it was used to provision for defaulted assets in the
past.

S&P said, "Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, excluding
defaults, at 1.99%, are below our Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) index, although they have been above the
index in the past (see "Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2017,"
published on June 1, 2017).

"Mortgage credits in arrears for more than 18 months are
classified as defaulted in this transaction, and, consequently,
artificially written off. The outstanding balance of credits in
default, at about 25%, is higher than in other Spanish RMBS
transactions that we rate as severe delinquencies rolled into
defaults in the past. Due to the lack of available resources, as
of July 2017 the balance of defaulted collateral that the
transaction was not able to provision for in advance totaled
EUR137.48 million. Prepayment levels remain low and we believe
that the transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the
near term.

"About 71% of the collateral pool is concentrated in Catalonia,
which is the originator's home region. Specifically, about 61%
and 5% of the pool is concentrated in the provinces of Barcelona
and Girona, respectively. We have considered this high
concentration limit in our analysis. Since the pool exceeds both
the threshold province and region concentration limits, we have
applied the higher province adjustment.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, our credit analysis results show a decrease in the
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and a decrease in
the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for all rating levels.

"Based on recent information received from the trustee on the low
use of the payment holiday flexibility by borrowers on this pool
and our analysis of the performance of credits that used this
flexibility in the past and once the payment holiday period had
elapsed, we have reassessed our view of the risks in relation to
payment holidays. We have concluded that the use of the payment
holiday flexibility feature in Hipocat transactions does not
imply a potential payment shock. At the same time, we have
reflected the recent performance data, in combination with
improved macroeconomic conditions, and more specifically the
decrease in the unemployment rate, by not projecting arrears in
addition to the existing arrears in the pool in our credit
analysis. The combination of these two variables has had a
positive effect on our credit analysis. In addition, the current
WAFF level reflects the benefit from the increased seasoning. The
decreased WALS factors in the decrease in the current loan-to-
value ratio, due to the amortization of the pool, coupled with
the application of our revised market value decline assumptions.
The overall effect is a decrease in the required credit coverage
for each rating level."

  Rating      WAFF     WALS      CC
  level        (%)      (%)     (%)
  AAA        36.12    37.53   13.56
  AA         27.42    34.12    9.36
  A          22.23    27.88    6.20
  BBB        16.35    24.47    4.00
  BB         10.37    22.07    2.29
  B           8.51    19.83    1.69

  CC--Credit coverage.

S&P said, "We have considered in our cash flow analysis the
credits with the payment holiday option, by delaying a proportion
of scheduled interest and principal receipts in line with our
European residential loans criteria.

"The collection account is held with Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA; BBB+/Positive/A-2) in the name of the
servicer, BBVA. Consequently, the transaction is exposed to
commingling risk. However, since our ratings in this transaction
are at or below the rating on the servicer, we have not stressed
commingling loss in our cash flow analysis in line with our
current counterparty criteria. Therefore, our ratings on the
notes are constrained by our long-term issuer credit rating on
BBVA.

"BBVA is the swap counterparty. The replacement language in the
swap agreement is in line with our current counterparty criteria.
The hedge agreement mitigates basis risk arising from the
different indexes used by the securitized assets and the notes,
based on a notional. Under this agreement, the swap counterparty
pays the coupon on the notes and includes an additional margin of
65 basis points. If the balance of credits taking a payment
holiday exceeds 16% of the outstanding collateral balance, the
swap notional (which is the performing balance up to 90 days in
arrears) will include the balance of credits in payment holiday.
The swap counterparty also pays the servicer fees in case of
substitution.

"The class A2 and A3 notes do not pass our cash flow stresses at
the 'B' rating level. Our cash flow analysis for these classes of
notes shows that we do not expect a default to occur in the next
12 months. In line with our European residential loans criteria,
and our criteria for assigning 'CCC' category ratings, given the
degree of financial stress, the negative level of credit
enhancement for the class A2 and A3 notes, and the collateral
performance, we consider that the class A2 and A3 notes are
dependent upon favorable economic conditions to pay note interest
and principal (see "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-',
And 'CC' Ratings," published on Oct. 1, 2012). We have therefore
affirmed our 'CCC (sf)' ratings on the class A2 and A3 notes.

"The class B, C, and D notes continue to experience ongoing
interest shortfalls because of interest deferral trigger breaches
and the lack of excess spread in the transaction. Our ratings in
Hipocat 11 address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
principal during the transaction's life. We have therefore
affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B, C, and D notes in
line with our criteria (see "Timeliness Of Payments: Grace
Periods, Guarantees, And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published
on Oct. 24, 2013).

"Our European residential loans criteria set the minimum
projected losses at 0.35% at the 'B' rating level. The projected
losses that we compare with these credit coverage floors include
the negative carry resulting from interest due on the rated
liabilities during the foreclosure period. Projected losses with
interest meet the minimum floor level at the 'B' rating level.

"In our opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential mortgage
and real estate market is not benign, and we have therefore
increased our expected 'B' foreclosure frequency assumption to
3.33% from 2.00%, when we apply our European residential loans
criteria, to reflect this view (see "Outlook Assumptions For the
Spanish Residential Mortgage Market," published on June 24,
2016). We base these assumptions on our expectation of modest
economic growth, continuing high unemployment, and house price
stabilization during 2017."

Hipocat 11 is a Spanish RMBS transaction that closed in March
2007 and securitizes first-ranking mortgage credits. Catalunya
Banc S.A. (formerly named Caixa Catalunya and now part of BBVA)
originated the pool, which comprises credits secured over owner-
occupied properties, mainly in Catalonia.

RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating

  Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR1.628 Billion Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes

  Rating Affirmed

  A2                CCC (sf)
  A3                CCC (sf)
  B                 D (sf)
  C                 D (sf)
  D                 D (sf)


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


CB GEFEST: NBU Declares Bank Insolvent
--------------------------------------
The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) on Aug. 2, 2017, declared
Public Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank Gefest insolvent.

"In accordance with Article 76 of the Law of Ukraine on banks and
banking, on August 1, 2017 the Board of the National Bank of
Ukraine adopted Decision No 490-D/BS on declaring Public Joint
Stock Company CB Gefest insolvent. PJSC CB Gefest failed to meet
the statutory minimum capital requirements set by the NBU
requiring the bank to increase its regulatory capital to at least
UAH 200 million by July 11, 2017," the central bank said.

"As of July 31, 2017, the regulatory capital of PJSC CB Gefest
was less than one third of the minimum required amount.

"In view of the above, pursuant to paragraph 2 of part 1 of
Article 76 of the Law of Ukraine On Banks and Banking, the Board
of the National Bank of Ukraine was obliged to declare this bank
insolvent."

CB GEFEST PJSC was established in late 2013. The NBU said that
given the economic crisis, the bank de facto was not actively
engaged in banking business as of the date of the decision to
declare the bank insolvent had no obligations to its customers.


* UKRAINE: UAH644MM Insolvent Banks Assets Sold Via ProZorro
------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrinform reports that insolvent banks' assets worth
UAH644 million have been sold via ProZorro.Sales system in
July 2017, according to a report posted on the Deposit Guarantee
Fund's website.

"We set several new own sales records over this month - almost
UAH668 million. This is the sum of sales per month, of which
UAH644 million are sales for the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Also,
the property worth UAH2.11 billion was sold via the system,"
Ukrinform quotes Oleksiy Sobolev, head of ProZorro.Sales
projects, as saying.

The Deposit Guarantee Fund said this is a record figure since the
beginning of the year. For comparison, the sum of assets sold at
auctions last month reached UAH432 million, Ukrinform relates.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ECO-RESOURCES FUND: Liquidation Not Matter for FSA
--------------------------------------------------
Adrian Darbyshire, writing for Isle Of Man Courier, reports that
he who pays the piper does not call the tune in liquidations.
The report discloses that was the conclusion of First Deemster
David Doyle as he gave a judgment in the case of the taxpayer-
funded winding up of the Eco-Resources Fund.

In a judgment that will be seen as a defeat for the Financial
Services Authority, he ruled that the conduct of a liquidation is
a matter for the liquidator and not the regulator, according to
Isle Of Man Courier.

The report notes that Gordon Wilson, of CW Consulting Ltd, has
been brought in by the FSA as adviser, then controller of Eco-
Resources which was set up to invest in bamboo plantations.

And then in March he was appointed provisional liquidator and
official receiver when the fund was ordered by the high court to
be wound up, unable to pay its debts of more than USD2 million,
the report relays.

The report notes that at the time, the Deemster said no rescue
package had been finalised and he could not allow the 'extremely
unsatisfactory position to drag on any longer'.

But a claimed creditor and former director of the fund's Eco-
Bamboo IoM subsidiary, John Bourbon, applied for the appointment
of a different liquidator, Mike Simpson of PwC, the report
discloses.

And now the Deemster has approved the application, in the
'interests of justice' saying he has concerns over Mr. Wilson's
'inappropriate Eco-baggage', the report relays.

He said: 'He who pays the piper does not call the tune in
liquidations, including public interest liquidations.

'I do not doubt the integrity and competence of Mr. Wilson as
liquidator. On balance, however, I have concluded it is better
both for Eco and in the public interest that Mr. Wilson should
not be appointed in view of his Eco "baggage",' the report
discloses.

The report notes that Mr. Bourbon, a former director of Eco's
manager the Premier Group, now itself in voluntary liquidation,
had argued that Mr. Wilson's involvement in Eco had led to a
deterioration of its position and the prospect of any meaningful
recovery for investors would be lost if he continued in position.

But both Mr. Wilson and the FSA had serious concerns about Mr.
Bourbon's plans for a refinancing rescue package, the report
relays.  Mr. Wilson initially declined to step aside and
categorically denied serious allegations made against him by the
Premier Group, the report notes.

The report discloses the FSA said both candidates were well-
respected professionals.

The report states Deemster Doyle said the FSA and Mr. Wilson had
shown little appetite for refinancing/restructuring, with the
regulator wanting a speedy liquidation to keep costs to the
taxpayer down.

The report adds that it may well be that any rescue package would
come to nothing, he accepted, but that was a matter for the
liquidator.  He added: 'There is no suggestion that Mr. Simpson
will simply be Mr. Bourbon's puppet.'


ESP STRATEGIES: Two Directors Face Disqualification
---------------------------------------------------
The Insolvency Service on Aug. 4 disclosed that Timothy Richard
Edmunds has been disqualified from acting as a director for five
years and Annette Edmunds has been disqualified for four years.

On July 17, 2017, the Secretary of State for Business Energy and
Industrial Strategy accepted disqualification undertakings from
Timothy Richard Edmunds and Annette Edmunds, with effect from
August 7, 2017.

Mr. and Mrs. Edmunds were directors of ESP Strategies Ltd, which
went into liquidation on November 25, 2015.

The investigation found that ESP Strategies Ltd had entered in to
a tax avoidance scheme involving the issue of shares totalling
GBP240,000 to directors which were only partly paid for.

Mr. and Mrs. Edmunds agreed to a number of transactions ending
with the surrender of the shares, which resulted in GBP230,400 of
uncalled share capital becoming unavailable.  The transactions
took place at a time when the directors knew that the company had
an outstanding debt to HMRC, the sole creditor in the
liquidation, with a claim of GBP133,245.

Commenting on the disqualification, Sue MacLeod, Chief
Investigator at the Insolvency Service, said: "If your business
engages in transactions in the run up to liquidation which are
detrimental to any of its creditors, the Insolvency Service may
investigate you, leading to your removal from the business
environment."


GELPACK INDUSTRIAL: Goes Into Administration
--------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Gelpack Industrial Limited and Gelpack
Excelsior Limited in Hereford had recently suffered "difficult"
trading conditions, administrators KPMG said.

The majority of staff have been sent home, but there had been no
redundancies, they said, according to BBC News.

The report discloses that KPMG said it was reviewing options,
including trading in the short term, whilst seeking a buyer.

It said it had retained a "skeleton staff" to help fulfil
outstanding orders, the report relays.

The report says KPMG partner and joint administrator Mark Orton
said: "Gelpack is a leading name within the packaging industry,
with customers including well-known names from across the food
and drink, pharmaceutical and bedding sectors.

"However, both companies have recently suffered difficult trading
conditions that have led to an additional funding requirement,
which has prompted them to enter into administration."

KPMG said it would encourage anybody who may be interested in
buying the businesses to contact the joint administrators as soon
as possible, the report adds.


GFI CONSULTANTS: Chapter 15 Case Summary
----------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Debtor: GFI Consultants Limited
                   c/o Sequor Law, P.A.
                   1001 Brickell Bay Drive
                   9th Floor
                   Miami, FL 33131

Type of Business: GFI Consultants was formed on 2010 by Junie
                  Conrad Omari Bowers ("Bowers") and Andrew
                  Nathaniel Skeene ("Skeene") as an investment
                  scheme involving the sale of teak plantation
                  plots in Belem, a city in northern Brazil. GFI
                 Consultants was just one of several Ponzi scheme
                  vehicles set up by Bowers and Skeene to defraud
                  investors around the world.  Currently, the
                  Serious Fraud Office, a specialist prosecuting
                  authority tackling complex fraud in the UK, is
                  investigating the Debtor, Bowers, Skeene and
                  related entities for fraud and other financial
                  crimes.

Foreign
Proceeding
in which
Appointment
of Foreign
Representative
Occurred:              High Court of Justice
                       Birmingham Chancery Div.,
                       Insolvency No. 6647 of 2013
                       United Kingdom

Chapter 15 Case No.: 17-20003

Chapter 15 Petition Date: August 7, 2017

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of Florida (Miami)

Judge: Hon. Jay A. Cristol

Foreign Representative: Stephen Richard Penn
                        Judicial Administrator
                        1st Floor, Block A
                        Loversall Court
                        Clayfields, Tickhill Road
                        Doncaster, DN4 8QG
                        England

Foreign
Representative's
Counsel:                Gregory S Grossman, Esq.
                        SEQUOR LAW, P.A.
                        1001 Brickell Bay Drive
                        9th Floor
                        Miami, FL 33131
                        Tel: (305) 372-8282
                        E-mail: ggrossman@sequorlaw.com

Estimated Assets: Not Indicated

Estimated Debts: Not Indicated

A full-text copy of the petition is available for free at:

          http://bankrupt.com/misc/flsb17-20003.pdf


GFI CONSULTANTS: Liquidator Seeks U.S. Recognition of UK Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
The liquidator appointed in the United Kingdom for GFI
Consultants Limited, an entity accused of running a Ponzi scheme,
has filed a Chapter 15 petition in Miami, Florida, in the United
States, to seek recognition of the company's liquidation
proceedings in the United Kingdom.

Stephen Richard Penn, the duly appointed judicial administrator
of GFI Consultants Limited, has filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court a
verified petition for an order granting recognition of the
Debtor's court-approved liquidation pending before the High Court
of Justice, Chancery Division, Birmingham District Registry (the
"UK Court") as Insolvency No. 6647 of 2013.

GFI Consultants was formed on 2010 by Junie Conrad Omari Bowers
("Bowers") and Andrew Nathaniel Skeene ("Skeene") as an
investment scheme involving the sale of teak plantation plots in
Belem, a city in northern Brazil.  GFI Consultants was just one
of several Ponzi scheme vehicles set up by Bowers and Skeene to
defraud investors around the world.  Currently, the Serious Fraud
Office, a specialist prosecuting authority tackling complex fraud
in the UK, is investigating the Debtor, Bowers, Skeene and
related entities for fraud and other financial crimes.

Bowers and Skeene operated Ponzi schemes throughout the world and
targeted predominantly UK pension holders and investors.

Bowers and Skeene filed for bankruptcy proceedings in England on
July 29, 2014. In their bankruptcy cases, Bowers and Skeene
disclosed unsecured debts totaling GBP 5.2 million and GBP 3.3
million respectively.  However, they both disclose minor assets,
worth GBP 100,000 and GBP 30,000, respectively, with which to
satisfy their creditor claims. Further, they each listed monthly
incomes of GBP 10,000 per month prior to the deductions for
monthly expenses.  Consequently, Bowers and Skeene were
discharged from bankruptcy on January 4, 2016.

                    Investigations of Business

During his investigations of the business and affairs of GFI
Consultants, the Liquidator uncovered that the Debtor received at
least GBP 27.4million from investors.  Of those investment funds,
at least GBP 13.6 million was transferred to personal accounts of
Bowers and Skeene, including GBP 1.47 million sent to bank
accounts believed to be controlled by Bowers and Skeene in Dubai.
Bowers and Skeene also directed approximately GBP 9 million to
other UK companies referred to as "Escrow Agents" for the alleged
purpose of repaying investors of other fraudulent schemes.

The Liquidator's investigations have also unveiled other
transactions involving the Debtor or assets of the Debtor as well
as payments made to individuals or companies in the United States
involving assets of the Debtor.

A hearing on the petition is scheduled for Aug. 23, 2017, at
10:30 a.m. at C. Clyde Atkins U.S. Courthouse, 301 N Miami Ave
Courtroom 7 (AJC), Miami, FL.

                   About GFI Consultants

GFI Consultants was formed on 2010 by Junie Conrad Omari Bowers
and Andrew Nathaniel Skeene as an investment scheme involving the
sale of teak plantation plots in Belem, a city in northern
Brazil.  GFI Consultants was just one of several Ponzi scheme
vehicles set up by Bowers and Skeene to defraud investors around
the world.

On Dec. 12, 2013, a petition was filed in the High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, Birmingham District Registry (the "UK
Court"), on behalf of GFI Consultants Limited, under Insolvency
No. 6647 of 2013 (the "UK Proceeding"). On March 3, 2014, the UK
Court ordered the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding of
the Debtor.  On March 13, 2014, Stephen Richard Penn was
appointed as liquidator of GFI Consultants.

Mr. Penn, as foreign representative, on Aug. 7, 2017, filed a
Chapter 15 petition for GFI Consultants (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case
No. 17-20003) to seek U.S. recognition of the UK proceedings.

The Hon. Jay A. Cristol is overseeing the Chapter 15 case.

Gregory S Grossman, Esq., Sequor Law, P.A., is U.S. counsel to
the foreign representative.


ICICI BANK: Moody's Lowers Sub. Rating to Ba1, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
and senior unsecured ratings of ICICI Bank UK Plc. (ICICI UK),
the UK subsidiary of ICICI Bank Limited, to Baa1 from A3. In
addition, the subordinate ratings have been downgraded to Ba1
from Baa3, the junior subordinate programme ratings to (P)Ba3
from (P)Ba2, and the adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) to
ba1 from baa3. The rating agency also downgraded the long-term
counterparty risk assessment (CR Assessment) to Baa1(cr) from
A3(cr) and affirmed the P-2 short-term deposit ratings and P-
2(cr) short-term CR Assessment. The BCA was affirmed at ba2. The
outlook was changed to stable from positive.

This action follows the downgrade of the baseline credit
assessment of ICICI Bank Limited to ba1 from baa3 on 24 July
2017. The outlook on ICICI Bank Limited was at the same time
changed to stable from positive.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Following the downgrade in the BCA of ICICI UK's Indian parent,
ICICI Bank Limited, to ba1 from baa3, Moody's has aligned the
adjusted BCA of ICICI UK with the BCA of ICICI Bank Limited.
Although the rating agency still expects a very high probability
of support to ICICI UK from its parent, the parent's BCA
downgrade reflect Moody's view that its capacity to provide
support has reduced, resulting in a downgrade of ICICI UK's
adjusted BCA to ba1 from baa3. However, Moody's still expects the
parent to provide support in case of need, driven by its strong
core profitability, very strong capital levels and unrealised
gains in its insurance subsidiary. The change to the parent's BCA
was driven by an increase in non-performing loans.

The affirmation of ICICI UK's ba2 BCA takes into account its (i)
weak asset quality driven by high borrower concentration in its
legacy loan book, somewhat mitigated by recent years' improved
underwriting processes aimed at increasing diversification; (ii)
weak and volatile profitability; and (iii) high reliance on more
confidence sensitive wholesale funding, as compared to more
stable retail deposits. The bank's strong capitalisation, good
liquidity buffers and diversified funding sources mitigate these
weaknesses.

The downgrade of ICICI UK's long-term ratings reflect the
downgrade of the adjusted BCAs and also takes into account (i)
Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, indicating
that ICICI UK deposits and senior unsecured debts will face
extremely low loss-given-failure; and (ii) Moody's assessment of
a low probability of government support.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

ICICI UK's BCA could be upgraded because of a material and
sustainable improvement in asset quality and profitability
metrics. An established track-record of maintaining a core retail
deposit base and minimization of the impact of one-off events on
its profitability would also contribute to this trend. Moreover,
an upgrade of the parents BCA could positively affect the
adjusted BCA and ratings of ICICI UK.

ICICI UK's deposit and senior debt ratings currently benefit from
a 3-notch uplift from Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure
analysis, the maximum rating uplift according to Moody's
methodology, so an increase in the amount of loss absorbing debt
or deposits, everything else being equal, will not necessarily
lead to an increase in these ratings.

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

ICICI UK's BCA could be downgraded because of: (i) pressure on
the banks liquidity position or high volatility in the deposit
base; (ii) increased reliance on short-term funding; or (iii) an
unexpected deterioration in asset quality in the corporate loan
book, considering that the largest exposures can significantly
erode its profitability and capital. A reduction in Moody's
assessment of potential parental support and/or a downgrade of
the parents BCA would also negatively affect the supported
ratings of ICICI UK. A negative change in ICICI UK's adjusted BCA
would likely affect all ratings.

ICICI UK's deposit and senior debt ratings could also be
downgraded because of a large redemption of maturing senior
and/or subordinated debt without their replacement.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: ICICI Bank UK Plc.

Downgrades:

-- LT Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Downgraded to
    Baa1 from A3, Outlook Changed To Stable From Positive

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Baa1
    from A3, Outlook Changed To Stable From Positive

-- Subordinate, Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3

-- Senior Unsecurd MTN Program, Downgraded to (P)Baa1 from (P)A3

-- Subordinate MTN Program, Downgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3

-- Junior Subordinate MTN Program, Downgraded to (P)Ba3 from
    (P)Ba2

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to ba1 from
    baa3

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to Baa1(cr) from
    A3(cr)

Affirmations:

-- ST Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed P-2

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed ba2

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-2(cr)

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Spirit Issuer plc's notes at 'BB+'.
The Outlook is Stable.

The ratings reflect the quality of the estate, with financial
performance having improved in recent years, and now stabilising
on a per pub basis. The debt structure is robust and benefits
from the standard whole business securitisation (WBS) legal and
structural features and a comprehensive covenant package. Fitch's
rating case lease-adjusted free cash flow debt service coverage
ratios (FCF DSCR) to legal final maturity at 1.4x compare well
with Spirit's closest peers Greene King, Marston's and M&B.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Regulation Changes Bring Challenges: Industry Profile - Midrange
Operating Environment: Weaker
The pub sector in the UK has a long history, but trading
performance for some assets has shown significant weakness in the
past. The sector is exposed to discretionary spending, strong
competition and other factors such as minimum wages, taxes and
utility costs.

In 2016, the statutory pub code introduced the market rent-only
option (MRO) in the tenanted/leased segment. MRO breaks the
traditional tied model that requires tenants to buy drinks from
the pub companies, usually in exchange for lower rent. Fitch
expects the further implementation of the national living wage to
further compress margins. Fitch also expects that the financially
pressed 18-35 age group may curtail UK pubs' revenues over the
medium term.

Barriers to Entry: Midrange
Fitch views licencing laws and regulations as moderately
stringent and managed pubs and tenanted pubs are capital-
intensive. Switching costs within the drinking-eating out market
are low, although there may be some positive brand and captive
market effects.

Sustainability: Midrange
Fitch expects the strong pub culture in the UK to persist, taking
a large portion of the eating-drinking-out market. The forecasts
for mild population growth in the UK are also credit positive.

Performance Per Pub Stabilising: Company Profile - Midrange
Financial Performance: Midrange
Over the past five years, the managed estate has achieved an
EBITDA per pub CAGR of 4.6%. In relation to the tenanted estate
both absolute and per pub performance has stabilised in recent
years, and has improved in 2016. Spirit has a low exposure to the
tenanted model, with total securitised EBITDA contribution from
the tenanted estate at 24%.

Company Operations: Midrange
Branded pubs represent a significant portion of total securitised
pubs. Spirit has limited pricing influence but it is a fairly
large operator within the pub sector. Its acquisition by Greene
King could support further extraction of economies of scale.
Operating leverage has been increasing over the last few years as
a result of a growing food offer, but the change in strategy is
viewed favourably given that the food-led approach has generally
led to revenue growth, although increased competition appears to
be pressuring more recent sales performance. Management has
demonstrated a good track record since the closing of the
securitisation, implementing sensible and effective strategies in
a timely manner (increasing food offer, brand development,
reducing tenanted model exposure). Key-man risk is also viewed as
relatively low.

Transparency: Midrange
The more transparent managed business (self-operated) represents
77% and 61% of the securitised group by EBITDA and estate,
respectively. Historically, management has demonstrated some
ability to adapt to industry changes with the extensive rollout
of branding and food led offers to mitigate the declining
performance of the tenanted model.

Dependence on Operator: Midrange
Operator replacement is not straightforward but is possible
within a reasonable period of time (several alternative operators
available). Centralised management of the managed and tenanted
estates and common supply contracts result in close operational
ties between both estates.

Asset Quality: Midrange
Fitch views the pubs as well-maintained following the completion
of a three-year GBP200 million investment programme in 2014, in
relation to the managed estate. Assets are also well-located
(significant portion in London and the south-east). However,
Spirit has a significant portion of managed pubs on leasehold,
with an annual lease expense of around GBP30 million. The
secondary market is fairly liquid (extensive disposal programmes
across the industry have been absorbed).

Standard WBS Structure: Debt Structure Class A - Stronger
Debt Profile: Midrange
The majority of principal (around 80%) is to be repaid via
scheduled amortisation, with the class A6 and A7 notes due to be
paid down via cash sweep under the Fitch rating case (although
they also benefit from back-ended scheduled amortisation).

Security Package: Stronger
The class A notes have comprehensive first ranking fixed and
floating charges over the issuer's assets and ultimately over all
of the operating assets.

Structural Features: Stronger
All standard whole business securitisation legal and structural
features are present, and the covenant package is comprehensive.
The financial covenant level is fairly high (with debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) at 1.4x) and the restricted payment
condition, calculated using synthetic (annuity-based) debt
service, is currently set at 1.45x DSCR, higher than industry
levels. The liquidity facility reduces in line with principal,
meaning it falls below the usual 18 months peak debt service
coverage (to around 15 months by 2020) and is not available for
the last two years of the transaction. This is credit-negative
but mitigated by debt then being fully repaid through cash sweep
under the Fitch rating case.

Financial Metrics - Performance Stabilising
Debt service increases gradually until 2028, meaning it is not
well-aligned with the industry risk profile, but it gradually
reduces from 2028 to 2036. As a result of the mismatch between
the scheduled amortisation profile of the class A6 and A7 notes
and the class A1 and (former) A3 swaps, under-hedging is set to
increase gradually up to 100% by 2033. However, floating-rate
risk is mitigated by the cash sweep as prepayments eliminate
under-hedging to a maximum of 10% in 2018 and in full by 2022
under the Fitch rating case.

In June 2017, Spirit prepaid the principal amount of the
outstanding A3 notes using disposal proceeds account cash
balances. The net effect had an immaterial impact on Fitch's FCF
DSCR forecast. The transaction is still exposed to slightly lower
coverage in the earlier years of the forecast horizon, and
potentially faces a minimum of 1.1x in 2028. However, the revised
Fitch rating case is broadly in line with the 2016 base case and
the rating is supported by Spirit's position in relation to
peers. Fitch views Greene King, Marston's and M&B as Spirit's
closest peers.

PEER GROUP

M&B comprises solely managed pubs, whereas the other two
transactions consist of managed and tenanted pubs, although the
share of tenanted pubs in Spirit is much lower than in the
others. Compared with Marston's 'BB+' rated class B notes,
Spirit's notes exhibit a similar FRC FCF DSCR of 1.4x, although
lower minimum Fitch rating case FCF DSCR (1.1x versus 1.3x) but
"Stronger" debt structure and lower Fitch rating case EBITDA
leverage (based on one-year forecast) (5.4x versus 6.9x).
Compared with M&B's class D1 notes (BBB-/Negative), Spirit's
notes also have similar average/medium Fitch rating case FCF DSCR
of 1.4x albeit with lower minimum FCF DSCR, in addition to a
"Stronger" debt structure and similar leverage (5.4x versus
5.2x).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action:
- Improvement in Fitch rating case FCF DSCR above 1.6x due to
   strong performance of the managed division, in addition to
   continued stabilisation in tenanted performance could trigger
   an upgrade.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action:
- Deterioration of the forecast FCF DSCR below 1.3x could put
   the ratings under pressure. This could be a result of a change
   in consumer behaviour e.g. as a result of an increase in drink
   driving alcohol limit in England & Wales or MRO/national
   living wage having a materially larger negative effect than
   currently expected.


STRATFORD TOWN FC: Council Agrees on Repayment Plan
---------------------------------------------------
Laura Kearns at Statford Observer reports that Stratford Town
Football Club can play on after a council loan repayment plan was
agreed.

In 2005, the club borrowed GBP250,000 from Stratford District
Council to pay towards moving to its current home of Knights Lane
in Tiddington. They were also given a GBP500,000 grant from the
council along with GBP1 million from the Football Foundation,
Statford Observer recalls.

According to the report, the club agreed to pay back GBP1,200 per
month. But since then have repaid just GBP10,000 to the council
due to factors including league promotion.

They now say they can only afford to pay back GBP200 each month,
which councillors last week agreed to, the report says. At that
rate it will take 100 years to pay off the loan, but the
repayment plan will be reviewed in 12 months.

The alternative option was for the club to pay the original
agreed monthly amount, which councillors said would lead to
insolvency, the report says.

At a meeting with the council the club explained expenses had
increased and it was 'struggling to remain viable', with the club
only surviving due to sponsorship money and the help of dedicated
volunteers, Statford Observer relates.

The report says club bosses also repeated pleas which they had
made in 2011 calling for the loan to be written off.

"There is no question that the football club is an extremely
valuable community facility and we are delighted that a way
forward has been found that fulfils the requirement for loan
repayments that the club can afford," the report quotes Council
finance spokeswoman Coun Lynda Organ as saying.


TVCATCHUP LIMITED: High Court Bans Director for 9 Years
-------------------------------------------------------
Bruce Roy Pilley, a director of TVCatchup Limited, was
disqualified by the High Court from managing or controlling a
limited company until Aug. 9, 2026.

The disqualification order was made by Chief Registrar Baister on
July 19, 2017.

TVCatchup Limited (TVC) was a television programming and
broadcasting business that went into creditors voluntary
liquidation on May 8, 2015 following Administration, owing
GBP1,975,128 to creditors including GBP523,396 in respect of
liabilities due to a loan provider.

On 14 March 2014, HMRC presented a petition to wind up the
company to the High Court. On April 3, 2014, Mr. Pilley discussed
the Winding up Petition with HMRC by telephone on three separate
occasions. Despite the presentation of the winding up petition
and Mr. Pilley's knowledge of the petition being presented, on
April 4, 2014 he caused TVC to enter into a joint loan facility
agreement.

According to the terms and conditions of the agreement, Mr.
Pilley was obliged to disclose the existence of the winding up
petition to the loan provider. Mr. Pilley did not disclose the
petition and TVC subsequently drew down GBP523,396, in breach of
the terms and conditions of the agreement.

On May 29, 2014, the loan provider became aware of the existence
of the winding-up petition and on June 4, 2014, appointed
administrators.

Aldona O'Hara, Chief Investigator of Insolvent Investigations
Midlands & West at the Insolvency Service, said:

"The Insolvency Service will rigorously pursue company directors
who deliberately breach the trust of those providing financial
assistance."

"Fair treatment of customers and creditors is essential for
business confidence which is, in turn, essential for economic
growth.

"This disqualification is a reminder to others tempted to do the
same that the Insolvency Service will rigorously pursue
enforcement action to seek and remove from them the privilege of
trading with limited liability to protect the public for a
lengthy period."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
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Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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